

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN CYPRUS
DURING THE TURKISH OCCUPATION ON THE
BASIS OF SPANISH ARCHIVES OF SIMANCAS

PETROS STYLIANOU

1979

Διασκευή υποσημείωση και
επεξήγηση ως πανεπιστήμιο


Tennessee ως ΗΠΑ, ως
γενική ονομασία

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Παρακαλώ διευκρινισθείσα ως
αυτογραφή μου να παραμεινεί ως
αρχείο, η οποία επιδόθηκε ως αλληλο-
γράφου μου 16 Δεκεμβρίου 1983. Ουρρα
(ως αναμνηστική (Cum laude)) Διδά-
κτορας Φιλοσοφίας.



This study is by PETROS STYLIANOU

and particularly of the period of Turkish occupation (1974-1975), taking into consideration that the study of revolutionary activities and movements from 1972 to 1975 was basically unknown.

At these points in Cyprus history, over Sir George Hill, whose four volumes work A History of Cyprus Vol I-IV Cambridge University Press, (I vol. 1949), (II-III vol. 1949), (IV vol. 1950) and the author's work, together with the author's research, to reveal the present situation.

The sources of our research are based on the Spanish archives, which for the first time have brought to light by

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Tennessee University
U.S.A.

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟΥ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ

INTRODUCTION



This study is a substantial contribution to the study of Cyprus History and particularly of the period of Turkish occupation (1571-1878), taking into consideration that the chain of revolutionary preparations and movements from 1572 to 1630 was basically unknown.

All those engaged in Cyprus History, even Sir George Hill, whose monumental four volumed work A History of Cyprus Vol I-IV Cambridge University Press, (I vol. 1940), (II-III vol. 1948), (IV vol. 1952) is still fundamental and unsurpassed, ignore altogether the facts that the present research brings to light.

The elements of our research are based on the Spanish archives of Simancas, which for the first time were brought to light by distinguished professor of modern European history in the University of Salonica Ioannis K. Chasiotis by his exciting work "Spanish Documents in Cyprus History". This work was published in the series *Τυχαία και μελέτες επί Κυπριακής ιστορίας* No.3, of the Scientific Research (Cyprus) - Nicosia 1972. For a more thorough study of the documents the authorities of Simancas archives were very kind to respond to my request by forwarding to me a number of documents related to Cyprus History. I believe however that much more research work and study of these exciting sources of Cyprus history is needed to consider the work as complete. What is needed, in my opinion, is a long research on the spot for the evaluation of the still untreasured material of these archives which are related, at least, to Cyprus History.

These documents today historically used, give new dimensions to the obscured history of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and prove that Cyprus was an incessant revolutionary centre, in no way of less importance than Crete from the point of view of revolutionary movements against the same foreign ruler.

That the island otherwise could easily be taken over by the Christian West - as the repeated messages of the enslaved Greeks of the island to the Kings and other leaders of Christian Europe are



seeking - is shown from the fact that only some days after the naval battle of Nafpaktos, i.e. in February 1572, certain vessels were observed sailing near Cyprus coasts¹ and such was the fear of the turkish military guard of the island and especially of the panic stricken guard of Famagusta that members of the guard started pleading Greeks of Famagusta to help them to save their lives. Many members of the turkish guard dressed themselves with Greek dresses and put on Greek hats. At the same time some of them moved to Nicosia with the decision to give up themselves to the Christian army² in case of arrival of the Christian fleet. This panic of the Turks could partly be attributed to the fact that the castle of Famagusta, after the long and heroic defence of Greek Cypriot and Italian defenders of the castle, was still in ruins³. But the panic of the turkish guard of Cyprus was conveyed to the political and military circles of Constantinople as well, who hurried to send to the island 500 "genmitsaros", Jennitsars (soldiers) and four big vessels, while five small vessels were ordered to transport infantry and cavalry men from Karamania to Cyprus⁴.

But the presence of Turks in Cyprus - in spite of what certain foreign historians refer⁵ - could not continue without serious difficulties. A long series of revolutionary plans and movements will start to appear on the scene, which testify the incessant aspiration of Greek Cypriots to acquire their national freedom. The long distance from the enslaved Greek motherland and the free countries of Europe is not an impediment for the Greek Cypriots to undertake heroic and bold acts.

See also "A History of Cyprus", vol. IV (The Ottoman province, 1571-1943), page 33.

Our study gives a new approach to the literature relating to Cyprus History and sheds a new light on long and entirely obscured historical periods of Cyprus.

See also Hill's History, as above.

I warmly thank those who helped me in this study: The distinguished professor of modern european history in the University of Salonica Ioannis K. Chasiotis for his indications regarding the selection and supply of copies - relating to the study - from Spanish archives of Simancas, the Director of "Severios" Library (Nicosia) Mrs Deepina

Korogionnis

for indicating the bibliographical material, friend
Glafkos S. Christie for certain observations on the subject of
"Jennissars" in Cyprus and Miss Mitsa Solomou, secretary of Pancyprian
Organization for Rehabilitation of the Disable for typing the text.

PETROS STYLIANOU

Nicosia 1974

1. Archimandrite Kyprianos "Chronological History of the island of Cyprus", page 307.
2. Athanasios A. Sakellarios "Ta Kypriaka", volume E (pages 559-560).
3. Sir George Hill "A History of Cyprus", vol. IV (The Ottoman province. The British colony, 1571-1948), page 38.
4. George Hill's History, as above.
5. George Hill's History, as above.

A REVOLUTIONARY UPRISING IN CYPRUS IN 1578: HISTORICAL
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE UPRISING OF "JANNISSARS" AND
GREEK CYPRIOTS AGAINST THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION OF
THE ISLAND

The first substantial revolutionary movement in Cyprus happened seven years only after the occupation of the island, i.e. in 1578. The first written information about this extensive revolution come mainly from Spanish and Venetian sources, which however defer among themselves on certain basic details of the uprising.

According to the first information we have from Spanish archives, on Holy Saturday 29th March 1578 turkish slaves of Pasha Arab Ahmet of Cyprus, in cooperation with the "Jannissars" of the island, murdered him because they could not stand any longer his tyrannical tactics, his brutalities and his oppressive activities. To fill the post of Arab Ahmet the Sultan sent another Pasha with orders to annihilate "Jannissars" methodically and noislessly. Jannissars however have noticed the intentions of the new Pasha to annihilate them and acted immediately. During a religious se~~cre~~emony in the Moslem mosque they attacked and slaughtered "Tipeilimbey" of the island and his attendants. Then they slaughtered those who disagreed with them while many Turkish militarymen to save themselves were compelled to deliver to the rioters the castles of the island which they had under their control. "Jannissars" in cooperation with the Greeks of the island raised - as a revolutionary flag - the three flags of the principal enemies of Sultan i.e. the flags of Pope, of King Philip of Spain and of Venice. The information given by Hill - based on Venetian sources - in regard to the murder of the two turkish Pashas of the island is similar with the procedure included in a document sent by the famous Spanish diplomat Don Juan de Zuniga as Viceroy of Naples Marquis Mondejar.


Prominent and exclusive role in this uprising of 1578 is attributed to the Greek element by Athanasios Sakellarios, but this is not entirely true, since the uprising was a product of cooperation between Greeks and

Jannissars. In a report of Petros Lantzas, which was saved in a document of the Viceroy of Naples Marquis Mondejar, submitted to his Government, the combined role of Greek Cypriot revoltors and Jannissars rioters in the uprising of 1578 is better clarified. The information given by Petros Lantzas to Marquis of Mondejar differ in two points from Venetian information, as well as from the Spanish source which we have already mentioned. In Lantzas document the date 22nd May (1578) and not 29th March is given as the date of uprising, while it is also mentioned that the rioters (Jannissars) during the first day of the uprising killed the commissioner of Famagusta and during the following day, 23rd May, the general governor and pasha of Nicosia. The same information given by Petros Lantzas - who was eager to go voluntarily to Cyprus with two well equiped vessels - was also given by Annibal Prototico to the Viceroy of Naples.

From the aforesaid it is proved that the revolution was absolutely successful. In the interior every spot of resistance collapsed. The Government of the Ottoman Empire was thus compelled to intervene actively by sending to the island turkish admiral Ouloutz Ali, who had acted with success in Nafpaktos. He hurried to Famagusta with 50 vessels with intention to suppress the uprising. But he was repelled by the revoltors ~~during the clashes~~ *during the clashes.*

This latter success of revoltors i.e. to repel the attacks of Ouloutz Ali was met with doubt in the West, where they did not understand how great, exceptional and almost unique was this chance, which could be equal in importance with the chance that appeared after the naval battle of Nafpaktos. But the reality and the true facts are clear. About this unsuccessful attempt of Ouloutz Ali, who personally attacked Ararat, written statements have been saved not only of Petros Lantzas but also of witnesses in Lefkas, such as the statements of a Cypriot slave namely Ferrante Vitelli, who arrived on 2nd July 1578 in Kefallonia and who was general agent of (Latin) religious buildings in Corfu.

The failure of Ouloutz Ali, the successful chief admiral of the turkish fleet, cannot be evaluated with the common creteria and



measures. Because, apart from the fact that this happened after his personal success at Lepante, certain people considered that the revolt of 1578 in cyprus and the fact that the counter attack from the sea was repelled successfully had as a result the upsetting of turkish plans for a surprised attack of the turkish chief admiral against Apoulia or Calabria. It is considered that these plans would proceed because Guloutz Ali was to leave for Navarino before the revolutionary events happened in cyprus.

The revolt in cyprus could not continue for ever without foreign assistance. It is certainly a fact that some Spanish officials saw favourably this revolt and took a favourable stand towards the revolters, like the Spanish Ambassador in Rome Don Juan De Zuriga, who by his document (dated 24.7.1578) to the Viceroy of Naples, suggested the course that the Spaniards should follow in this instance. Particularly Don Juan zuriga had made a thorough evaluation of the existing political and military situation and considered as necessary and useful for the interests of spanish Monarchy to encourage the uprising of Jannissars and their (Greek) Christian co-fighters in Cyprus. He further however stresses that neither Spain nor Venice could act, because the former had serious trouble while the latter followed a policy of appeasement of the Sultan. The Holy See was only left, but it could not act effectively because of insufficient military power. According to Juan De Zuriga, all these difficulties could be surpassed if all three cooperated closely in the following way: With the close cooperation of the Pope and the Order of the Knights of Malta to form a corp of the Order consisting of 600 selected soldiers who should be put in charge of the revolters. The cyprriot refugees in Spain to undertake to organize the revolt of large masses of the population. From the outcome of the effort and generally from the course of the events until the end of next winter (1578-1579) it would be clear which should be the official stand of Spain from now on. It was stressed in the document that even from the fact that the Turks would be compelled - because of the revolt of Cyprus - to keep their fleet in alert, this would be of considerable benefit because the turkish fleet would be involved in the operations in Cyprus and could not be used against western Mediterranean. So, the small expense and the symbolic assistance to Cyprriot revolters would not



be in vain. The Spanish King, who would undertake to meet the expense of soldier's salaries and revolters' maintenance would achieve a double result: On the one hand he would cause a diversion of the attention of turkish naval forces for all winter, without having to assign for this purpose a single vessel. On the other hand, in case of successful outcome of the revolution in Cyprus he could hope that he could possibly exploit favourable developments by effecting armed intervention for conquering cyprus.

The Viceroy of Naples however, only 17 days ago, had submitted from Naples a ciphered letter to the King of Spain Philip B', by which he was explaining to him the reasons why Spain should keep away from the events that were happening in Cyprus. These reasons, according to Marquis Mondejar, are as follows: a) It was not certain that the situation in Cyprus was as alleged by Petros Lantzas b) Strict restrictions were put recently by royal decrees to sorties of Spanish vessels (to Eastern Mediterranean) c) Since the fleet of Ouloutz Ali was still there (near Cyprus) the mission of war vessels there was dangerous. And in case it was decided to send Spanish vessels to Cyprus these should at least be equal in number with the Turkish naval power. d) The fact that Cyprus was the most distant island of the Mediterranean made it difficult for the Spanish military forces to defend it. This difficulty was becoming even greater from the fact that the island was only 60 miles away from turkish coasts and e) From such an indirect military involvement it was possible that unfavourable problems could be created which might harm the objects of Margliano during his negotiations (in Constantinople).

It seems that the arguments of Marquis Mondejar, as stated above, had finally convinced King Philip to follow a policy of non intervention to what were taking place in Cyprus. Furthermore the King gave to Viceroy his consent to continue for the time being the solid spanish policy of keeping away from the events in the island and agreed with Marquis not to make any military preparation (in Naples or Sicily) before the developments of the matter could show clearly the situation which would be formulated. The revolters have thus been abandoned by the Spanish side.

Similar were also the reactions in Italy. After the announcement made by the revoltors, about their revolution, to Spain, the Pope and Venice as well as the briefing of the Government of Crete, the Venetians called three special meetings of the senate. But finally Venice could not manage to give any assistance to the revoltors and thus the revolution failed. This was natural since the revoltors were left alone to bear the whole load of a strong empire which was at its pick and was aspiring to conquer the whole world.

After the suppression of the revolution, it was natural that the revoltors met the sanctions and the reprisals of their rulers, who turned against revoltors and non revoltors.

The news about the suppression of the revolution came rather late to the West. And naturally the hopes of the claimants of the Kingdom of Cyprus were revived. One of those claimants, who appeared in 1578, was Guy de Saint - Gelais, the ruler of Lanzaac. He, as well as his father Louis de Saint - Gelais, were both serving the diplomacy and the Court at the same time. Guy particularly had a distinguished career as Ambassador in Poland and had contributed very much to the election of Henry B'.

Laboureur in his additions to the memoirs of Gasteluan stressed the conditions and presuppositions that permitted de Lanzaac to relate the name of Saint - Gelais with that of Lusignan and appear as a heir to the Lusignans Kings of Cyprus. This allegation of Saint - Gelais (for his identification with the Lusignans Kings of Cyprus) was questioned by certain historians, while others supported it as true to a certain point.

As soon as de Lanzaac was informed about the revolutionary uprising in Cyprus he developed an enormous activity and moved to every direction with a view to acquiring political and moral assistance on the one hand and on the other for securing the necessary financial resources that were necessary for carrying out an expedition against Cyprus. According to relevant information we have from the Ambassador of Philip B;

in Paris John de Vargas Mexia, the aforementioned claimant of Cyprus Lanzaac started long talks with Archbishop of Nazaret and the Venetian Ambassador, whom he tried to exploit to achieve his target.

His efforts towards the Ambassador were mainly aiming at convincing him to exercise his influence on pope so that he may agree to offer him the necessary support. During his talks with the Ambassador de Lanzaac underlined the enormous moral and political benefit that the Christian world would acquire if the kingdom of Cyprus was conquered and was used as a bastion against the Turks.

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Both aforementioned personalities gave indeed many promises to the Duke that they would openly support him. But the support which they finally gave him was rather moral than financial and thus the Duke had to sell immovable property and contract loans for his military operation and particularly for his programme to arm a whole armada. These ambitious plans of Lanzaac could have given the fruits expected by him and by those who were supporting him if at least one of the two great powers of that time (i.e. Spain or Venice) decided to help him. The spanish Ambassador in France describes Lanzaac as a young man with mature mind, maneuverability, excellent abilities that could be well exploited by the Spaniards but a little dangerous. He also describes him as a great enemy of the Queen of England.

But the activities of this young man have ended nowhere. The same Ambassador of Philip in Paris finally suggested to the King to give priority to the matters of India, which attract more interest for the Spaniards than the matters of Cyprus and the support of Lanzaac. This suggestion was made by the Ambassador in spite of the fact that he considered seriously the case of Lanzaac and at a certain point of his letter to King Philip he seems to favour some kind of support.

The revolution of 1578 in Cyprus presents also another angle of the Greek drama. The forced recruiting of Christian boys to turn them into Jannissars.

If from the uprising of 1578 certain events could be spotted out to draw useful conclusions from them these facts are the following:

A) Jannissars did not hesitate to revolt against the central ottoman authority, either when they felt unbearable tyranny or when there were reasons of lesser importance like the delay in payment of their salaries. This leads to the following conclusions:

a) Cypriot Jannissars were not closely linked with the central authority, otherwise they would not revolt in 1578 or plot in 1618. If they had unlimited confidence and devotion to the Sultan they would not take arms but they would ask by diplomatic means that Mpeillerbey should be replaced.

b) If it is supposed that the delay in payment of salaries of the corp of Jannissars was the main reason for the plot, two conclusions can be derived:

a' Either that unacceptable weaknesses existed between the central government and the Cyprus administration, or

b' That recklessness and embezzlements started very soon in Cyprus as well - like elsewhere in the empire. A similar attempt of stealing a large amount of money - by declaring wrong number of soldiers in the service - is referred to in a document of the Sultan, number 46 which has been published. This was addressed in April 1572, in the form of a severe note, to both Mpeillerbey and Defterdar (the Chief Accountant) of Cyprus.


B) The move of Jannissars for close cooperation with the Greek Cypriot during the development of the revolt - with a view to make the revolt a success - leads to the following conclusions:

a) Their national conscience and character was not entirely lost, but in the contrary existed in an oppressed and repulsed condition, in a form of conscientious alertness which awakes and takes a clear conscientious development, from the time their sense of dignity and pride is offended.

b) From a similar cooperation of Greek Cypriots and Jannissars - which appeared 40 years later again in Famagusta - with object the liberation of Cyprus with the cooperation of the Spaniards, it is testified again that the national (Greek) conscience of many Jannissars in Cyprus was not changed.

c) These two paralld movements indicate that if finally the revolutionary movements were successful, Cyprus would pass under Christian administration. Thus the conscientious alienation of Jannissars from turkish nationalism is complete.

c) The common appeal of Jannissars and the Greek Cypriot revoltors to Christian leaders and the Pope to help their common liberation struggle shows that the religious (Moslem) dogma was dead in them, since this does not prevent them from cooperating with Christian Orthodox (the Greek Cypriots) or the Catholic powers of Venetians and Spaniards as well as with the (Christian) military forces of the Pope.



1. A.G.S. - E. 1077, n. 98, A.G.S. - E. 1077, n. 97, A.G.S. - E. 1077, n. 88, A.G.S. - E. 1077, n. 96, A.G.S. - E. 1078, n. 108, A.G.S. - E. 1077, n. 117, A.G.S. - E. 1078, n. 156 etc. Published by I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", pages 5-6, 6-11, 11-12, 12-14, 14-16, 16-18, 18-19 etc.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF 1587

In the year 1587 the prominent citizens of the island stress that their only hopes for a new revolutionary movement is noted in Cyprus during the second half of 1587.

This new revolutionary initiative is attributed¹ to the oppression that Turkish arbitrary has started against the Greek population of the island. It is specifically said² that the homes of Christians are violated and many immoralities happen against wives and daughters. In two instances churches and monasteries were looted. In parallel, the Turkish rulers imposed many new unbearable taxes, the collection of which is sought by systematic threats, persecutions and tortures, to the extent that many are compelled to become Moslems. Then from Greek Cypriot families the sons are abducted - to be added to the corps of gennitsaros (Jannissaries), something which the inhabitants of the island consider as the worse menace that has fallen upon them as a result of the Turkish occupation of the island³.

As a result of this situation a secret gathering⁴ was called in the house of Archbishop Timotheos, during which it has been decided to send a written appeal to the King of Spain by which to ask his armed intervention in Cyprus for the liberation of the Christian inhabitants from Ottoman rule. In this new revolutionary movement Bishops, prominent citizens, clergymen and monks of the island were enlisted - after swearing-.

1. A.G.S. - E I342, number 53.

2. As above.

3. As above.

4. As above.

In this appeal which they sent to Spanish King on 24th October 1587 the prominent citizens of the island stress that their only hopes for their liberation are no longer turned towards the Venetians, but towards the powerful King of Spain - to whom they send priest Gabriel Nomikos⁵ - awaiting from him to send them a military leader, in charge of Spanish fleet, to take over the command of Cyprus revolution.

It is underlined in the above document that there are 65.000 men in Cyprus able to take arms, who are willing to revolt as soon as royal armada appears, while the Turks can hardly assemble 6.000 men. In this number cavalry men and Jannissaries are included - who are armed with "arkevouzia" - as well as the corps of cavalry men who are acting as coastguards. This, small in number, power of turkish guards of the island is due to the great losses that Turks have suffered during their clashes with Persian troops. Cypriot leaders are therefore requesting

5. About Gabriel Nomikos see A.G.S. - E II6I, number 108, included in I.K. Chasiotis; "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 44. See also document dated October 1604 addressed to the Viceroy of Naples Duke de Feria. In this document it is stressed that Gabriel Nomikos participated in certain Secret missions, carrying confidential documents from Greece and recently accompanying the Archbishop of Cyprus who died in Madrid. The Turks, having been informed about the activities of Nomikos, confiscated his property and arrested his two brothers. Because he could not return to his fatherland - where certainly execution awaited him - it is decided to establish himself in the kingdom of Sicily (or of Naples) and a regular monthly financial assistance of eight crowns (escoudes) be given to him.

On the other hand document number A.G.S. - E I293 number 186 (in which no place and time is mentioned) [October 1604] states that whereas Greek priest Gabriel Nomikos, who served the interests of Spanish King by repeated and dangerous journeys between Cyprus and Spain, is today in an advanced age, it has been decided to grand - in-aid him with eight crowns monthly and to make use of his services as the Viceroy (of Naples) may decide.

that a favourable, for their national liberation, decision is taken, which they are expecting to be conveyed to them by their messenger.

The Greek original document⁶ may have been lost.

According to a relevant document of the Spanish archives⁷ the Council of State studied - after royal instructions - the proposals which were submitted to the Spanish Government by the Archbishop of Cyprus, acting on behalf of all Christian inhabitants of the island. From the investigation of the situation and the elements available it was shown that Cypriots have no hope to get rid of the heavy slavery of Turks without the intervention of Spanish fleet. It has also been

6. I.K. Chasiotis: "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" 1972 page 21. At the end of the document a signed statement of the translator was added as follows: "Yo, Botuito Nericio de Sala Godo, criado de Su M(agesta)d hago fee que fielmente traduxe la sobrescripta/ letra de lengua griega, conforme a lo que me entregaron, en lengua castellana, como/arriba se contiene. En Madrid, siete de mayo de ochenta y ocho anos. /Botuito Nericio, criado de/ Su Mag(esta)d".

On the cover of the document (page d') translation of the Greek text of the management: ("Al muy religioso y muy Catholico y muy poderoso Rey . de las Espanas y de los demas Reynos don Phelippe de / Austria. / Dese con devido acotamiento / en Sus reales monos"). The usual details of the document (origin, date, receiver, sender, summary) are also added by the royal secretary (: Venezia /Nicosia - A Su M(agesta)d - ,587/El arcobispo de Chipre, a 24 de Octubre 1587/ Supp(lican) do en nombre de todos /los christianos de aquella/ ysla; se haga Jornada, I p(ar)a librarles de la tirania/ de los Turcos")

7. A.G.S. - E 1948 number 83.

ascertained that 65.000 experienced warriors were willing to fight to death for their liberation. On the other hand it has been ascertained that Cyprus is guarded only by 6.000 Turks, including cavalymen, Jennissaries and coastguards. In spite however of all these positive elements the Council of State suggests that the proposal for armed intervention in the island be rejected, but in such a way as no dissapointment is caused to the bearer of the proposals Gabriel Nomikos and his compatriots. This must be done in view of the possibility of undertaking similar operation in Cyprus in future. The Council also suggested to the king to accept the said messenger and speak to him favourably (for his case) as well as to approve a financial assistance to him towards the costs of his long journey. The Council also suggested to the King not to give to the representative of the Archbishop of Cyprus written messages, because it was possible to fall in the hands of Turks and thus the danger of reprisals might be created against the leader of the revolutionary movement and the other Christians of Cyprus.

The revolutionary movement of 1587 has not therefore succeeded and the excellent attempt of Archbishop Timotheos⁸ remained fruitless.

In another spanish document (of October 1604)⁹ which deals with the retirement of Gabriel Nomikos, it is mentioned that Nomikos participated in certain secret missions accompanying the Archbishop

8. About Archbishop Timotheos see K.P. Kyrris in Rivista Di Studi Ryzantini et Neoellinici number 14 and John Hakket - Charilaos I. Papaioannou: "History of the Church of Cyprus" Athens 1923, pages 259 and 260. The Church History of Hakket - Papaioannou places Timotheos as being Archbishop of Cyprus from 1572 to 1592.

9. A.G.S. - E II6I, number 108, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 45.



of Cyprus who died in Madrid. The name of the Archbishop is not known, because there is much disagreement among the Greek and foreign researchers about the list of Archbishops during the first years of Turkish occupation¹⁰. It seems however that the Archbishop referred to in this document was travelling in all Europe pleading for the assistance of the West for the liberation of his unfortunate compatriots from slavery.

through his son, to his relative in Heliakon Ioannis Boreas to transport his family to another area (which was not under Turkish occupation). Ioannis realized from the letter that there were serious reasons for the dispatch and understood its allegoric meaning. So he decided to transport his family to Corfu (which was under Venetian rule) and then he went to Cyprus to meet Petros Boreas. The latter called a secret meeting of five Bishops of the island in his house twelve miles away from Famagusta. It is furthermore stated that the Bishop who first came to the meeting, tried with cautious questions to ascertain which Christian ruler Ioannis Boreas considered as the most religious and powerful. After (the Bishop) ascertained that Boreas - who had served

1. A.G.S. - E 1092 number 2, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus history", page 28.

10. Costas Hadjipsaltis in Cyprus Studies, volume K ST, 1962, published a document of Archbishop of Cyprus Timotheos regarding the monastery of Heliakon pages 141 -143 - saying (page 142) specifically that: "After this year (1575) we know nothing about Timotheos, while his death must have happened before 1579 when the Archbishop's throne of Cyprus was taken over by Lavrentios". See also of the same author "Unknown Archbishop of Cyprus Lavrentios", "Cyprus Studies" volume 8, pages 137 -139.

But after the publication of document A.G.S. - E 1342, number 53 by I.K. Chasiotis these views must be revised because in the year 1587 Timotheos appears as a leader of revolutionary movement.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF 1589

According to Spanish documents¹ another movement for the liberation of the island is undertaken in August 1589 by the relatives Petros and Ioannis Renesis, in cooperation with Bishops of the island. In August 1589² the inhabitant of the island Petros Renesis, acting on behalf of the Bishops and other distinguished men, sent a message, through his son, to his relative in Nafplion Ioannis Renesis to transport his family to another area (which was not under turkish occupation). Ioannis realized from the letter that there were serious reasons for its dispatch and understood its allegoric meaning. So he hurried to transport his family to Corfu (which was under Venetian rule) and then he went to Cyprus to meet Petros Renesis. The latter called a secret meeting of five Bishops of the island³ in his home - twelve miles away from Famagusta. It is furthermore stated⁴ that the Bishop⁵ who first came to the meeting, tried with cautioned questions to ascertain which Christian ruler Ioannis Renesis considered as the most religious and powerful. After (the Bishop) ascertained that Renesis - who had served

1. A.G.S. - E 1092 number 28, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History", page 28.

2. There.

3. The number 5 Bishops contradicts the reality. The number of Bishops in the island was limited by frankish rule to three.

4. A.G.S. - E 1092, number 28 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 27.

5. But it is not made clear which one of all Bishops.

for 26 years in the spanish army and had in his possession documents⁶ certifying his services - considered the King of Spain as the most powerful and the most closed to his Catholic dogma, he carried out a religious service and subsequently he asked him to swear on the prayer book that he would keep the secret which he was about to entrust him.

A secret meeting of Bishops and certain prominent citizens of the island followed, in which it was decided to entrust Ioannis Renesis with the task to carry the document (to the spaniards) which he actually submitted to the Viceroy. His journey from Cyprus to Naples lasted four and a half months. He first arrived in Zakynthos, then he moved to Corfu and from there to Otranto and Naples⁷.

6. The 26 years service of Ioannis Renesis is certified by relevant decision of Philip B' of 31st May 1588 (A.G.S. - Nap. libro 129, sheet 128). The establishment of Renesis' family in Corfu mentioned in line 27, which was effected for other members (of the family) under different conditions, is testified from sources of Corfu; Lavrentios S. Brokinis "The emigration of people from Nafplion and Monemvasia to Corfu in the middle of 15th century", Corfu 1905, page 12. Also C.N. Sathas: Documents inedis relatifs a l' histoire de la Crece au moyen age, vol. 5, Paris 1884, page 301.

7. The document was published for the first time by I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 27, from a deciphered copy from A.G.S. - E 1092, number 28. On the upper right side of the first page of the text the following indication exists: "Descifrado". On the cover (d' page) the same indication appears about the deciphering of the document and a note is added about its content: "Descifrada/Lo que ha dicho al alvames que viene de /chipre. En Naples, a 8 de Junio 1590".

9. About the services of many members of this family of "Stradioti", at first to Venetian democracy and subsequently to Spanish Monarchy, see I.K. Chasiotis, the Greeks, page 142, notes, 2, 3 (where reference is also made about the presence of the family in Cyprus), 213, 222 and

Ioannis Renesis went through terrible hardships before he arrived in Naples⁸. Owing to these hardships of the long journey - which enfeebled him - he could not continue his journey to Spain, as it was originally decided for the completion of the mission entrusted to him. To this end Viceroy of Naples Count De Miranda transmitted to his Government the documents brought from Cyprus by Renesis, after he had attached to them his own report, about which we have already spoken, in which the Viceroy stated what was orally told to him by Renesis.

Unfortunately there are no indications of how the Spanish King reacted towards this appeal of Cypriots, which was submitted to him by the said Albanian Ioannis Renesis⁹. But it seems that this appeal was also met with the same cold and substantially negative reception from the part of the official (royal) Spanish side.

This new revolutionary attempt of enslaved Cypriots had not therefore substantial and concrete results.

8. A.G.S. - E 1098, number 29. It comes from a deciphered copy. On the upper left side of the text the details of the sender are shown (of count de Miranda, who was Viceroy of Naples during the years 1586-1596 and President of the Highest Council of Italy (he died in 1603) and date: "Napoles. /El conde de Miranda / A 15 de junio 1590").

On the right side the indication exists; "Descifrada". On the cover (d' page) of the document the same details are repeated, the date of receiving and a short summary of the document and of the report which was attached (A.G.S. - E 1092, number 28): "Napoles - A Su M(agesta)d - Descifrada. El conde de Miranda, a 15 de junio 1590. R(ecivi)da a II de julio/ Con nua relacion del alvanes/ que ha venido de chipre, despach(a)do / con nua carta de 3 obispos/ y otra gente principal de aquella / isla para Su M(agesta)d".

9. About the services of many members of this family of "Stradioti", at first to Venetian Democracy and subsequently to Spanish Monarchy, see I.K. Chasiotis, the Greeks, page 142, notes, 2,3 (where reference is also made about the presence of the family in Cyprus), 218, 222 and

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AND SUGGESTIONS

OF SIR ANTHONY SHERLEY FOR LIBRARY OF ST. PETERS


especially in A.S.V. - Sen, Mar, filze 47, with out number 48, with out number 49, with out number 54, with out number (I570 -I573) Senato - Secreta - Rettori, Reg. 105, sheet 220^r, 308^v, Reg. 119 sheet 317^r, Reg. 132 sheet 199 and A.G.S. - E 1024, number 13, E. 1098, number 153, E. 1105, number 224, E 1879, number 121, S.F. : Nap., libro 131, sheet 16^v, libro 16I, sheet 143^r - 145^v, libro 163, sheet 255, libro 169 sheet 51^r, libro 184, sheet 127^v.

1. British adventurer (1565 - after 1636). See Yavits, Flores, La "Peca politica de todo el mundo" d' Antony Sherley ou un aventurier au sein de service de L' Espagne, Paris 1963, page 51.

Also in A.G.S., more than 500 documents about his work saved while a number of various other sources exists in archive de Indias (Indiferente general, Junta de guerra, Consultas originales 1612-1618) tomo 147, tomo 5, leg. 17) of Seville and an unknown number of documents in A.S.V. about his propositions on Cyprus see A.G.S. - E. 1350, numbers 25, 27, 63, 65, 67, 68, 141, 231, etc.

2. Deciphered copy from A.G.S. - E. 1350, number 64. On the cover (page VIII) there exists an enlightening note about the sender, whose name is missing from the text of the document: "Copia de carta de don Antonio Sirley, de fecha 3 de abril 1609". This document of Sherley was not found. This copy transmitted by A.G.S. - E. 1350, number 63.

3. About see A.G.S. - E. 1350 numbers 25, 27, 63, 65, 67, 101, 231 etc. The salariness, by document number 63, is considered by the sender (Sir Antony Sherley) as a person that can be trusted.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AND SUGGESTIONS
OF SIR ANTONY SHERLEY FOR LIBERATION OF CYPRUS

On 3rd April 1604 Sir Antony Sherley¹ submits a document² to the King of Spain through his representative Paliarinos³, by which he conveys to the King of Spain propositions for the conquer of Cyprus. He had combined this case with the general spanish interests in Algier,

1. British adventurer (1565 - after 1636). See Xavier - A. Flores, Le "Peso politico de todo el mundo" d' Antony Sherley, ou un aventurier anglais au service de l' Espagne, Paris 1963, pages 9-15.

Also in A.G.S., more than 500 documents about him were saved while a number of various other sources exists in Archivo de Indias (Indiferente General, Junta de guerra, Consultas originales 1612-1618, estante 147, cajon 5, leg. 17) of Seville and an unknown number of documents in A.S.V. About his propositions on Cyprus see A.G.S. - E. 1350, numbers 23, 27, 65, 67, 68, 141, 231, etc.

2. Deciphered copy from A.G.S. - E. 1350 , number 64. On the cover (page VIII) there exists an enlightening note about the sender, whose name is missing from the text of the document: "Copia de carta de don Antonio Sirley, de Veneca 3 de abril 1604". This document of Sherley was not found. This was transmitted by A.G.S. - E. 1350, number 63.

3. About this see A.G.S. - E. 1350 numbers 23, 27, 63, 65, 67, 101, 231 etc. Knight Palarianos, by document number 63, is considered by the sender (Sir Antony Sherley) as a person that can be trusted.

.../...

where their only supporter remained the "King of cuco"⁴. It is emphasized in the document that the conquer of Cyprus will also open the way to the neutralization of the mercantile centres of the Near East, which are not only being exploited by the Ottomans but also by the western european enemies of Spanish Monarchy⁵.

For the preparation of this operation, sherley emphasizes in his document, he has already started working tentatively. Particularly, through his cooperater Michael Aggelou Coray, who comes from the area of Syria, he came into conduct with the Syrian noble Nami Shelubi, son of the Count of Palatinos Gogia Copher, who is now in Venice and arranged with him to convert in their plans the leaders of the Christian inhabitants of Lebanon and Syria⁶. To this end the Syrian noble traveled

4. "re del cuco" of line 10 of the document is the Moslem local chief of Algier who had collaborated with Spaniards in 1602. About him series of documents were saved in A.G.S., some Arabic, such as: E.492, E.493, E.494 etc., E.1949, numbers 92, 96, 115 etc, which were not used exhaustively by Carlos Rodriguez Joulia Saint - Cyr, Felipe III y el Rey de Guco, Madrit 1954.

5. According to I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History", page 44 the hint made in lines 18-19 about enemies of Spain ("altri memici") who are exploiting commercially the area of Halepi and generally Syria is very probably referring to the then developed tentative commercial activity of Englishmen and Dutch on the shores of Eastern Mediterranean. see Xavier - A Flores, as above page, 121.

6. References in lines 27 etc about the dispositions of the inhabitants of Syria against Ottomans are related with the turmoil that was created there at the time of the revolt of Drouzos and Maronites of Lebanon during the rule of Emir Fahr ad - Din B' (1598-1635) (See his conducts with the Christian West in P. Paolo Carali, Fahr Ad - Din II, Principe del Libano e la Corte d' Toscana Gli ^{stati} Italiani, l' Europa e li problema turco dopo Lepanto, Firenze 1961, 70 etc.). About the conducts developed later (1613) by Emir with Spaniards, see documents 57 and 58, in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" (pages 97-100 and 100 - 102, as well) asB. 1170



numbers 46, 100, 113, E. 1889, numbers 47, 115, 125, 193
- E. 1948 number 212 (views of Prime Minister de Lerma and counsellors of consejo de Estado about the various operation al plans in the East) where informations exists about consultations of Grand Duke of Toskani with Philip for rendering assistance to Fahr-ad-Din.

About the Syrian Cogia cepher, referred to in line 28etc, see I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History", page 44, and Giorgio Levi della vida: Recerche sulla formazione del Pi u antico Fondo dei manoscritti orientali della Biblioteca Vaticana, Roma 1939, page203).

The Patriarch referred to in lines 37 and 41 is the Patriarch of Antiochia Maronite Joseph B' Al Ruzzi (1591-1608), who was known for his relations with the West and for the introduction of Gregorian Calendar in Syria (1606). Gioseppo Emir of line 44 must be identified with the uncle and guardian of Emir Fahr-ad-Din, Yusuf.

The dispositions of Cypriote and Syrian Maronites to take part in antiturkish upraisals are shown in a Spanish deciphered document which includes an appeal of the Maronite Patriarch of Antiochia as well as of the Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus George B' to King Philip 3rd.

By "isti signiori" of line 52 the Venetians are certainly meant. The vessels of Genoa are described as belonging to King Philip by the word vostre of line 68 because of t'e close cooperation of admiral Gianandrea Doria (1539-1608) of Genoa with Spaniards since t'e time of Philip B' . For the same description of the vessels of Malta the traditional identification of the interests of Ioannites Knights with Spanish Monarchy should be born in mind. (Jaime Salva, La Orden de Malta y las acciones navales es espanolas, page 298 etc., where informations exists about common raids of Spaniards, Genoans and Ioannites in areas of Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus). The informer of Sherley referred to in line 81 is the English Ambassador in Constantinople Perry Lello (1597-1607). About the conquering plans submitted by Sherley to the Spaniards see K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", table A' , documents number 69, 70, 71, 75, pages 120-121.

in August of 1603 from Venice to Cyprus on the Venetian vessel "Zona" and subsequently disembarked in Tripolis. There he met the Patriarch of Maronites and Amir Yousouf, from whom he managed to get a written appeal to the King of Spain as well as a promise for the realization of antiturkish revolt of 30.000 infantrymen. Ten thousands of them will be armed with "arkevouzia". For this revolt those taking part in it will not need money or other kind of allowances apart from a small quantity of weapons. The success however of the revolt - Sherley emphasizes - will depend on the intervention of Spaniards in Cyprus, which has a particular importance for the material and moral coverage of the revolters of Syria. The conquer of Cyprus on the other hand - it is further emphasized - will probably lead the spanish weapons to the neighbouring Holy Sepulchre.

Sherley further emphasizes that the realization of the plan must be combined with the military achievements of the Shah of Persia against the Turks. He furthermore presumes that the development of military operations prejudge the final and conclusive overthrow of Ottomans, which is something that has already been spotted by the venetians - who are always acting wisely - and who are already studying in which ways they will take advantage of the impending turkish collapse. Spaniards should therefore hurry to obtain the Syrian shore, taking advantage of the proposition of the inhabitants and consolidating themselves in Cyprus. This operation - by which they will be safeguarded from possible predominance of Persians in the east - can easily be carried out by the united Spanish fleet of the Mediterranean (Sicily and Naples) and the maritime allies of Spanish King (Genoa and Malta).

In any case, Sherley emphasizes that he will further develop his plans in detail and that he will send his confessor to Spanish Court to hand over to the King the documents from Halepi.

By this opportunity and by the same document military information from Constantinoble, sent to sherley by the British Ambassador in that town on 22nd February and earlier, is being submitted. This information refer to the developments of the war between Persia and Turkey. According to these developments, the Ottoman state is running the most crucial turn in the whole course of its history.

THE 1606 CYPRIOT REVOLUTION UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF PETROS AVENTANIOS

Only thirty five years after the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey, as this is testified by many documents in the archives of Simancas¹ the Cypriot people, were engaging in a dramatic armed (revolutionary, popular) uprising in order to get rid of the foreign domination.

The cause and the reason of this armed uprising against the Turkish oppressors by the Greek Cypriot people was a decision by the Turkish governors of the island to apply in Cyprus the Turkish policies of jannissarism² (paedomazoma).

The Greek Cypriot revolutionaries under the leadership of Petros Aventanios³ - who managed to inspire the broad popular masses in the titanic effort which he undertook - had in the beginning important military successes although they were poorly armed⁴ (in essence almost unarmed) with the result that they had inflicted considerable losses and injuries among their Turkish conquerors.⁵

1. deposited with Archivo General de Simancas (A.G.S.) - Ceccion de Estado (E) file number (1077), document number 75 (No.75).

2. A.G.S. - E. No 149, given as document No 38 by Ioannis K. Chashiotis (J.K. Ch.) in his "Spanish documents of Cyprus History" (Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist.) 16th - 17th century A.D. Nicosia 1972 (Publication of the ~~Scientific~~ Cyprus Scientific Research Centre).

3. Aventanios. The ending anios is latin (from anius): possibly the root is the latin Aventus or the greek αφεντις: Afentis Afentanios > Aventanios. Compare similar linguistic phenomenon in the case of names of Cyprus localities: Koutsafentis, Koutsaventis, Koutsoventis, a village on the Entadaktylos mountain range - (a common phenomenon in the change of the greek letter ϕ (into the latin y)).

4. See A.G.S. - E 1105, No 149 and A.G.S. - E 493 without number.

5. More specifically they killed about 3500 Turks, see A.G.S. - E 493 without number, lines 38 and 39, "y mato mas de tres mil / y quinientos".

In this popular uprising about twelve thousand Greek Cypriots had taken part⁶. This is evidenced in two documents presented to the State Council of Spain, of which one was a letter dated 4th September 1606 and addressed to the king of Spain by the bishop of Paphos and other important citizens of the island, and the second document related to a memorandum by Petros Aventanios drafted for the information of the State Council of Spain.

But in spite of the initial military successes which are mentioned in many varied documents, the revolutionaries ultimately were defeated mainly because of lack of appropriate arms. Nevertheless the revolutionaries did not surrender their arms but retreated into the mountains from where they continued their difficult national liberation struggle against the Turkish oppressors waiting and anticipating the moral and material support by the Christian leaders of western Europe and in order to start again their organized and articulate counter-offensive for the final ejection from the Island of the Ottoman overlords. The number of the revolutionaries who had retreated to inaccessible mountainous areas was about four thousand⁷.

The Revolutionaries had decided to send to Spain their leader of the revolutionary uprising, Petros Aventanios himself - a matter which testifies that there was a kind of undeclared truce between the belligerents - who on behalf of all the people of the Island begged his majesty the king of Spain to undertake an expedition in the island and in order to free it from Turkish domination. More specifically Aventanios had asked the king for men, arms and ammunition and in return for this offer by the Spaniards he gives the assurance for a popular uprising of all the Greek Cypriots with the aim of the complete and final abolition of the Turkish rule and its replacement by the Spanish rule of the Island. Aventanios furthermore promised to offer to the king of Spain the Holy Head of Saint Philip (the Apostle) which was kept in a hiding place known only to Aventanios himself⁸. In the above mentioned document Petros Aventanios develops broader military aspects,

6. A.G.S. - E 493, without number, line 36: "el numero de doze mil, y siendo el d (io) ho".

7. A.G.S. - E 493, without number, lines 43-46: "de quatro mil

suggesting after the acquisition of Cyprus, the possibilities open to the spanish forces for the development of military endeavors for the acquisition of Jerusalem.

According to Aventanios⁹ the firm establishment of the Spanish presence in Cyprus would put Spain in a strong position to free the Holy Grave of "Our Lord Jesus christ"¹⁰. Aventanios had offered additional incentives to the Spaniards such as the repayment - even if partially - of arms and ammunition sent for the purpose in cyprus, through spoils which the revolutionary forces of the greek Cypriots had seized during the armed uprising in the encounters with the forces of the Turkish overlords. In this way Aventanios in the context of above documents reveals himself as a strong political military genius with broader perspectives of targets. But he had the bad luck to act in a period in which the turkish armies were still steadily developing - the seige of Vienna had not yet taken place with the consequences therefrom of the steady decline of the military might of the Ottoman Empire - with the consequent defeat of the dynamic uprising of 1606 in cyprus, whereas also the turn of the Spanish attention to the problems of Flándres¹¹ had absorbed most of the activity of the spanish state Council and of the Spanish Monarch, leaving for a more appropriate time in the future the problems of the Christian population of the Eastern Mediterranean basin.

christianos, que oy/44 dia están hechos fuertes en las mon - /45 tanas, esperando a que algún princi - /46 pe christiano se duela déellos.


8. A.G.S. - E. 493, with out number, lines 60-64.

9. A.G.S. - E. II05, no. 149.

10. A.G.S. - E. II05, no. 149.

11. A.G.S. - E. I878, no. 10.

.../....



Whilst Aventanios was struggling to convince the Spanish ruler of the necessity for a concrete (in arms and men) assistance towards the Greek Cypriot rebels, very harsh came the revenge of the Turkish occupation forces against the Greek Cypriot rebels. More particularly the family of Petros Aventanios suffered like others the inhuman penalties of the occupying forces. The Turkish rulers having confiscated and sold their property, had taken prisoners his mother and two of his brothers and had nailed his father - in - law on a cross¹².

The Spanish State Council expressed an opinion on the proposals of Petros Aventanios three years later¹³, more concretely on 14th March 1609. More particularly the state Council stressed that the following procedure should be followed:

- a) It suggested that the king and his Prime Minister the duke de Lerma should accept at a special hearing the Cypriot Representative.
- b) It suggested that they would offer Aventanios the affirmation that it was their intention not to leave helpless his compatriots but render them help.
- c) It suggested that they should take care to convince him (Aventanios) to restrain his compatriots fighters so that they stop all their military activities until more favorable conditions and circumstances arise for a military intervention of Spain in the island. The tactics, at least for the moment, of abstention by the Greek Cypriot guerillas from any fighting in the greek island against the Turkish occupation forces, as was suggested by the Spanish State Council to the king Philip the third, coincides with the tactics pursued by the same king in the

12. A.G.S. - E. II05 no I49 given in I.K. Ch., Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. pp62-63.

13. A.G.S. - E.493, with out number, given in I.K. Ch., Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. pp 64-66. The preserved written document of opinion of the Spanish State Council deals in most of its part with the proposals of Petros Aventanios and his advice to the Spanish for cooperation against the Turks. The State council in the last paragraph of his opinion testimony - and after the exposition of the history of the events in two long paragraphs - proceeds to a concise exposition of its own suggestions.



matters of the Greek Revolutionary Movements. Exactly the same stand was adopted by king Philip the third when (stating his opinion on the subject in answer to a document of the Regent of Naples, the count of Benavente) he stressed to the Regent of Naples that although he strongly wished to help the Cypriots in their efforts to regain their freedom, nevertheless the problem of the Flanders prevented him at the moment to effect a military intervention in the Greek Peninsula.

At the same time king Philip the 3rd advised Benavente to try to persuade the Greeks to show patience and selfrestrain, given that in a premature uprising, the result would be their own destruction.

Towards the unfortunate ending of the delegation of Petros Aventanios to Spain, contributed the fact of the long time passed for a decision to be taken by the State Council. This long lapse of time is mainly due to the long enforced stay of the leader of the revolution Petros Aventanios in Naples¹⁴. Then there was a new delay, in addition to the long stay of Aventanios in Naples when he reached Madrid but without the documents (apart from his passport) testifying to his role, not even the relevant letter from Count Benavente. In a way the secretary of the State council¹⁵ was justified to see with some suspicion the delegation of Petros Aventanios to Madrid. Hence he suggested¹⁶ the turning back of the case with the relevant documents to the Regent of Naples, count Benavente, who was asked to give concrete and explicit informations and clarifications:

a) concerning the bearer of the documents.

14. A.G.S. - E. II05 No 147 given in I.K. Ch., Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. No 37 p. 61.

15. The person is Andres de Prata.

16. A.G.S. - E. II05 No 147.

b) Concerning the signees of the documents (greek cypriot community leaders).

c) About the truth of the facts explained in the documents.

This procedure was suggested by Andres de Frada to the regent of Naples, been known that the last ~~was~~ was in a position to supply the requested facts since he had sent a special deputation to Cyprus who undertook to check and elaborate about the real political - military conditions existing in the Island¹⁷. As is known the regent count Benavente had sent to Cyprus the French knight Charles de Belmonte¹⁸ who had briefed him thoroughly about the situation in the island. Benavente in spite of the fact that his envoy to Cyprus Charles de Belmonte had not yet returned to Naples from Genoa - had become aware of the existing political - military situation in the island, having been briefed by De Belmonte from Genoa.

17. As above.

18. The mission of Belmonte to Cyprus, as is derived from a letter by the king of Naples (A.G.S. - E. II05 No 105, published for the first time by I.K.Ch. in sp. Doc. cyp. Hist. pp. 52-53, from the original, partly written in secret code) had its origin in a movement of certain Dutch merchants who had settled in Cyprus and who had transmitted to the spanish ambassador to Genoa Juan Vivas proposals of their own and of the people of Cyprus for the acquisition of cyprus by the spanish, with the warm support of the people who had on several occasions shown their willingness to put themselves under the sovereignty of the king of Spain. These Dutch merchants are described as "grandes catholicos" and as trustful persons (A.G.S. - E. II05 No 105, line 3). This characterization was necessary for the Dutch merchants in view of the existing at the time deep hatred between the Spaniards and the protestant people of the Low Countries, which had increased after the last had withdrawn from the Spanish control. As is known the problem of the Low Countries was one of the most serious of the European problems facing Spain.

[Comments and further portrayals about the French knight de Belmonte - in line 16 of A.G.S. - E. II05 No 105 is referred to as ("Velamon"), - look comments in above document by I.K.Ch. in Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. pp 53-54, where Velamon is identified as "Capitan Belmonte" who submitted

in 1622 to the regent of Naples, cardinal zapata, a report on the dethronement of the turkish gultan Osman the second (1618 - 20th May 1622). About Belmonte see also in above - A.G.S. - E. 1884-by Ricardo Magaleno Redondo, Papeles de Estado de la correspondencia y (negociacion de Napoles. Virreinato, Valladolid, 1942, pp. 142). About the same knig t see, also, doc. 40, 41, 43 and 60 with comments by I.K.Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist.)].

About the policy of Benavente with regard to the efforts of the Greeks, slavs, Albanians and Italians for shaking off the Ottoman yoke with the help of the Spanish - as is deduced from hint in lines 39-41 A.G.S. - E II05 no 105 - see a) reference I.K. Ch. Sp. doc. Cyp. Hist. pp 54, in A.G.S. - E 1099 - II05 (where almost every document refers also to above policies) and b) the secret reports sent by the agents of the Democracy of Venice, parts or section of which have been published selectively by Jov Tomic, gradja za istoriju pokreta na Balkanu protiv Turaka krajem XVI i pocetkon XVIII veka, Beograd 1933, pp 341 and seq. passim.

The indication in the document (A.G.S. - E II05 No 105) "en manos de Andres de Prata" is indicative of the seriousness of the document it refers to the secretary of the State Council [1600 Andres de Prata (+ 1611) who had been utilized during the above mentioned period for the following up of the Spanish policies with regard to the problems of the Italian peninsula]. After this the Spanish Consul sent to Benavente the relevant for the Cyprus case documents together with a map of Cyprus. The Consul suggested to him to send to cyprus a representative to personally ascertain the facts. The Regent accepted the suggestion and dr sent to Cyprus the French Knight Charles de Belmonte ("Carlos de Velamon"), who was considered highly knowledgeable about for fortifications and a trusted friend of the Spanish (see A.G.S. - E. II05 No 105).

Belmonte left from Naples in October 1608, arrived in Cyprus and met with the Dutch merchants. Belmonte having studied the existing situation in the island and having ascertained on the basis of the personal examinations he carried out, the prospects of realizing the

Benavente although he stressed the importance of the acquisition of Cyprus - which he described as the most interesting of all foreign matters facing Spain, under the proviso that the Spanish naval forces gave the necessary protection against attacks from the sea by the Turkish naval forces - and underlined the necessity of using considerable Spanish forces for the Cyprus venture so as to hit on the one hand the expected naval attacks from the Asia Minor Turkish shores, and to be able to cope in case of any betrayals by allies, a factor which ought to be taken into serious consideration not only in the case of Cyprus but also in the appearing perspectives for a similar Spanish military venture in the affairs of Greece and Albania. Nevertheless taking the immediate perspective of things, Benavente placed the serious situation of the Spanish affairs in Flanders as the number one problem of Spanish political matters, an assesment which relegated the Cyprus problem into secondary place¹⁹.

proposals of the merchants from Holland, as well as the objectivity of their suggestions, returned hereafter to Genoa with one of the aforementioned merchants. Belmonte with the merchant from Cyprus was expected - at the time Andres de Prada was addressing himself to Benavente - to arrive Naples from Genoa.

19. The Benavente document is published in I.K. ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. pp. 52 where are mentioned the identifications of the sender and recipient, dates of despatch and receipt and the competent secretary of the Council of State Andres de Prada to whom the letter was addressed, "Nap(ole)s - a Su M(agesta)d - descif(rada)- 1608. Elconde de Venav(en)te, a 24 de diciembre./R(ecivi)da a 24 de hen(er)o./.../ Al Rey n(uest)ro Senor. / en m(an)os de Andres de Prada, Su s(ecretari)o d' Estado".

CHAPTER IX

THE EVALUATION OF THE CYPRUS REVOLUTION OF 1606 FROM SPANISH POINT OF VIEW.

From a Spanish document¹ more light is shed on Cyprus revolution referred to by the Armenian historian Papken in his book "Pai Kibros", volume 1 page 24, registered by Krikor of Jaranagh². According to the Armenian historian about 80.000 Greek Cypriots revolted in 1606 (3) against their Turkish occupators. The revolt was suppressed by Porsou Pasha with the help of the Armenian inhabitants of the island. Papken says furthermore that about 40.000 revolters were killed. Hill says that this figure is exaggerated and that tradition has multiplied by 100 the number of victims⁴.

This Spanish document however⁵, which Bishop of Paphos Leontios⁶ and five prominent citizens⁷ have forwarded on 14th September 1606 to King Philip 3rd, asking for the liberation of the island, speaks about

1. A.G.S. - E. 1105, number, 148. this is affixed to documents Nos 36 and 37..

2. Pages 98-100. See George Hill "A History of Cyprus", volume IV, page 50, footnote 1.


3. Papken writes in some lines before that the revolt took place in 1600 adding that Pasha had entrusted to Armenians the defence of Paphos. A strong tradition actually connects the Armenians with Paphos Gate. These lines of Krikor however - according to Hill - are referring to a previous revolt.

4. As above.

5. A.G.S. - E. 1105, number 148.

6. Bishop of Paphos Leontios together with Archbishop of Cyprus Christodoulos will move a little bit later towards Duke of Savoy as well.

7. The names of five laymen clearly suggest popular Roman Catholic origin: I) Deti Libiero, Capitan en la dicha occassion me firmo II) Nicolas de Zoni me afirmo III) Albezo Nicolas me firmo IV) Don



terrible events that had happened in the island. Bishop Leontios and his co-signatories addressed the King of Spain on behalf of the whole Christian population of the island and informed him that they had revolted against their foreign occupators, asking desperately his help. To this end they were sending to him the military leader of the revolution noble Petros Aventanios³, who was of Spanish origin. A certain section of revolvers has formed a guerilla corp of 4.000 men who are fighting from the mountains. It is further underlined that Cypriot revolvers have no more confidence in any other Christian ruler - except the King of Spain - whom they request to accept their envoy and approve their appeal for help.

Fran(is)co Litigio me firmo v) Cesar Alvys da Lanna me Firmo.

8. The Chief of Cypriot revolvers ("capitan general") whose surname Aventanios is of roman catholic origin - Avendano is a common name among the Spaniards of the time - is also referred to in documents, coming from the correspondence of apostolic representative in Madrid during the years 1594-1610. These documents (with the exception of one only) refer to the involvement of Aventanios in the antiturkish revolt in the island. see A.S. Vat. Spagna, volume 321, sheet 126 (19th December 1594), volume 336, sheet 142-143 (19th June 1610), volume 369 sheet 39 (a draft of the previous document). A reference to the activities of Aventanios in Sicily in 1614 is made in two documents of A.G.S. published in Codoin, volume 45, pages 134, 165. Aventanios was permanently established in Naples. He - according to I.K. Chasiotis: Spanish documents of Cyprus History, pages 48 and 49 - is referred to in a legal document relating to a member of the Greek brotherhood (old Arch. "cap. Parchment No 6: 19th March 1619) as well as in the minutes of a meeting of the administration of Brotherhood of 6th April 1614 (as above, ledger 4, sheet 49v). (See document 51, lines 8-13, document 54, lines 8-12).

The reference (lines 19-20) to the spanish origin of Aventanios is a token of good policy of the authors of the document who were aiming at convincing and moving the Spanish Monarch. This effort is also met in other documents, such as A.G.S. - E. 1346, document No 33 which was registered under number 19 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History", pages 30-31, (lines 5-9).



Dramatic revolutionary events are happening in Cyprus in 1906. Spanish documents⁹ indicate that in this year Greek Cypriots revolted and formed a fighting force of 12.000 men, which - though almost unarmed¹⁰ - fought fiercely the Turks causing to them 3.500¹¹ victims. It was however natural that the revolters were defeated at the end, while 4.000 of them withdrew to the mountains awaiting the proper time - of an armed intervention by a Christian ruler - to continue their fight.

Leader of the revolters is Petros Aventanios who - in spite of the foreign origin of his name - is referred to as a Greek¹² in most Spanish documents.

After the suppression of the revolt the Turks have done terrible massacres and lootings. The Greek Christian population of the island is suffering wild oppression. There are numerous executions¹³. The family

9. A.G.S. - E. 1105 No. 149 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", pages 62-63.

10. As above.

11. As above.

12. See documents Nos 38 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 62, line 2 quoting "Don Petro Aventanio, griego de nacion, de la insula de Chipre, dize que...". In the same document 36, page 60, line 1 is quoted: "Don Petro de Avendano, griego de nazion, allegado...". See also document No 37 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 61, line 1: "va equila tradicion de la carta en griego...".

13. A.G.S. - E. 494 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 57.

15. A.G.S. - E. 493 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", document 39, pages 64-66. In the written notice of the Spanish Council of State which has been saved the views of Petros Aventanios are mainly repeated.

of the leader of the revolt Petros Aventanios is suffering inhuman sanctions from the part of the occupators. The Turks, having confiscated his property, have arrested as hostages his mother and two brothers and have crucified his father in law¹⁴. In spite of all these Aventanios is going to Spain carrying written appeals of the "Bishop of the island" and other prominent citizens to ask for help in soldiers, weapons and ammunition, for which the revolters are prepared to pay even partly by giving away things that they have conquered during the hostilities. Aventanios pledges also to give the head of apostle Philippos to the King, saying that he is keeping it in a special hiding place. He is thus asking for an interview to report things in detail and underlines the fact that possible establishment of Spaniards in Cyprus will help them to conquer Jerusalem and set free the Holy Sepulchre.

The Spanish Council of State convenes three whole years¹⁵ after the dramatic events of 1606 to resolve in writing on 14th March 1609 - after considering the letter of Bishop of Paphos and his co-signatories addressed to the King of Spain together with a memorandum by Petros Aventanios, which he had written to enlighten the Ministerial Council - that the following procedure is necessary.

- a. To suggest to the King and his Prime Minister to accord an interview to the Cypriot envoy,
- b. To assure him of their willingness to help his compatriots
- and c. To convince him to exercise his influence on the revolters so that they may refrain from war acts until more favourable conditions are created for an armed intervention by Spaniards.

14. A.G.S. - E. 1105 No 149 included in I.K. Chasiotis Spanish Documents of Cyprus History, pages 62-63.

15. A.G.S. - E. 493 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", document 39, pages 64-66. In the written advice of the Spanish Council of State which has been saved the views of Petros Aventanios are mainly repeated.

The relatively long delay in reaching a decision by the Council of State is largely due to the long - more than a year - stay of Petros Aventanios in Naples¹⁶. It is also due to the fact that doubts were created in the mind of the Secretary of the Council of State¹⁷ because aventanios had not brought from Madrid - together with his official passport - the relevant letter of the Viceroy. The Secretary has thus suggested¹⁸ that the whole case and the relevant document be referred to the Viceroy Count Benavente, who would undertake to give concrete details,

a. regarding the bearer of the documents

b. regarding the signatories and

c. regarding the truthfulness of their argumentation), who was an expert in fortifications, and was a proven collaborator of Spaniards. He

This procedure is being suggested by Andres de Prada taking into consideration that Benavente was in a position to offer this information because he had already sent to Cyprus his special envoys, who had undertaken to find out the actual conditions that existed in the island¹⁹.

The Viceroy had actually sent to Cyprus French Chevalier Charles de Belmonte who had briefed him on the existing situation in the island.

16. A.G.S. E.1105, No. 147 bis, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" No 37, page 61.

17. Andres de Prada.

18. As above (A.G.S. - E.1105 No. 147 bis)

19. As above.

22. This testifies the truthfulness and objectivity of reported documents and appeals of Cypriot religious leaders and other/.../... elements to the West.



From a letter of the Viceroy of Naples Count Benavente²⁰ to the King of Spain Philip 3rd it is proved that the Ambassador of Spain in Genoa, Juan Vivas²¹, had already notified the Viceroy some days before that he had received from certain Dutch merchants - Catholics and reliable persons - who were established in Cyprus, suggestions for the conquer of the island by Spaniards with the help of the inhabitants, who had already expressed their willingness to work for their submission under the crown of the King of Spain.

The Spanish Ambassador had shown relevant documents together with a map of Cyprus to Benavente. The Ambassador had also suggested to him to send a special envoy to Cyprus to find out the actual situation. The Viceroy complied with the suggestion of the Ambassador and sent to Cyprus Chevalier Charles de Belmonte (Carlos de Velamon), who was an expert in fortifications and was a proven collaborator of Spaniards. He left Naples in October 1608 and upon his arrival in Cyprus he met the aforesaid merchants. After having verified the truthfulness of the suggestions and the possibility of their realization²² he returned together with one of the merchants to Genoa wherefrom he was expected in Naples. The Viceroy in his document²³ to the King of Spain promises to study the facts of the case after the return of "Velamon" to Naples, where he was expected to arrive to brief his Government.

20. It is published for the first time by I.K. Chasiotis in "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" pages 52-53 from A.G.S. - E.1105 No. 105 from the original with partly cryptographic text.

21. Don Juan Vivas (de Canamas) was Ambassador of Spain in Genoa and for short intervals in Savoy (Tourino) for more than twenty years (1599-1620). (See Hill, volume 4, pages 48-51). For the failed attempt information was saved in A.G.S. - E 1434, Nos 47, 72, 102, 117 etc. Passim.

22. This testifies the truthfulness and objectivity of repeated documents and appeals of Cypriot religious leaders and other social elements to the West.



In spite of all these Benavente expresses the opinion that though the serious situation of Spain in Flandre does not allow the undertaking of conquering operations, the idea of conquering Cyprus is the most interesting, since the maritime powers of Spaniards will safeguard them from Turkish attacks by the sea. In spite of all these considerable military power will be needed for overpowering Turkish attacks from the (neighbouring) land and for safeguarding from possible treason by friends, something which must be taken seriously in mind as well in regard to the (relevant) matters of Albania and Greece²⁴.

24. comments of I.K. Chasiotis (Spanish documents page 52). (On the cover(d' p.) besides the summary of the document (~~which summary is not published~~) details of the sender and the receiver are noted together with the date of forwarding, and receiving and the competent secretary of the Council of state to which the letter is being sent: "Nap(ole)s - a su M(agesta)d - descif(rada) - 1.608. / El conde de Venav(en)te, a 24 de diciembre . R(ecivi)da a 24 de heni(er)o. /... Al rey n(uest)ro Senor /En m(an)os de Andres de Prada, su s(ecretari)o d' Estadon).

The description (line 3) of the Dutch merchants of Cyprus as "grandes catholicos" was necessary in view of the hostility of Spaniards towards the protestant inhabitants of Netherland, who, after their withdrawal from Spanish rule, became one of the most serious problems of Spain in Europe and are generally called debeldes. See relevant comments in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", document 25 where a reference is made to Memici of Spanish Monarchy in the eastern Mediterranean . The French chevalier referred to with a distorted surname (lines 16-19) must be rather identified with "capitan" Pelmonte, who in 1622 submitted a report to the Viceroy of Naples about the dethronement of Turkish Sultan Ostian B' (1618- 20th May 1622) A.G.S. - g. 1834 by Ricardo Magdaleno Redonelo, P. de Estadode la correspondeciano y negodacion de Naples. Virrieno, Vaslanddia, 1942, page 142). See documents 40, 41, 43 and 60 (comments). The Viceroy referring (lines 39-41) to the revolts that were being prepared in Albania and Greece hints to the then intense efforts of Greeks, Slaves, Albanians etc to cause a stirring up in southwest Balkan peninsula with a view to Kicking away the Ottomans, mainly with Spanish weapons. See the relevant policy of Benavente in his correspondence with his superiors

Thus, even this shaking in extent and enthusiasm revolutionary movement of Greek cypriots of 1606, having left entirely uncovered from the western european and spanish side, has collapsed. A confirmation of the desire of Spaniards to substantially refrain from anything that is happening in Cyprus is the letter of King Philip 3rd to the viceroy of Naples²⁵.

By this letter Philip approves the policy on Cyprus suggested by Benavente as well as the mission of "Don Carlos de Velamon"²⁶ to Cyprus. And he certainly expects the results of his visit to Cyprus.

Philip suggests to count Benavente to reassure the Greeks²⁷ that he earnestly wishes to help them in their effort to gain their freedom

in Madrid in AGS - E. 1099 (almost all documents of these files) and in the secret reports that were sent to Venice by the agents of French Democracy. The latter were partly or selectively published by Jon Tomić, Gradja za istorija Poksreta na Protin Jura Ra Kvasem XVI i packetrom xvii neka.

25. A.G.S. - E 1878 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of cyprus History", pages 66-67.

26. About "Belamon" (Belmonte) mission see documents 32, 41, 43, 60.

27. The Greeks of Naples are four men from Epirus, namely Constantinos Postelnikos, skarlatos Matsas, Stavros Apsaras and Michael Bzoumenos, who since the beginning of 17th century they systematically started to persue the armed intervention of Spaniards in their fatherland, representing sometimes Bishop Larisis - Trikkis Dionysios and sometimes other compatriots. For their activities many information was included in A.G.S. in the sections of Estado: Costas de Africa y Levante, Napoles, Venecia, Expediciones maretimas and Servicios Militares. See I.K. Hasiotis, "Fuentes", pages 144, 145, 147.

but that certain problems compel him not to proceed for the time being to interventions in the greek peninsula. Philip finally suggests that Benavente may try to convince the Greeks to wait, since in case of an untimely revolt they may cause their destruction²⁸.

about six months after the council of state received its final conclusions, the well known Greco-Catholic militaryman Iraynos...

Raspis who is referred to as Cypriot because he lived in Cyprus for many years, is trying to make useful the presence of gossills...

a) That negotiations should start with their own after his return from Naples and that Viceroy should send relevant letters.

28. The special counsellor referred to shortly on the cover is diplomat P. Baltasarde Zuniga (+1622) member of Conselo de Essato and a dignitary second in command (Commandador Mayor) of Leon of the Order of Saint Jack (Santiago).

(1969), page 286 (note 27), in I.E.H. (works of which published by Jov. Soric, Gradja, pages 18-19, 196, 296, 299, 254 in I.E. Vat. (Sageas) volume 43, sheet 295v, volume 43 sheet 319, volume 319 sheet 30v, volume 320, sheet 30x-31x, 187v, volume 321, sheet 55r, 126r-126v, volume 323 sheet 69r). Support documents 52, 54, 55. I.E. Chacivita "Spanish Documents of Greek History". Relevant also work - see I.E. Chacivita "Spanish Documents of Greek History" page 170 - about the active involvement of Zuniga in the preparation of many revolutionary movements towards the end of 16th century and the beginning of 17th century is going to be published by I.E. Chacivita.


SUGGESTIONS OF KOMPIS TO PHILIP 3RD FOR
MAKING GUERRILLA EMIR OF SIDON USEFUL FOR AN
ARMED INTERVENTION OF SPANIARDS IN CYPRUS.

About six months after the Council of State reached its known conclusions, the well known Grecoalbanian militaryman Ironyomos Kompis¹ appears in the scene. When he was informed that the Grand Duke of Tuscany

is trying to exploit the presence of Emir of Sidon in Italy, by this Kompis who is referred to as Cypriot because he lived in Cyprus for many years, is trying to make useful the presence of guerrilla Emir of Sidon Fahr - ad - Din B' in Italy for the benefit of Cyprus. After the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa instructed Petros Aventanios, who was passing by that town, to try to meet Emir in Florence for the finding out if he was prepared to cooperate with the Spanish King and after the assurances given that Emir was actually ready to cooperate, Kompis suggested the following:

a) That negotiations should start with Emir soon after his return from Naples and that Viceroy should send relevant letters.

1. About Kompis see in A.G.S. specimens of which are in I.K. Chasiotis "La comunità greca di Napoli e i moti insurrezionali nella Penisola balcanica meridionale durante la seconda metà del XVI secolo", Balkan studies, volume 10 (1969), page 286 (note 27), in A.S.V. (some of which were published by Jov. Tomic, Gradja, pages 18-19, 198, 250, 259, 264 and A.S. Vat. (Spagna) volume 43, sheet 395v, volume 45 sheet 522r, volume 319 sheet 38v, volume 320, sheet 30v-31v, 132v, volume 321, sheet 55r, 126r-126v, volume 328 sheet 69r). Compare documents 19, 20, 52, 54, 56, I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History". Relevant monography - see I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" page 100 - about the active involvement of Kompis in the preparation of many revolutionary movements towards the end of 16th century and the beginning of 17th century is going to be published by I.K. Chasiotis.



THE REVOLUTION OF 1607

b) If things develop well Spain will gain many benefits, such as the conquer of Cyprus, the kingdom of Jerusalem, the fortifications of Syrian coast, the occupation of Hungary, Persia and Constantinoble and after a little difficulty the taking over of Albania and Greece.

Kompis' attempt to make useful Emir of Sidon in favour of the spanish King in the affair of Cyprus is repeated in his second document dated 31st december 1613², when he was informed that the Grand Duke of Toskan³ is trying to exploit the presence of Emir of sidon in Italy. In this second document Kompis suggests to the Spanish King to hurry in taking a decision - because the subject is connected with Holy sepulchre - while he finds at the same time the opportunity to speak again about his many sacrifices and services and raise questions relating to the unit of "stradioti" and the justified - according to Mpoua- claim to the salary of the son of its commander Michael Papada⁴.

2. See document in A.G.S. - E. 1949, number 226.

3. Kosimos B' (1609 - 1621) who welcomed in Livorno his ally Fahr ad-pin B' in 1613.

4. About Capitan Michael Papada (line 20, document 58-taken from A.G.S. - E.1949, number 226) see I.K. Chasiotis pages 101-102 where a reference about his arrival in Flandra, Italy is made in A.G.S. S.P.:

• Libro 154, sheet 307r, libro 162, sheet 181v, libro 166, sheet 159v-162r and A.S. vat Spagna, volume 319, sheet 19r.

5. M. Kanetos "History of Cyprus", vol. 0^a, page 1080.
A.G.S. - E number 1 (?) 104. the document which was for the first time published in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 51, was forwarded from Naples and was written by the author of most of the documents of the correspondence of Vicery Bonavente during this time and was included in the official correspondence of the Count. The "arresca" of 4th september is followed by other similar information - registered in the same document - forwarded from Constantinople on 19th september 1607. These as well, are referring to events irrelevant Cyprus.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1607

Grand Duke of Toskan⁵ made an unsuccessful attempt to invade the island at the same time. Cypriots attempt another revolution in 1607.

The Spanish fleet carried out successful operations in crucial points of the island. Grand Duke of Toskan Ferdinand II, relying on Cypriots' goodwill, attempted a surprised attack against Famagusta with 5 galleys, and 5,000 soldiers. But owing to a mistake by an officer, they entered the harbour through the wrong entrance instead of remaining out of it and entering it the next night as it had been decided. The Turks took their arms and called Cypriots to join them in the defence. Some 400 Cypriots rebelled at Paphos but they all lost their lives in massacre. According to the report of Sieur de Grandnou which was published in the work of Mas Latrie¹ "in 1607 Grand Duke attacked against Cyprus at the area of Paphos and the cape of Cavo Gata. He clashed with the Turkish fleet which was under the command of Greek abjurer Moustafa - and he defeated it, but he could not put his plans into effect in regard to Cyprus². The above events of 1607 are placed by the historian Ph. Zannetos³ in 1606, adding at the end that "similar attempt seems to have been undertaken by the Venetians in 1607".

Information about this attempt of the Grand Duke of Toskan also exists in a Spanish document⁴, by which it is announced to Constantinople

1. Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne de la Maison de Lusignan (volume C' official documents up to 1670, page 577).

2. Constantinos Sathas: "Greece under Turkish occupation", Athens 1869, page 196.

3. Ph. Zannetos "History of Cyprus", vol. C', page 1030.

4. A.G.S. - E number 1 (?) 104. The document which was for the first time published in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 51, was forwarded from Naples and was written by the author of most of the documents of the correspondence of Viceroy Benavente during this time and was included in the official correspondence of the count. The "ariso" of 4th September is followed by other similar information - registered in the same document - forwarded from Constantinople on 19th September 1607. These as well, are referring to events irrelevant Cyprus.

that 10 big and 15 small vessels belonging to the fleet of the Grand Duke of Toskan⁵ made an unsuccessful attempt to invade the island at certain areas of Famagusta and Larnaca. A word was spread also that the spanish fleet carried out successful operations in crucial points of cyprus. The government of the Ottoman Empire tried to strengthen the turkish guards of the island without delay, by forwarding, through Karamania, military forces, which were to arrive within ten days to their destination.

... prominent citizens of the island as well as document by Petrus Aventuricus - both documents presented to the Council of State - Petrus Aventuricus came back in 1483 with a new memorandum to the Spanish throne.

The memorandum as is mentioned at the beginning, refers to Cyprus and is submitted for the perusal of His Majesty the king of Spain Philip the third.

Aventuricus stresses at the beginning that the island of Cyprus and its kingdom have great strategic importance because of its military and geographic location, given that he who controls Cyprus is in a strong position to control at the same time Asia, Karamania, Syria and Egypt. This - as mentioned subsequently by Aventuricus - is mentioned

1. I.K. Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. p. 52.


2. ... Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. no. 52 ...

5. Ferdinand A' (1587-1609). About the naval operation of his vessels in Cyprus see Gino Guarnieri di Santo Stefano nell Storia della marina Italiana (1562-1859), Pisa 1960, pages 138-139, 207, 225-302.

3. ...

5. Indication of failing geographical knowledge in view of drawing parallels between continents (e.g. Asia) and countries, the last being parts of the continent; (e.g. Karamania, Syria, etc).

is in a strong position to control at the same time Asia, Karamania, Syria and Egypt. This - as mentioned subsequently by Aventuricus - is mentioned



THE APPEAL BY CYPRUS IN 1609 TO THE SPANISH KING PHILIP THE THIRD FOR LIBERATING CYPRUS

HISTORICALLY EXAMINED

In spite of the failure of the revolution of 1606 and the indirect rejection by the official Spanish side of the memorandum of the 4th of Sept. 1606, which was addressed to the Spanish king by the bishop of Paphos and other prominent citizens of the island, as well as a similar document by Petros Aventanios - both documents presented to the Spanish Council of State¹ - Petros Aventanios came back in 1609 with a new memorandum² to the Spanish throne.

The memorandum as is mentioned at the beginning³, refers to Cyprus and is submitted for the perusal of His Majesty⁴ the king of Spain Philip the third.

Aventanios stresses at the beginning that the island of Cyprus and its kingdom have great strategic significance because of wealth and military and geographic location, given that he who controls Cyprus is in a strong position to control at the same time Asia, Karamania, Syria and Egypt⁵. This - as mentioned subsequently by Aventanios - is mentioned

1. I.K. Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. p. 52.

2. Published in I.K. Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. His. no. 52 from A.G.S. - E 1949 and states in its first line the phrase: "En nombre de Jesus" (=in the name of Jesus").

3. Line 2. ...

4. As above. ...

5. Indication of failing geographical knowledge in view of drawing parallels between continents (e.g. Asia) and countries, the last being parts of the continent: (e.g. Karamania, Syria etc). ...

is in a strong position to control at the same time Asia Karamania, Syria and Egypt⁵. This - as mentioned subsequently by Aventanios - is mentioned

by the Greek overlords⁶ of the island, as well as in old and more recent written sources.

Aventanios subsequently proceeds to present the situation existing in the island. Having mentioned that the area of the island is about 700 thousand miles and its length 250 thousand⁷, he makes references to its cities which he describes, giving about them at the same time very useful military, political and demographic informations. Referring to Nicosia⁸, he places it correctly at the centre of the island, he characterizes Famagusta as the second larger city (demographically) but first in strategic importance. As third town in significance he mentions Kyrenia¹⁰, whose harbour nevertheless is affected by storms¹¹, whereas the fourth in importance town of Paphos has a calm harbour¹². In addition to the four above mentioned cities and towns he stresses that there are in the island 700 settlements, one being found for every mile, whereas more rural settlements are developing¹³.

6. The phrase "los griegos imperadores", of line 7 (A.G.S. - B 1949 no II9) indicates at large failing knowledge of the ancient (Greek) history of the Island, given the Greek composition of the population of Cyprus since antiquity.

7. Very evident is the wrong information.

8. Characteristic is the term used for the name of the town in foreign documents and writings: Nicosia.

9. The exact vocabulary in the Spanish copy: Famagusta (line I3).

10. Characteristic is the form in line I4: Cherreines.

11. Line I4: Cherreines es ciudad tercera verso tramundana... Related as the name still used for the name of mountains (in Kyrenia district) Tramundana in the Pentadaktylos range.

12. Line I5: Verso Poniente. The calm of the harbour has military significance for the success of a probable Spanish expedition in Cyprus, about which he will refer later.

13. Some of these rural settlements must have been remnants of the

The demographic information given by the document is very worthwhile. Characteristically it is mentioned in the document that the Greek population of the island - in spite of the brutalities, the tyranny and the terrorism as well as other acts of barbarism which the Turks had unleashed against it - continues to increase and the ^{rythm} of increase will continue unabated¹⁴. Already 28000 men (Greek Cypriots) are able to take up arms against the Turkish tyranny.

Very worthwhile is furthermore the information¹⁵ by Av. that the Turkish citizens of the island are apostates, who do not eagerly permit the settling of other Turks to the island¹⁶. On the contrary to the 28.000 whom the Greek Cypriot side can rally under arms, the Turks in

disappearing feudal system, some bearing an appropriate name such as tsiflikoudkia (feudal estates) (near ^{Ky}ythrea), tsouflidjin, elsewhere etc.

14. It is worth noting here the anticipation by P. Av. about a gradual increase - in spite of the persecutions - of the Greek Christian population of the island.

15. Line 22: Los Turcos que sse allan en aquel reino son los rrenegados de la mesma tierra...

16. This indicates that the Turkish masters of the island reacted against the settlement in the island of new Turks from the Turkish mainland, fearing perhaps the usurpation of land and other property, high positions etc and throws even some light to the question as to why the Turks from the Turkish mainland did not settle in the island in large numbers, in spite of its proximity to Turkey and lastly it is a supplementary evidence - exaggerated it must be stated - for the change by force of religion in the island, since it describes all the Turks in the island as apostates of Christianity.

numbers

the island cannot rally more than 6.000 men - and this with great difficulty - who furthermore are dispersed in 16 provinces. The small number of the Turks in the island is explained by Av. by the fact that many had been slaughtered¹⁷.

More specifically about Nicosia the information is given that it has II strong ramparts¹⁸, of which the two¹⁹ in the middle are in ruins making it possible for horsemen to get in, thus rendering the capture of the town on easy undertaking. Famagusta is described as having around it (7?) ramparts but the ditch surrounding these being at most places dry (without water), makes it easily possible for military units to approach, whereas the central entrance having a movable bridge offers the possibility of an easy conquest provided the undertaking is carried out at the right time.

17. It is repeated here again, line 28, the information about 3500 Turkish dead during the revolution of 1606.

18. The II bastions mentioned in line 30 according to an old map of Nicosia (Excerpta Cyprica. pp 86-87) bearing the title: SIEGE OF NICOSIA MDLXX and the information: These entrenchments are still in existence, 1899, are the following: Caraffa, Podocataro, Constanza, D' Avila, Tripoli, Rocas, Mala, Guirini, Barbaro, Londano, Flatro. The bastions bear at large names of prominent families of Nicosia (about these see Kyprianou, "Chronological History of the island of Cyprus, publ. by "Phoenix" Euripides Ioannou, Nicosia - Cyprus 1933 pp 401 to 402 such as the Caraffa bastion by the family of Caraffa, the family of Constanza, the D' Avila bastion by the family of D' Avila, the Flatro bastion by the family of Flatro. All evidence shows that the bastions acquired their names from these prominent families, due to the fact that these families undertook the expences of their erection (or part of it).

the family of Podocataro, the Constanza bastion the family of D' Podocataro

the Podocataro bastion by

19. In spite of our efforts we have not succeeded to identify them.

Kyrenia is mentioned as having a strong fortress²⁰ on the seaward side, whereas this can easily be conquered from the land side.

The inscription, consisting of four verses, guides to the conclusion that Lastly Paphos is mentioned as the fourth town in importance, but it is described as possessing a very worthwhile harbor, to which many sailship (παλιέες) run for protection. The town on the other hand is not very large and has no walls, although there is a castle outside the town²¹ which has ten guns and other military material, whereas at the foot of the castle is a little harbor, cut from the sea by a chain, where 10 sailships can find anchorage. This number however can be increased up to 80.

20. The castle of Kyrenia was utilized militarily very recently, during the period of the Turkish rebellion, 1963-1967, by the Cyprus National Guard - for dealing with any probable Turkish invasion - and also during the 2nd world War by the British rulers of the island.

During the last stages of the British presence in the island (period of the EOKA struggle: 1955 - 1959) it was stationed in the castle of a body of about 40 British soldiers, and the castle was utilized - for a few months ending the year 1955 - as a place of concentration (appr. 120 then) of Cypriot political detainees (fighters of EOKA).

By mid 1956 and until the end of the EOKA struggle the Castle was being used by the British masters of the Island as a place of tortures of captured patriots. See Petros Stylianou, The Castle of Kyrenia, Nicosia 1966.

21. The mentioned Castle is preserved until to day and is known as the castle of Paphos. The castle has been built on a site where during the Byzantine and French periods there was a castle built by Byzantium. About the castle of Paphos see Loizos Philippou Tourists Guide ("Tourists guide of Paphos") Nicosia, 1936, p. 25 as well as G.N. HJ Costis Ώρες της Πάφου ("Paphos Hours"), Nicosia 1969, p. 53. Over the entrance of the castle is a Turkish inscription translated in English by L. Philippou (as above p. 25).



Very worthwhile are the views subsequently expressed by ... in relation to the possibilities of military utilization of these islands -

The inscription, consisting of four verses, guides to the conclusion that the castle was built at the year 1000 since Hegira, which corresponds to the year 1592 A.D. The founder of the castle Ahmet Pasha, (about whom see L. Philippou, as above) a very worthwhile figure of the Ottoman Empire, was governor of Egypt and lastly for a short time prime minister, died in 1014 (hegira time). worthwhile is the information by L. Philippou (as above) as to the castle being fortified with 8 cannons - information which closely coincides with the information given by Petros Aventanios, speaking of the existence of 10 cannons in the castle - which (cannons) were removed after the acquisition of the island by the British. The castle was subsequently used by the British as stores for storing salt, and later as a Museum. Under the Cyprus Government it is being used as a Museum and on its highest point an observation post has been built by the Cypriot National Guard, in view of the panoramic view which reaches to the whole of Paphos up to Kouklia (the ancient Paphos), the fringes of the hills surrounding Ktima and the small island of Ayios Georgios at Feyia. From the above it is apparent the military significance of the castle and the importance of its capture, which Aventanios had stressed.

... was being used for scores of years as *μαγαζάκια* and was called *μαγαζάκια*. In these were stored for many years - possibly for centuries - commodities from Laphos, such as carob, citrus, fruits etc which subsequently were exported by sailing ships which could approach to a distance of half a mile from these *μαγαζάκια*. The sailships were loaded from these *μαγαζάκια* by the use of special loading ships. Similar *μαγαζάκια* in excellent condition - exist at the seaside Greek village of Vayles of the Kyrenia District which were built about 1920 and were till very recently - been used as stores for the loading and unloading of agricultural produce. Similar *μαγαζάκια* are found by near the Greek village of ... in the same district of Kyrenia and which were erected at about 1894 - 1895.

.../...

.../...



Very worthwhile are the views subsequently expressed by Av. in relation to the possibilities of military utilization of three islets - sited about three miles from the castle - called stores²² and where it is possible for many ships to find anchorage.

Av. describes the above islets as being safe and suitable for the landing of military units, which could offer a camping for soldiers - for as long as the army would wish - and in the case a decision for the conquest of the island had been taken, but under the provision that these islands would be well strengthened.

22. The name *μαγαζεβια* (Magacen, line 45-47) which is used about the islets in the Spanish copy of the memorandum of Petros Aventanos is still preserved - according to information given to the author by the researcher of Cyprus Scientific Centre A.Ch. Rousounides - in the mentioned district. Furthermore in Lapithos - according to information given to the author by the researcher from that town K.P. Kyrris - the term *μαγαζεβια* used to mean 20 years ago (and possible to day may still be in existence) commercial stores by the seaside. The buildings of present Reformation school of Lapithos - according to the same source - established in 1940 as a casino was being used for scores of years as *μαγαζεβια* and was called *μαγαζεβια*. In these were stored for many years - possible for centuries - commodities from Lapithos, such as carobos, citrus, fruits etc which subsequently were exported by sailships which could approach to a distance of half a mile from these *μαγαζεβια*. The sailships were loaded from these *μαγαζεβια* by the use of special loading ships. Similar *μαγαζεβια* in excellent condition - exist at the seaside Greek village of Vavylas of the Kyrenia District which were built about 1920 and were till very recently been used as stores for the loading and unloading of agricultural produce. Similar *μαγαζεβια* are found by near the greek village of Orka in the same district of Kyrenia and which were erected at about 1894 - 1895.

parallel to the coast of a part of a pure Greek surname Kyrenian compare other Greek names - therefore it is about Greek Cypriot prominent citizens - who till recently were wrongly considered to be "alien" captains such as Philippos Laskaris, Anastrios Laskaris, Demotrios Palaeologos - Designan "Description" f. 244v, 245r, 246.../...

But apart from these islets and independently of these islets Av. in his memorandum characterizes the district of Paphos as the key to the whole of the Cyprus kingdom, and from which it was possible to embark on the basis of a plan for the conquest of the whole of the island, in view of the following basic advantages which it has compared to the other districts. At first Paphos is described as having the capacities to provide large supplies for the needs of the whole of the army. Furthermore Paphos offered 2616 horsemen and foot soldiers whose captain was Ieronymus Erelesa²³, who is described by Av. as very willing to proclaim the revolution provided that he knew there was a plan for support of the revolution by the Spanish king.

23. A more careful study of the name Ieronymos Erelesa (line 50, A.G. - E. 1949 no 119) and his period, indicates (historically as well as glossologically) that captain Ieronymos Erelesa may be the same person as captain Marcos Antonios Kyrieleison - about whom see George Hill "A History of Cyprus", tome 3, p. 805, note 3 and K.P. Kyrris, "The Tylliri and Tylliria" "Kypriacos Logos", year 3, issue of Jan - April 1972 p. 70 - who distinguished himself in the war of 1570 - 71. Recent research - K.P. Kas above - tend to prove that at least some of the till recently considered Albanian captains (of whom our mentioned Kyrieleison) of the war 1570-71 were not Albanians, but prominent Cypriots who took the description "Albanians" either as leaders - as above - of Albanian bodies, or because a number of these were actually Albanians. Another captain under the name of Nicolaos Kyrieleison is met at the war of 1570 -71, but in Nicosia.

In parallel the surname Kyrieleison is a purely Greek one in contrast to the surnames of other captains such as: Albanos (Aniba), acted in the Chrysochou region, Rodacchi (Rondacchi, from rundache shield), Petros Mavresis, from the known Albanian ending - compare *Λουδοβέρδης* > *Λουδοβέρδης* > *Λουδοβέρδος* by Ioulos - etc. On the other hand in parallel to the bearer of a ~~pure~~ of a pure Greek surname Kyrieleison compare other Greek names - therefore it is about Greek Cypriot prominent citizens - who till recently were wrongly considered to be "Albanian" captains such as Philippos Laskaris, Demetrios Laskaris, Demetrios Palaeologos - Lusignan "Description" f. 244^v, 245^v, 246 as well as in

It was sufficient, according to ... for him (Hellas) to see the
 together with letters of the petitioner
 in Gio Sosomeo by G. Cobham (in Excerpta cyprica p. 85). If one of the
 above two Kyrieleison must be identified with Erelessa this must rather
 be the one who was active in the region of Paphos in view of the fact
 that Erelessa was considered by Aventanios on ready to act - in 1609 -
 in the Paphos region. On the other hand in no way could we exclude the
 possibility of identification between Erelessa (of the memorandum of
 Aventanios) with the son or grandson or other relation of captain
 Kyrieleison from either Paphos or Nicosia, who at the time of the
 presentation of the memorandum must have been a fully grown person.
 Furthermore examining linguistically the term Erelessa we can infer
 that in the greek language this is Kyrieleison from which other forms
 are derived in the greek language: Kyrieleisos >, Kyrelesos >, Kereleisos.
 The first part of this name Kyr could be taken as indication nobility
 e.g. Κυρ ταδουλος, which in western sources has become Kyrsak.
 Therefore the name Κυριελεισον could be split in the real or
 supposable partial parts, whence it is possible for the form Κυρ ελεισον
 to have been derived. The Spanish form Erelessa has the known ending
 form in -a in language - and in the rest of the Romanic languages -
 (e.g. Istria, Herrera, Doria, Catania, etc) and comprises such separation
 in composite parts, but with such jumble with elements of the first
 syntetic part.

.../...

It was sufficient, according to Av., for him (Erelesa) to see the flag of his Catholic Majesty together with letters of the petitioner (Av.) and he would instantly have obeyed to their orders. But there was a third reason, according to Aventanios, for which Paphos was considered as possessing strong advantages in relation to the other districts of the island for inaugurating a struggle for the liberation of the island from the Turkish yoke:

It is mentioned that the Turkish siliktar (officer of the cavalry) of Paphos
It was the existence in its wild inaccessible mountainous regions²⁴ of 4000 revolutionaries, as a result of the previous (in 1606) uprising. In the memorandum it is explicitly clarified about the reasons which forced the Greek Cypriots in the aforementioned revolutionary uprising. It is clearly stated that the main reason for the revolution were the efforts of the Turks to apply jannissarism in Cyprus - as they did in other parts where Greeks lived in the Turkish dominated areas - by the known method by which they used to forcibly despatch the most intelligent and healthy Greek Cypriot children to Constantinople to develop these into jannissaries.

24. Unquestionably clear and also very justified are the reasons for the 1606 revolution. Of primary importance, as has already been stated, is the explanation attributed to the forceful application of methods of jannissarism which has also led to similar reactions in other enslaved part, of Hellenism. Among other sources compare "The Greeks under Turkish Occupation" by Vassilios Sfyroeras pp. 130-131, where is mentioned the uprising of Chimara since 1566 as a result of the Turkish taxation and the application of Jannisarism. The people of Chimara having been strengthened with arms and ammunition by the Regent of Naples declared a revolution against the Ottomans. The Sultan having been informed what was in the offing sent against the rebels the Ottoman fleet, which having been supplied at Methoni and Pylos, reached Iperos. The Chimariotes when they realised that 8000 soldiers had disembarked on the sea shore they retreated to the mountains from where having been reorganized they attacked killing many of the Turkish soldiers and forcing the rest to retreat in disorder. Furthermore another mention of violent reaction against jannissarism - see V. sfyroera as above pp.33-34 - is given as having taken place in Naousa, Macedonia. More concretely

The strong disgust of the Greek Cypriots of the island towards this barbaric procedure of jannissarism²⁵ - which never existed before in the island - and also as a result of the practice of other brutalities and tyrannies on behalf of their overlords, the cypriots rebelled in 1606.

it is mentioned that the Turkish siliktar (officer of the cavalry of the Sultan's Guard) having gone there for a forceful conscription of 50 youths for the jannissarist's army met with the deterained resistance of the people, who refusing to surrender their children, killed the siliktar and his companions. As we are informed by a Turkish document the Naouseans "having in the end formed a gang of one hundred and more criminals, these infidels murderers, having as their leader the guerrilla Zisis Karademos and his two sons, raised the flag of rebellion and roaming through mountains and plains of the administrative centers of Verroia and Naousa have committed and are still committing thousands of crimes". In the end the guerrillas having been surrounded by the Voevoda of Veria, who was leading 800 moslems were captured or killed. among these last was Karademos, whereas his two sons were arrested and subsequently having been put to death were executed.

But the heroic resistance of the people of Naousa against the despicable institution of Jannissarism - as V. Sfyroeras very aptly remarks - manifests the epilogue of Jannissarism which since that time declines as an institution.

The dynamic reaction to the Greek population of Cyprus against Jannissarism - 40 and more years after its occupation - testifies as to the vitality of this section of Hellenism and its determination to survive ethnologically.

25. Very important historically is the above testimony of Aventanios, indicating that in Cyprus the methods of Jannissarism started to be applied only by 1606.

Nicosia 1973.

Aventanios in his memorandum appears once more as a clever politician, trying to touch the feelings of the Spanish monarchs on the issue of religion - declaring that the inhabitants of the island prefer to die as christians, that to survive as apostates - draws upon the steadfast catholic²⁶ faith of the inhabitants of the island, which makes it intolerable for them to sustain their oppression by the believers in another religion.

Supreme military leader of the 1606 revolution is found to be - in written testimony by the leader of the revolution himself in the above mentioned document - Don Petros Aventanios, who is considered - according to the same document - as the strongest and most important (military - political) personality of the island. The characterization which is given in justification of this characterization, does not stem only from Aventanios resumption the supreme military command of the 1606 revolution, but also on his being the leading representative of his compatriots in the delegations negotiating with the High porte and others (Turkish ministers). The undertaking by Aventanios of the important role of representative of the people and negotiator with the Porte, gave him the opportunity, which he utilized by developing the right tactics, to get first hand information about the population of the island, as well as the respective military forces and generally the demographic composition of each side (the greek cyriot and Turkish) which he has already presented by concrete numbers to the Spanish monarch.

26. Very conspicuous, as has already been mentioned, is the effort of Aventanios - in spite of the till recently allowable ignorance, as well as the temporary confusion between catholicism and orthodoxy - to move the Spanish monarch in the religious field as well exaggerating the percentage of the population believing in the catholic dogma. About the overwhelming majority of the Greek orthodox population of the island in the 17th century (but also during the whole period of the Turkish occupation of the Island) see Zach. N. Tsirpanli: "Unpublished documents from the archives of the Vatican" (1625 - 1667) (published by centre of Scientific Research - "Sources and Studies of Cyprus History" IV), Nicosia 1973.

Aventanios stresses anew that he has repeatedly in the past asked through memoranda from the Spanish monarch for the following as being absolutely essential for the reconquer of the Island: Lances, ten thousand swords, 6000 arquebuses and muskets and some other arms necessary for operations in rural and other areas in the plains. Consequently Aventanios had asked for 12000 soldiers, not for the conquest of the Island²⁷, but in order to preserve and consolidate the Spanish presence in the island. Of these 12000 soldiers, the 6000 would be used as a reservist force. At the same time Aventanios had asked for 200 horsemen for any unpredictable events. The small number of Spanish soldiers being asked for by Aventanios is explained subsequently in the memorandum by the fact that the island could provide (from its Greek Cypriot population) very considerable military forces which - in cooperation with any Spanish forces sent for the purpose - could be considered more than enough for dealing with any consequential foreign intervention. The military defence of the island could be completed, according to Aventanios, - as he had developed in the Past in other documents - by the disposition of 40 sailships and 25 other smaller vessels by the Spanish monarch, which - according to the signer of the memoranda - His Majesty could do with ease.

Aventanios in order to give material and economic incentives to the whole project and in order to give scope to any latent tendencies of the Spanish kings for acquiring useful things, stressed the abundance of products in Cyprus which the Spanish King, after he had conquered the island, could exploit to the full. Specifically it is mentioned that the master of the island could acquire in plentiful commodities

27. Towards this effect it was sufficient the much more numerous, than the Turkish Guard, force of the revolutionaries.

28. Foustes (skirts): fustas (line 76 A.G.S. - E 1949, No 119).

such as: wheat, cotton, sugar, salt, wine, oil, as well as a large quantity of gold annually. In addition mention is made in the memorandum about the existence in Cyprus of mines producing silver, sulphur and copper in addition to the already mentioned gold mines²⁹.

29. News about the mineral wealth of the island are given in many historical sources. Compare information by a Roman Patrician Pietro della Valle who visited the island in 1625 - only 12 years after the memorandum - entered in Cl. Del. Cobham Excerpta Cyprica, Cambridge 1908, pp. 214-215, on the basis of facts given to him by the Greek Cypriot monk and Italian scholar Mathew. Very important and serious is the information of Della Valle that the Cypriot nobility (Exc. Cyprica p. 212) although they had handed over to the Turkish conquerors everything they knew about the accounting and the land registration system of the Venetians - for which they were rewarded in various ways by the conquerors - they nevertheless refrained from disclosing to the conquerors anything they knew about mining in the island. In parallel and at the same time, on 8.9.1625. Alvise Cucci informs Della Valle "The Minerals existed still but... I would be hard to find anyone who knew them well, and could find them, the people were all very stupid: The Christians had long ago given up working the minerals so as not to tempt the Turks to covet the island, and the Turks had let them alone on account of their ignorance. (Excerpta Cypr. p. 219): No one knows now (in Cyprus) how to make the cloth or the thread (from the stone of Amiantus)... In the Laboratory of Ferrante Imperato of Naples a man of most curious learning, among the innumerable samples and strange things he had collected, I remember seeing both the stone and the cloth woven from it".

Even more important - as being nearer to the date of conquest - is the information - Exc. Cyp. p. 171 - by Villamont who in 1589 makes very clear remarks that the Cypriots have not disclosed to the Turks most of what they knew about mines agreeing in this with Della Valle: It has its mines of gold, which the Cypriots have not yet chosen to show to the Turks, no more that the mines of other kinds, except probably sulphate of copper which is used in medicine".

Expressing very different views (but much later, 1760-1767)

Mariti - Exc. Cyp. p. 10 - supports that "The Existing Turkish government allows no search, and no enterprise for their recovery"... "In old days there were mines of gold, silver, copper, iron marcasite (iron pyrites), vitriol and rock - alum: even emeralds have been found here. Of some of these remains but a memory, and the name of the district where they were found". His contemporary (1766) Constantius Sinaeus agrees with Mariti (Exc. Cypr. p. 309). "All... island..." and further on Constantius makes references about copper, vitriol, salt of other minerals.

The opposite information to the information by Villamont and Mariti is given in 1673 by Van Bruyn who - Exc. cypr. p. 243 - writes: "The turks will not allow the mines to be worked" whereas in parallel profesor John Peyman writing - between 1700-1709 speaks of "recent historians and geographers (who) speak of various mines in cyprus both of gold and silver and gems: but the present proprietors do not concern themselves about mines, and the Greeks, must not work them indeed the ore, after all their pains and charges would be of little advantage to them, for they know nothing of separation, or any other branch of metallurgy; under the Venetian government, however, Cyprus exported a great deal of very good vitriol...".

In parallel R. Pococke writing in 1738 - Exc. cypr. p. 262 - speaks like Van Bruyn about prohibition, which seems to derive from ignorance and negligence. But there arises so far the problem as to whether the turks really had, ignored the existence of mines in Cyprus . It is a fact that Selim the second by and order on the 4.5.71 (that is while the siege of Cyprus was continuing) he ordered the chief auditor and the governor of the island - see in Cyprus chronicles B' 1927, p.36, a turkish document translated by I.K. Peristianis published for the first time in Εορτακή Συλλογή Εθνικ. Πανεπιστημίου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (=Anniversary of the Philological school of the University of Constantinople), issue of June - december 1926, no 42 - to establish a calcium nitrate factory (salt - petre =potash) in the island, which most probably is the known "Fabrika" in New Paphos (same on above p. 36, compare Hill IV p. 18, no 1) for utilizing the gun powder transporters to Cyprus from

his military recommendation eventually placed Tripolis in October 1571 for the factory which the Turks had established when they discovered the existence of potash in Cyprus suitable for the manufacture of ammunition. For the above aim they had transferred to Cyprus skilled workers. Furthermore it is known that in the government machine (See K.P. Kyrries, Historical information about the mineral wealth of Cyprus" in "Cyprus studies", tome KΘ, 1965 p. 172) a section is indicated of incomes from the mines of Akatasi which registered mainly the mines of gold and silver as well as the relevant accounts and rents etc, but later other duties were transferred to this section completely irrelevant which may indicate the gradual decline of mineral prospecting in Cyprus. Therefore the weakness of the general utilization of the mineral wealth of the island by the Turks is due in our opinion to the following three reasons:

a) In the organizational structure of the new regime which had left behind in Cyprus, after the withdrawal of the main forces of the Turkish army on 17.9.1571, a very small number of Turkish soldiers and civilian settlers, (according to some - see Alessandro Podocattaro "Cypr. chr." XII, p. 31 - one in each community or village and not more than 3000) and the regime as a result had to rely mainly - as it is stressed by K.P.K. (as above) - on a substantial dynamic section of noble Latinos and greek Latinos, renegates or not, who by various manoeuvres and adaptations had managed very quickly to take the control in the new regime, to take for themselves the most important positions, the administration, the land and the resources of the island, and they were struggling to rid the island of the Turkish yoke with the help of the west.

b) In the conviction of the Cypriots that the Turkish occupation was temporary - example the uprisings and the efforts in general for the overthrow of the turkish yoke - and hence their decision not to hand over to the conquerors any knowledge which might help them to retain the island.

c) The mountainous population of the island - where were the most, important mines of the island - considered themselves as practically not coming under the Ottoman sovereignty and kept most of the laws and

Before he had completed his military recommendation Aventanios placed in front of king Philip a grand strategic plan: That by conquering Cyprus the foundations were laid for the conquest of Asia and Constantinople³⁰. As supporting argument the writer of the memorandum sites the fact that - due to the revolutionary uprisings and the Turkish Persian wars Asia is sparsely populated. In subsequence it is stressed that Spain will acquire the preconditions for its expansion to the Holy Places on the one hand - the liberation of which is an issue of the highest moral responsibility for the Spanish king, him being sponsor and protector of the Holy Catholic faith - and towards Egypt on the other hand due to the proximity of these places³¹.

ethics of the Lusignas and venetian intact (See Villamont (1589), Exc. Cypria pp. 173-174) as well as the properties and types of cultivations and industries intact. (See Villamont as above). The mountainous regions of the island had retained on almost absolute greek population.

Furthermore it is known that during the period of the second world war the Greek Mining Company as well as the Cyprus Mines Corporation produced gold in Cyprus - all the copper mines in Cyprus contain very small quantity of gold and silver - by the method of cyanice, which was discovered only 70 years earlier. This method was unknown to the ancients.

30) Here (line 82) Constantinople is mentioned by Aventanios in parallel to Asia, perhaps due to its position as capital of the Ottoman Empire.

31) About the strategic importance of Cyprus with relation to the Arab countries and the Turkish space, see article by K. Spyridakis in the magazine "Review of Speech and Art" Nicosia, issue No 10, p. 475 - 487.

.../...



According to Aventanios this duty of the Spanish monarch is considered very logical and just, the fulfilment of which does not allow further postponement, since it (postponement) is pregnant with the following dangers: either the Christian guerillas (Greek Cypriots) would die of cruel death (such as maltreatment if captured, or due to starvation or other privations) or might lose their soul (to become apostates)³². Aventanios joins in his petitions and supplicates to the Spanish king with the rest of the christian population of the island so that the king might come as a helper ^{and} protector of the island's Greek christian population, himself being a christian, as well as on his [the Spanish King] known qualities of being compassionate.

In conclusion Aventanios suggested the following:

A) The undertaking of an expedition should take place in September and October. The army it was suggested should embark in the expeditionary ships from Sicily or Naples and with the aim of reaching Cyprus by October. This was necessitated for the following two important reasons: first so that the army might be able to find the required provisions (and to talk and solve successfully, that is at the right time its problem of food supplies) and second, to allow to the Spanish navy to retain the initiative in its moves vis - a - vis the Turkish navy, in this easternmost region of the Mediterranean basin, as it would coincide with the absence from Cyprus of the Turkish nautical units, which at this time of the year would be at Constantinople.

B) The necessity is stressed for the strengthening of the guerilla movement, which could develop a decisive role in the fate of the whole operation. It is explicitly stressed that by the showing of a little ope

32. Time, as was natural, was working against the guerillas. At the time those who had retreated to inaccessible mountainous region of the island, were passing, during the time of the memorandum, their fourth year in the mountains.

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interest and compassion on behalf of the Spanish king the guerilla forces not only will succeed to sustain themselves but will be able to successfully defend themselves against the turkish oppressor. Aventanios praises the high morale of the guerillas, who are struggling, while anticipating a Spanish intervention and support in their noble struggle. The opinion is held, furthermore, among the guerillas that Spanish forces are very considerable and they do not lack the will for the undertaking of a military expedition against the Ottoman conquerors.

The petitioner stresses in the final turn of his appeal, that he does not intend to talk any longer than what he has developed so far.

He nevertheless submits on his final appeal his suggestion that the following four Greek - Albanians - as their names testify - military officers, who have a burning wish to fight, be sent to Cyprus instead of being idle in Naples. These - who must be noted belong to the service of the Spanish King - are the following: Captain Nicolaos Renesis³³, Ieronymus Kombis³⁴, Michael Mbuas³⁵ and Georghios Kresias³⁶.

33. About Renesis see A.G.S. - E. 1940 No 119, E. 1098 No 153, E. 1879 No. 121.

34. About Kombis see comments in I.K. Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. documents: 19, 20 and more specifically 57-58.

35. About Michael Mbua see E. 1098 no. 153, E. 1879, No. 121. The Mbua family played a very important role in the dramatic struggle of casting away the foreign yoke from the hellenic continental space. Already Michael Mbuas, ancestor of Michael Mbua, had participated - together with Korkodelos Kladas, Michael and Peter Ballis, Nicolaos Kresias and others - in the revolutionary uprising of the Peloponnesians in 1463, having been encouraged to this by the Venetians. As is known during the summer of 1463 the Venetians declared war against the Ottomans and sent as chief general in the field of operations, Berdoldo d' Este with the aim of cooperating with Alvise Lorentano, who since Jan. 1463 had been sent to Peloponnesus leading a nautical force (see Vas. Myroera "The greeks during Turkish rule", chapter "revolutionary uprisings during the 15th century", p. 119). Furthermore

In conclusion Averanius submits the suggestion that the expeditionary force taken dwelling at Mirrey of Nauplion, from where it (the) Petros Mbuas is praised for bravery - so is the other leading personality of the struggle against the Turks Michael Rallis - in Venetian documents of the period, having led the revolution in Arkadia (see V. Sfyrocras, as above p. 122). In parallel Theodoros Mbuas had closely cooperated with the reknown fighter Korkodelos Kladas, whereby they both succeeded - after the treaty between Venice and Turkey of 1479 - to capture the fastions of Megalou, Trigophylou and Oetylou and to liberate Kastania, Gastila, Vaskos, Piaga and Papaphingos. The cooperation between Kladas and Mbuas proved extremely fruitful with great successes. They smashed together (Jan. 1481) the operations undertaken against them by the order of the Sultan) by the Sankjakbey (governor) of Peloponnese and the Beylerbey of Roumeli Ali Bunico, rendering total destruction - more than 700 are considered the Turkish dead of the engagement in the eastern ranges of Oetylus - to the Turks. The cooperation between Mbuas and Kladas was discontinued when the first, having disagreed with Kladas in April 1483 withdrew from the region of military operations and returned to Nauplion.

A descendant of Theodoros Mbuas, who in 1480 was active in the Mami region, is the fighter of Vonitsa and Louros, Theodoros Mbuas Grivas, who - instigated by the Democracy of Venice - raised with his brother Ginos Mbuas in 1585 the flag of revolution in Akarmania and Ipirus and killed in one night the Turks of Vonitsa and Xeromeros. Mbuas was followed by the fighters of Ipirus, Pulios Drakos and Malamos who captured Arta and moved against ^{as} Xiannena (see V. Sfyroera ~~er~~ above p. 134). The overall fate of the revolution was decided when the Turks of Macedonia and Thessaly had rushed to face the revolutionaries, whereas Theodoros Mbuas Grivas - who was operating in Akarmania - was defeated by the Pasha of Nafpaktos at Acheloos, and had to retreat "to the sanctuaries of nearby mountains". The fate of his brother Ginos Mbuas was tragic, since having been pursued by the Turks and having reached Peratia he was killed (as above pp. 134 and 135).

36. All four surnames (Kresias, Mbuas, Renesis and Kombis) are Albanian. The ending -ias of Kresias is a commonplace ending of Albanian surnames. Compare Tousias, Thopias, Kresias. Mbuas is Albanian. Renesis is Albanian, incorporating the known ending - esis like ^Menesis, Renesis, Lykouresis. With regard to the name Kombis, comp. Komboti.

CHAPTER TEN

In conclusion Aventanios submits the suggestion that one expeditionary force takes dwelling at Birrey³⁷ of Naples, from where it (the expeditionary force) will be in a position to give help to the whole of the operation in terms of the necessary arms on the one hand and of the other necessities for the holy war on the other. In this way, according to Aventanios, the task will be under the grace of god and king.

In his new document the Cypriot leader... referring to his previous... of 1609, stresses in subsequent... which was not possible... of the matter (the Cyprus case) referred to the report... nevertheless four years had lapsed without an answer... this because... the... apart from the personal... for the production of... support for the dramatic struggle of the people of Cyprus.

37. The synchronous Bari?

Thus Aventanios... stress and anxiety, comes back to Madrid - with the... letters of de Lencastre - and submits to the king Philip the 3rd the... document of his in which he stresses that the acquisition of Cyprus will serve as a stepping ground for the expansion of the... sovereignty at first up to Rhodes and subsequently up to... and the Holy Places.

A.G.S. - 2. 23. 15. In the cover page (page 3^a) apart from the... summary it is recorded by the royal secretary a comprehensive and informative title about the contents of the document: "Memorial del capitán D(on) Fern(ando) de Aventanios".

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CHAPTER TEN

Nevertheless the tragic experiences of Aventanios as a result of the development of the Cyprus problem - that he asked in consequence of his letter that the Spanish throne - a realist and practical, SPANISH THRONE FOR THE LIBERATION OF CYPRUS AND THE OFFICIAL SPANISH REACTIONS taking of a decision on the Cyprus problem -

Four whole years lapsed since the presentation by Petros Aventanios of the document to the Spanish throne and the Spanish still continued to reflect on the Cyprus problem. In 1613 the Cypriot leader Petros Aventanios returns to Madrid - accompanied by a Cypriot comrade in arms - in order to deal anew with the Cyprus problem and to stress and try and impress by a new document¹ the need for an urgent decision which should be concrete and positive.

The Spanish position on this new desperate effort of Aventanios is all In his new document the Cypriot leader revolutionary, after initially referring to his previous known document - which we have mentioned - of 1609, stresses in subsequence with feelings of anxiety and indignation, which was not possible to hide or restrain, that although the investigation of the matter (the Cyprus case) was referred to the regent of Naples count Benavente, nevertheless four whole years had lapsed without an answer been received in his report and petition. This because count de Lemmos, who succeeded Benavente as regent of Naples, apart from the personal subsidisation and moral support for Aventanios he did nothing for the promotion of concrete support for the dramatic struggle of the people of Cyprus.

2. See also our work under publication: "The Cypriot national Thus Aventanios, under stress and anxiety, comes back to Madrid - with the supporting letters of de Lemos - and submits to the king Philip the 3rd the mentioned document of his in which he stresses that the acquisition of Cyprus will serve as a stepping ground for the expansion of the Spanish sovereignty at first up to Rhodes and subsequently up to Constantinople and the Holy Places.

I. A.G.S. - E. No. 121. On the cover page (page D') apart from the usual summary it is recorded by the royal secretary a comprehensive and informative title about the contents of the document: "Memorial del cap(ita)n D(on) P(erd)o de Avendano".

Nevertheless the tragic experiences of Aventanios as a result of the developments of his first measures, render him absolutely a realist and practical, with the result - and considering the very probable risk of the Spanish king to postpone once more the taking of a decision on the Cyprus problem - that he asked in consequence of his letter that the king authorized at least De Lemos to allow the departure from Naples with Aventanios of the Greek - Albanian military men of Naples Nicolaos Renesis, Ieronymos Kompis, Georgios Kresias, and Michael Mbua², who - after having been duly supplied by the king - should rally in support of Aventanios with the objective to start together a revolutionary or by armed uprising in Cyprus as soon as conditions became favourable.

The Spanish position on this new desperate effort of Aventanios is already outlined and determined within the drawn framework of the Spanish foreign policy and military strategy on the subject. Aventanios petition was preceded by a report by don Francisco Juan De Torres who had dealt in Naples with the case of Aventanios - this in carrying out the instructions on the matter of the secretary of the king Philip the 3rd Andres de Trade.

De Torres specified as follows the line of policy to be followed by Spain; Since it had been ascertained that Aventanios with his comrade³

- 2. See also our work under publication: "The Cypriot national liberation movements under Turkish occupation".
- 3. "Otro companero" of line 3 A.G.S. - E. 1949 no 161 is likely to be Demetrios, Cypriot priest, who was sent to Spain by the Cypriots Hector Denores, Loizos Bali and Markos Kouppis from Famagusta, to Spain for the promotion of a previous request of theirs to the king of Spain whereby they were urging him to intervene militarily in Cyprus (See A.G.S. - E. 1949, No. 150).

6. From A.G.S. - E. 1948 No 219, mentioned by I.L.S. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. no doc. no. 56 (pp. 96, 97).

7. This is a very worthwhile information in the .../... given by direct sources, by ... - according to which ... apostates had

and translator Sagta Mavra⁴ proposed virtually the same things, it was proposed to Count de Lemos, not to occupy himself thoroughly with the problem, given that this was not so important as to occupy him exhaustively. De Torres added in subsequence that if the king were interested to be informed about the existence and promotion of other (more simple) proceduses, a relevant report would be sent from Valencia⁵.


The final rejection of the last proposals of hopes of the rebellions (1606) Greek Cypriots was given by the spanish State Council by its document⁶ of the 3rd of August 1613. The arguments of this rejection by the State council of the proposals of the cyprriot revolutionary include in general outline the following: After referring - in a concise way - to the exposition of the facts by Petros Aventanios about the 1606 revolution - in which Moslems who had given up their religion are appeared as having taken part⁷ with the Greek Cypriots - the role and activities of Aventanios are subsequently described from the time of his departure from the island as representative of the revolutionaries. The argument stresses in subsequence that him (Aventanios) having been referred at first to the regent of Naples, the Count of Benavente - who was giving

4. Sangtamavra, of line 3 is (according to I.K.Ch. Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. p. 95) Julius Caesar Sangtamavra, son of code writer John (1538-1613). About Julius Caesar see Constantinos P. Kyrris "Cypriot Scholars in Venice", p. 249 note 8^I, as in Archivio Secreto Vaticano - Nanziazione Di Spagna, - as per I.K. Ch. as above p. 95-336, 20r, 54v-55r, tome 337, ^{sheet} 82r, 413-414r, tome 338, ^{sheet} 71r tome 339, ^{sheet} 19r, 57r, 80v-81r (1609 - 1614) and A.G.S. - E. 1879, No. 397, 409 (1616). Also see table A! (I.K.Ch., as above) doc. No. 108, 115. Last see A.G.S. - E. 1948, No. 209.

5. Here the implication about the promotion of other plans for Cyprus by another more fruitful procedure may refer to the proposal by don Juan Vivas (De Canamas), which is mentioned above, as in I.K.Ch. on above doc. 31, 37, 41, 43.

6. From. A.G.S. - E. 1948 No 209, mentioned by I.K.Ch, Sp. Doc. Cyp. Hist. as doc. No. 56 (pp. 96, 97).

7. This is a very worthwhile information in the document - given by direct sources, by P.Av. - according to which Moslem apostates had



him there a monthly salary of 50 eskudos - had arrived to Madrid, on the approval of the new regent Count De Lemos, asking for the concrete Spanish assistance to the petitions for help of the rebellions Cypriots, or at least the permission to return to Cyprus accompanied by the four known Greek - Albanian army officers of Naples, Nicolaos Renesis, Ieronymos Kompis, Georgios Kresias and Michael Mbua⁸, who after having been supplied by the Spanish with 5 to 6 thousand arms and 4000 Greeks, Albanians or Spaniards, would be able to succeed in the fulfilment of the fundamental targets of the whole expedition.

The argument of the council deals incidentally with the case of the Greek Cypriot man of letter Sangtamavra⁹, whose services had been utilized in Naples. More specifically it is pointed out that Sangtamavra acted as translator for Aventanios in Naples. However as a result of the mistrust which developed between the two men, instructions were given to Francisco Juan De Torres to find out about the truth. De Torres replied that Aventanios was the one who had taken part in the rebellion of Cyprus, coming subsequently to Naples as representative of the rebellions Cypriots, and it was Aventanios therefore the real representative of the people of Cyprus, whose aspirations he was expressing. But on this opportunity De Torres submitted the known suggestion that the case of Aventanios did not offer the same important scope which offered the acquisition of Cyprus by some other procedure (about which mentioned was made above).


To recapitulate the Council of State arrived to the following conclusions;

a) It considered that the acceptance of the suggestions of Aventanios in relation to the Cyprus problem met with the already known difficulties.

taken part in the rebellion. This movement has elements in it which are similar to the rebellion of the Greeks in the island and the Jannissaries of 1580.

8. About these see, Petros x Stylianou, under edition: "The Cypriot National liberation Movements under Turkish occupation".

9. See note above.



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b) It did not exclude at some time in the future the ascension of some action by Spain with regard to Cyprus, but under the necessary proviso that Aventanios - who would be sent anew to Cyprus with the assistance of the regent of Naples, and accompanied by two persons among those Aventanions had asked for, or other more suitable - would submit to the Spanish side a new report, in compliance with the new situation and developments pertaining to the island. The availability of new facts and reports was considered a necessary precondition if the most appropriate decisions were to be taken in future by the Spanish side.

c) It supported in secret Aventanios with 500 escudos for his expenses until that day.

In this way this dramatic and wonderful struggle of 1606 of the revolutionary Petros Aventanios and his compatriots virtually came to an end given that their petition for practical and concrete assistance by the Spanish side was being transferred in a last analysis to the systematic military initiative by the Spanish monarch for the recovery of the island. Great revolutionary excitement - In spite

1. The document is signed by Archbishop Christodoulos, Bishop of Limassol Iakovos, Bishop of Paphos Leontios, Bishop of Trichoupolis Koinis, chief priest of Nicosia Iakovos, chief priest of Lefkara Leontios, chief priest of Vavili Konstantinos, chief priest of Larnaca Konstantinos, chief priest of Kyrenia Theodoros, chief priest of Limassol Georgios, "grand logothetes" of Lefkara Bishopric Boikos Petros, secretary of holy church Chrolianos Dimas and steward of Paphos Iakovos.

Here I have made certain corrections to the wrong spelling of the names of Limassol, Paphos, Vavili etc.

2. A.G.S. - N. 494, with out number. On the cover (=d' page) the address: "ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΙΣΠΑΝΙΑΣ / ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΙΣΠΑΝΙΑΣ / ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΙΣΠΑΝΙΑΣ (-to the holy Catholic Kingdom of Spain, in Spain)"

3. The revolution of 1606 is here implied.

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CHAPTER ~~FOUR~~ ELEVEN

MEASURES TAKEN BY ARCHBISHOP OF CYPRUS CHRISTODOULOS
AND OTHER PERSONALITIES OF THE ISLAND

The dramatic and moving appeals of Cypriots, after the unsuccessful revolutions of 1606 and 1607, to the Christian rulers of Central and Western Europe for their liberation from the Turkish rule reach their climax in February 1609. More specifically between 3 and 5 February 1609 Archbishop of Cyprus Christodoulos, the Bishops of Limassol and Paphos and other religious leaders¹ are sending from Nicosia on 3rd February 1609 a document² to the Spanish King, in which they are underlining the massacres and the other oppressive measures of Turkish occupiers against the Christians of the island, following the revolt of the inhabitants³ and the attempt of the Duke of Toscan to land military forces after arrangements made with him by the inhabitants of the island.

The situation, as it has now been formulated, favours the undertaking of active and systematic military initiative by the Spanish Monarch for the recovery of the island. Great revolutionary excitement - in spite

1. The document is signed by Archbishop Christodoulos, Bishop of Limassol Iacovos, Bishop of Paphos Leontios, Bishop of Trimythountos Moisis, chief priest of Nicosia Iacovos, chief priest of Lefkara Leontios, chief priest of Vatyli Toumazos, chief priest of Larnaca Kyriacos, chief priest of Kyrenia Theodoros, chief priest of Limassol Georghios, "grand logothetis" of Lefkara Bishopric Moizos Tzenos, sacristan of holy church Gerolemos Damilas and steward of Paphos Iacovos.

Here I have made certain corrections to the wrong spelling of the names of Limassol, Paphos, Vatyli etc.

2. A.G.S. - E. 494, with out number. On the cover (=d' page) the address: "Εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν βασιλείαν τῆς Ἰσπανίας / Εἰς τὴν Ἰσπανίαν. (=To the holy Catholic Kingdom of Spagna, in Spagna").

3. The revolution of 1606 is here implied.

of the massacres and other terrible activities of Turkish occupators - exists among the Greek population of the island. Thirty five thousands⁴ warriors are ready to attack the turkish occupators, whose number does not exceed eight thousands.

The authors of the document are proved to be good knowers of war strategic by suggesting a distracting movement of 10 vessels towards the area of Famagusta, the result of which will be the diversion of the attention and the concentration of the turkish occupators in that town. After this movement the remaining force of the fleet must turn towards Laphos to arm 15.000 of Cypriot revoltors, who are waiting the moment to attack the occupators, while another 20 thousands of Greek Cypriot warriors will revolt. The Turks are not expected to resist as soon as the Greek Cypriots are armed, but in the contrary it is considered as certain that they will surrender the island without fighting.

The Archbishop and the other clergymen of the island are sending their written appeal through their envoy Loizos⁵.

The text of the document, which we give below, is full of errors of syntax and spelling, but it is at the same time a valuable source, from which we can derive useful information about the educational course of Greek Cypriots. It is a token of the greatness of illiteracy that was spread in the island for more than one century after the occupation by the eastern invaders and this adds to the already given picture of tragedy from illiteracy and smattering of harassed Greek race⁶.

4. In I.K. Chassiotis "Spanish documents of cyprus History" (page 64) it is erroneously stated that they are 20 thousands.

5. The same sender (Loizos) was also used in another mission.

6. Vas. Sphyroera: "Greeks under Turkish Occupation" (Chapter "Cultural course of enslaved hellenism") pages 91-95.

Simultaneously (on 3rd February 1609) with the letter of Archbishop of Cyprus Christodoulos and the other superior clergymen, Petros Gonemis⁷, the interpreter of Pasha of Cyprus, addresses a letter to Spanish King Philip 3rd⁸ by which he stresses the hardships that the inhabitants of Cyprus suffered after the two uprisings - the first from
for the upholders to send their armada to Cyprus and help Christian
part of the armada will appear in

7. Petros Gonemis sent on 8th October 1608 a similar appeal to Duke of Savoy. See Giovanni sforza "Inegoriati di Carlo Emanuele 1, duca di savoia, per Forsi ve di Cipro", Atti della R. Accademia delle Science di Torino, Vol. 53 (1917 - 1918) pages 383-384. Bibliography of the well known Gonemis family - to which must probably belong the man who signed together with the Archbishop Timotheos the appeal to King Philip of Spain (see I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History" pages 22-23) as Daniel Gonemis (as "Gunemes" was transcribed by the translator of the greek letter Botuito Nericio) see in Costas P. Kyrris "The Cypriote Family of Soderini and Other cypriotes in Venice (XVI-XVII centuries) "Neo-hellenica, volume 1 (1970), page 59 note 6, p.67, note 42, page 73 and page 74. Though in the above document as well as in the document of Archbishop Christodoulos some phrases are included which are also included in the appeal of Gonemis to the Prince of Savoy (e.g. lines 2-4, 19-21, 25-30), certain concrete details (e.g. those relating to the operation of Spanish vessels or the plan of conquering Paphos and Famagusta) are not included (purposely as some say, like I.K. Chasiotis page 58) in the document submitted to Carolos Emmanuel A'. The anonymous secret envoy who is referred to in line 38 is the one mentioned in the document of Archbishop Christodoulos (line 28) and in the document of Bishop of Solea Ieremias to King Philip 3rd (lines 13-14). According to I.K. Chasiotis (page 58) the document was not written in Gonemis' handwriting apart from lines 56-57 (signature nad title) and the address written on the cover.

8. A.G.S. - E. 494, with out number, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 57.
(see table IV I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History").

11. Bishop of Solea and Ieremias Ieremias who signs, is included among those who are said to have signed the appeal of 1608 to the Duke of Savoy (Niklosch - Bulletin, Acta et diplomata graeca, vol. 3 page 267)

their own initiative and the second during the operation of the vessels of the duke of Toskan - adding that the Christian population of the island suffers unbearable oppression from the part of the occupators who have done massacres and executions of numerous inhabitants. For continuing the revolution, Gonemis stresses, there is a unique chance for the Spaniards to send their armada to Cyprus and help Christians to take over the island. A part of the armada will appear in Famagusta. It will thus cause a concentration of the Turkish military forces there from the whole island with the result that the remaining Cyprus will be left unguarded. The main Spanish naval power will disembark at Paphos, where it will be waited by 15:000 men, who - as soon as they are armed by the Spaniards - will spread the revolution by mobilizing another 20.000 Cypriot warriors as well as the unarmed population. After the implementation of this plan⁹, there will be no difficulty in conquering the island, while Cypriots will be turned gladly into loyal and devoted subjects of Spanish Monarch. To this end they are sending to Spanish Court the carrier of their appeals, who is authorized to receive the decision of the Spanish Government.

A third letter, two days only after the two previous¹⁰ ones -i.e. on 5th February 1609 - is sent to King of Spain Philip 3rd by Ieremias, the Bishop of Solea and Kyrenia¹¹ and Leontios, Monk and Abbot of the

9. The plan is identical with the one drawn up and submitted to Spanish King Philip 3rd by Archbishop Christodoulos, which has already been mentioned above.

10. A.G.S. - E. 494, with out number, included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" page 59. On the cover (=d' page), the address, of which the title ("*τῆς ἁγίας καὶ καθολικῆς βασιλείας*") ("*=Holy and Catholic kingdom*"), ^{of which the address} was cut off during the unsealing of the letter: "*Ἐἰς τὴν ἁγίαν καὶ καθολικὴν βασιλείαν τῆς Ἰσπανίας / Ἐἰς τὴν Ἰσπανίαν*" ("*=To the holy and Catholic Kingdom of Spagna in Spagna*"). (see table IV I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History").

11. Bishop of Solea and Kyrenia Ieremias who signs, is included among those who are said to have signed the appeal of 1608 to the Duke of Savoy (Miklosich - Muller, Acta et diplomata graeca, vol. 3 page 267)

holy monastery of Vergin of Kykkos¹². Out of them, 5,000 are men who are receiving normally their salary. Out of the

The envoy of cypriots Loizos Skoutaris, after his arrival in Madrid submitted (in spring of 1610) a memorandum¹³ to King Philip 3rd regarding the propositions of Archbishop Christodoulos and the other religious leaders of the Christian population of the island. By this memorandum details are given about the meeting of the religious leaders of the island and the following information is supplied by skoutaris:

though he bears here only the title of Bishop of Kyrenia.

12. The handwriting shows that the document was written by Abbot Leontios, while the seal set on the cover (showing a Saint dressed as a Catholic monk and including the letters A.N.) seems to be of western origin. As K. Kyrris observes (Cypriot family of Soderiny) in the lists of Abbots of Kykkos monastery, which were drawn by various researchers and are published by N.K. Kyriazis in "History of Holy Monastery of Kykkos" (Larnaca March 1949) pages 15-21 as well as in the similar list which he (Kyriazis) has drawn (pages 21-32) Abbot Leontios is not included. It must be noted that from all the above lists only the one of Peristianis includes 3 Abbots of the 17th century, while Pantelides one. Kyriazis and the other researchers (Hakkot, Pantelides, Kleopas and Gerasimos) do not say anything about. Kyriazis is the last of the researchers who wrote about the said 3 Abbots of 17th century but he says nothing about it.

It must be noted that even researcher K.P. Kyrris - who studied in detail all documents of Kykkos Monastery and particularly the notes written on the margins which are full of new information, portraits, historical events etc, generally about Kykkos Monastery - could not find any information about Abbot Leontios. See K.P. Kyrris "A list of Abbots of Holy Monastery of Kykkos".

13. It has been published from a spanish copy, with out mentionig place, date, from A.G.S. - E. 494 (without number) included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of cyprus History" pages 74-76.

The guard of Cyprus consists of eight thousands soldiers. Out of them, 5.000 are men who are receiving normally their salary. Out of these 5.000, the 1.000 are cavalry men distributed in six groups as follows: 400 in Famagusta, 200 in Paphos, 100 in the castle of Limassol, 100 in the castle of Larnaca, 100 in the castle of Limassol, 100 in the castle of Larnaca, 100 in the castle of Kyrenia and 100 in the tower of Chrysohou. All are turned towards the coasts. Out of the 1000 Jennisars - who are armed with arkevouzia - 200 belong to the guard of Famagusta, 100 to the guard of Paphos, 100 to the guard of Limassol, 200 to the guard of the harbour of Mari - with a commander in charge but without a castle available - 100 in the castle of Larnaca, 100 in the castle of Chrysohou and 200 in the castle of Kyrenia. 1.000 archers are distributed in the same military centres as follows: 400 in Famagusta, 200 in Kyrenia, and 100 in each of the remaining towns or villages. Out of the 1.000 spear bearers ("azapides") 500 are distributed in the same centres, while the remaining 500 are distributed in various other castles and fortifications of the island. In the same way the 1.000 cannoneers ("topsis") are distributed. The remaining 3.000 are without specific duties, they do not receive salary and they are spread all over the island doing their own occupations, such as farmers or merchants. For security reasons the Christian inhabitants are unarmed.

In earlier times the population of Cyprus was much more: There were 800 towns, 14 villages and settlements before turkish occupation. The despotism of the new occupators uprooted many inhabitants and has reduced the number of towns and villages to about 700.

There are castles in Chrysohou, Paphos (military centre of the island), Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta (the key and bastion of Cyprus). At both sides of Karpasia cape one meets guards and towers.

Pasha of Cyprus and his counsellors are staying in Nicosia, where 16 Turkish commissioners of districts and other areas of Cyprus are also established.

14. The information that 800 village existed before turkish occupation proves as incorrect the allegations of Papkien - Cricor that 14.000 towns, villages, and settlements existed.

On the opposite Asian land - which is at a distance of 24 leagues from the cape of Saint Epiphanius¹⁵ - there are Turkish inhabitants, but they are in a state of revolt against the Sultan. Finally, from Famagusta to Jerusalem the distance is estimated at about 70 leagues. The Christians of Cyprus that can bear weapons are estimated at about 25,000¹⁶.

15. The name still exists.

16. The Document has the same handwriting with the one that accompanied the documents of Loizos Skoutaris when they were submitted to the King of Spain, which is included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" number 44. The same hand noted on the cover (= d? page) the address and a small summary of the document: "A S(u) M(agesta)d Cat(oli)ca. De / Luys Escútari, ciprioto, de / secreto de quel rey(n)o a Sus reales piés / supp(li)ca muy humilm(en)te se mande leer/en Cons(ej)o de Estado con los despachos/ que ha traydo y p(rese)ntato *enbiado*"

On the left the content of the memorandum of Skoutaris is repeated in short, while immediately under it a suggestion of royal secretary Antonio de Arostegui, who initials it with his peculiar sign, is added: "Relaçion que haze Luys de Escútari de /La guarniçion qve tiene el Turco en el reyno /de Chipre y de la desposiçion y discription/del - /Off(ici)o. / A cons(ul)ta: que hombres como este /suelen traer papeles y proposiciones /sin fundamento, que se / podria remitir al conde de / Lemos Para que le oyga y/ avise lo que se le offeciére, / yencargalle que sin dalles / grandes esperanças con que ellos /se pierdan, les entretenga/lo mejor que se pudiere".

This suggestion was adopted by the other members of the Council of State and was included with the same words in their advice to King Philip 3rd, see document 47 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", lines 20-26.

After the submission of the documents the usual procedure followed: The Council of State is dealing with them, subsequently the King and finally the already known method of gentle and diplomatic rejection of the propositions.

Analytically reviewed this latter procedure is as follows:

Royal secretary Petro de Valencial submits officially a report¹⁷ about the letters¹⁸ submitted by Skoutaris for King Philip 3rd. More specifically Valencia says that three documents have been submitted addressed to the King of Spain: two in Greek - of "Bishop of Nicosia Iacovos"¹⁹ and the Abbot of the monastery "de Tisaea"²⁰ Leontios and one in Italian

17. It has been published by I.K. Chasiotis from A.G.S. - E. 1948 number 195. The phrases "illamanles ... archiprestes" (line 3) and tanpoco... turquesca (line 42) were added by the author of the document on the left side (pp a and b). On the cover (=p.d') the royal secretary clarifies that it is about : "Traducion de las cartas en griego".

18. The letters referred to in lines 1-7 are the documents which were included under No 33, 35, 34, in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" i.e. the letters of Archbishop Christodoulos, Ieremia Leontios and Petros Gonemis respectively.

19. Here De Valencia is mistaken because he considered second signatory Bishop of Limassol Iacovos as Bishop of Nicosia.

20. The translator reads wrongly certain words in line 5, such as "of holy" of document No 35 (Chasiotis), line 23 with the result that he formulates new wrong words like "Tisaea". In lines 4-5, 37-38, 42, are included similar mistakes.

the following order was added by the king with his own handwriting and bearing his own initials. The order is addressed to ... of ... regarding the count of / ... as inform ... por ... via de / lo que de esto passa y lo oxiect.

The order was dealt with by document No 43 (see part .../... lines 9-10).

language of Petros Gonemis, the interpreter of the Turkish Pasha of Cyprus. The translator further refers in short to the substance of the documents according to which their authors appeal to the King to help Cypriots who are suffering very hard reprisals from the Turks after their participation in two uprisings, the first after their own initiative and the second after the presence in the island of the vessels of Duke of Toskan. Further down, de Valencia mentions the assurances of Cypriots that there are no more than 8.000 Turks in the island and that 35.000 Christians are ready to revolt. Further, de Valencia explains the well known plan of Cypriots for the diversion of the attention of Turkish military power of the island by the appearance of a part of the fleet in Famagusta while the main naval force will be directed towards Paphos. Finally the translator stresses that though he had not made a full translation and he had not given the full names of the signatories the Greek texts are written in mixed language with Greek, Italian and Turkish words²¹ while the signatures are hardly readable. In spite of all these the substance of the letters was translated well in the report.

The Council of State deals²² finally with the documents of Loizos Skoutaris and expresses disbelief as to the soundness of the allegations

21. certain words are written in Cyprus dialect, such as the words
 "συνιβάσμενον" ("Synibasmenon") (document 33), "ἀποστα" ("aposta")
 (line 13, document 33), "γρικισιν" ("grikisin") (line 4, document
 35, "ἀκάρτεροντας" ("akarterontas") (line 5, document 35).

22. A.G.S. - E. 1948 number 194. On the cover (page d'), the usual enlightening note: "De off(ici)o. / El Consejo d' Estado, a⁵ de Junio 1610. / Incluso un papel que trata de particulares del/ reyno de Chipre".

On this, the following order was added by the king with his own handwriting and bearing his own initials. The order is addressed to Viceroy of Naples: "Assi^{se} haga, encargando al conde d / Lemos se informe también por otras vías de / lo que en esto passa y lo avise".

The order was dealt with by document No 48 (see particularly lines 9-10).

CHAPTER TWELVE

of this Cypriot. It suggests that he should be referred to the Viceroy of Naples Count de Lemos²³, who will undertake to close gently the whole case.

The epilogue of the dramatic appeal (of 1609) of abandoned Cypriots is written by King Philip 3rd, who refers²⁴ miserable Cypriot Loizos Skoutaris and the documents of the case he supports to Viceroy of Naples Count de Lemos, who is asked to study very closely the case, to reject it diplomatically and keep the King informed on the developments of the whole matter.

23. Count De Lemos, referred to in line 22 (as well as on the cover by Philip 3rd in his own hand writing is the heir of Benavente/in the post of Viceroy of Naples (1610-1616) Don Petro Fernandez de Castro, seventh count De Lemos, (+1622), brother of homonymous count of document 21 (I.K. Chasiotis) and son of his also homonymous^{as document 20} (compare also documents Chasiotis 21, 48, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 63, 65, 67).

24. A.G.S. - E. 1878 number 113, I.K. Chasiotis page 80. On the cover the elements of the document are noted: "Al conde de Lemos - de Aranda, 3 de/ julio 1610 /Con Luys Escutari".

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CHAPTER [REDACTED] TWELVE

NEW APPEALS TO PHILIP 3RD

After the dramatic appeals of Archbishop Christodoulos and the other religious leaders of the island in 1609, new appeals and pleading documents are sent in 1611 by less important personalities of Cyprus to King Philip 3rd for the liberation of Cyprus from Turkish rule.

Thus, on 17th October 1611 three Cypriot patriots namely Hector Denores¹, Loizos Mpalis and Markos Koupis², the latter from Famagusta send from Cyprus a new dramatic letter³ to King Philip 3rd, by which they request him to hurry to help them for the liberation of harassed

1. About family De Nores see Loizos Philippou "Greek Letters in Cyprus during Turkish occupation" (1571-1878) vol. 2, pages 27-31, where reference is made to scholars Iason Denores 1590 and his son Petros Denorew, K. Sathas "History of Modern Greek Literature", pages 197-198, a Archimandrite Lyprianos "Chronological History of Cyprus" page 539, N. Rodinos "About heroes, generals etc" ("Kypriaka Chronika" C, 47), K.P. Kyrris "Cypriote Scholars in Venice in the XVI and XVII centuries", page 191, note 40, 206. See also document No 19 I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", pages 30-31, where (line 24 etc) Loukia Denores is referred to as having two daughters, who are wives of Turkish officials, one new "prince" and one renegade "voivode", named Franginos, who is close friend of the former. In the same document Iason Voustronios, secret agent of Venice in Constantinople - descendant of Spanish settlers of Cyprus (under Frankish rule) - appears as relative of the wife of Sultan - who is again of noble Cypriot origin - the mother of the heir of Sultan Mehmed (line 20). About this latter version - i.e. the relations of the family with the mother of the son of Sultan Mehmed C!, very probably Sultan's wife Khendān (+1605), mother of Ahmed A¹ and about what is said regarding her origin from Cypriot family Saflato (line 21) see observations of I.K. Chasiotis ("Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", page 32) where the view is expressed that Saflato perhaps derives from wrong copying by the decipher of the words ca¹ (=casa) Flatro, i.e. from the family of Flatros to which Ioannis Flatros belongs, ^{see} document 16 Chasiotis according to which this view is questiona

2. Markos Koupis adds after his signature "από την Αμμοχώστη" (= from Famagusta).

Cyprus, because Cypriots "have nowhere else to bend their heads" (i.e. they are desperate). By the same document it is further stressed that Cypriots are becoming dissatisfied⁴, given the fact that six years ago the same signatories asked through envoys his help for setting them free from the hands of barbarians⁵. Therefore - it is further stressed - after a meeting⁶ they are sending for the second time⁷ an envoy, priest Demetrios⁸. The letter is full of errors both of syntax and spelling and includes a lot of words of Cyprus dialect⁹.

3. A.G.S.- B 1949 number 150 included in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" page 81. On the cover (= p.d') the address: "Τῷ καθολικῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀδελφεῖ, ἰς τὰς ἰδίαις χερσὶ καλοῦ / Ἰωάννου" (=To the catholic King and our master by hand etc). Chasiotis observes that the signatures at the end of the documents were signed with the same ink.

4. Ἀρχὴν οὐ χριστιανὶ να χαννοῦντες /¹³ ὀφθαλμοὶ, βραχίονες ποὶ καὶ ἐχνοῦντες . (= The Christians started to lose their hopes, saying that you have abandoned us") (in Greek with many errors in spelling).

5. "Ἐξ ἡμερῶν σήμερον ὡσὺ /¹³ ἐστὶν ἔτι πρῶτον βασιλεῖ πρὸς τὴν βασιλεῖαν σου ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν /¹⁴ χιρεβουλα βασιλεῖαν να πρῶτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἐλεγκνοὺς /¹⁵ καὶ να συνδράμῃ μὴδὲν βασιλεῖαν, δια να ἐλευθέρωσῃ ἡμᾶς /¹⁶ τὰς χερσὶ τοῦ βαρβαρῶν καὶ να ἔχομεν τὸ βασιλεῖαν σου πᾶν /¹⁷ τῶν ἀναγ, κυρίου τοῦ ὑμῶν πατρίδος" (Ἑβραϊκῶς ὑμῶν μετ' ἡμᾶς βασιλεῖ).

(="Six years have already passed since (13) we first sent trustworthy men (14) to your Majesty asking for assistance to be provided to our miserable (15) selves and contribute some help so that we may be liberated from (16) the hands of barbarians and have your kingdom above us (17) and yourself King and master of our fatherland". (Greek text with many errors in spelling).

6. "We convened a meeting

7. The second letter, which is stressed and explained in lines 12-18, refers, according to some commentators (I.K. Chasiotis page 82) to the document of Bishop Leontios and the other signatories of the appeal of 14th September 1606, though the time lapsed between the two appeals is not 6 but 5 years. It is however possible that this appeal is

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Priest Demetrios will again try - towards the end of 1612 (14) and the beginning of 1613 - by a new memorandum (15) to King Philip III - ~~unrelated with the appeal of Bishop "eontios for the following reasons;~~
unrelated with the appeal of Bishop "eontios for the following reasons;
(a) The signatories are not included in the list of signatories of the document of 1606 and (b) the time between 1606 and 1611 - even if it is supposed that the second appeal was sent during the ~~saxo~~ second half of 1611 - is not 6 years but 5 years.

8. *ὁ πρεσβυτερος ἀρχιεπίσκοπος* ("The "priest Mr Demetrios"), line 21, may be Demetrios Zamperlanos, who is found during the years 1616, 1621 and 1663 (documents 59, 68, 69 L.K. Chasiotis) as an envoy of his compatriots to the Spanish Court trying to convince Spaniards that they should undertake an expedition for liberating the island. The only difference is that Zamperlanos in Chasiotis document number 59 is referred to as a monk (Fray, line 1), in document 68 as chiefpriest (arcipreste, line 1) and in document 69 (line 2) again as chiefpriest.

9. AS: *οἱ βουλευταί* ("=hopes"), line 19, *βουλή* ("=decision") ~~=parliament~~, line 20.

.../...


Priest Demetrios will again try - towards the end of 1612 (10) and the beginning of 1613 - by a new memorandum (11) to King Philip 3rd to obtain the assistance of the Spanish Court in the struggle for the liberation of the island. In his document Demetrios underlines that he was present during the uprising of 1606 of Petros Aventanios and asks from Spanish King his final reply on the subject.

Petros Aventanios about the Turkish and Greek military forces in Cyprus in 1613, though they include some small errors in the way of the

9. As: "hopes" line 19 =parliament" line 20.

10. The time of sending the document must be put towards the end of 1612 or the beginning of 1613, since - as it is stressed in the document - six years lapsed from the uprising of Petros Aventanios in 1606.

11. A.G.S. - E 1949 number 9. According to I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History" (page 82) the document - which is in the same handwriting with document 53 - in its cover (=d' page) writes: "Senor/Don pimitrio sacerdote". The document, according to I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" (page 83) was written by the same man who wrote the spanish text which is included under number 52 in the above edition. The words "algunas letras" mentioned by Demetrios (line 18) refer - according to I.K. Chasiotis to document 49etc.



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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

DETAILED REPORT MADE IN 1613 BY PETROS AVENTANIOS ABOUT THE STATIONING IN CYPRUS (IN EACH DISTRICT) OF TURKISH MILITARY FORCES AS WELL AS OF THE CORRESPONDING GREEK FORCES WHICH COULD TAKE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Very significant are the explicit and detailed reports¹ given by Petros Aventanios about the Turkish and Greek military forces in Cyprus in 1613, though they include some small errors² in the sum totals due to errors in addition. Particular significance about the nationality of Aventanios has the fact that the report was written by Greek³, a fact which corroborates the opinion which we expressed that Aventanios was Greek.

The A.G.S. - E 1949, number 120.

2. For example the whole number of turkish inhabitants - warriors is given as 10.370, while they are actually 10.400 - out of which 2.710 cavalry, while they actually are 2.072- and the total number of Christians, who are given as 28.851 while they are actually 27.751.

3. I.K. chasiotis "Spanish Documents of cyprus History" page 90.

Morphou	750	50	30
Lefka	2.125	100	50
Chrysochou		200	50
Kilani	1.800	30	
Nicosia		8.500	1.500
Nesosoria	1.000	400	27

The only district where the Turks appear to be much more than the Greeks is Nicosia, while in the contrary in all other districts the Greek inhabitants are predominant.

5. During the already mentioned gathering of archbishop Christodoulos and the other Bishops of the island.

.../...

The situation⁴ as submitted by Aventanios is not identical with that which Loizos Skoutaris⁵ submitted in a memorandum to King Philip 3rd in 1610, since the latter says that turkish military forces in Cyprus do not exceed 8.000 men. In spite of this, the information supplied by Skoutaris show bigger concentration of turkish forces in the six towns than that referred to in Aventanios report.

4. The distribution of military forces is as follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>Christians</u>	<u>Turks</u>	<u>Cavalry men</u>	<u>Castles</u>	<u>Harbours</u>
Paphos	2.616	500	100	1	2
Kouklia	1.800	150	60	-	-
Avdemou	1.800	60	50	+	-
Episkopi	2.000	150	80	-	-
Limassol	2.000	300	150	1	1
Vasilopotamos		50	30	-	-
Larnaca	1.130	60	40	1	1
Famagusta	2.000	500	250	1	1
Karpasia	2.120	100	50	-	-
Kyrenia	1.640	200	100	1	
Lapithos		50	15		
Morphou	720	50	30		
Lefka	2.125	100	50		
Chrysochou		200	50		
Kilani	1.800	30			
Nicosia	3.000	7.500	1.500		
Mesaoria	3.000	400	27		

The only district where the Turks appear to be much more than the Greeks is Nicosia, while in the contrary in all other districts the Greek inhabitants are predominant.

5. During the already mentioned gathering of Archbishop Christodoulos and the other Bishops of the island.

In his memorandum Aventanios again suggests the island Magazeni⁶ in Paphos as suitable place of landing, while he rejects categorically Kyrenia⁷ on the ground that no vessel can anchor or sail there because north sea is within the range of activity of the castle. The harbour of Famagusta⁸ on the other hand is closed by chains, while the cape of Saint Andreas is suitable for anchoring and sail⁹ whenever this becomes necessary under exceptional circumstances.

The suggestion about taking advantage of the springs of Fontana Amoroza and of the cape of Saint Epiphanius was not new. It had already been said that these places could be used by vessels of the Order of Malta¹⁰.

It is noteworthy an information supplied¹¹ by Aventanios in this document, that Limassol had a fortification of the same kind as the one at Paphos, something which nowhere of document number 52 is mentioned.

6. Of the stores² Here only an island is named Magazeni, while three islands ("tresislezas," line 43) are mentioned in document number 52 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History". Perhaps only the largest of the three islands is mentioned here. The observation of I.K. Chasiotis (page 92) that in line 6 he speaks about islands is wrong. The author speaks about island (E l' isole...).

7. Line 45-50.

8. Line 35-40.

9. Line 40-45.

10. See Alonso de Centrerras as above, pages 212, 213.

11. Line 21.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Very significant is also the information supplied by Aventanios in the last paragraph of the document according to which a large number of the aforementioned Turks died or were killed by an epidemic of plague or by the uprising of 1606 so that those who survived were no more than 6000 distributed in towns and districts, while (a significant event) most of the remaining 6000 Turks were favourably disposed towards the Greeks because they were abjurers¹².

According to a British document¹ the first organized revolt of that decade in Macedonia happens in 1616. At that, organized people of Slavonia - through their envoy "Franciskas Agapitos" - the prominent people from other parts of the island conveyed a message to the authorities that their unanimous decision was to turn to other shores for helping their patriotic struggle in overthrowing the ugly rule, & again the Slavians ignored their repeated appeals for effective assistance.

The decision of the inhabitants of the island to get rid of the ugly foreign rule goes as far as to propose, as an alternative, to abandon the island and establish themselves in another country² if their aim fails.

1. From J.P.S. - L. 1877 - 1878, number 187, Report of oral testimonies to Spanish Court by Greek witnesses. The document is related to propositions made by the inhabitants of various and other provinces, people of the island.

2. About the same documents 63, 65, 67 and 3 1885, number 134 in which the arrival of Agapitos in "Paris" is announced and the resolution of some of the inhabitants for an "emigration" in Greece is sought. In the said document, the document, published by J.P.S. as number 187, also attached and the reviewer of the case of Cyprus and the

12. Line 78-83. "Franciskos Agapitos, see E.P. Kyriakos "Cypriot Scholars in Venice", page 208.

3. J.P.S. - L. 1886 number 1887.

CHAPTER ~~XXXXXXXX~~ FOURTEEN

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES
FROM FAMAGUSTA

During the second half of the second decade of 17th century Famagusta becomes the centre of tentative revolutionary movements and activities.

According to a Spanish document¹ the first organized effort of that decade in Famagusta happens in 1616. At that, prominent people of Famagusta - through their envoy Frangiskos Agapitos² - and prominent people from other parts of the island conveyed a message to the Spaniards that their unshakable decision was to turn to other rulers for helping their dramatic struggle in overthrowing the ugly turkish rule, if again the Spaniards ignored their repeated appeals for effective assistance.

The decision of the inhabitants of the island to get rid of the ugly foreign rule goes so far as to resolve, as an alternative, to abandon the island and establish in other country³ if their aim fails.

1. From A.G.S. - E. 1880, number 183. Report of oral submissions to Spanish Court by Cypriot noble Frangiskos Agapitos in regard to propositions made by the Archbishop of Cyprus and other prominent people of the island.

2. About this see documents 63, 65, 67 and E 1889, number 184 in which the arrival of Agapitos in Madrid is announced and the revision of former appeals of the inhabitants for an "empresa" in Cyprus is sought. To the said document, the document, published by I.K.Ch. as number 60 was attached and the revision of the case of Cyprus and the official briefing of the King is sought. About Ector Agapitos, who was probably relative of Frangiskos Agapitos, see K.P. Kyrris "Cypriot Scholars in Venice", page 208.

3. A.G.S. - E. 1880 number 1883.

In the framework of these decisions their envoy Frangiskos Agapitos was sent to Spain carrying the documents which included the views of the inhabitants. He was however compelled to throw these seditious documents in the sea because he met near Rodos seven Turkish sailing vessels and he was afraid lest they would search him. The views of the inhabitants which were expressed by Frangiskos are summarily as follows:

Demetrios Zampetinos who acted together with a friend of his, a) that the Spanish Monarch should assist the Emir of Sidon Fahr-ad-Din and b) that he may then conquer Cyprus within a fortnight, taking advantage of the existing situation in Cyprus and of the willingness of the inhabitants to revolt.

To make himself convincing Agapitos presented to the Spanish Court certain documents, such as: a. Passport of the Marquis of Villafranca, which he got on his way through Milan while going to Spain, b. A certificate given to him in Milan on 8th August 1616 by father Constanto Ambrosini, Knight of the Order of Saint Stephen.



1. About Demetrios Zampetinos see also the references in documents 49, 50. Compare also documents 52, 53. The name of Ioannia Zampetinos of the family of Sidon (Cyprus) is mentioned in Kyria "Eggrafi" of "Eggrafi" (1931), page 193, number 42.

2. The friend of Demetrios Zampetinos - probably Zypios himself as well - is not known because of lack of supplementary information.

3. Act. n. 1000, number 146. Draft of a royal letter to Don Pedro de Sion, 3rd Duke of Omsa.

The third Duke of Omsa (1574 - 1624) is grandson of the Duke of the same name of Sicily n. 13 document, a scholar and Viceroy of Sicily (1611 - 1615) and then of Naples (1616-1624).

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPTS OF CYPRIOT

DEMETRIOS ZAMPERLANOS 1616-1623

A movement - which failed at its birth - to convince the Spanish Kings to undertake military operation in cyprus was undertaken in 1616 in Madrid by a Cypriot monk who later became an archpriest, namely Demetrios Zamperlanos¹ who acted together with a friend² of his. But the stand³ of the Spanish King was again decently negative. In his letter to Duke Osouna⁴ - who had recommended by a letter to King Philip 3rd to listen to Demetrios and his friend, in order to explain to him the revolutionary aspirations of Cypriots - the Spanish King asked Duke Osouna to convince Demetrios that it was necessary to postpone military operations in Cyprus until better conditions prevail in the island, which will allow the Spaniards to handle the matter from a better negotiating position. So the first movement of Demetrios Zamperlanos to Philip 3rd had not substantial results, though in the aforementioned royal document a certain disposition of the Spanish King was shown to follow the cyprus developments.

1. About demetrios Zamperla or Zamperlanos see comments of Chasiotis in documents 49,50. Compare documents 68,69. He may be a relative of Ioannis Zamperlas of the Greek community of Venice (See Constantinos P. Kyrris "Cypriot Scholars in Venice", page 199, number 82).

2. The friend of Demetrios Zamperlanos - probably Cypriot himself as well - is not known because of lack of supplementary information.

3. A.G.S. - E. 1880, number 146. Draft of a royal letter to Don Pedro Tellez Giron, 3rd Duke of Osuna.

4. The third Duke of Osuna (1574 - 1624) is grandson of the Duke (with the same name) of Chasiotis n. 13 document, a scholar and Viceroy first of Sicily (1611 - 1616) and then of Naples (1616-1620).

.../....

Six and a half years later, i.e. towards the end of 1622, a new attempt of penetrios Zamperlanos is made to overthrow the turkish rule of Cyprus. This is shown in a letter⁵ of Spanish King Philip D' to Prince Filiberto of Savoy, viceroy of Sicily, to whom Zamperlanos was referred by the King. The attempt of Zamperlanos to convince Spain to underrake military ^{operation} ~~opposition~~ had again no result, since Prince Filiberto was ordered by the King to see that the suggestion of the cypriot priest is diplomatically rejected and that the priest returns normally to Cyprus. The Spanish stand is already clear. By other similar letters⁶ Spanish Kings (Philip 3rd and 4th) express disbelief to the suggestions of Cypriot representatives.

Viceroy of sicily Prince Filiberto received⁷ the Cypriot priest in Palermo in May 1623 and after being briefed by him on the incessant aspiration of ^{Cy} ~~Cy~~ priots to revolt against the turkish rule so that they may come under Spanish Monarchy, he sends him to Cyprus with these two terms of reference:

- a) To find out if Cypriots, after the lapse of so much time, still aspire a revolution ~~and~~
- b) To let the Spanish authorities know, by letters and not by personal visits which entail so many dangers, the existing feelings in the island.

5. It has been published in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History" page 115, as Doc. number 68, from A.G.S. - E 1894, number 289.

6. See E. 1883 number 385 and E. 1894 number 291, respectively.

7. I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", pages 115-116 doc. 69, from A.G.S. - E. 1895, number 40.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

PERSONALITIES OF SIMANCAS ARCHIVES RELATED WITH
CYPRUS REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

1. Io. Ayiomavras or Sagktomavras, as otherwise named, was born in Nicosia between 1538-1540 from a noble family. Names of persons with the surname Santa Maura were also mentioned before in Cyprus, such as Antonio Santa Maura who flourished during the reign of Jack B', but no indication exists if they had any relation with Ioannis Ayiomavras. Nothing is known about his studies, but very probably he attended schools in Nicosia.

At the time of the conquest of Cyprus by the Turks in 1571 he was in the island and he wrote in Italian language a short description of it in code B No. 3067, page 72 of the Library of Paris.

After the conquest of Cyprus, in about 1572, he took refuge in Sicily and stayed at Massini, where he copied two Greek inscriptions from churches of Messini in code 3067 of the Library of Paris.

In 1572 he went to Saint Laurentius of Calabria where he copied four religious speeches of an unknown Avva (Abbot) Angelos, who was a student of Constantinos Laskaris, and which are in code 60 Ottoboni of Vatican (Revue V. p. 429) and to Seminova, where he was in 1574 as well and where he copied various religious books for the sake of Monks of Saint Philaretos Monastery.

In 1582 he was in Naples. From 1585 to 1612 he was in Rome and his work was to copy manuscripts in Vatican Library receiving a monthly salary. At the same time he was undertaking private orders for similar kind of work.

It is known that Cardinals Antonios Caraffa, Jack Davy Duperron, Frederick Borromeos Archbishop of Mediolana and Felios Rvini used his services. Various Greek manuscripts copied by Ayiomavras and belonging to Archbishop Charles de Montchou are now in the Library of Paris.

II. Andre de Frederic Secretary of Philip 3rd.

Ayiomavras was the last representative of Greek bookwriters who took refuge in Europe in 11th and 12th centuries. According to Omout, he had copied 44 manuscripts out of which 30 are in the Library of Paris, 5 in the British Museum, 3 in Rome, 3 in Milan, 1 in Leyde of Holland, 1 in Hamburg and 1 in Luxeux France.

In the manuscripts room of the library of Milan there are certain portraits of him, where he appears as an old man, with white and not so smart beard. Above the portrait an inscription says: 1^o Ο ΣΑΚΤΑΜΑΥΡΑΣ ΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΣ ΓΡΑΦΕΥΣ (=SANCTAMAYRAS CYPRIOT GREEK SCRIBE). Under the portrait another inscription says: aetatis suae 75; Julii 1613.

About this scholar see H. Omout in magazin Revue des etudes Greques (Vol. A', Paris 1888, pages 177-191 under the title: "Le dernier des copistes Grecs en Italie Jean Saint -maure (1572-1612)" and in the same magazin vol E' (Paris, 1892, pages 427-430 a study "Note sur un portrait de Jean de Saint - Maure conserve a la Bibliotheque Ambrosienne de Milan", where the portrait of the author is also publishedd - a photocopy of the portrait saved in Ambrosian library. Sykoutris was aware of the studies of Omout from which he transferred the most important biographical information about the man to the report of the Critic Committee from which we get the most substantial (pages 96-99).

About Sanctamaura (3rd line document 55 of I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History") I.K. Chasiotis believes that he is Julius Cesar Sanctamauras, son of codewriter Ioannis (1538-1613). About Julius Cesar, apart from bibliography Constantinos P. Kyrris in "Cypriot Scholars in Venice" (page 249, note 81) see reference of I.K. Chasiotis page 95 referring to A.S. Vat. Spagna vol. 336, sheets 20, 54, 55, vol. 337 sheet 82, 413-414, vol 338 sheet 71, vol 339 sheet 19, 57, 80-81 (1609-1614) and A.G.S. -E. 1879 number 397, 409 (1616). compare also I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History", (TableA) document 108, 115 and document (I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History"), number 56.

II. Andre de Prada: Secretary of Philip 3rd.

- III. Benavente: Viceroy of Naples; comments in documents 27, 47 I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History".
- IV. De Lemos: the man who substituted Benavente as Viceroy of Naples; see comments in documents 27 and 47 I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History".
- V. Aventanios: Cypriot chief revolter; see documents 29, 36-39, 51-53, 55, 56 and 57 I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History".
- VI. Hpouas, Kompis, Renesis, Kresias, see comments in documents 17, 19, 20, 52, 57, 58 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History".
- VII. Don Francisco Juan de Torres: See documents 56 and 55: The man who dealt with the case of the propositions of Aventanios in Naples. He may be Torres, who was private secretary of Viceroy Benavente and who appears in documents of the collection of Tomic as coordinator of the activities and consultations of Balkan agents in Naples during the years 1606 - 1608, Torres is irrelevant from Baltasar de la Torre who was again spanish secretary (1607) of Benavente. Torres in May 1613 undertook to investigate the proposition of Fagases Ioustinianos from Chios in a case similar to that of Cypriots.
- VIII. Juan Vivas: see documents 32, 37, 41, 43 I.K. chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History".
- IX. Demetrios Zamperlanos: see documents 49 and 55 page 95 in I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish Documents of Cyprus History".
- X. Don Alvaro de Bazan: second marquis of Santa cruz, who sends an important letter (30/4/1693). Table A, document 111 I.K. Chasiotis "Spanish documents of Cyprus History", page 98.
- XI. Fahr ad - Din: Guerilla leader in Syria. He is mentioned with comments in document 25 of Chasiotis as well as in document 57, where Kompis is trying to exploit him in favour of Cyprus.

XII. Gran Juca. He is, according to I.K. Chasiotis (page 101), Kosimos B' of Toskan (1609-1621) who received in Livorno in the same year (1613) his ally Fahr ad - pin. About the mission of one of the men of the Grand Duke to Cyprus for reconnaissance see document 60, lines 14-22, where (1616) the journey of the Knight of the Order of Saint Stephan of Toskan Constanzo Ambrosini to Famagusta, Nicosia and other places of the island - under the pretext of a pilgrim to Holy land - is mentioned to have taken place some years ago ("ha algunos años") (Chasiotis page 101).

XIII. Constanzo Ambrosini Knight of the Order of Saint Stephan of Toskan, who made a journey to Cyprus. See Chasiotis page 101.

XIV. Capitan Michel Papada (line 20, document 58) - compatriot of Kompis - is mentioned also in the letter of Ieronymos of 5th November 1613 (A.G.S. - E 1879, number 55). For information about the activities of Papada in Flandra, Italy and elsewhere see A.G.S. - S.P. libro 154, sheet 307^r, libro 162, sheet 181^v, libro 166, sheet 159^v-162^r and A.S. Vat - Spagna, vol. 319 sheet 19^r.

XV. Antonio de Arostequi royal Secretary, who took over the position of Andres de Prada in the secretariat of the Council of state for the affairs of Italy. Document 45 in Chasiotis.

XVI. I. Zuniga Don Juan (see Chasiotis^{pp} 6, 17, 18) Comments of Chasiotis page 18. distinguished spanish diplomat Zuniga(+1583), Ambassador at Vatican during the time of Cyprus war and the negotiations for the formation of Sacra Liga (1570 -1571) and Viceroy of Naples (1579-1582). Receiver of the document was the then Viceroy D. Inigo Lopez Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Mondejar. He was supporting active intervention in Cyprus.

