

**THE  
FRIENDS**
**DAY TWO: CYPRUS, A GRAVE CRISIS THAT DEMANDED A GRAVE SOLUTION**

# Why did Makarios sign?

## Sex secret the spy chiefs knew — and were willing to use

IT had been a long night spent entirely alone. Even the comforts of a Claridge's suite, where nothing would be too much trouble for the staff to provide, failed to ease the anxiety that burdened the bearded, imperious figure of Archbishop Makarios.

He might have prayed some of the time. One would expect that of the charismatic, American-educated leader of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. God would surely help this man, born Michael Mouscos, decide whether to approve or to torpedo the settlement reached by opposing Greek and Turkish governments over the blood-spattered Mediterranean island.

But there was one other power leaning on him with what one might call transcending influence — The Friends, the British Secret Intelligence Service. Their file on the holy man bulged with information that dare not reach the people he had led spiritually and politically for nine years, since 1950, if they were not to replace their reverence and admiration with scorn and even hatred.

In his private life Archbishop Makarios was a homosexual. That alone made public was enough to ruin him. But he was a homosexual with particularly distasteful proclivities that frequently involved children.

The SIS had not come by this information by chance, nor were they squeamish about using it if necessary to bring the bloody Cyprus emergency to an end.

Taps on Makarios's private telephone and the buying in of photographic evidence from contacts in fact made up only half of what the joint MI5-SIS scheme had code-named Operation Sunshine.

The other half of the operation was to trace the Archbishop's military partner in their furious 'Enosis' — Union with Greece — campaign. Colonel George Grivas, and see justice done.

**T**HE men who devised the operation were (Sir) John Prendergast, a tough Irishman who had masterminded the suppression of the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya and was now brought over in the new co-ordinating post of Chief of Intelligence, and Philip Kirby Green (known to all as 'KG'), one of Britain's most remarkable and seasoned secret warriors.

KG had been an officer in the Royal and Merchant navies and spent 10 years in the Metropolitan Police before joining MI5 in 1942. Prendergast and KG were a formidable team and were supported by MI5's director of E Branch (overseas section) who sent Philip Ray to Nicosia to organise local intelligence.

In anticipation of finding the elusive Grivas, SIS heavy (Sir) Stephen Hastings was transferred to Cyprus from the Paris station — where he had diplomatic cover — to be, it was explained, 'in at the kill'.

by **RUPERT  
ALLASON  
AND  
GEOFFREY  
LEVY**

Old Etonian Hastings, who was knighted in 1983 after 23 years as Conservative MP for Mid-Bedfordshire and is now, at 66, chairman of the British Field Sports Society, had a matchless reputation.

He had been decorated with the Military Cross when serving with the SAS in 1944 and joined the SIS in 1948, remaining with them until he left to become an MP in 1960.

He had been in Helsinki before being moved to Paris in 1953. An experienced case officer, he now ran an agent recruited from inside Makarios's immediate entourage.

He was never to be in at the Grivas kill, however, because of the intervention of Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd. He stopped it because he believed a Grivas sentenced to death would take on the role of martyr. So they were left to exploit the damning item of intelligence gathered during Operation Sunshine — Makarios's bizarre homosexuality. Meanwhile, against all the odds, the politicians began to make progress.


Secret negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had opened late in 1958 at the United Nations and continued into February the following year at Zurich. An agreement was in their grasp.

By the time Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had called all the interested parties together for a grand signing ceremony at London's Lancaster House, the end of the Cyprus emergency, which at its peak had 28,000 British servicemen swarming over the island, was just a signature away.

That signature was Archbishop Makarios's. Suddenly, unexpectedly and with a flourish of grave drama, he said 'No'.

The deal did not, after all, realise the dream of Enosis, a Cyprus politically unified with Greece. It gave the island, instead, independence with a guaranteed role for the Turkish minority in the political framework.

But no Enosis. Britain would

**THE CYPRUS FILE**
**THE ARCHBISHOP, THE TERRORISTS, THE BRITISH AGENTS**


Holy man Makarios: Spiritually-spent leader of Cyprus whose bizarre homosexuality allowed The Friends to 'lean' on him



Dreaming of Enosis: A group of Cypriot terrorists including Col. Grivas (third from right) in their fight for union with Greece



Out to find Grivas: Under Operation Sunshine, Stephen Hastings (above left) and John Prendergast were to be 'in at the kill'. Hastings, an experienced case officer, was transferred from Paris to Cyprus where he ran an agent



inside Archbishop Makarios's entourage. And Prendergast, who had masterminded the suppression of the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya, was brought over as chief of intelligence to co-ordinate the operation

retain sovereignty over two of the principal bases on the island and pay rent for the others.

It was brinkmanship on an astonishing scale to end the bloodshed and it worked for everyone — except the Archbishop.

The frustration and anger at Lancaster House was almost tangible. Both Greek and Turkish delegations protested that Makarios had been party to every stage of the agreed compromise.

But he would not budge. It was not Enosis. He proposed certain 'modifications'.

Reluctantly Selwyn Lloyd agreed to a 24-hour extension to allow Makarios to reconsider so, as the holy man solemnly returned to Claridge's alone, The Friends played the homosexual file card and left the

Archbishop to consider all the options, and the implications, for Cyprus as a whole and for himself in particular.

**S**EVERAL words can be used to describe this particular SIS approach to an awkward problem. Persuasion is one, blackmail another. The phrase Dirty Tricks would be the current parlance but it must be argued that grave crises sometimes require grave solutions. That night everyone involved was turning over the recent bitter years in Cyprus, not just the Archbishop.

The island had been under British control since 1878 when Disraeli acquired it from the Turkish Otto-

man Empire for Queen Victoria. During the First World War the island was offered to Greece in return for a declaration of war against the Kaiser, but King Constantine backed the wrong horse.

In 1925 Cyprus became a Crown Colony, and Greek Cypriot support for Enosis was growing. And in the high, hot July of 1952, in Athens, the first secret meeting took place between Archbishop Makarios and a fiery young Greek army colonel, George Grivas, both with Cypriot backgrounds.

An era of bombings and arms caches began, of killings and death sentences carried out by hanging.

The British Government's formal withdrawal from Egypt in July, 1954, gave Cyprus a strategic importance it had never enjoyed before, even though it boasted only a limited

number of airfields and had no deep-water harbour.

From the intelligence point of view, Cyprus had been designated the new home for SIS's regional base, then led by George Young, who had become Controller Middle East in 1951 after John Teague, a legendary British agent who had operated inside the Soviet Union under commercial cover for many years.

Young's busy empire originally took in the SIS stations at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Jeddah, Tehran, Basra, Damascus, Cairo and Port Said. Under normal circumstances the days should have been fairly routine, but suddenly operations were put virtually on a war footing.

An early intelligence success was the interception of a caïque, the

Ayios Georghios, by HMS Comet. Ten thousand sticks of dynamite were confiscated.

Even without the delivery EOKA, the Enosis terrorist organisation led by Grivas, set off a chain of 16 explosions across the island a few weeks later. New regulations were enforced which included a mandatory death penalty for possessing firearms, life sentences for sabotage, collective fines on whole towns and a ban on strikes.

An information fund of £150,000 was set up to encourage informers and Grivas went underground in mountainside hide-outs, entrusting his diary to a supporter called Pascalis — who sold it to the authorities.

This remarkable document had been kept by Grivas in case he should ever fall out with Makarios. It gave a detailed account of how they both had led the EOKA campaign of assassination and terror.

As a result, one afternoon when Makarios arrived at Nicosia airport to fly for consultations with Constantine Karamanlis, the new Prime Minister of Greece, his party was guided to an RAF transport aircraft and once aboard he was served with a deportation order.

He was flown to Mombassa in Kenya, transferred to a Royal Navy frigate and deposited in exile on Mahe, the largest of the remote Seychelles islands in the Indian Ocean.

The Cabinet decided to release Makarios from his detention after Anthony Eden's post-Suez resignation as Prime Minister in 1957, at which time killings had escalated alarmingly — 115 Greeks and 81 Britons.

**B**Y now the Turkish Government, interpreting the release of Makarios to negotiate and his order to Grivas to cease operations as the first steps in a sell-out to the Greeks, began to arm VOLKAN, the Turkish-Cypriot counter terrorist organisation.

Grivas, meanwhile, was murdering many Left-wingers and trade unionists whom he considered it important to eliminate before the anticipated power struggle that would follow a British withdrawal took place.

The British response was a re-organisation of security, the arrival of Prendergast, of KG, of Stephen Hastings long before he was to become a pillar of the Conservative Establishment ... and Operation Sunshine.

Now the black-robed Archbishop was alone in Claridge's. Politically isolated, morally deflated, spiritually spent. He could have consulted Grivas at any time that night, indeed he was expected to do so. But he did not.

Whether it was prayer that made up his mind or those people known sardonically among colleagues as The Friends, one can not be sure.

But he signed.

*\*Adapted from The Friends, British Secret Intelligence Operations In The Postwar Era, by Nigel West, to be published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson on June 23 at £12.95.*

**TOMORROW: THE UNKNOWN VICAR WHO CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY**