

9-10 Σεπτεμβρίου, 1967
Νίκος Πίνος
Μολα του Δεσποϊστανίου

10 Σεπτεμβρίου 1967

Οι αναφορές επί της ένταξης του ΝΑΤΟ
~~στην Ελλάδα~~ και της συνθήκης
της Ουάσιγκτον για την αμερικανική βοήθεια
παραμένουν οι αναφορές
υπό τον αριθμό 10ης Σεπτ. 1967

Βιβλιοθήκη Πανεπιστημίου Κύπρου-Αρχειο Νίκου Πινού

VAN, COUFOUDAKIS: U.S. Foreign Policy
and the Cyprus Question - An Interpretation.

Responses to the Renewed Conflict on Cyprus

The rejection by the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots of Makarios' "Thirteen Points"⁴ was followed by fighting in Nicosia on December 21, 1963. As the hostilities spread over Cyprus, the immediate concern of the United States was to contain the fighting. The "grave anxiety" expressed by President Johnson in his identical letters of December 26, 1963, to Makarios and Kutchuk, appeals by the Greek, Turkish, and British governments, and the limited peacekeeping effort undertaken by British troops at the request of the Cypriot government, had not restored peace on the island. Moreover, rumoured threats of an impending unilateral Turkish intervention and the abortive appeal by the Cypriot government to the United Nations Security Council on December 28, 1963, clearly gave the dispute an international dimension. But the United States declined to initiate any new policies and anxiously waited for the British initiatives that culminated in the calling of the London Conference on January 15, 1964.

The Conference was attended by the three guarantor powers and the two Cypriot communities, but it soon became apparent that the British mediation effort was stillborn. The Greek Cypriots would not return to the 1959 status quo, for they were determined to achieve the objective of "unfettered independence." Duncan Sandys⁵ thus proposed to broaden the British peacekeeping force on the island by the participation of other NATO countries. The United States proved receptive to the British proposal and moved quickly to gain the endorsement of Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish preparations for a military intervention on Cyprus gave great urgency to this proposal. General Lemnitzer, the NATO Commander, travelled to Greece and Turkey at the request of Lyndon B. Johnson on January 28, 1964. His mission postponed the impending Turkish action and set the stage for the unveiling of the NATO plan for Cyprus. As Philip Windsor clearly shows,⁶ this plan was in reality an Anglo-American creation. By providing for both a NATO peacekeeping force and a mediator, the sponsors expected to help stabilise the situation on the island and seek a solution that would safeguard Western interests as well as those of Turkey.

The Anglo-American NATO plan for Cyprus failed, much like the London Conference, despite the acceptance of the plan by the guarantor powers and the heavy pressure applied on Makarios by George W. Ball in his February 12, 1964, mission. The plan did not fail because of Makarios' unwillingness to accept an international peacekeeping force, but because of the American insistence to keep the peacekeeping and peacemaking effort under the control of an organisation that Makarios felt would place the interests of Turkey and the alliance above those of the Greek Cypriots. The plan was also rejected by France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Makarios' opposition to the NATO plan was further enhanced by Nikita Khrushchev's warning to the NATO states of February 7, 1964, not to intervene in Cyprus. Moreover, Makarios' appeal to the U.S.S.R.

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for help during the Turkish invasion scare of January 29, 1964, and his ties with the non-aligned states and with AKEL on Cyprus, enhanced the fears of American policy makers. Thus, the image of Cyprus as the "Mediterranean Cuba"⁷ gained currency in the United States in the Spring of 1964.

Meanwhile, by mid-February 1964, Cyprus and Britain had brought the Cyprus Question to the Security Council. While the United States supported the Security Council's Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964,⁸ it also took several diplomatic initiatives intended to forestall new Turkish invasion threats⁹ and bring Greece and Turkey to an agreement over Cyprus. Although the former objective was achieved, the latter remained elusive. Even the President's personal diplomacy during his talks with Prime Ministers Inonu and Papandreou, on June 22 and 24 respectively, failed to produce any concrete results. Johnson's initiatives actually increased the Greek suspicions about the American intentions on Cyprus¹⁰ and did not overcome Turkey's anger in the aftermath of his letter of June 5. The failure of these diplomatic initiatives and the American fears over Cyprus led to the genesis of the Acheson plan.

Following the visits of the two Prime Ministers in Washington, George W. Ball convinced United Nations Secretary-General U Thant to dispatch the Cyprus mediator Sakari Tuomioja to Geneva. There, Tuomioja would offer his good offices to the negotiators of Greece and Turkey. No Cypriots would be invited to this meeting. The United States in turn would make Acheson available "in the wings" to assist in the negotiation process.

The next task for Ball became to sell this proposal to the reluctant Greeks. This was finally achieved by Johnson's letter of July 2, 1964, which warned Greece that the United States would stand aside if Turkey intervened on Cyprus, thus causing a war that Greece was bound to lose according to American estimates. Papandreou's reluctant acceptance was also motivated by the mounting tension on Cyprus and the increased interest in Cyprus shown by the U.S.S.R.

The Acheson Plan

Discussions began in Geneva on July 4, 1964, in the absence of the Cypriots. The so-called Acheson plan for Cyprus¹¹ was the American proposal for the resolution of this protracted dispute. This plan proposed to safeguard American interests in the dispute, provided for the *enosis* desired for so long by Greece, and safeguarded Turkish political and strategic interests.

On June 5, 1964, President Johnson, in his ultimatum to Inonu, noted that:

. . . the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting an attempt by the Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution that is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. . . .

Yet, not only what amounted to the partition of Cyprus was contemplated under the Acheson plan, but its ultimate effect would have been the end of the independent Republic established by the 1959 Agreements.

One is struck by the bluntness of the American position as defined on July 2, 1964, by Talbot and George W. Ball for Acheson. Cyprus, as an independent state, was seen as a threat to United States interests because

- (a) of a potential Turkish intervention and thus an unavoidable Greco-Turkish war; (b) it had weakened the ties of Greece and Turkey to the United States; (c) it had strengthened the position of AKEL and the U.S.S.R. on Cyprus; (d) it had created a serious problem to the UN; and (e) it had undermined NATO.

For these reasons and in order to remove and minimise these threats, they proposed that the settlement of the Cyprus Question must bring to an end Cypriot sovereignty, a plan to be best achieved through *enosis* with:

- (1) territorial compensation by Greece to Turkey; (2) Turkish military presence and bases on Cyprus; (3) resettlement and repatriation to Turkish Cypriots that desire to do so; and (4) pledges by Greece to apply the Lausanne Treaty minority provisions to the Turkish Cypriots, to disarm all irregulars, to eliminate AKEL's influence, and to neutralise Makarios' political action capability.

To these proposals Acheson added provisions for increased autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot community.¹²

Acheson's plan was rejected by Cyprus. Consequently, Greece also rejected the Acheson plan on August 22, 1964. Once more Makarios was able to influence Athens which, in the course of the negotiations with Acheson, had accepted in principle most of Acheson's ideas.

Some additional points must also be analysed here. One is the manner of the implementation of the Acheson plan. Acheson recognised that his plan could potentially create political problems for Papandreou. This is why in his letter of August 20, 1964, he proposed to Papandreou that no formal agreements be signed between Greece and Turkey requiring Greek parliamentary and cabinet approval. Instead, the sovereignty of Cyprus would be terminated by a unilateral declaration of *enosis* by Greece. To ensure that the prearranged strategic concessions to Turkey would be made, a secret NATO protocol would be drawn up in advance. This protocol would provide for a Greek request to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO that he determine on the grounds of strategic necessity the extent of the bases to be leased to Turkey.

The plan was significant in that it also carried the Greek pledge to "eliminate AKEL influence." That was not only a reflection of the "Cuba complex" that affected Washington at the time, but also of the fact that Washington trusted the Greek government to deal firmly with Communism in Cyprus, much as it had done on the Greek mainland since the end of the Civil War. And finally, because Makarios was

seen as the chief threat to American interests in the area, the plan called for "neutralizing" his "political action capacity." As it will be shown, this has remained a constant in American policy toward Cyprus even after the Acheson plan was aborted by Cyprus.

Although the overt scheme for neutralisation provided for in the plan was the end of Cypriot sovereignty and the implementation of Greco-Turkish-NATO control of Cyprus, Washington had also worked covertly to achieve its objectives. One of the little known facts of the July-August, 1964, period was that while Acheson attempted to gain Athens' approval of his plan, George W. Ball attempted to capitalise on the rift between Makarios and Grivas. The latter had secretly returned to Cyprus under Greek auspices in June, 1964, to take charge of the Cypriot Armed Forces and provide a Conservative countervailing force to Makarios. Ball, in secret meetings with Grivas, gained his endorsement of a plan for union of Cyprus to Greece, with bases being turned over to Turkey and eventually to NATO. Makarios, the chief obstacle to such designs, would also be ousted.¹³ This agreement did not deviate from the general objectives of the Acheson plan.

By the end of August, 1964, the American diplomatic initiatives were successful in averting a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus, but in the process they had succeeded to alienate and complicate the relationship of the United States with both Greece and Turkey. As for Cyprus, it had survived only because of the steadfastness and the political realism of its leadership. Thus, American policy makers have been haunted by the fact that Cyprus has capitalised on the changing political balance at the United Nations and the power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to frustrate their policies.

The United States and the United Nations

The United Nations Security Council had briefly discussed the Cyprus Question on December 28, 1963, soon after the outbreak of the hostilities in Cyprus. Representatives of the Secretary-General were also present on Cyprus since January, 1964. But the organisation did not actively get involved in the post-colonial phase of the problem until February 15, 1964, when Britain, followed by Cyprus, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the rapidly deteriorating situation in and around Cyprus.

It has been noted that the United States had definitely shown preference for either direct diplomatic initiatives, or limited internationalisation in NATO for handling the Cyprus Question. In the tradition of United States Cold War diplomacy, such a response to the Cyprus Question was consistent with the American position on disputes arising within the Western family. But under the urgency of the situation in Cyprus, the Security Council became the only place where a practical and tolerable response to the immediate problem could be devised. In the discussion that opened on February 18, 1964, in the Security Council the United States and Britain endorsed the idea of an international force under

the control of the Security Council. Yet by supporting the adoption of Security Council Resolution 186, which provided both for an international peacekeeping force and the appointment of a mediator, both states tacitly acknowledged that a negotiated settlement had to be found to replace the 1959 Agreements.

The United Nations presence on Cyprus served American and NATO interests in a variety of ways. UNFICYP up to the summer of 1974 had assisted in the reduction in the level of intercommunal violence. By contributing to the pacific perpetuation of the Cyprus dispute, it created conditions conducive to negotiations through the mediator and the intercommunal talks. Of course, UNFICYP did not have the capability or the authority to cope with the increased levels of armaments of the two communities, the conflict within the Greek community, the infiltration of military personnel by all sides, or to stop the Turkish bombing raids of 1964 and successive Turkish invasion threats. But, its presence made such actions more difficult and harder to justify.

Thus, despite the fact that the internationalisation of the Cyprus Question legalised the Russian concern over Cyprus and strengthened the diplomatic position of Makarios, the practical objectives served by the United Nations presence have met with American approval and considerable American and NATO material support.¹⁴

But the offer of material support has neither precluded independent American diplomatic initiatives that ultimately undermined United Nations efforts, nor has it provided the United Nations mediators and other representatives of the Secretary-General with the moral and political support that would increase their leverage on parties to the dispute. This apparent contradiction in the American position toward the United Nations can be explained first by taking into account that the appeals to the United Nations came at a time when other more preferable alternatives had failed. And second, the United Nations, by contributing to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute, provided the United States with the opportunity to seek new solutions without the pressures of the period of January–February, 1964. Further, if the mediation objectives of the United Nations and the United States could be made to coincide, or if the organisation provided the framework for American mediation efforts, this would add to the legitimacy of the American initiatives.

The divergence in the peacemaking objectives of the United States and the United Nations became apparent twice in 1965. The first time was in the Spring of 1965 when the United Nations mediator Galo Plaza Lasso issued his report,¹⁵ which fundamentally conflicted with the aims the United States had followed throughout 1965. The mediator recognised Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state and stressed that a viable and mutually agreed political settlement to the problem must be sought between the two Cypriot communities, and ought to be respected by the other interested parties. *Enosis*, partition, and the Turkish concept of a federal state were found to be impractical on political, economic and

social reasons. Plaza, therefore, upheld the concept of an independent sovereign state based on a fuller application of majority rule, and respect for minority rights.

The Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government flatly rejected this report, while Greece and Cyprus accepted it. As a result, Galo Plaza Lasso resigned as United Nations mediator early in December, 1965. The United States, for obvious reasons, did not oppose this resignation nor did she, in subsequent years, exert any serious effort toward the appointment of another full-time mediator. Thus, although the United Nations mediation effort has continued since the resignation of Plaza, it has been undermined by the fact that United Nations personnel has served only on an *ad hoc* basis, or in a limited capacity as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Also, lacking superpower support such representatives have had to rely increasingly on their own personal prestige, while at crucial times, such as during the 1967 crisis over Cyprus, they were displaced and their policies were undermined by the parallel mediation efforts of American and NATO representatives.

For the second time in 1965, the United Nations clearly came into conflict with American objectives on Cyprus, when on December 18, the General Assembly, acting on the request of the Cypriot government, adopted resolution 2077 (xx). The action in the General Assembly was part of the broader diplomatic effort by the Cypriot government to utilise the United Nations to protect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This resolution in its substantive part stated that Cyprus,

“ . . . as an equal member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference . . . (and calls upon all states) . . . in conformity with their obligations under the Charter . . . to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention directed against it. . . .”

Of the five negative votes cast against this resolution, one was by the United States, while three by CENTO members, *i.e.*, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The American vote on this resolution was clearly a continuation of the attitude expressed in the Acheson plan toward the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. It was also intended to satisfy Turkish objectives over Cyprus.

Greece as a Promoter of American Interests in Cyprus

The politics of the colonial phase of the Cyprus Question undermined not only the pro-Western commitments of Greece, but also the political system that was so carefully constructed under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine in Greece. The post-colonial phase of the Cyprus Question troubled even further the Greek political system as the Cyprus

crisis of November, 1963, came at a time of political transition in Greece.

The Cypriot leaders had always been able to influence Greek politics by appealing to the nationalism of the Greek public. Moreover, by operating in the international system as an independent actor, Cyprus received considerable diplomatic support from numerous states.¹⁶ Thus, if other states supported the cause of Cyprus, any elected Greek government would be compelled to offer political and material support to the Greek Cypriots, especially in the face of Turkish invasion threats. Yet Athens, from the early days of the *Magali Idea*,¹⁷ considered itself as the *ethnikon kentron* (national centre) of Hellenism and thus the chief source of political direction to the "unredeemed areas" of Greece. This had frequently caused friction between Athens and Makarios during the colonial phase of the Cyprus Question. The friction inevitably increased during the post-colonial phase of the problem as the independent Cypriot government frequently adopted tactics and objectives divergent from those of Athens, and realistically gave up the goal of *enosis*.

Thus, since the Spring of 1964, Greek policy makers found themselves in a peculiar predicament. There was considerable political consensus in Greece in support of the Cypriot revisionist aims and on utilising the United Nations as an instrument of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Yet Greece would not risk a war with Turkey because of Makarios' independent actions.¹⁸ Further, even under George Papandreou, Greece was conscious of the importance of NATO and of the strains that the Cyprus Question created for the alliance. Finally, Greece was concerned about the diplomatic independence and pro-neutralist outlook of Makarios. Even if only for practical reasons Makarios accepted the support of AKEL at home, and the material and moral support of the U.S.S.R., could he remain independent of them in the long run? This is why Papandreou infiltrated Greek Army units to Cyprus, and sent Grivas to the island to organise and command the Cypriot National Guard and unify all irregular Greek Cypriot forces. Both decisions were intended to increase the defensive capability of Cyprus. Yet both were also intended to introduce a new Conservative countervailing influence in Cyprus to that of Makarios. This was evident to Makarios in 1964, but the impositions of the Cyprus problem at the time required acceptance of the Greek aid, even at the cost of having to face some controls from Athens.

Greece had often been looked upon as an obstacle to the promotion of American objectives in Cyprus.¹⁹ American policy makers, however, were aware of the Greek desires and the fears emanating from the dispute. Thus, they were able to exploit the political conditions existing in Greece since 1963 and the indirect coincidence in Greek and American objectives in Cyprus to further promote their policies. American officials warned Greece that

- (a) in a Greco-Turkish war, Greece would be the loser given the numerical and military inferiority of her armed forces; (b) the

United States would not indefinitely stand in the way of a Turkish intervention on the island; (c) the anticommunist feelings of Greece and the United States, as well as those of NATO, were best served by controlling if not also eliminating Makarios; and (d) only through an Acheson-type solution would the nationalist aspirations of Greece ever be realised.

This indirect coincidence of Greek and American objectives over Cyprus was temporarily endangered because of internal developments in Greece during 1965. The rise of Andreas Papandreu to the leadership of the governing Centre Union Party challenged not only the domestic power balance, but also the external outlook and commitments of the country. As we now know,²⁰ the Cyprus Question was an important impetus to the American sponsored and supported ousting of Papandreu in the summer of 1965. The minority Conservative cabinets that succeeded Papandreu until the military takeover of April 21, 1967, renewed the pressure against Makarios. The Cypriot President in self-defence began exposing the dimensions of the NATO and the Acheson plans, as well as the Greek attitudes toward these proposals. Thus, the rift between Athens and Grivas on the one hand, and Makarios on the other, threatened the Greco-American objective.

The various Greek Conservative minority cabinets, relying primarily on American support for their survival, also embarked on secret talks with Turkey over the future of Cyprus. This had been a major objective of the Johnson Administration that Papandreu had not pursued. The first major breakthrough in these secret talks was the protocol that Greek Foreign Minister Toumbas and his Turkish counterpart Mr. Caglayangil initialed on December 17, 1966. This protocol provided for *enosis*, as well as other provisions. One of the major Greek concessions was the granting to Turkey of the Dekhelia military base (one of the two British Sovereign Base Areas). According to a key Greek Foreign Office source present at the negotiations, the offer of the Dekhelia base had the full sanctioning of Britain. This protocol was never implemented as the Stephanopoulos minority cabinet fell some 48 hours later for reasons other than Cyprus.²¹

This inconclusive dialogue was briefly interrupted after the 1967 military takeover of Greece. But the new régime, isolated at home and abroad, desperately sought for reasons of prestige a resolution of the Cyprus problem that for many years had troubled Greek and international politics. Meeting a few days after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the NATO Foreign Ministers succeeded in getting Greece and Turkey to renew their diplomatic contacts over Cyprus. These contacts culminated in the abortive September 9-10, 1967, meetings on the Greek-Turkish border between leading elements of the Greek junta and the Turkish Prime Minister. Turkey, realising the Greek diplomatic weakness, rejected the Greek proposals for resolving the Cyprus Question.²²

Grivas's attack on Turkish Cypriot positions on November 15, 1967,

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gave Turkey the opportunity to move decisively and attempt to settle permanently this dispute. Turkey thus issued an ultimatum to Greece²³ and mobilised for an invasion of the island. Although the United States frantically worked on the diplomatic front with Cyrus Vance to avert a war that could have brought in the Soviet Union, there was no repetition of the 1964 Johnson letter to Inonu. This time Greece, who had courted the favour of the United States by claiming to safeguard NATO interests on Cyprus, had caused the kind of instability that threatened NATO as well as a serious confrontation in an area of high strategic value to the United States. Thus, Greece, under the pressures of Cyrus Vance, made all the major concessions. The major Greek leverage in Cyprus, i.e., the Greek troops, and Grivas, too, were withdrawn. The removal of the Greek troops and Grivas indirectly strengthened Makarios's hold of Cyprus. But in the long run Cyrus Vance's mediation achieved the weakening of Cyprus's defence capability. A substantial fighting force had been removed from the island without any concessions or pledges on the part of Turkey to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. Moreover, the unconditional withdrawal of the Greek forces from Cyprus confirmed to Turkey the Greek unwillingness to go to war over Cyprus. This fact was not lost in Turkish military circles as they embarked, late in 1967, on the acquisition and construction of numerous amphibious vessels for use in a future landing on Cyprus.

The significance of the November, 1967, crisis was clear. The United States had, with great difficulty, been able to diffuse the latest crisis on Cyprus, although Greece and Turkey had not been able to control Makarios. Yet the rapidly changing conditions in this strategic area required the resolution of this troublesome dispute. Such an opportunity appeared in the aftermath of the 1967 crisis when the two Cypriot communities on June 24, 1968, began negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus Question from "within."

Cypriot Independence: An American Objective?

Since the intercommunal talks began in Cyprus, the United States consistently endorsed this method of arriving at an agreed settlement of the Cyprus Question. Yet this was the very method that Galo Plaza Lasso, the UN mediator, had proposed in the spring of 1965. Why was it then that the U.S. endorsed this method of resolving the dispute only after 1968? The answer is to be found in a number of related reasons. First and foremost had been the ability of the Cypriot government to reject the pressures of the United States and Greece by exploiting the conditions of the international system, as well as by defiance, delay and partial compromise. United States Ambassador Popper's characterisation of Makarios as a man who "lives by his wits" is an accurate portrayal not only of the Cypriot leader, but also of the whole Cypriot political experience. Second, there was the more realistic perception of Makarios's statesmanship among many officials in the Department of State, such as David Popper, former Ambassador to Cyprus, and Tom Boyatt, of the

Cyprus Desk in the State Department. Unlike the Cold War perspectives of Acheson, Ball, and Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca, Makarios was seen as an astute diplomat exploiting the conditions of the international system. Further, these officials had also concluded that if Cyprus was to remain an independent Republic, a dangerous leadership vacuum could develop, for with the exception perhaps of Clerides, there were no other Greek Cypriot leaders with the widespread popular appeal of Makarios.

A third reason can be traced to the changing power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The growing presence of the Soviet Union since 1964 had seriously complicated the ability of external powers to impose solutions on unwilling parties, while the costs and risks of an attempted overthrow of Makarios, or of a partition of Cyprus had risen considerably. The fourth reason is composed of a variety of factors, including American concern for the overall instability in the Middle East since the six-day war, and thus the preoccupation of American diplomats with safeguarding oil supplies and shipping routes and the possibility of a reopened Suez Canal. Moreover the strategic importance of Cyprus was enhanced due to the loss of American base rights in states like Libya, and the parallel development of Soviet treaty and base arrangements with various Arab states, as well as the rise of Mintoff in Malta. In this context, the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs)²⁴ had obtained great significance for American national security planners. Thus the urgency of a stable and peaceful Cyprus, which lies in the heart of such strategic considerations, had contributed to the revised American policies toward Cyprus.

But had the United States truly accepted the principle of an independent Republic of Cyprus? My conclusions as a result of an examination of documentary materials from 1971 and 1972 reveal some important qualifications. The acceptance of Makarios had not meant complete denunciation of covert efforts to curb his independence, nor did it imply acceptance of his objectives. The "independent Republic" solution was thus a practical policy alternative, while the search for a solution that met more fully the American interests, as outlined earlier in this article, continued. While in 1964, it was Ball, Acheson and NATO who attempted to impose the settlement preferred by the United States on the Cypriots, after 1965 the burden shifted to Greece and Turkey. And henceforth, any settlement along the principles of the Acheson plan agreed upon and implemented by Greece and Turkey, and their supporters on the island, would have the kind of legitimacy that neither NATO nor the Ball-Acheson proposals ever possessed. Thus, the Greco-Turkish efforts received the blessings of the United States as long as their actions did not create the threat of Soviet involvement in Cyprus.

The Revival of the Acheson Principle

The worsening of the relations between Athens and Nicosia continued after the 1967 Greco-Turkish confrontation over the island, as the

military junta in Athens attempted to control Makarios and resolve the dispute without his consent.²⁵ The six years prior to the 1974 Greek coup against Makarios and the Turkish intervention in Cyprus saw the revival of the Greco-Turkish dialogue over Cyprus at a variety of levels, such as the Ambassadorial level in Athens and Ankara, and the Foreign Minister's level at NATO meetings. These talks literally took place "behind the back" of Makarios and contributed to the increased mistrust between Athens and Nicosia. Moreover, it must be noted that these talks paralleled the intercommunal talks that were held in Cyprus under the auspices of the United Nations and radically differed in the objectives they sought to obtain. While the objective of the intercommunal talks was a restructured, independent, united Cypriot Republic, the secret Greco-Turkish talks aimed at a solution through "double *enosis*" and the means of its implementation. In the latter case there was a noticeable shift in the Greek objectives, i.e., from *enosis* with "minor" compensation to Turkey to "double *enosis*." The reasons for this shift can be found in the weakness and isolation of the Papadopoulos junta, Papadopoulos' willingness to adopt U.S. suggestions on Cyprus in return for continuing U.S. support, and the growing military capability of Turkey. In addition, a solution to the Cyprus problem acceptable to Turkey would reduce tensions along the Greco-Turkish frontier and thus the need for substantial troop concentrations in Thrace and Macedonia. These troop concentrations had provided the breeding ground for the attempted Royal coup of 1967, and could again become a similar source of trouble for Papadopoulos.

By late 1969, on Cyprus itself, a new political movement was formed, the National Front, whose declared aims were union to Greece and the ouster of "anti-union" elements from the Cypriot government. This movement engaged in terrorist activities against the government. *Der Spiegel*, in the Spring of 1970, linked this group with the Greek government and to a secret plan "Hermes" for the overthrow of Makarios by the Cypriot National Guard and the eventual partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. The plan was authored by Colonel Ioannides, an influential member of the Greek junta.

Another event of crucial importance was the Lisbon meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers of June 3-4, 1971, which formalised the Greco-Turkish agreement to terminate Cypriot independence by partitioning the island. Greek and Turkish determination to resolve the Cyprus Question was also publicly manifested in the recognition that their continued friendship and co-operation was dependent on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Papadopoulos further declared that the Cypriots had to resolve their differences in a manner acceptable to Greece and Turkey.²⁶ In a sense, the Lisbon meeting marked a turning point in the diplomacy of the Cyprus Question as it followed the deadlock that developed in the intercommunal talks late that Spring largely over the issue of local government. Moreover, it manifested Greece's determination that Makarios had to come to terms with Greece and the Greek

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view so as to reach a quick solution in the intercommunal talks. On June 18, 1971, Papadopoulos, via a special emissary,²⁷ delivered a letter to President Makarios in which he demanded the acceptance by the Greek Cypriots in the intercommunal talks of a local government scheme favoured by Turkey, but considered by the Greek Cypriots as partitionist in character. These proposals were rejected by Makarios six days later, despite the warning in Papadopoulos' letter that in such case "... the Greek government will be faced with the serious need to take the necessary measures that are dictated by the national interest ... however bitter such measures may be ..."

Another largely unknown facet of this phase of the diplomacy of the Cyprus Question has to do with U Thant's attempt to reopen the UN mediation effort in Cyprus in the aftermath of the deadlock in the intercommunal talks and the rapidly growing tensions between Athens and Nicosia. Always sympathetic to the Cypriot cause and maintaining a good rapport with Spyros Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, U Thant wanted to achieve the resolution of the Cyprus dispute before he retired as Secretary-General of the United Nations. U Thant, late in the Summer of 1971, therefore proposed to have a special committee of the Security Council consisting of the non-permanent members of the Council, under the chairmanship of France, to undertake a new mediation effort in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia within the framework of Galo Plaza's suggestions. The proposal carried the consent of the Cypriot government which had always wanted to keep the problem of Cyprus at an international forum rather than in the confines of NATO or of Greece and Turkey. The Secretary-General, in his preliminary contacts, gained the support of France, Britain, the U.S.S.R., U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, and Greece for his plan.

The U.S. State Department, however, began raising objections to this process via Mr. Sisco, who, instead of encouraging Turkey's acceptance of the mediation plan, expressed doubts as to the acceptability of the proposal to Turkey. Shortly thereafter Mr. Palamas, on behalf of Greece, informed the Secretary-General and Mr. Kyprianou that, despite his earlier acceptance of U Thant's proposal, he and Mr. Olcay had agreed to reactivate the Cyprus intercommunal talks in an expanded manner with the presence of "constitutional experts" from Greece and Turkey, in addition to Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash. The proposal for the expanded intercommunal talks received immediate U.S. support. Despite strong objections by Mr. Kyprianou,²⁸ Cyprus, under strong Greek and American pressure, eventually accepted this new framework of negotiation even though it institutionalised the role of Greece and Turkey in these talks. Once more the preference of the U.S. and Greece for a Greco-Turkish inspired solution to the Cyprus problem prevailed over other more impartial methods of conflict resolution.

Finally, late in the Summer of 1971, George Grivas secretly returned to Cyprus from Greece and went into hiding in order to lead the fight for *enosis*. At the age of 73 Grivas would not have returned without the approval, or at least the knowledge, and the toleration of the

Papadopoulos regime. It must be remembered that Grivas had fundamentally accepted the 1964 Ball proposals for *enosis* and there was no reason to believe that he would not be willing to accept similar plans in 1971. *Enosis* had been his lifelong dream, and a compromise arrangement that included some form of *enosis* was more satisfactory than Makarios' version of an independent neutralist Cyprus.

How did the United States view these developments, and especially those of 1971? In June, 1971, State Department analysts, including those in the Intelligence and Research Division, had concluded that Greece and Turkey were favourably disposed to "double *enosis*" (*i.e.*, partition) proposals. Although it was proposed that the United States should restrain Greece and Turkey from any premature moves toward partition, Department officials did not foreclose the possibility of an eventual "double *enosis*." Such a solution would not be dangerous for American interests if Makarios, or some alternate Cypriot leader, could be induced to accept it. This is an important point as the "alternate," *i.e.*, Grivas, was already in Cyprus. The same officials recognised that Makarios would even accept "double *enosis*" if "confronted with something worse as an alternative." Thus, the consensus reached among State Department analysts in the Summer of 1971, was that the "Makarios' problem must be left essentially to Greece." The reasons for this assessment were outlined in the preceding section of this article. As for the estimate of a Soviet response to such a Greco-Turkish action, the same officials stressed the need for the quick implementation of any partition plans so as to present the Soviets with a *de facto* situation. Otherwise, the U.S.S.R. was expected to act not so much in the interests of Cypriot independence, but to prove to the world that the United States possessed neither its "Lebanon flexibility"²⁹ nor the ability to dictate Western-inspired solutions to Middle Eastern problems.

In late January 1972, a new supply of Czech weapons arrived for the Cypriot police. This shipment of arms gave Athens the opportunity to implement its plans against Cyprus, and it delivered a nine-point ultimatum to Makarios on February 11, 1972. The note mainly demanded (a) the surrender of the weapons to UNFICYP, thus leaving the Greek-officered Cyprus National Guard as the strongest Cypriot force; (b) the recognition by Cyprus that Athens is the national centre of Hellenism and that Cyprus is only a part of the Greek nation (the implication being that Cyprus should accede to Greek policies and not act as an independent sovereign state); and (c) the reconstitution of the Cypriot government into one of "national unity" drawn from all segments of the Greek Cypriot public to assure confidence in the relations between Athens and Nicosia. This demand clearly implied the elimination of pro-independence figures, such as Foreign Minister Kyprianou, and the introduction of Grivas and his supporters into the Cypriot government. Cyprus was then warned that as Greece had not denounced the Treaty of Guarantee, which included the right of intervention, Cyprus would be responsible for the consequences arising from noncompliance to the

Greek demands. This ultimatum was made public by both sides. But Makarios did not respond to the demands of the "national centre." Nor did Grivas move against Makarios, having finally realised that he was being used by Athens to implement the policy of partition which contradicted his lifelong goal of *enosis*. Bitter, he remained in Cyprus until his death, early in 1974, in charge of EOKA-B. With his small band of loyalists from the independence struggle and newly recruited *enosis*ts, Grivas attempted until the end to induce Makarios to give up his independence policy.

As the clumsily executed Greek move against Makarios failed, the United States urgently tried to cool-off the frustrated Athens government. Makarios was Greece's problem, but the Greek gamble had failed. Makarios had stalled and calmly resisted the Greek pressures.³⁰ And the repeated Soviet warnings to Athens not to attempt to overthrow Makarios had proven the validity of Washington's expectations about Russia and Cyprus.

Appraising the Cyprus situation in the aftermath of this historic confrontation, State Department officials emphasised the need to support Cypriot independence through the process of the intercommunal negotiations. The importance of Makarios was recognised, and although he was not considered indispensable, his removal was seen as a threat to the laboriously built and maintained non-violence on the island. Yet Makarios' independence remained a disturbing factor to the State Department analysts who continued to recommend that he had to be "cut down to size" and be made to realise the strength of his opponents in Cyprus. This was seen as necessary in order to force the Cypriots to make accommodations in their negotiations with the Turkish community for a final solution of the Cyprus Question.

At this point I have no direct evidence linking the United States with the terrorist activities in Cyprus during 1973 and 1974. But Cypriot, as well as Israeli, sources have acknowledged the extensive deployment and the active involvement of American intelligence operatives on Cyprus. The fact remains, though, that the United States did not undertake any initiatives to assist the Cypriot government against Grivas' insurgency. Nor is there any evidence that the United States ever suggested to the Greek government to "leash" Grivas and the Greek Army officers of the Cypriot National Guard who openly supported the activities of EOKA-B.³¹ Anti-government terrorism in Cyprus thus undermined Makarios' power and weakened the Cypriot negotiating position in the intercommunal talks. This was recognised by Ambassador Popper who viewed Grivas and the National Guard as the "joker in the pack" for any future developments in Cyprus.

As shown, the American approach to the Cyprus Question was largely motivated by Cold War and national security considerations. Thus, the United States never gave up its attempts to seek a permanent settlement in Cyprus, ideally one that would achieve the American objectives in the area if not also the minimum objectives of Greece, Turkey, and NATO.

Yet up until July 15, 1974, overt and/or covert attempts at an imposed settlement of the dispute had proven unsuccessful.

The Coup against Makarios and the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

The latest phase of the Cyprus Question was the result of Makarios' determination to reassert his control over the Cyprus National Guard and its Greek Army officers. Thus, Makarios' letter of July 2, 1974, to Greek President General Gizikis requesting the removal of these officers became the catalyst that brought to a climax 25 years of uneasy Greek-Greek Cypriot relations.

What can we conclude at this point from the attempted assassination and the overthrow of President Makarios by the Cyprus National Guard? First, it is difficult to assess the real motivations for the timing of Makarios' letter to President Gizikis. His decision was undoubtedly affected by an underestimation of the determination of Col. Ioannides in Athens, and of the intentions of Washington. In the latter case, Makarios never expected to be overthrown because of the influence the United States possessed in Athens and the steps it had taken on his behalf during the 1972 crisis. He thus concluded that Washington would continue to protect him.

Second, the overthrow of Makarios was based on an updated version of plan "Hermes."³² Colonel Ioannides' decision to forcibly move against Makarios reflected his influence in the previous Greek military regime. He may have also literally interpreted Washington's 1971 guidelines that "Makarios' problem must be essentially left to Greece." But Colonel Ioannides blundered in two ways. First, although his predecessor, Colonel Papadopoulos, had similar designs against Makarios, they were to be implemented with Turkish participation. Yet the second military coup in Athens on November 25, 1973, had temporarily suspended the secret Greco-Turkish talks on Cyprus, and the subsequent crisis over oil rights in the Aegean Sea had brought the two states on the verge of armed conflict. Thus, the Greek move against Makarios was not only looked upon as a unilateral attempt at *enosis* by Turkey, but also provided the opportunity to Turkey to land troops on Cyprus, under the Treaty of Guarantee, for the first time since the collapse of the First Cypriot Republic. Hence, the Greek gamble failed because Colonel Ioannides must have counted on the United States to stop a potential Turkish invasion of Cyprus, as in 1964 and 1967. This did not happen.

The new crisis over Cyprus may have been unplanned as far as the United States was concerned, but it provided both a crisis and an opportunity for the involvement of Henry Kissinger. The primary task of American diplomacy was to control the risks of a broader Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus and of a possible Soviet involvement. By carefully managing the crisis and controlling the risks, the United States could move to achieve the elusive peace on Cyprus. Thus, the Cypriot crisis had become another opportunity for Washington to attempt to impose stability.

Makarios' escape from Cyprus certainly created some political complications over the status of the new Cypriot government. But the expression of American support for the "continuation of constitutional order in Cyprus" was not a major concession. Makarios, at the time in virtual exile, had his "wings" clipped, while the American objective of "limiting his political action capability" had finally been obtained. And by tolerating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the subsequent violations of the ceasefire, and the enlargement of the Turkish expeditionary force, the United States had allowed the regional balance of power to be inalterably changed for the first time since the collapse of the first Cypriot Republic. Now it was up to the Greek Cypriots to make the concessions. Thus the Cyprus question entered its latest and most tragic phase with the application of the Kissinger diplomacy to this perennial problem of the Western alliance. As Stephen R. Graubard has observed³³ a basic principle of the Kissinger philosophy is that:

. . . In any international negotiation, it was impossible for one state to be entirely satisfied and another entirely frustrated. A successful negotiation demanded that all parties receive some satisfaction. . . . The statesman's task . . . was not only to know what one wanted for one's own country, but to understand something of what the representatives of the other negotiating parties also wanted . . . a statesman generally recognized the existence of a greater number of options than were seen by those who lacked his vision. . . .

Despite State Department denials of American foreknowledge or toleration of the Turkish invasion, or of complicity in it, or of an opportunity to prevent it, the facts reveal Washington's duplicity.³⁴ Certainly, the movement toward *détente* between the superpowers, the rapprochement, since the late 1960's, between Turkey and the Soviet Union, and the diplomatic isolation of the Greek and the Cypriot juntas, made it easier for Turkey to invade Cyprus without serious concern for the international repercussions of her actions. But the fact remains that the United States did not interfere or exert any serious effort to stop the Turkish invasion, as it did in 1964 and 1967. Moreover, NATO's political assets remained largely unutilised in this critical period. What is most important about the American position, however, is how it encouraged the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by issuing various public statements, after Makarios was overthrown, and at a time when the intercommunal talks in Cyprus had nearly reached a complete agreement on the restructuring of the Cypriot Republic.

In contrast to the rest of the Western community, the United States failed to condemn the action against Makarios, and it never acknowledged the Greek-led coup as an intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic. Furthermore, because Washington never sought an early return of the constitutional order on Cyprus, it thus encouraged Turkey to do so as a guarantor power, and the intervention followed. But the lack of a clear warning against a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, coupled along with its description by American officials as "minor military

action," is striking. And even after the collapse of the Greek and the Cypriot juntas and the return toward constitutional legitimacy in both countries, the United States once more failed to take any steps that could have prevented the eventual breakdown of the Geneva Conference on Cyprus. Following this breakdown, the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus began, bringing under Turkish Army control nearly 40 per cent. of the Republic. Instead, Assistant Secretary of State A. Hartman and other American spokesmen contributed to the Greco-Turk instabilities. Hartman, in his testimony before Congress, supported the need for the greater autonomy of the Turkish Cypriots, depicted Turkey's claims on Cyprus in equal terms to those of the Greek Cypriot majority, urged compromises on the part of the Greek Cypriots to achieve a permanent solution, and opposed an "early complete withdrawal" of the Turkish invasion forces from Cyprus in that such action would lead to "anarchy." Under these circumstances, Turkey, unhindered, proceeded in forcibly occupying a substantial portion of the island, devastating the Cypriot economy, and causing untold misery to nearly 50 per cent. of the population of the Republic who are now refugees.

Kissinger's quest for a stable international order had been severely tested by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and its impact on superpower relations. Thus the new balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean had not only increased the strategic value of Cyprus since 1973, but also the need to remove Cyprus as a source of instability in this critical region.

Kissinger's lack of opposition to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus undoubtedly differed from the actions of his predecessors. In other areas, though, there was conformity with earlier trends. There are several examples. He revealed even greater sensitivity toward the demands of Turkey, given Turkey's strategic importance in the region and in a revitalised CENTO. He accepted even more drastic measures in the continuing attempt to "curb Makarios' political action capability." And he failed to account for the sentiments of the majority of the population of Cyprus. In an unanticipated manner Kissinger had also regained political stability in Greece, although at the cost of the Greek withdrawal from the military component of NATO.

As Graubard points out,³⁵ the Secretary of State believes that:

. . . The statesman's skill was demonstrated in his capacity to choose well among the options he detected . . . All choice involved risk; all choice was based on conjecture . . . one could not be certain of the results. . . . The policy maker was the risk taker: there was no way to guarantee his success . . . [As Viet Nam shows] . . . the decision was made to run those risks, in the belief that the alternatives, while less dangerous, promised results that could not be satisfactory. . . .

Thus, calculated risks were taken in the Cyprus Question in July-August 1974, for the purpose of achieving the permanent solution that defied Dulles, Rusk, and Johnson. As for the damage to NATO's southeast

flank, this, according to Kissinger, can also be corrected given the presence of a "reliable" Conservative government in Greece and a rapid resolution of the Cyprus Question.

It may be too early at this point to draw any conclusions as to the shape of a future settlement of the Cyprus Question. Even if Cyprus remains an independent state, given the drastic change in the balance of power in Cyprus itself, Cypriot independence will be far more restricted than even that provided for under the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements. What may be worse for the majority community in Cyprus, though, is the strong possibility of partition. It was a plan endorsed by the State Department since 1956, a fact accepted by the United States in the 1971 contingency plan of the Department of State for Cyprus, and a fear repeatedly expressed by many leading Greek Cypriots.³⁶

American political observers and journalists have treated U.S. reaction toward the latest phase of the dispute as an isolated event that occurred within the context of the developments in Cyprus and Greece during the Summer of 1974. Thus, the U.S. policy is looked upon in Congress as a "blunder" by many in the State Department as the result of the United States acting as an "uninvolved observer" in the dispute. While, on the other hand, it is regarded by others as a manifestation of Kissinger's "Realpolitik."³⁷ As this article has shown, in contrast to these views, there is a fundamental continuity in American policy toward the Cyprus dispute since the breakdown of the First Cypriot Republic. This continuity has been traced to the Cold War considerations that have dominated American policy perspectives toward the Eastern Mediterranean since the end of World War II.

This article has traced the elusive search for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus Question by the United States. Thus, the temptation and the danger of the present situation in Cyprus lies in the fact that such an opportunity now exists. Before American policy makers attempt to capitalise on the "new" situation in Cyprus they should perhaps read once more the valuable, but forgotten, report by the former United Nations Mediator to Cyprus, Galo Lasso Plaza, and look beyond the narrow limits of Cold War considerations.

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REFERENCES

1. This particularly applies to portions of this article dealing with the Acheson Plan and the U.S. assessments of the Cyprus situation in the period of 1968-1972. In the past, much of what has been written about the Acheson Plan is either based on conjecture, or on the more general dimensions of Acheson's proposals. Similarly, the U.S. assessments of the 1968-1972 period reflect official Washington sources.

2. From among the nine documents signed at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, three are the most important as they define the nature of the independence

granted to the Republic of Cyprus. The first defines the "Basic Structure of the Republic." Here Cypriot bi-communalism and division is constitutionally and permanently guaranteed and finds expression in the Executive, Legislative, Judicial and Administrative system of the island. In what could be called a "diarchy," the President and Vice-President have final veto powers, independently of each other, in all major policy areas. A 70:30 ratio governs the distribution of all public offices, including the Cabinet, the Civil Service, and the Legislature. This ratio is extended to 60:40 in the Armed Forces. The bi-communal system is further applied in the provision for separate municipalities for all major cities, separate majority votes in the unicameral legislature, and separate chambers dealing with communal affairs. *Enosis* and/or partition are strictly prohibited.

The second crucial Agreement is known as the "Treaty of Guarantee," under which Britain, Greece, and Turkey guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and the constitutional structure of the Republic. The three states jointly or independently are given the right to take actions necessary to maintain or re-establish the status quo created by these agreements. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, in turn, guarantee the sovereign base areas which are granted to Britain.

The third major Agreement was the "Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey." Under its terms the three states pledge co-operation and consultation for their defense and agreed to protect the territorial integrity of the Republic against any direct or indirect threat. This included the creation of tripartite headquarters and the stationing of a 950-man Greek Army contingent and a 650-man Turkish Army contingent on Cyprus. A supplementary special Agreement provided sovereign base areas to Britain.

3. Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus the 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," *Stanford Law Review*, Volume 18, May 1966, pp. 1021-1097. Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 36-60. Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

4. On November 30, 1963, Makarios, with the support of the British High Commissioner, had presented Vice-President Kutchuck with thirteen proposals for amending the Cypriot Constitution. The Greek Cypriot proposals were intended to remove the obstacles that had developed in the operation of the Republic. The Turkish Cypriots saw the proposals as unilateral attempts to revise the political system of the Republic. For the proposals see: Cyprus, Publications Department of the Greek Communal Chamber, "Cyprus: The Problem in Retrospect," *Cyprus To-day*, II, Nos. 3-4 (May-August 1964), pp. 10-15.

5. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, and presiding officer at the Conference. The British mediation plan was based on a proposal for the geographical separation of the two Cypriot communities.

6. "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 14, November 1964, p. 13. The original plan called for a NATO force of some 10,000 men to be stationed for an initial period of three months. It would involve at least 1,200 U.S. troops as well as troops of the three guarantor powers, while the mediator would represent a different NATO member. A few days later, February 9, 1964, U.S. Under-secretary of State George W. Ball, in an effort to overcome Cypriot objections, offered to include some additional European non-NATO troops in this force and to provide for limited supervision, but not control, of the force by the UN Security Council. These concessions though did not affect the fundamental NATO characteristics of the operation.

7. For some examples see: Ted Szulc, "Cyprus Concern Mounts," *New York Times*, June 21, 1964. See also Lyndon B. Johnson's speech to the American Bar Association on August 12, 1964. Finally, George Weller in a typical article in the *Detroit Free Press*, March 13, 1964, analyses the question, "Will Cyprus Be Johnson's Bay of Pigs?"

8. The resolution established UNFICYP and a UN mediator for Cyprus.

9. Such as those of March 13, 1964, and June 5, 1964. In an unusually strongly worded letter to Prime Minister Inonu, Lyndon B. Johnson, on June 5, 1964, warned Turkey not to invade Cyprus. For the text of this famous letter, see Cyprus, Public Information Office, *Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective* (Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1969), pp. 36-37.

10. The Johnson-Inonu communique upheld the "present binding effects of existing treaties," i.e., the 1959 Agreements.

11. Adlai Stevenson on June 19, 1964 (see United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 4417), insisted that the United States "... has no position as to the form or to the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem ... it is not for my government to say what that solution should be. ...". Yet thirteen days later the Talbot-Ball proposals presented to Acheson provided the solution to the Cyprus problem!

12. The Talbot-Ball draft of the Acheson plan examines three other alternative solutions for the Cyprus problem which, for a variety of reasons, are found to be unsatisfactory. These solutions were (a) an independent and unitary Cyprus; (b) double *enosis*, i.e., formal partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey; and (c) *enosis* of Cyprus to Greece including a population exchange with Turkey.

Acheson originally proposed the full sovereign cession to Turkey, in perpetuity, of the Karpasian peninsula, including the Peristeria-Boghaz region in the Northeast of Cyprus for military bases. He later modified this proposal to meet Greek objections by delimiting the territory just west of the Village of Komi-Kebir in the Northeast of the island, and leasing the bases to Turkey for fifty years only. The proposal also included the establishment of up to three Turkish Cypriot cantons with local administration in their complete control. Eventually this proposal was modified to provide for Turkish Cypriot prefects, rather than formal cantonal divisions, with Turkish Cypriot staffs to administer local affairs in heavily Turkish Cypriot areas of the island. Acheson also proposed the creation of an international body to observe the application of human rights provisions, with NATO exercising an enforcement role in case of violations. Finally, in regard to territorial concessions by Greece to Turkey, Acheson proposed the cession of the Island of Kastelorizon, although the islands of Chios, Simi, and Samos were given as alternatives.

13. Grivas led EOKA against the British during the colonial phase of the dispute. A staunch Conservative and anti-Communist, Grivas believed in *enosis*. He therefore disagreed openly with Makarios over the latter's endorsement of independence, his toleration and acceptance of AKEL's support, and his ties with the non-aligned. Only Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, *Facing the Brink* (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1967), pp. 31-32, seem to be aware of the Grivas-Ball meeting.

14. Between March 27, 1964, and December 15, 1974, the total cost of UNFICYP was \$186.4 million, with the UNFICYP Special Account showing a deficit of some \$27.5 million. In this period, contributions were received from 55 member and three nonmember governments. See S/11568, December 6, 1974, *Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, pp. 17-18. Of the \$156.3 million in voluntary contributions, NATO members contributed nearly 75% of the total.

15. S/6253, March 26, 1965: *Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General*.

16. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, Volume XXI, Spring 1967, pp. 221-237.

17. The "great ideal," that powerful nationalist force that throughout the 19th and the early 20th Centuries affected Greek politics. It primarily aimed at the union of all "Greek" areas to the independent motherland.

18. See the correspondence between Papandreou and Makarios of August 29, 1964, and February 21, 1965, in K. Hadjiargyris, A. Xydis, et al., *Ho Makarios Kai Hoi Symmachoi Tou* (in English: *Makarios and His Allies*) (Athens: Gutenberg, 1972), pp. 94-95.

19. See the reluctant acceptance and ultimate rejection by Greece of the NATO role, the mediation of Acheson, etc.

20. The Congressional hearings on the CIA confirmed what Greek political leader Andreas Papandreou has maintained in his writings about the events in Greece in 1965. Similar information had been earlier provided by respectable Greek journalists such as Stavros Psycharis, *Ta Paraskinia Tes Allages* (in English: *The Background of the Change*) (5th ed., Athens: Papazisis, 1975), and K. Hadjiargyris, et al., *op. cit.*

21. The text of this protocol has been published in Greece by Damonides (Chr. Christides) in his book *Akros Aporreton—To Protocollo Tes 17 Dekembriou 1966* (in English: *Top Secret—The Protocol of 17 December 1966*) (Athens: by the Author, 1973). The authenticity of the protocol as published by Damonides

has been verified by a Greek Foreign Office source present at these negotiations. This individual emphasised that the notes taken during these Greek-Turkish meetings must be read in conjunction with the protocol in order to clarify the Greek intentions and the nature of the concessions made to Turkey. My source was unfortunately unwilling to show me these "notes."

22. The Greek proposals provided for union of Cyprus to Greece, minority guarantees, and territorial adjustments on the Greco-Turkish border in favour of Turkey. Turkey demanded either a return to the 1959 *status quo*, or double *enosis*, and is said to have complained that these "new" Greek proposals had been made earlier in 1966 by Papadopoulos' and Collias' civilian predecessors.

23. Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967*, pp. 90-116. Turkey demanded: (1) the removal of all Greek forces above those provided for in the 1959 agreements; (2) the removal of Grivas; (3) that Cyprus disband its National Guard; (4) disengagement in areas of conflict; (5) the enlargement of UNFICYP; (6) compensation for losses suffered by Turkish Cypriots in the attack; and (7) the formation of local Turkish governing bodies in the enclaves.

24. The SBA at Akrotiri has been used by the U.S. for electronic espionage and for tracking Soviet vessels by U.S. aircraft. The British SBAs are not in the NATO base network.

25. Athens implicated Giorkadgis, the former Cypriot Minister of the Interior, and Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, Makarios' trusted advisor, in the 1968 attempt against Papadopoulos' life. On March 8, 1970, Greek Army officers were implicated by the Cypriots in the assassination attempt against Makarios. A week later Giorkadgis was also found murdered by unknowns.

26. See the Papadopoulos interview in *Millet* of Istanbul, May 30, 1971, and related comments by Turkish government officials. Washington sources and dissident Greek Foreign Office officials have reluctantly acknowledged that at the 1971 Lisbon NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting Greece and Turkey reached a consensus over a plan involving "double *enosis*." Highly reliable Greek Cypriot sources have also confirmed this point to me in interviews in Nicosia during the summer of 1976.

27. Ambassador Angelos Chorafas. This letter and Makarios' reply of June 24, 1971, were published in the Athens daily *Ta Nea* on May 31, 1976. The accuracy of the printed text has been established at the Greek Foreign Office, and in Cyprus.

28. Mr. Olcay and Mr. Palamas are the same men who agreed in Lisbon on the "double *enosis*" solution. Kyprianou objected to the expanded inter-communal talks because (1) they neutralised the Secretary-General; (2) the addition of the two "constitutional experts" would revive the Constitutional Committee that drew up the Cypriot constitution in the aftermath of the Zurich and London accords; (3) would limit further initiatives by the Secretary-General on the Cyprus Question as a whole; and (4) a new deadlock in these talks would increase the chances of a new confrontation over Cyprus.

29. The unopposed intervention in Lebanon in 1958.

30. Although Foreign Minister Kyprianou did resign, this was only a token measure of compromise on the part of Makarios. The new Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides also shared Makarios' outlook.

31. The Cypriot National Guard (CNG) is officered by mainland Greek Army officers under the authority of the Greek government. Even if they remained neutral in the Makarios-Grivas conflict, they left the government defenceless and therefore contributed to Grivas' strength. This is why the Cypriot government had attempted to create countervailing forces in Cyprus, such as the Cypriot Police and the Presidential Guard, and attempted to reassert its control over the CNG by carefully screening all recruits and eliminating those with ties to EOKA-B. Makarios' opponents have also been supported by Israel. Daniel B. Drooz, in a report in *The Times of Israel* (April, 1974) named Cyprus as "Makarios' Soviet leaning theocracy" and admitted that Israel provided "substantial support to the Grivas forces." Israel viewed the Cyprus situation within the broader context of the Middle East crisis and had no sympathy for Makarios' neutralism and friendship with the Arabs. See pp. 42-47.

32. Colonel Ioannides, the author of plan "Hermes," served in Cyprus during 1963-1964 with the Greek forces that had been sent to Cyprus. He strongly disliked Makarios' ties with the non-aligned, the U.S.S.R., and AKEL. While in Cyprus he became a friend of Nikos Sampson, who shared the same fears and

concerns. The latter was installed as President of Cyprus following the overthrow of Makarios. For details of Ioannides' plan "Hermes" see *Greek Report* (London), May 1970, pp. 4-5, also *Der Spiegel*, March 16, 1970, No. 12, pp. 127-129. An updated version of plan "Hermes," known as plan "Aphrodite," was used in Makarios' overthrow on July 15, 1974. See Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 34-78.

33. Stephen R. Graubard, *Kissinger—Portrait of a Mind* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973), p. 275.

34. This became quite clear during the House Intelligence Committee hearings (Pike Committee). The Committee's report was leaked to the press. For the portion dealing with Cyprus see *The Village Voice*, Volume XXI, No. 7, February 20, 1976, pp. 32-33.

35. Stephen R. Graubard, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276.

36. One of them is Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, a politician-journalist and personal advisor of Makarios. For a prophetic expression of this view see his "Cyprus and the Middle East Crisis," *Review of International Affairs* (Yugoslavia), Volume 18, August 5-20, 1967, pp. 6-8.

37. For an informative analysis on this point see Theodore A. Coulombis, "Five 'Theories' Regarding Kissinger's Policy toward the Cyprus Crisis," *International Studies Notes*, Volume 2, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 12-17.

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