

# HAROLD MACMILLAN: TIDES OF FORTUNE (1945-55) LONDON 1969

1952: NEUHIB seizes power in Egypt. (July 23)

EUROPEAN COAL & steel Community inaugurated (August 10)

NOV. 4. EISENHOWER elected President of the U.S. <sup>OCT. 3. 1st British</sup> Atomic Bomb Exploded

NOV. 16. U.S. explodes Hydrogen Bomb.

In October 25 1951

Conservative Party won BRITISH GEN. ELECTION (Churchill became premier, Eden F. Secretary, Macmillan Minister of Housing)

On Sept 8 1951, Peace Treaty with Japan was signed; on October 6, Russia admitted exploding atomic bomb; on October 8, Egypt denounced Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

1953

FEB. 12. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Sudan (providing trans. period of not more than 3 years, "self-government for the Sudan with an elected Parliament")

March 5. Death of Stalin. Malenkov succeeds

May 11. Churchill's speech proposing talks with Russia

JUNE 17. Anti-Communist riots in E. BERLIN & EAST GERMANY

JUNE 23. Churchill's illness (stroke)

July 27. Armistice in Korea

August 12. U.S.S.R. explodes H-bomb

OCTOBER 23. Fed. of Rhodesia and Nyazaland inaugurated.

Dec. 4-7. Bermuda Conference U.S., U.K. & Fr. (General, particular point was the preparation for a 4 power Conference)

1954

JAN. 25, FEB. 18. BERLIN Conference of Foreign Ministers (no results)

April 26, June 19. GENEVA CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS (INDOCHINA)

JULY 3. FOOD RATIONING ABOLISHED IN BRITAIN.

JULY 21. ARMISTICE signed in Geneva between warring parties in Indochina. Vietnam partitioned

SEPTEMBER 8. SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY SIGNED IN MANILA.

1954. October 5. U.K., U.S.A., Italy and Yugoslavia sign Trieste Agreement.

OCTOBER 18. Macmillan becomes Minister of Defence.

" 19. Agreement on withdrawal of British troops from Suez.

OCTOBER 23. PARIS Agreements establish Western European Union and terminate occupation of West Germany.

NOV. 14. Nasser ousts Neguib, assumes control of Egypt.

Dec 14. Rioting in Athens over 'Enosis' for Cyprus.

1955.

FEB. 8. Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Premier of USSR.

" 24. TURKEY & IRAQ sign Baghdad Defence Pact.

April, 4. Britain joins Baghdad Pact.

April 5. CHURCHILL RESIGNS (80 years 5 months old). Eden is P.M. Macmillan becomes Foreign Sec. BUTLER, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

April 18-24. Bandung Afro-Asian Conference.

May 5. Western European Union inaugurated (made possible by agreement between Mendès-France and Adenauer) on four days later (May 9) Federal Germany was admitted to NATO.

MAY 14. 'WARSAW' Pact signed in Warsaw.

May 15. Austrian Peace Treaty signed.

May 26. BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION. CONSERVATIVES INCREASE THEIR MAJORITY.

JULY 1st. Pakistan joins BAGHDAD PACT.

JULY 18-23. FIRST SUMMIT MEETING AT GENEVA. EISENHOWER, DULLES, BULGANIN, KHRUSHCHEV, ZHUKOV, EDEN, MACMILLAN, FAROUK.

AUGUST 29. Cyprus Conference opens.

Sept. 27. Announcement of Soviet arm deal with Egypt.

Oct. 27 - Nov. 6. GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE (on German re-unification and European security - abortive).

November 23. Iran joins Baghdad Pact.

" 13. BRITISH & Egyptian Troops withdrawn from the Sudan.

Dec. Macmillan vacates F.O. becomes Chancellor of the Exchequer, SELWYN Lloyd becomes Foreign Secretary.

JOHN HARDING (Marshal) as General Commanding the XIII Army Corps in Northern Italy during the last stages of the war.

(In 1954 Macmillan's thought run like this:)

"The paradoxical effect of the emerging balance of nuclear power was, it seemed to me, that the risk of a major war would continue to recede as its character grew more devastating, but the corollary was that our 'cold war' would continue for a long time at its current tempo and perhaps, indeed, be intensified. I felt that during the next few years our Colonial Empire in its various stages of development would probably be a vital 'Cold-War' battleground. If we were defeated there, much of our effort in Western Europe would be wasted. Trouble in the Colonial Empire might be inspired by the Communists. Alternatively they might inspire unrest which stemmed from other sources, such as nationalism or even tribalism.

To meet this threat the first essential was good intelligence.

"No one is wholly responsible - it's partly Defence, partly Colonial Office, partly Foreign Office. There is no central anti-communist organisation with any drive in it. 'Cold War' alarms me more than 'Hot War'. For we are not really winning it and the Russians have a central position... and a well directed effort with strong representatives (through the Communist Party) in every country." p. 572

In 1955. Britain had over 800,000 serving in the Navy, Army, & Air Force Force of whom 300,000 were National Service men. There were backed by Reserve and Auxiliary forces of over 600,000." p. 574

On the 1st March 1955 (five weeks before his retirement) Churchill made his last major speech to the House of Commons. On the theme of peace which increasingly dominated his thought ended with the provocation

"What ought we to do? which way shall we turn to save our lives and the future of the world? It does not matter so much to old people; they are going soon anyway but I find it poignant to look at youth in all its activity and ardour and, most"

of all to watch little children playing their merry games and wonder what would lie before them if God wearied of mankind?  
 Harvard March 1955.

In February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed a mutual defence pact in Baghdad "to which, on April 4, Great Britain adhered" 630-31

\* In summer 1955 Egyptian Government proposed construction of new ASWAN DAM.

"On 22 September (1955) we heard of an important arms deal between Egypt and Russia on a scale which would seriously alter the balance of power in the Middle East" p. 635 (Part of the deal was for the supply of 100 mias through the medium of Czechoslovakia.

Five days later (Sept. 27) Masare formally announced the completion of the deal.

(In the second half of 1955 Macmillan as F.O. was pre-occupied with two issues - Middle East and the reunification of Germany).

CYPRUS p. 660 ff.

"Nevertheless as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-1922 Greek refugees from Asia minor had fled into Cyprus in such numbers (italics mine) as to destroy the old Balance between the populations" p. 661 (the number remain unspecified)

"But while the Cypriot Turks might be willing to accept a self governing Cyprus" if they could be guaranteed "against inequality and repression" the Turkish Government "would never willingly allow an island, lying off their vital coasts and threatening their main harbours, to pass into the hands of a nation which, although at the moment allied, might become politically hostile" p. 663 and later on

"My Turkish friends sometimes used to say to me" ... about "if Cyprus were to fall into hostile hands, it would have the same effect on us as it would have had on you if the Isle of Wight had been held by your enemies in two world wars" p. 663

In the early days of April when Hill Minister of Defence Macmillan recorded:

Very bad news from Cyprus. In spite of the confidence of our Governor and the Colonial office that there would be no trouble, there have been serious bomb outrages including the destruction of the new wireless station" 664

"Greek Government was certainly inspiring the recent terrorism" 664

Macmillan and <sup>Alan</sup> Lenny Boyd thought

a. United Nation. Revision of the "Cyprus question" theme would be contrary to terms of U.N. Charter

b. Britain needed the "support and sympathy of the people and Government of the United States" 664

This could not be done "without some positive action of our own" 664

we proposed, therefore, that a fresh initiative should be taken which would at least demonstrate the sincerity of British policy. As a first step we decided to invite both Greece and Turkey to a tripartite discussion. We expected the Turks to accept. If the Greeks also agreed, we would put forward definite proposals for constitutional progress in the island. If the Greeks refused, at least Britain's position at the United Nations would be strengthened. (my italics).

In sending out the invitation the B. Gov. were "careful to emphasize not merely the need for constitutional advance in Cyprus but the importance of protecting the strategic and political interests of the three Governments in the Eastern Mediterranean" 665 Macmillan met Stephopoulos (G. For. M.) in Strasbourg in July and writes: "Rather to my astonishment, he accepted our invitation without any conditions or reservations, even saying they would be glad to meet their Turkish friend" 665

(The only point the Greeks made was that the Turks have surrendered their right in Cyprus by the Treaty of Lausanne)

The choice of the Conference was London.

Greece and Turkey agreed with Macmillan at Starbourny (i.e. Stefanopoulos and Menemencioğlu) agreed upon the meeting to start on August 29th. Stefanopoulos then wanted an earlier meeting otherwise August 29th but through the possibility of raising the C. 9. before the U.N. because the latest day for involving it on the agenda was August 20.

"I told him" writes Macmillan "that I thought he would be making a serious error in agreeing to such a move, and that the British Government and people would be affronted". and adds from his diary of July 16, 1955

"This was not the way to get concessions out of us. He was very apologetic, but said that the Greek Government was torn apart already about the conference. Only the influence of Papagos (it was really the King acting on Papagos) has persuaded him to accept!" p. 666.

Macmillan acted as chairman.

"My plan was to reserve (the British) proposals until the Greeks and the Turks have spoken of the wider issues involved!" p. 666.

The Greek position (as exemplified by Stefanopoulos) was

- Self Government for Cyprus
- The principle of self-determination to be applied in three years time (when a free Govern. would make its own choice).
- Arrangements would be made for the British base.
- The interests of the Turkish minority to be guaranteed.

Macmillan describes Stefanopoulos' argument both moderate and skilful. But from his diary notes at the time (31 August 1955) he quotes:

"Fundamentally, the division among laymen is between the older Greek politicians and civil servants and soldiers (who look back with pride to generations of friendship with England) and the younger who begin to revive some old and foolish dreams of expansion." p. 669

The Turkish position as expounded by M. Zorlu were:

- a. According to the Treaty of Lausanne the sovereignty of Cyprus must remain with Britain or revert to Turkey.
- b. The historical connection of Cyprus with the mainland of Asia Minor was the one thing common to Cyprus through all its changes. (In private discussion Zorlu suggested that a degree of self-government may not be unacceptable but if there could be a moratorium "for five years on the question sovereignty" 669.

The British plan was:

- a. Liberal constitution leading to the fullest measure of <sup>internal</sup> self-government compatible with the strategic situation's requirements.
- b. All Depts would be progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security.
- c. A special Tripartite of the conference should be set up in London for helping to apply the new Constitution, considering the necessary guarantees for the minority community. Finally there was the proposal for the appointment of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Communities to reside in Cyprus with "special access to the Governor". 669

Meanwhile riots in Istanbul and Smyrna against the Greeks. Zorlu ~~threatened~~ <sup>hinted</sup> at Turkish counter-claims (counter i.e. to Cyprus) in March.

The British proposals were merely a sounding board—calculated to bog proceeding into endless procedural debates.

And so:

"When the full conference met, I pointed out that an argument for self-determination was one which could not be a principle of universal application to all communities whatever their size, location, history and strategic importance." Because there was no brilliant reply to his suggestion Mac declared the conference "suspended." He wrote in his diary (7/9/55) that i.e. the conference.

• has at least proved that Cyprus is not a "colonial" problem but a great international issue. The Turkish position has never been understood. Most English people do not

of only the others involved would meet him half-way. (But Turkey was  
frankly precisely with the purpose of preventing such a solution). In  
November, in pursuance of this policy, they press to get 2 TK. Govts.  
an Arch. M. or "formula for Cyprus"

It started:

H.M.G. adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter  
of the U.N. etc. It is not therefore their position that the  
principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is  
their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on  
account of the present strategic situation and on account of the  
consequences on relations between the NATO countries powers in  
the Eastern Mediterranean. They will therefore, have to satisfy  
themselves that any final solution safeguard the strategic interests  
of the United Kingdom and her allies.

H.M.G. have offered a wide measure of self-gov. now. If  
the people of C. will participate in the constitutional development  
it is the intention of H.M.G. to work for a solution which  
will satisfy the wishes of the people of C. within the framework  
of the treaties and alliance in which the countries concerned  
in the defence of the Eastern Med. are parties. H.M.G. will  
be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representa-  
tives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved  
itself a workable proposition and capable of safeguarding  
the interests of all sections of the community."

Then (it <sup>strategic work</sup>) Britain position was weakened. American policy was  
won over. But on the Cypriot side no adequate exploitation was  
made of Britain's slight but significant shift of position

On Nov. 22 Mak. broke off neg. with Hrding.  
Marshall was then in Baghdad (B. Power meeting). "I had a  
meeting (he writes) with Menzies and Zorin, who had accepted  
the formula without enthusiasm but without bitterness. Both of them deplo-  
red their of their relations with Greece." p. 674 And from his diary "The work  
of 26 yrs has been ruined by the Gov's adoption of Enosis and the violence of  
their propaganda." p. 674.



look at maps and few have realised the its key position both for us and the Turks. whoever held Cyprus commands the port of Alexandria and the back-door to Turkey" (p. 672)

(The riots in 1955 increased Cypriot-Turkish tension - ~~and was~~ undoubtedly caused if not promoted by the Government's Macmillan axioms - was a by-product of the Conference

Other by-products were

- a) Dulles claiming now that Britain was waging a counter-administration stand by Britain and on 23/9/55 by <sup>28</sup> vote of 22 with ten abstentions it was decided not to include Cyprus in the agenda of the United Nations.

FIELD - Marshal Sir JOHN HARDING arrived in Cyprus on October 3rd 1955 "determined to do his best to restore order and to reach some solution". p. 673.

Harding began negotiations with Makarios. <sup>at</sup> Edey seemed surprised to try a new formula for these talks. But this was not easy to devise without some weakening in our position. The search for a new basis of negotiation continued throughout October and November. I kept Dulles informed sometimes by telegraph sometimes by letter. One of the main difficulties was to discover how far the Archbishop and the Greek Government played their hands jointly or separately". p. 673.

Comment: at a tripartite conference the British Government managed to shed its load of responsibility on Cyprus. She could no longer play the game alone. Greece and Turkey and Cyprus were all equally involved in decision-making... and the issue could be thus excellently portrayed (assumption being that not all four could agree) and Britain left unscathed even if not absolutely wasted at the end. The second war to <sup>win</sup> over American policy-maker. Now Mr Macmillan worked with method and diligence. He took Dulles into his confidence. He showed willingness to work for ~~an~~ solution.

- The third was to lower political temperatures in England and by a display of reasonableness and willingness to understand to split the guns of the opposition.

Thus the ~~formality~~ almost concluded with the State of Emergency. It provided a cease for it. And so when the parliament debated a Cyprus bill in Dec. 5 1955 Macmillan writes:  
 "The third step was still hope of a settlement made responsible members unwilling to say things which would exacerbate feelings. Even James Griffiths... seemed to want not to be unhelpful." p. 675