

CHAPTER I.

In the form of an Introduction.

Now and in the foreseeable future world security will devolve upon the shoulders of the three greatest powers, i.e. U.S.A. U.S.S.R. and the British Commonwealth. Modern military technology, including the harnessing of atomic energy to military ends place the three great Powers above the rest of the world and increase the disparity in strength between them and any other power. No modern state, including two of the big five - France and China - can withstand for long the mechanical might air-power, naval strength and armour of any of the big three. World peace or world war will rest definitely with the Great Powers. The rest of the world can act only as reinforcements to the greatest powers.

Even amongst the big three only two, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, can pass the test of a really first rate power in relation to resources, man-power and economic and military potential. Great Britain is the smallest of the greatest powers. But though the smallest, she is by far the strongest geographically and strategically. Her early industrial development, her century old naval supremacy and the consequent far-flung conquests and commitments have placed Britain in a unique world position. From the geographical standpoint the British Isles command the northern entrance into, and exit from Europe. Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and Aden command the inland seas waterways from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. When the Napoleonic wars were over and British sea-power, encompassed, almost without competition, the great African Continent and the seas between Africa and Japan, it gradually established itself in the West-African seaboard and the Cape of Good Hope, which command the entrance to the Indian Ocean. The British Falkland Islands command the Southern entrance from the Pacific Ocean round Cape Horn and the West Indies command the North-South American sea routes through the Caribbean and also command the western approaches to the Panama Canal. Thus British seapower and possessions notably in the Caribbean and the Pacific ocean come

geographically near and are in cases intermingled with American possessions. By the agreement of 1940 when British bases were leased to the U.S.A. in the Bahamas, in Jamaica, in Barbadoe and Trinidad and the inevitable American establishment in a number of Pacific Islands has led and will increasingly lead to an "intermixture" of the possessions and power of the two countries. This in itself is a guarantee that territorially and strategically the interests of the two countries do not fundamentally conflict. The economic conflict which is likely to remain unresolved for some considerable time cannot in itself jeopardise Anglo-American relations unattended as it will be by geographically and/or historical complications and claims.

America, unlike Britain, is a power of the first magnitude but a predominantly American power. Her world influence without world naval and air bases has been up to now intangible and whenever it has been exercised it proved to be feeble and unenduring. But the results of two world wars has impressed upon the Americans the necessity of establishing their power beyond American shores and reinforce the admirable defensive position of America with further defensive rings stretching far into the Atlantic and indirectly to Europe and spreading over the Pacific to the borders of China. With leased bases with occupation and conquests of territory with massive armaments and so far the monopoly of atomic bomb production America emerges in the second half of the twentieth century as a truly formidable world power. From the Arab lands, right round the world to the coast of China and beyond the U.S.A. is making the volume of its power felt. Will that power be a stabilising force in the future or will American isolationism turn into rabid imperialism and try and supplant British domination or render British power a mere appendage to American omnipotence? The open ports, the direct connection through the ocean mains to all parts of the world the air-naval domination of the Atlantic and the Pacific which are within America's physical reach and which can place American's power into swift contact with any point of the globe with the sole exception of the ~~mass~~-land-mass of northern Europe and Asia, make America one of the decisive factors in world destiny in our future.

The U.S.S.R. unlike Britain which is a naval power and America which is both military, naval and air power, is predominantly a land power. Potentially the Soviet Union is the strongest and richest power on earth, and on present reckoning she ranks a power on an equal ~~foot~~ footing with America. But in spite of its size and power, actual and potential, the U.S.S.R. is not a world power of the magnitude of the other two. The U.S.S.R. is an imprisoned giant with its influence confined within its own regions and not "directly" brought to bear upon other communities. Even if its influence is bound to grow upon the border states, still those states cannot be encompassed by that influence in the same way that naval power can which is both intangible and potent. America and Britain with their navies can exercise far more influence, let us say upon distant Iraq or Persia than the U.S.S.R. which is next door. And when it comes to points relatively removed from the U.S.S.R. then the latter's influence is practically non-existent - influence that is to say that springs directly or indirectly from the existence of power.

The U.S.S.R. in spite of her immense size of uninterrupted compactness is almost completely landlocked. Modern U.S.S.R. in spite of her great power is hardly in any different position as far as the elusive world-skirting sea influence is concerned from the old Tsarist Empire. Ever since Russia began to expand from a small inland state in the neighbourhood of Moscow and drove the Tartar invaders eastwards started her drive to the Sea. The expansion was both North-eastwards and southwards. To the East, the Russian pursuing the invaders pushed steadily into Siberia, and Russian Cossacks were on the Pacific Ocean before they were on the Black Sea. That urge to the sea has been interpreted by Western observers to be the dominant characteristic of Russian policy during the last few centuries. But whatever the motives behind that drive the drive itself has been resisted with unabated obstinacy by the Western powers particularly by Great Britain. The drive itself and the opposition that it had excited which at times made Russia face the whole of Europe resulted in some form of Russian isolationism which for centuries have kept that country outside the main European political

social and economic cross -currents.

The physical aspect of the power of the U.S.S.R. from the standpoint of world problems is, unlike the two other powers (Great Britain and the U.S.A.) severely restricted. A look at the map will convince anybody of this serious drawback of the U.S.S.R. if she is to play her co-equal share in world security and international stability and peace. Seapower with the attendant bases is still, and is likely to remain for some considerable time the key to world peace and the means of enforcing peace; it is equally important in the promotion of trade and the steady and irresistible rapprochement among peoples. But for seapower, whether naval or commercial to play its part it requires the unrestricted use of sea lanes, the requisite bases and points d'appui the freedom of the oceans. How is the U.S.S.R. served in that direction? Indeed very badly. The two main sea "ways out" from the Baltic and the Black Sea are both through partially closed seas, the exits of which are not under her control. The Skagerrag is dominated by Denmark and the Kiel Canal runs through German territory. From the Black Sea the outlets of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are under Turkish sovereignty. The Caspian sea is landlocked and her greatest inland waterway the Volga flowing into the Caspian sea leads ~~xxx~~ thus to nowhere. To the north the Arctic ocean for almost the whole of the year limits navigation to a complete standstill with the sole exception of the ports of Murmansk and Petsamo - inevitably of limited and restricted importance - which are ice-free ports. To the south, between the U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean stand Persia, Afghanistan and the North West provinces of India. Equally restricted is the U.S.S.R.'s sea position in the Far East. Up to the capitulation of Japan, Vladivostok and the whole eastern seaboard of the Soviet Union was effectively enclosed by the chain of Japanese islands stretching from the southernmost tip of Kamchatka for three thousands miles down to Formosa. A soviet ship in war or peace had to pass through the Korean straits or through the Kurille chain, both Japanese dominated before reaching

the freedom of the open ocean. With the defeat of Japan and the establishment of the U.S.S.R. in Southern Sakhalin and the Kurille Islands an open Soviet window to the Pacific ocean has been established. That window leads through the inhospitable Yakutsk sea. Thus the U.S.S.R. occupying a sixth of the world's surface has only two unrestricted openings to the broad sea, one in the north-eastern tip of the Scandinavian peninsula and the other in the Pacific Ocean south of Kamchatka.

In contra-distinction the U.S.A. is now anchoring its defensive power in the Ryuku islands -almost to the shores of China, and behind it is a series of islands stretching to Hawaii which form an admirable defensive and offensive region and provide the U.S.A. with innumerable air and naval bases. Lower down, in the southern Pacific, the U.S.A. power reaches to the regions of Australasia. To all intents and purposes, from the standpoint of bare power the Pacific is becoming an American Lake. Throughout all that vast sea as well as in the Caribbean American power is supreme and its influence is relatively preponderant in the Atlantic. In such a position the U.S.A. can exercise admittedly at times indirect but nevertheless potent influence in the shaping of events throughout the whole American continent as well as in the countries washed by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Great Britain finds herself in the second half of the twentieth century almost in the same advantageous situation as she had after the Napoleonic wars: with only one exception - that her influence in the American continent has vanished and if it is to be relatively reasserted it has to be done with U.S.A. indulgence. British sea power, with the collapse of Italy and the elimination of the Italian navy and the great weakening of France dominates the Mediterranean and skirts the world promontory from Gibraltar to Singapore round the coast of Africa. Indonesia becomes a kind of no-man's-land between the sea power of Great Britain and the U.S.A.

Such is the world picture if one looks beneath the covering of words and wishes and sees the bare bones of power at the end of the second world war. As such it means that in every case U.S.S.R. forces have to be used under the world Security Organisation for

maintaining peace or for exerting compulsion to would-be aggressors in the future, those forces, save where there is territorial contiguity will be the hostages of Britain or America. The U.S.S.R. has no world bases. Her ships have to use the bases of her allies or collaborators, something which is not a right but a privilege. Consequently there cannot be harmonious world co-operation between the three Great Powers where such a geographical military disparity exists. The whole complex of world power harmony centres round the question of control of the seaways. Are they to remain the exclusive right of individual Powers with the consequent uneven distribution of world authority and the attendant friction and conflict or are they to become the property of some international authority for example, the world security organisation (Security Council) in order to promote world harmony.

world's first socialist state its influence is great but indirect. Possessing a more or less self-sufficient economy and comprising territorial unity, internal changes and developments can influence the outside world indirectly by example only. Behind that example does not lie contact which is the thin edge of power.

Therefore whatever the three biggest Powers do now and are likely to do in the future is bound to have incalculable influence upon the entire planet. A concerted policy among them based on realisable aims will confer the cherished blessings of security, peace and progress on humanity. Prolonged and sustained disagreement and antagonism will result in instability, stringency and eventually another and more dreadful holocaust. The world might then truly plunge into Armageddon!

Is such concerted policy among the three principal Powers feasible? Unfortunately angry streams of suspicion and mistrust still flow between them. To bridge them, or at least to give the appearance of bridging them was comparatively easy while the war was on. The dire question of survival or subject or put every other consideration in the background. Harmony was established. But it was a deceptive harmony. With the ending of the war policy ceased to be looked at from the standpoint of the world's crying demands but through the dusty prism of Foreign Offices archives from which the formulators of policy are hardly able to lift their eyes.

The elimination of the Axis, Germany, Italy and Japan, from the list of reckonable Powers has left a void in the world of precarious balances and brought the three victorious powers, which for so long before looked or scowled at each other from behind safe distances into proximity and contact. As there was nothing ready-made to fill the ~~lx~~ void and preserve a form of stability the angry currents were stopped where they were by the "opposing fear". Thus a balance based on mutual fear has been found. But as fear is the worst possible guide to future policy and as it is the sure road to anarchy men began to feel less secure with the ending of the war than they were when rockets, bombs and shells were flying about. If this feeling of insecurity continues then Central Europe, Indonesia and Japan will become a vast "marsh" and what is on either side of them

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will become "glacis" of individual big powers. Then all points of contact between the three Powers will become points of conflict and tension will mount till either sanity will prevail ~~or~~ or universal explosion will result.

What is the driving force behind this apparent drive for the division of the world into three powerful constellations? Is it that so-called community of interest fall into the pattern of domination and become a scheme of Empire? Or is it due to the modern pernicious conception that the defence of any given power extends far beyond its own frontiers, embraces adjacent territories and pushes on beyond that ad infinitum? If we accept the principle that the active defence, in distinction to the passive defence of the U.S.A. must be anchored in the Ryuku Islands and ~~of~~ Anglo-American defence must be stretched somewhere to the depths of Eastern Europe, a line running from the Baltic to the Black Sea and embracing Poland and Rumania, then on the same principle the "active defence" of the U.S.S.R. must be pushed to the Atlantic seaboard in Europe and to the Alaskan and Canadian shores in the Pacific. In that case the whole thing becomes an unholy mix-up and instead of the big Powers becoming trustees of peace they become the real or nominal bosses, but nevertheless, bosses of the smaller states. National sovereignty will go by the board and the clock of human progress pushed back.

The student of politics cannot fail to realise the significance of the focal points of conflict being in Central Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Far East, particularly China. They do not embrace any of the countries of South America or the Western seaboard of Europe or the Continent of Africa. Conflicts might be in those places but they do not carry in themselves the seed of world war. Events in South America might interest the U.S.A. and to an extent Britain, but the latter has to play a secondary and subordinate role to the U.S.A. but at least she can claim a voice. Events in the Middle East, Syria or Palestine interest Great Britain and to an extent the U.S.A. although the latter can play a secondary role but can nevertheless claim and demand the "right" to have a co-equal share in responsibility. And yet if the Soviet Union will

demand a proportional voice in South American events on the principle of big-Power equality and world responsibility the reaction of Great Britain and America will be catastrophically adverse. Even in the Middle East which is territorially near to the Soviet Union and for which geographically and strategically it is vitally affected, the Soviet Union can have no voice, or at least, is not given a voice. And yet Gt. Britain and the U.S.A. demand not only a voice but the arrangement of the problems of Eastern Europe not according to the U.S.S.R.'s or the peoples concerned wishes but according to their (Gt. Britain and the U.S.A's) satisfaction. Thus equality of responsibility in world affairs is interpreted that the U.S.S.R. should cease to be interested in anything outside the U.S.S.R. while the rest of the world is conditioned by Anglo-American pressure and/or guidance.

Stripped of all the high-sounding words and moral utterances about democracy, representative institutions, people's will etc. with which the issues of Central and Eastern Europe and also of China are clothed, the bare fact emerges that it is the "unexpressed" will of the United Kingdom and of the U.S.A. to imprison the U.S.S.R. within the confines of its state frontiers. Nothing less than that will suffice in the eyes of the pursuers of such policy, to ensure big three co-operation. But such an urge fundamentally conflicts with the principle of equality of responsibility and undoes all the results of the war. It even goes further than the surrendering of the entire world to Anglo-American influence; it presupposes that the U.S.S.R. equally bows before the above combination. Realisation of such a policy is fraught with dire potentialities. It ignores and antagonises a big country and violates the oft expressed but hardly ever honoured principle that peoples should be allowed to determine their own destiny. Under Anglo-American world omnipotence the so-called determining of ones destiny will be fashioned according to the wishes of the Big Two.

Apart from the fact that such a policy is both impracticable and impossible of realisation, it is not one that will preserve

peace. It is rather one which will ultimately lead to war.

When one examines cursorily the whole world scene one comes to the startling realisation that there appears to be no profound conflicts of interest among the Great Powers. Britain is separated from the U.S.A. by three thousand miles of ocean and both are separated from the Soviet Union by the sub-continent of Europe and China. Each of them, if we include Britain and the Commonwealth possess vast territories, huge resources and are capable of immense advancement and economic prosperity. No one covets the territory of the other. The logic of economics, particularly if one takes the short range view, should render harmonious co-operation inevitable. The U.S.A. could find great markets in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and the undeveloped parts of the Western European Empires. Britain could equally find a great outlet for her products and provide in turn a market for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as within her Empire. World-wide advancement as well as the rapid economic expansion of the big ~~xxx~~ powers themselves depend on the fruitful economic co-operation. Why then if economically and territorially the three great countries do not come into conflict, should there be that seemingly unbridgeable chasm amongst them? Economically i.e. from the standpoint of the 19th century discredited economics of laissez-faire - there might be considerable antagonism and ultimately friction between Gt. Britain and the U.S.A. but there is none that one can at least foresee between the above two and the U.S.S.R. Politically, however, Gt. Britain becomes almost an appendage to U.S.A. policy towards the U.S.S.R. i.e. there is politically an apparently inexplicable hostility of the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. in which Britain plays the role of a planet to the American sun.

Seeing that conditions of harmony are hard to materialise the historian can only examine the causes of the antagonism and lay bare the roots of an all-pervading suspicion which conditions policy. In fact this is the only valid method by which one can go beneath the surface of things and examine the sub-soil upon which has grown this suspicion that has hardened into policy.

The history of the relations of the different countries are also important because the Foreign Offices have their views moulded by the contents of memoranda and files, dusty volumes of precis and documents that stretch back whole decades and even centuries. Therefore what happened in the past, right or wrong, which has not been expressly repudiated, but allowed to continue or lapse into disuetude, helps to mould opinions for those who are directly responsible for formulating policy.

It is an inevitable accompaniment of a foreign policy that it does not only affect the life and destinies of the nations which fathered that policy but that it equally affects the lives of other peoples. We can say that the Eastern Mediterranean must be under British domination or influence because it is paramount to British imperial security. But what happens then to the Egyptians, the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Cypriots etc? Must they remain the abject pawns in the game of big Power security? So far Foreign Policy has been following the slippery path of trying to harmonise these two incompatible tendencies, that of the security as it at a given time understood by the dominant nation and that of the demand of subordinate people for a full control of their affairs. That harmonising has been effected sometimes by force, sometimes by cajolery, sometimes by concession but has remained essentially unstable and a fountainhead of tension. A tension that progresses with cumulative effect and makes for world-wide instability, strengthening the antagonism of the big powers and leading to war. This insistence upon the security of the vital interests of the most powerful states involves an illiberal and arbitrary treatment of the weaker nations. And as such, it makes the prospect of an international order an elusive chimera.

When we examine the relations of Gt. Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. among themselves and their policy vis-a-vis the rest of the world we must always bear in mind that their alliance and co-operation did not evolve peacefully as a result of natural growth but has been forced upon them by the aggressive powers. As such it has worked more or less efficiently in war. But with the coming of peace we find that the negative basis of war-time

cooperation has disappeared and historic antagonisms have come to the fore. That historical antagonism, springing from diverse and conflicting policies and interests is particularly deep-rooted between Gt. Britain and the U.S.S.R. They are not so long-standing neither so deep-rooted between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. And yet the U.S.A. is now the ~~prim~~ chief anti-Soviet influence. The mantle of the anti-Russian policy of Pitt, of Palmerston, and of Disraeli has fallen upon the State Department which today appears to try to play in the world the same role that Great Britain played in the 19th century, i.e. of being constant in its anti-Russian pursuits and striving for a balance of power in the rest of the world. This is not a mere rhetorical statement but is borne out by the facts of U.S.A. policy. The demand for further bases in the Pacific, and presumably later on in the Atlantic, the maintenance of ever-whelming forces in a constant state of preparedness, the unwillingness to share the manufacturing secrets of the atomic bomb, the forbidding of direct or indirect concerted action by the other allies in areas considered to be within the American orbit, and the insistence on a voice in the unfolding events in Eastern Europe and the meddling in the internal affairs of China. All these are portents of the new American attitude to world problems. Great Britain has factually surrendered all her previous world influence and meddling to America with the exception of the Mediterranean zone, and plays in general questions a secondary and faithful role to the American protagonist. The U.S.A. protests about the Governments established after liberation in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria etc. Gt. Britain follows suit. The U.S.A. recognises the Hungarian Government and the Austrian Government. Britain follows suit. In all cases in international affairs on the morrow of victory wherever there has been any single instance by which some form of pressure could have been brought to bear upon the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. led the way and Britain followed. Cooperation and understanding there must be and not only among the two of the Great Powers but amongst them all, but that cooperation must be based on equality and not on pronouncement by the one side and acceptance by the other.

The lack of variance in Anglo-American relations towards the U.S.S.R. is hardly in itself a commendable fact. It would have been commendable had there been a fundamental harmony and cooperation in every aspect of economic social and political life. As it has been unfolding in the decisively formative period of the end of the global war Gt. Britain -U.S.A. cooperation has been one of community in antipathies only.

British-Russian antagonism is not in itself explosive or even untimately unresolved. It only becomes so when American tendencies come into play. But in itself British-Russian suspicion and mistrust, is by far the strongest contributor to world instability. Expressed in geographical terms this tension covers an area forming a semi-circle and stretching from the North Cape via Central Europe, the Danube Valley, Asia Minor, Iran and Afghanistan, i.e. from the Arctic region to the desolate Himalayan uplands. (The Far Eastern area, another point of British-Russian friction has now become an American preserve and a point of American-Russian friction). Whatever happens in that vast region of the globe is directly a concern of both Powers according to contemporary reckoning. But acceptance of this fact renders the peoples of these countries under certain compulsion to so regulate their lives as to conform to the wishes of two Great Powers when it principle it should be that the peoples concerned should be allowed to determine their future under conditions of freedom both in the external and internal field.

In Lord Baldwin's premiership the frontiers of England were on the Rhine. Now they have extended not only to the Elbe but one can say to the Vistula and the Danube. Such an extension of the security frontier implies direct and indirect intervention in the affairs of all states within that region, and promotes counter-measures by other interests.

The origins of British-Russian antagonis, are hard to define They go back into the dark past. There is no natural and/or historical reason why it should be so. Those who delight in seeing a certain fundamental cleavage between East and West which cannot be bridged

refrain from facing the logical conclusion of their argument or postulate their principles clearly that in that case the only solution to the world's ills is for the East to conquer the West or vice versa. As this is supposed to be impracticable, the next best thing is a patchwork arrangement which will keep the fundamental East-West conflict in being. But when one sees beneath the surface of things one finds that the terms East and West are in meaningless expressions except as a geographical designation. There is not the implied unity which will render them, at this stage, close knit entities. Germany - at least Western Germany - Britain, France, Spain and Italy are Western Powers. Their unity, or lack of it, has been amply demonstrated in the last few centuries. Britain and Japan are East and West Powers and yet they have been allies and friends both in peace and war. Britain and Russia are also East and West countries but although they have been always at loggerheads in peacetime, in the three major convulsions of the last 150 years - the Napoleonic and the first and second world-wars, they fought side by side. In the same period they only went to war one against each other - the Crimean war. If that is so then this antagonism does not constitute part of the nature of things and neither is it conditioned by geographical and historical factors which cannot be avoided. They are deep-rooted mistrusts springing from nothing more than the scheme of Empires which has been strengthened by historic traditions and geographic causes. Had Russia remained the small Muscovite state of the 16th century there would have been no East to West antagonism. Had Britain kept out of the Mediterranean and the Middle East there might not have arisen the Anglo-Russian conflict. Had there been an accommodating British attitude over the Mediterranean area, similar to that shown by Britain to France, Germany, Belgium and other countries in Africa, ^{the} Anglo-Russian conflict might have been resolved long ago.

The distinction one can draw between East and West is that whereas in the West we have clearly defined national and state entities, in the East the situation is more fluid. Gt. Britain, ~~and~~
to the Netherlands, France

France, Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark etc. are and have been clearly defined states with more or less definite geographical barriers or historically established frontiers - as is the case of Portugal. For several centuries/^{now} this situation has remained valid. But in the East the position is less stable. The ebb and flow of conquests, the spreading and overlapping of populations with distinct cultures and traditions over the barrierless European plains and the river valleys of central and south-eastern Europe have left no clearly defined lines of national cultures. In the West the Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic element after centuries of struggle against the Latin West reached a stage of accepted territorial equilibrium. Since Queen Mary lost Calais there have been no British attempts to have possessions across the Channel. With the sole exception of the Rock of Gibraltar, no part of Spanish territory has been coveted by Britain. The same applies to the other countries as regards Britain. In the East one has to remember that the boundary between the Germanic tribes and the Slavs was, at the time of Charlemagne, the River Elbe and that both Berlin and Vienna now stand in areas which were Slav areas in early medieval times. Since then the Germans have spread eastwards, engulfing and dominating Slavic people. The Germans through the centuries made a three-pronged advance eastward; one down the Danube Valley, the second across the European plain beyond the Elbe, the Oder and almost towards the Vistula, and the third across the Baltic coast almost into the Gulf of Finland. And beyond these utmost reaches of Teutonic settlement there have been established scattered but compact German communities in the East. Before the 1939 war there was German communities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, White Russia, the Volga Region of Russia and the Ukraine. Apart from the areas over which the Germans were actually in complete domination, wherever they have settled they were landlords or merchants. They were not assimilated by the surrounding people but remained a dominant "national minority" enjoying a privileged position amid subject populations.