UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS

Department of English Studies

Translation as Travel:
The US In and Out of the World in the Work of
Jonathan Raban, Pico Iyer, William Gibson and
Alphonso Lingis

PhD Dissertation

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During the years I researched and wrote this thesis, I was often aware of the irony of my project. Alone with my computer and enclosed within the walls of my room, I wrote about translation in travel and the journeys of others. But composing such a work constitutes a journey of sorts, and I must acknowledge the people who enriched my travel. I thank Stephanos Stephanides for his generous professional guidance and intellectual inspiration throughout the years I have been involved in this research. Evy Varsamopouloou for responding to early drafts with thoughtful and encouraging suggestions. I am indebted to Antonis Balasopoulos for his meticulous and insightful revisions during the final stages of the thesis production. I thank many friends, colleagues, and mentors for their ongoing support and interest in my work: Kathy Cosimano Stephanides, Maria Margaroni, Dionysis Goutsos, Vladimir Gutorov, Jura Avizienis, Zenonas Norkus and Gintautas Mazeikis. I owe my deepest gratitude for my immediate and extended family, especially to Elektra, Nefeli and Chrysanthos, whose understanding and patience made this work possible.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the relation between travel, language and culture in the context of translation theory. The focus of the case studies is on the traveller as translating agent and intercultural mediator, and the creative tension in the elaboration of culture and identity. The thesis reveals that travel in a world of diverse languages is still fraught with difficulty in an era of globalization and a dominant Anglophone culture such as the US.

Chapter one traces historically the interrelatedness of translation and culture from Mikhail Bakhtin’s critical work on Russian Formalism to the recent ‘Cultural Turn’ in translation theory and its importance for contemporary Translation Studies.

Chapter two shows how the perception of translation as cultural has changed the understanding of translation from interlingual, to intercultural transfer indicating how translation is interrelated with other disciplines and genres concerned with travel and language.

Chapter three examines intralingual translation in the travelogues of Jonathan Raban, a British writer residing in the US. His work shows that the apparent liberation from the problems of translation is illusory as his travel accounts reveal the intractable presence of language difference even as the Anglophone traveller makes his way through the English-speaking world. Intralingual travel accounts highlight not the limited repetitiveness of the travel experience, but the endless series of finer discriminations that become apparent as the traveller charts the social, regional, and national metamorphoses of the mother tongue.

Chapter four explores interlingual and intercultural translation in the travelogues of Pico Iyer, a resident of the US of British-Indian descent, who travels outside the US to find ‘anomalies’—collusions and collisions of American and local cultures—with pidgin English as a prevailing factor. Interlingual and intercultural travel is perceived in Iyer’s travelogues in the light of the human desire to understand the world within the human limitations to learn, speak, and
understand the languages and signs of foreign cultures revealing the frequently troubled nature of the translation exchange in foreign-language travelling.

Chapter five focuses on the immediate present and near future as projected in the science fiction of William Gibson. Cyberspace raises a number of interesting issues about translation and virtual travel or cybertravel. Software agents automatically collate and translate information and they are no longer constricted by a physical geographical location. However, constraints such as political, economic, financial are still likely to prevail. With the danger of codified translation, the argument is made for the continuing importance of the embodied translating subject.

Chapter six focuses on exile from rational language as a means of communicative rebirth as it is pursued in the philosophical travelogues of Alphonso Lingis. Focusing on the insufficiency of language in the transmission of meanings, Lingis expresses a critique of rational translation, and points to spontaneity in translation as bodily performance—highlighting the importance of the remainder or surplus in translation by emphasizing ways of knowing that are channelled through taste, touch, vision, smell and (non-verbal) sound.
ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Η διατριβή διερευνά τη σχέση μεταξύ περιήγησης, γλώσσας και πολιτισμού στο πλαίσιο της θεωρίας της μετάφρασης. Η μελέτη περίπτωσης επικεντρώνεται στον περιηγητή, ως τον δράστη της μετάφρασης και της διαπολιτισμικής διαμεσολάβησης, που διαπερνά τα σύνορα μεταξύ των πολιτισμών και των γλωσσών, προεδρώντας την τάση για ανάπτυξη του πολιτισμού και της ταυτότητας. Η διατριβή συμπεραίνει ότι η περιήγηση στον κόσμο των διαφορετικών γλωσσών αντιμετωπίζει δυσκολίες στην εποχή της παγκοσμιοποίησης και της κυριαρχίας του αγγλόφωνου πολιτισμού, όπως οι ΗΠΑ.

Το Α’ Κεφάλαιο εξετάζει από ιστορική σκοπιά την αλληλεξάρτηση της μετάφρασης και του πολιτισμού, αρχίζοντας από την κριτική έργο του Μιχαήλ Μπαχτίν για τον ρωσικό φορμαλισμό μέχρι την πρόσφατη πολιτισμική στροφή στη θεωρία της μετάφρασης και τη σημασία της για τις σύγχρονες Επιστήμες της Μετάφρασης.

Το Β’ Κεφάλαιο δείχνει πώς η πρόσληψη της μετάφρασης ως πολιτισμού έχει αλλάξει την αντίληψη της μετάφρασης από διαγλωσσική σε διαπολιτισμική μεταφορά, καταδεικνύοντας πώς η μετάφραση είναι διασυνδεδεμένη με άλλες Επιστήμες και λογοτεχνικά είδη που αφορούν την περιήγηση και τη γλώσσα.

Το Γ’ Κεφάλαιο εξετάζει τη διαγλωσσική μετάφραση στα ταξιδιωτικά έργα του Τζοναθαν Ραμπάν, ενός Βρετανού συγγραφέα που διαμένει στις ΗΠΑ. Το έργο του καταδεικνύει ότι η πλήρης απεξάρτηση από τα προβλήματα της μετάφρασης είναι ουτοπία, καθόσον η περιηγητική του αναφορά παρουσιάζει την αδιάλειπτη παρουσία της γλωσσικής διαφοράς, ακόμη και αν ο Αγγλόφωνος περιηγητής ταξιδεύει στον αγγλόφωνο κόσμο. Η διαγλωσσική περιήγηση υπογραμμίζει ότι την περιορισμένη επαναληπτικότητα της περιηγητικής εμπειρίας, αλλά την ατελείωτη σειρά από εξωδικευμένες διακρίσεις, που μετατρέπονται σε μόνιμο συνοδό καθώς ο περιηγητής επιχειρεί την κοινωνική, τοπική και εθνική μεταμόρφωση της μητρικής γλώσσας.

Το Δ’ Κεφάλαιο εξερευνά τη διαγλωσσική και διαπολιτισμική μετάφραση στα ταξιδιωτικά έργα του Πίκο Ιγιέρ, ενός κατοίκου των ΗΠΑ με
Βρετανο-Ινδική καταγωγή, ο οποίος ταξιδεύει εκτός των ΗΠΑ για να βρει τις «ανωμαλίες» - αντεγκλήσεις και συγκλίσεις της Αμερικανικής και των τοπικών πολιτισμών – με τα απλοποιημένα (pidgin) Αγγλικά ως τον συνδετικό παράγοντα. Η διαγλωσσική και διαπολιτισμική περίγραψη προσλαμβάνεται στα έργα του Ιγιέρ υπό το φως της ανθρώπινης επιθυμίας να κατανοήσει τον κόσμο μέσα στα πλαίσια των περιορισμών του ανθρώπου να μάθει, να μιλήσει και να κατανοήσει τις γλώσσες και τα σημεία έξων πολιτισμών, αντιμετωπίζοντας τη συχνά προβληματική φύση της μεταφραστικής ανταλλαγής στην περίγραψη σε μια ξένη γλώσσα.

Το Ε' Κεφάλαιο επικεντρώνεται στο άμεσο παρόν και στο εγχύς μέλλον όπως προβάλλεται στην επιστημονική φαντασία του Γουίλιαμ Γκίμπσον. Ο κυβερνοχώρος αναδεικνύει αριθμό ενδιαφέροντων ζητημάτων σχετικά με τη μετάφραση και την εικονική περήφανη ή την κυβερνοπερήφανη. Οι φορείς λογισμικού αυτόματα συγκεντρώνουν και μεταφράζουν την πληροφορία και πλέον δεν περιορίζονται από οποιοδήποτε φυσικό ή γεωγραφικό χώρο. Εν πάντω, περιττότε, είναι πιθανόν να εμφανιστούν περιορισμοί, όπως πολιτικοί, οικονομικοί, χρηματικοί. Με τον κίνδυνο τυποποιημένης μετάφρασης, προβάλλεται το επιχείρημα για τη συνεχή σημασία του μεταφραστή.

Το Στ' Κεφάλαιο επικεντρώνεται στην εξορία από την εθνική κουλτούρα ως μέσο για την επικοινωνιακή αναγέννηση, όπως αυτή περιγράφεται στα πολιτισμικά ως την αναποτελεσματικότητα της γλώσσας στη μεταφορά των μηνυμάτων, ο Λίνγκις εκφράζει κριτική για την ορθολογιστική μετάφραση και δείχνει τον αυθορμητισμό στη μετάφραση ως σωματική παράσταση, υπογραμμίζοντας τη σημασία του κατάλοιπου ή του περισσεύματος στη μετάφραση, δίνοντας έμφαση στους τρόπους απόκτησης γνώσης, μέσω των καναλιών της γεύσης, της αφής, της όρασης, της όσφρησης και της (όχι λεκτικής) ακοής.
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Translation theory, especially the translation of culture, in particular is taking new shapes and assuming new meanings within the context of contemporary globalization. The term “translation of culture” is not new. It is widely used in translation theory, anthropology, ethnography, cultural studies and other disciplines and contexts that aim at a deeper understanding of cultural processes affected by current globalization. Cultural hybridization, transnational cultural flows, the cultural dynamics of deterritorialization, cultural reproduction, and new relationships between the world and language, the world and text, etc., are only a few such processes. The experiences of migration, displacement and travel, recorded, represented, reinvented and studied can shed considerable light on translation as a construction of culture as a mode of writing.

The main focus of this chapter involves the consequences of the ‘Cultural Turn’ in translation theory that began in the 1980s and continued on into the third millennium, opening up a variety of new, surprising and alternate views and transformations. To begin with, I will trace when, how and why the theory of translation incorporated culture into its context and began to speak about translation as cultural. This will gradually lead me to the definition of a “translation of culture”—the aim of the theoretical part of the thesis. Since theories and ideas mature diachronically and interact in ways that sometimes overlap, split, or contradict each other, I would like to take a diachronic, i.e., historical approach and focus on the schools, ideas and circumstances that brought culture to translation theory, expanding its boundaries and creating spaces for new disciplines, particularly, Translation Studies (TS).

One of the first monographs outlining the chronology of the ‘Cultural Turn’ in Translation Studies was *Translation Studies* (1980) by Susan Bassnett-McGuire. In her study she takes a chronological approach to translation terms and concepts, and concentrates on the strategies of translation practices within
specific cultural situations. Her work is a useful source of reference when one seeks to trace the emergence of TS as a separate discipline that began to overlap more and more with linguistics, literary criticism, philosophy, and cultural studies. As one of the main influences on the contemporary situation of translation theory, Bassnett names the rediscovery of Russian Formalism in the literary criticism of the early 1960s, which led to developments in critical methodology and to important advances in TS (Bassnett, Studies 4).

The important influence of Formalism on translation theory was acknowledged in several scholarly works referring to the history of translation. George Steiner, in his study of the history of translation theory, After Babel (1975), suggested that certain differences in the emphasis and direction of translation theory after the 1960s are related mainly to two facts—first, the rediscovery of Russian Formalism among Soviet and Czech translation scholars in the fifties/sixties and, secondly, the ‘discovery’ in the early 1960s of Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Task of the Translator,” originally published in 1923. After that, posits Steiner, “we are in the fully modern current of translation theory and in many ways we are still in this phase” (450). Together with the influence of the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer those two discoveries initiated a new era in the history of translation and brought about, as Steiner puts it, “a reversion to hermeneutics and almost metaphysical inquiries” into translation and interpretation. Further, underlying the importance of the discourse of translation Steiner wrote:

Much of the confidence in the scope of mechanical translations, which marked the 1950s and early sixties, has ebbed. The developments of transformational generative grammars has brought the argument between ‘universalist’ and ‘relativist’ positions back into the forefront of linguistic thought. As we have seen, translation offers a critical ground on which to test the issues. Even more than in the 1950s, the study of the theory and practice of translation has become a point of contact between established and newly evolving disciplines. (250)
A decade later Edwin Gentzler, in his work *Contemporary Translation Theories* (1993), named the sixties and the seventies as “the period of Early Translation Studies,” and stressed that “the roots of Early Translation Studies can be found in Russian Formalism” (77). At the same time, Lawrence Venuti, referring to the French cultural scene in the seventies, also emphasizes the importance and need to study historical cases of, as he calls it, “strategic cultural interventions” (Venuti, *The Translator’s Invisibility* 20). Such “interventions,” or, as Venuti otherwise called them—the “foreignizations,” come into force at particular historical moments through translations. According to Venuti, the revival of Formalism within French literary criticism and philosophy in the seventies, and the later “discovery” of France in the “Anglo-American tradition,” can serve as meaningful examples of such cases of cultural ‘interventions’ and exchanges (*Invisibility* 20).

The study of the entire history of the translation of culture could be very extensive if one takes into account numerous works on the theory and practice of translation, but for my purposes I have chosen works that describe the current situation in the field of translation and then explain the formation of the “translation of culture” as a concept and a mode that is being applied in multiple ways in writing about phenomena of culture. My focus also unavoidably will touch upon one of the central problems of translation theory—that of the translatability of culture. The question of the translatability of culture or of its objects is as old as it is new in the light of contemporary globalization. Trying to theorize it, I hope to demonstrate how it is possible to arrive at a cultural object that can be translated across linguistic, cultural, and social contexts and what its cultural consequences are.

**i. Formalist concepts of translation and culture**

The aim of this section is to highlight the main ideas upon which the movement of Russian formalism (Formalism) rested, and briefly elaborate on the reasons for the revolutionary change it brought to the field of translation theory.
Because of the vagueness of the historical boundaries of Formalism and its wide scope, the term “formalism” evoked an internal division within the formalist movement from the very beginning. Peter Steiner, after examining the myriad of texts where the term “Russian formalism” is used, discovered a wide diversity of functions the term was meant to serve. In part, the term explains the controversy of the formalist movement. Formalism was “a stigma with unpleasant consequences for anybody branded with it, a straw man erected only to be immediately knocked over…, a historical concept that on different occasions refers to very different literary scholars…, an empty sign that might be filled with any content” (17). It could be supposed then that the label “formalism” is commonly extended even to movements whose members considered their own theorizing as clearly non-formalist, and who referred to themselves by rather different names. For instance, the Prague Linguistic Circle (established in 1926), named itself Structuralists and its theoretical framework Structuralism. Coined by Roman Jakobson in 1929, the term “structuralism” was used, as Peter Steiner puts it, to “designate the leading idea of up-to-date science in its most various manifestations” (31). Yet another kind of labelling is offered by American literary scholar Ewa Thompson and German literary historian Jurij Striedter. Thompson divides the Russian Formal School into idealistic, i.e., Shklovskian, and positivistic, i.e., Tynjanov’s trends (55-110). In his study of the history of Russian Formalism, Peter Steiner mentions that Striedter uses the label of “orthodox formalists” to refer to Viktor Shklovskij and the label “baptist of structuralism” for Jurij Tynjanov (20). The Shklovskian notion of the artistic work as the sum of devices that defamiliarizes the reality to make its perception more difficult was rendered, then, obsolete by Tynjanov’s more comprehensive definition of “the art work as a system composed of devices” whose functions are specified synchronically and diachronically (Peter Steiner 106-108).

The list of examples indicating the variety of labelling and the problematic of periodization of Formalism could be endless, but these examples are indicative for the understanding that the concept of formalism was from its very beginning meant to be a traveling and heterogeneous concept, and formal concerns in general seem to be far-reaching and not limited merely to Formalism. Envisioned thus as a traveller, the concept of formalism was easily transferable to other literary theoretical schools outside the Russian culture,
causing at times a problematic labelling and overlapping with other theoretical trends such as structuralism. The best illustration of the problematic labelling would be the rise of the new critical trend in literary theory known as post-structuralism. With post-structuralism another Russian literary-theoretical group with ties to Formalism—the Bakhtinians—caught the attention of literary scholars.

Nevertheless the main aim, the center of gravity of the Formalist movement, was to establish a unique object of inquiry—literature itself. In his essay “Вокруг вопроса о формалистах [Around the Question of Formalists],” formalist Ejxenbaum puts it as follows: “…the prime concern of the Formalist is …literature as the object of [literary] studies” (2). This aim necessarily presupposed a new conception of what literature and the literary text were: the vital issue for literary science was no longer the investigation of other realities that literary texts might reflect, but the description of what it was that made them a literary reality. To view literature as an independent phenomenon having a life of its own was the first step in beginning to look into its interrelatedness with society, politics and culture. An illustrative example of how these links began to be established are the metaphors used in Formalism. Formalism rests upon three metaphors—mechanism, organism and system. A more detailed explanation of the specific character of metaphors is vital for this research based on ideas of travel and translation because they demonstrate the relationship between language and place.

The founder of mechanistic Formalism, Viktor Shklovsky, and his key principle disjunction which became the organizing concept of Formalism split art from non-art. The first concept coined by Shklovsky is widely known—defamiliarization (ostranenie), and it accounted for the special nature of artistic perception. In his manifesto, The Resurrection of the Word (1914), Shklovsky presented the dialectics of defamiliarization and automatization:

By now the old art has already died… things have to die too… We are like a violinist who has stopped feeling his bow and strings. We have ceased to be artists in our quotidian life; we do not like our houses and clothes and easily part with life that we do not perceive.
Only creation of new forms of art can bring back to man his experience of the world, resurrect things. (12)

Shklovsky implies that art develops in order for us to regain a feeling for objects that have become automatized in our perception. The concept of *device* is central. It is the device that transforms non-literary material into the work of art by providing it with form, forming it anew--defamiliarizing it. The difference between device and material in the actual literary work (like prose) is the difference between the narrative and the events it narrates. For example, the plot and story, where the story serves the artist as mere pre-text for plot construction. Therefore the material, the *byt* (usually translated as everyday-life), and art are inseparable—an idea that Shklovsky’s mechanistic model has denied. The contribution of the mechanistic model to the idea of the translation would be perhaps the acknowledgement of the *extraliterary* reality vital for an understanding of culture as a system where translation plays an important role. Shklovsky insisted on the idea that once the material becomes a part of art it loses its original ties with life and becomes a component of the form of art. Literature lives for Shkolovsky while “extending over” non-literature (Sheldon 86).

Another group of Formalists—the morphologists--turned to biology, insisting that the literary work functions like an *organism*: as a complex whole composed of heterogeneous elements which are hierarchically differentiated, some being more essential to the whole than others like the human body. In Vladimir Propp’s *The Morphology of the Folktale* (1928), the conception of the fairy tale as an empirical, temporally extended object led him to stress the formal units that constitute narrative flux, and to ‘disregard’, as Peter Steiner noted about him, the semantics of the work (P. Steiner 80).¹ Although morphologists tried to bridge the gap between literature and *byt* (everyday-life), they also believed that the internal organization of a literary work is affected by external influences—*the extraliterary*—but is so affected only at random, occasionally, having nothing to do with the internal functions of the literary work or with the inherent regularities of literature.

¹ Also pointed out in Levi-Strauss’s *Structural Anthropology* 133.
The third formalist metaphor—the *system*—was intended to fill the so-called gaps between the other two metaphors and to describe the relationship between art and everyday life in the light of literary history. Literary history was seen by systemic Formalists as capable of explaining the dynamic interplay between art and everyday life. Most frequently in literary theory the metaphor of *system* is associated with two names—those of Jurij Tynjanov and Roman Jakobson. They argued that formal elements took on value only when they distanced themselves from standard forms, and that any innovation was dependent upon something that was considered “normal.” The literary work itself could no longer be studied in isolation from social-cultural relations. The concept of “literariness” for systemic Formalists became clearly equated with ‘difference.’ Peter Steiner noted that for Tynjanov literature is a dynamic speech construction and defining literature like this, Tynjanov envisioned the correlation of *byt* with literature through speech (*Russian Formalism* 104). According to Jakobson, the idea of ‘dominant’ language and speech forms “was one of the most crucial, elaborated, and productive concepts of Russian Formalist theory” (Jakobson, “Problems of Literature” 82).

It is on the level of language and speech that the literary fact is distinguished from literature. It means that under certain conditions speech can turn into *literary fact* or into the fact of *byt*. This interplay of literary and extraliterary discourse is called *ustanovka* (the closest translations of which would be *intention* or *orientation* or *positioning oneself in relation to some given data*). *Ustanovka* is one of the central Formalist concepts along with *device* (Striedter 2). The *ustanovka* of the literary system rendered many forms of social interaction literary and was instrumental in recognizing such genres as the epistolary and travel genre as literary.

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2 Tynjanov, for his article “On Literary Evolution” written in 1927, and a year later for another article he wrote with Roman Jakobson, “Problems in the Study of Literature and Language;” both articles collected in Matejka and Pomorska (1978).

3 For a better illustration of *ustanovka* I’d like to mention one example from the history of Russian literature, the epistolary genre in the 18th century. In this ‘form’ the new—sentimentalist--principle of construction found its implementation. In 1791, Nikolai Karamzin’s *Letters of a Russian Traveller* marked a new stage in the history of Russian prose and even the subsequent generation of Romanticists paid close attention to the epistolary form. From a fact of *byt* (automatically perceived) the letter became an important literary genre.
The concept *ustanovka* led Tynjanov, and later Jakobson, to evaluate the literary system as something incorporated into the overall cultural system:

The discovery of the immanent laws of literature (language) permits us to characterize every concrete change in literary (linguistic) systems but does not permit us either to explain the tempo of evolution or to determine the actual selection among several theoretically possible evolutionary paths. This is because these laws while limiting the number of solutions do not necessarily leave only a single one. (Jakobson, “The Problems of Literature” 37)

The function of the formal element can only be viewed as differing, *defamiliarizing* in the specific intertextual moment when the norm and novelty come into contact. Literariness as such is distinguished through the process of *defamiliarization* of something normalized, automatized, ordinary, banal, *byt*. Therefore the revelation that formal elements were capable of taking on different functions in different cultures (as in translation, for example) suggested to Formalists that literary scholarship needed to be expanded to also include the extraliterary.

Through the three metaphors of *mechanism, organism and system*, Formalists gave life to a ‘Holy Trinity’ of *interaction, struggle and form* which gave their movement a specific character, a special cultural significance that was later revealed by Mikhail Bakhtin. This is realted to the contempoary idea of translation as intersystemic and intercultural transfer.

**ii. The Bakhtinians: dialogue and culture**

The critique and revision of Formalism in Russia is usually associated with the name of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle called the Bakhtinians. The main target of the Bakhtinians’ critique was the Formalist vision of literature as an *autonomous reality* more or less (even in the case of systemic Formalists) independent of other cultural domains. The most important approach which set Bakhtinians apart from Formalists was their semiotic frame of reference. Steiner, for instance, argues that the Bakhtinians’ definition of literature in semiotic terms
may seem to paraphrase that of Jakobson (P. Steiner 262), who also conceived the verbal art as a specific type of sign—the expression. As an expression, the literary work is an oxymoron: stylistic figure and semiotic non-sign. For the Bakhtinians, however, literature differs from other ideological domains not in failing to signify but in its mode of signifying. The idea in Bakhtin and Medvedev’s joint work *The Formal Method* is explained as follows:

Literature is one of the independent parts of the surrounding ideological reality, occupying a special place in it in the form of definite, organized philological works which have their own specific structures. The literary structure, like every ideological structure, refracts the generating socio-economic reality, and does so in its own way. But, at the same time, in its “content,” literature reflects and refracts the reflections and refractions of other ideological spheres (ethics, epistemology, political doctrines, religion, etc.). That is, in its content literature reflects the whole of the ideological horizon of which it is itself a part. (17)

From a linguistic point of view, a verbal sign that *reflects* or *refracts* another verbal sign resembles an utterance replying to another utterance: it forms a *dialogue*. The concept of *dialogue* is the controlling metaphor which the Bakhtinians have made the *center* of their theory. In general terms, dialogue indicates movement and process; it presumes heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. The concept of dialogue supposedly filled the gaps in Tynjanov-Jakobson’s systemic approach that pointed out the interaction of different cultural systems and elements but failed to explain the mechanisms of such interaction.

What the Bakhtinians and their Prague counterparts searched for was a well-defined, unified theory. They insisted that literary study, in order to treat its material adequately, must proceed from such a theory. The Bakhtinians envisioned such a theory in the philosophy of Marxism:

All the products of ideological creation—works of art, scientific works, religious symbols and rites, etc.—are material things, part of the practical reality that surrounds man. Nor do philosophical views,
beliefs, or even shifting ideological moods exist within man, in his head or in his “soul.” They become ideological reality only by being realized in words, actions, clothing, manners, and organizations of people and things—in a word: in some definite semiotic material… We are almost inclined to imagine ideological creation as some inner process of understanding, comprehension, and perception, and do not notice that it in fact unfolds externally, for the eye, the ear, the hand. It is not within us, but between us. (Bakhtin/Medvedev 4-8)

The Bakhtinians insisted that to study literature means first of all to study distinctive forms of social intercourse which are constituents of the meaning of the works of art themselves. The Bakhtinians were the first to clearly bring up the idea of dialogue and translation as the base of the interdependence between the social interaction and the work of art. Every word, as such, is involved in social intercourse and cannot be torn away from it without ceasing to be a word of language (Bakhtin/Medvedev 94). But dialogic forms of language (i.e., relationships possible through language) were brought to literary scholarship only through criticism of Formalism, i.e., by Mikhail Bakhtin’s extensive study of Russian poetics:

Dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not reside within the system of a language. They are impossible among elements of language. The specific nature of dialogic relations requires special study. (Bakhtin, *Dostoevsky’s Poetics* 117)

I believe that the Bakhtinian invitation to study dialogic relations stimulated further developments in literary theory and in the field of translation theory. What Bakhtin meant by ‘the specific nature of dialogue’ though went far beyond the limits of a single language.

If one of the most important elements in the theory of Bakhtin is dialogue, then Bakhtin’s thought on dialogue has one unifying idea—culture. Bakhtin’s theoretical mode could be straightforwardly described as a cultural dialogism which embraces the idea of great time in culture. In the 1970s Bakhtin openly speaks of an unavoidable amalgamation of cultural and literary enterprises. In his
“Response to a Question from Novy Mir,” (a progressive Russian magazine on culture in the 1970s), Bakhtin describes the problems of literary scholarship in the 70s and offers a new programme for its improvement. The central axis of this ‘programme’ was an idea of a “deeper study of the inseparable link between the literature and culture of the epoch” (Bakhtin, “Response” 2). Culture was seen by Bakhtin as the main theme underlying the whole set of socioeconomic and political conditions and as an ideologeme (a product of ideology). Bakhtin’s thinking opened new spaces for both—a theory of culture and a theory of literature. Perhaps that is why a translator and an editor of Bakhtin’s voluminous work, Caryl Emerson, has called him “the apostle of the next chance” (xxvi).

In “Response to a Question from Novy Mir;” Bakhtin presented the programme of literary improvement wrapped in an idea of culture:

Literature is an inseparable part of culture and it cannot be understood outside the total context of the entire culture of a given epoch. It must not be severed from the rest of culture, nor, as is frequently done, can it be correlated with socioeconomic factors, as it were, behind culture’s back. These factors affect culture as a whole, and only through it and in conjunction with it do they affect literature... In our enthusiasm for specification we have ignored questions of the interconnection and interdependence of various areas of culture; we have frequently forgotten that the boundaries of these areas are not absolute, that in various epochs they have been drawn in various ways; and we have not taken into account that the most intense and productive life of culture takes place on the boundaries of its individual areas and not in places where these areas have become enclosed in their own specificity. (Bakhtin, “Response” 2)

Bakhtin’s personality and his life-long philosophical activity embody the link between epochs, schools and ideas. In the case of Bakhtin, it is important to note that although he has not directly been concerned with translation problems as such, scholars still find reason to write about him in connection with issues of translation (Emerson 1999, Michiel 1999, Torop 2002). Margerita de Michiel emphasizes that the text to be translated is itself a place of multi-levelled
Bakhtinian dialogism because two different practices—empirical and theoretical, science and ideology--meet there: the different logics of two different languages are always already present in the text to be translated (Michiel 695).

Peeter Torop argues that the most important principle revealed by Bakhtin through his analysis of Dostoevsky’s novels is a polylogue of a culture. The polylogue cannot be analyzed as a sum of monologues but only as intertwined phenomena that involve cultural space, languages, and sign systems. Since sign systems are apt to change and are ambiguous, culture needs to be approached “via events and texts that bind different sign systems, yet have a general meaning or theme that can be described” (Torop 60).

The polylogue is closely related to the idea of great time in literature. The idea presupposes that the work of literature should be studied and interpreted diachronically—as something extended through time, something which breaks through the boundaries of its own time and lives in epochs or centuries. In other words, the life of culture is measured by the diachrony of its events and texts. Events and texts find breathing space within culture which must be conceived historically. Culture so conceived makes the life of literature in other epochs more intense and fuller than its life within its own time:

…if it had belonged entirely to today (that is, was a product only of its own time) and not a continuation of the past or essentially related to the past, it could not live in the future. Everything that belongs only to the present dies along with the present. (Bakhtin, “Response” 4)

Bakhtin grounds the idea of great time on the semantic cultural context of epochs:

Semantic phenomena can exist in concealed form, potentially, and be revealed only in semantic cultural contexts of subsequent epochs that are favourable for such disclosure… (“Response” 4)

The transfer of the work from one epoch to another is, therefore, possible through the semantic cultural potential of the work that is disclosed by a
transferor—be it a translator or an author. As Bakhtin further illustrates, the same occurs with genres (of literature and speech): genres accumulate forms of seeing particular aspects of the world, and the writer awakens their semantic possibilities while liberating him/herself from “captivity” in his/her own epoch (5). But for this reason, the one who translates the text should always remain outside the time and culture she/he translates or interprets. Outsideness, for Bakhtin, is the most powerful factor in understanding the culture. But in order to understand the great time of the work, one needs also to develop a creative understanding. And that demands remembrance and unforgetfulness:

Creative understanding does not renounce itself, its own place in time, its own culture; and it forgets nothing. (7)

Creative understanding also presupposes a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of particular cultures. In terms of translation of culture these ideas have a central importance as they point to the essence of ‘dialogical encounters between cultures’:

…we raise new questions for a foreign culture, ones that it did not raise itself… and foreign culture responds to us by revealing to us its new aspects and new semantic depths… Such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched. (Bakhtin, “Response” 7)

It seems that the whole idea of dialogue was worked out by Bakhtin in the space of culture—be it a specific culture or cross-cultural interaction. His understanding of dialogue therefore is inseparable from culture and its semantic depths. Although Bakhtin does not offer us any theory of translation (in the sense of technique), what can be said with certainty is that translation for him was a particular form of dialogue and, broadly conceived, it lies in the essence of all human communication. What distinguished Bakhtin’s idea of dialogism is its universality conceived on the level of an individual human soul. As a number of scholars have noted (Bibler 1989, Emerson 1999, Torop 2002), an important insight to Bakhtin’s theory is that culture reveals most of its ramifications on the
level of an individual: the possibility of the self-determination of an individual embodied in a creative act is the highest expression of culture. It is even more so because each individual carries a non-reducible and unique “speech energy,” and speech energy is a prerequisite to a dialogue. Dialogue exists because of speech energy. Translation is “a dramatic illustration” of these processes, as Emerson—a translator herself—puts it (Emerson, Poetics xxxii). In place of comfortable synthesis Bakhtin suggests that the permanent dialogue has a dual character: a dialogue through the gap. Life in language is dependent upon the preservation of this gap: two speakers must remain only partially satisfied with each other’s replies, because the continuum of dialogue is in large part dependent on the fact that neither knows exactly what the other means.

Therefore the most important turn in literary theory that occurred with Formalism and Bakhtin in the 1930s was the abandonment of the view of the world as unified—or the single word, single voice, single accent. Literary theory inherited from Bakhtin and Formalism the concept of polyphony, which in its own turn was an expression of the changing attitudes toward culture and history. The epoch itself made polyphony possible, argued Bakhtin; the objective contradictions of the epoch determine the creativity of an author on the personal level of perception of these contradictions (28). Since the social contradictions are ever present, the polyphony—the Bakhtinian ideal—has yet to come. Perhaps Bakhtin’s work is the best embodiment of the permanent dialogue between epochs, generations and the internal, changing voices within the individual. Bakhtin—“the apostle of the next chance”—predicted the expansion of globalization and, not surprisingly, the logical and gradual successors of Bakhtinian dialogism were theories of semiotics of culture (Jurij Lotman and the Tartu school) and Polysystems theory.

iii. Polysystem: bridging the voices of polyphonic culture

Itamar Even-Zohar, on the basis of the data collected from his observations on Hebrew literature, proposed a hierarchy of cultural systems. The terms ‘Polysystem’ and ‘Polysystemic approach’ refer to the entire network of systems—literary and extraliterary—within a given culture, and are intended to
demonstrate how all kinds of texts function within it, shape and affect it. Polysystems theory envisioned the stratified subsystems within the literary system from a sociological point of view, unlike Bakhtin’s looser literary system supported by philosophical thinking. The polysystemic approach aimed at a systemization of the “voices” in the literary system, to use Bakhtin’s term. To distinguish the factors that demonstrate their interrelatedness, to stress the role of culture within a social-political system and, most importantly, to grasp the relationship of a given culture with other cultural systems--these were some of the major concerns of Polysystems theory. The theoretical advantage of this theory for Translation Studies is apparent: by embedding translation into a larger cultural context and focusing on the role of specific historical situations, it expands the notion of translation far beyond the linguistic phenomena.

In general terms, the Polysystem regards literature not only as a system operating within the larger social, literary and historical system but also as a system itself, which affects, influences and forms hierarchies of other, target culture systems. The systemic approach to literature, especially the inclusion of translations into the system, was an important move, since “translated literature had up to that point mostly been dismissed as a derivative and second-rate form” (Munday 109). It is through the system of hierarchies existing in a culture that Polysystems theory undertakes the study of the complex interrelationship of culture-related concepts and cultures. For instance, in his article “The Position of Translated Literature within the Literary Polysystem,” Even-Zohar speaks of translations as ‘completed facts’ correlating to another culture in at least two ways: (a) in the way the target literature selects works for translation; and (b) in the way translation norms, behaviour and policies—the literary repertoire--are influenced by other ‘home co-systems’ (Even-Zohar, “The Position” 193).

With a polysystemic approach there appears the possibility of diffusion of the borderlines between the original and translation. The approach allows for an expansion of the boundaries of the concept of “translation” and the consideration of a wider interpretation of translation. The Polysystem speaks of translation in terms of “text making:”

…the distinction between a translated work and an original work in terms of literary behaviour is a function of a position assumed by the
translated literature at a given time. When it takes a central position, the borderlines are *diffuse*, so that the very category of “translated works” must be extended to semi- and quasi-translations as well… Under such conditions the chances that the translation will be close to the original in terms of adequacy are greater than otherwise… Periods of great change in the home system are in fact the only ones when a translator is prepared to go far beyond the options offered to him by his established home repertoire and is willing to attempt a different treatment of text making. (“The Position” 197)

The Polysystem, like Bakhtin’s thought before it, demonstrates that the literary system is an ever-evolving process where innovatory and conservative elements coexist in constant flux, competition and struggle. Because of such flux, the position and definition of translation also are not clearly fixed. It might occupy a primary or a secondary position within the Polysystem. If it is primary, it participates actively in “shaping the centre” of the Polysystem; it “is likely to be innovatory and linked to major events of literary history as they are taking place” (Even-Zohar, “The Position” 193). If it is secondary though, translation represents a peripheral system within the Polysystem, has no major influence over the central system and even becomes a conservative element, preserving conventional forms and conforming to the literary norms of the target system.

The process of transmitting and receiving culture involves time. To understand/explain the interrelationship between cultures, one needs to adopt a diachronic approach. With the incorporation of diachrony, Polysystems theory begins to address a whole new series of questions and research directions. Edwin Gentzler, for instance, characterizes the role of Polysystems in literary and translation theories as follows: “The process translation theorists now wish to describe is not the process of the transfer of a single text, but the process of translation production and change within the entire literary system” (Gentzler 109). The interest in the production of translation arises from the Polysystemic assumption that the social norms and literary conventions in the receiving culture govern the aesthetic presuppositions of the translator. The latter influences ensuing translation decisions and not the other way round, i.e., it is not the
subjective ability of a translator, that influences the literary and cultural conventions in a particular society.

In general terms, Polysystemic ideology demonstrates that to speak of translation is to accept the idea of transcending literary borders which cannot be realized by a translating subject alone but requires a whole set of historical, political and ideological conditions. This is possible only via diachrony which opens a possibility for the comparison and interplay of the voices of epochs, for the disclosure of changing hierarchies that allows us to view the culture as a semiotic whole: “…just as the linguistic borders have been transcended, so must the literary ones be transcended. For there are occurrences of a translational nature which call for semiotics of culture” (“The Position” 108).

Perhaps the most important contribution of Polysystems theory to the concept of translation of culture is the dynamics within the Polysystems itself, which create “turning points, that is to say, historical moments where established models are no longer tenable for a younger generation” (“The Position” 194). At such moments interest in another culture and consequently in translations of other cultures may play a decisive role in any given literature.

Through the diachronic approach Polysystems theory recognizes the innovative power of translation in the literary system. Even-Zohar distinguishes three main ‘cases’ when translation might occupy a primary position in a given culture: the translation strikes the literature of a given culture with novelty when a literature is young, peripheral or weak, or going through a crisis. To make a remark here, it can be said that there are numerous examples of this ‘case’ in the Eastern European countries, particularly in countries of the former Soviet Union: after regaining political independence, the national literatures of those countries advanced mainly with the help of translations. As Even-Zohar notes, when a so-called weak literature, often of a smaller nation, cannot produce all the kinds of writing that a larger system can, it develops a subsequent dependency upon translation. The most important factor is that in such circumstances, translated texts serve not only as a medium through which new ideas can be imported, but also as the form of writing most frequently imitated by creative writers in the native language. Gentzler points out that an analogous cultural situation existed in the USA in the sixties: established literary models no longer stimulated the new generation of writers, so they turned elsewhere for ideas and forms. Under such
circumstances or combinations of circumstances, both established and avant-garde writers produce translations, and through the translated text new elements—which would otherwise never appear—are introduced into the literary system (Gentzler 118). Even while playing a secondary role in strong systems, translation sometimes can paradoxically both introduce new ideas into the culture and preserve traditional forms. In other words, Even-Zohar and Polysystems theory indirectly indicated the turn towards translation as a mode of writing wherein methods of creative writing and translation merged.

Seen from this point of view, translation is no longer a phenomenon whose nature and borders are permanently fixed, but an activity “dependent on the relations within a certain cultural system” (“The Position” 197). The Polysystem not only freed the discipline of Translation Studies from limiting traditions but also expanded the theoretical and practical boundaries of traditional translation theory and the notion of translation, allowing people to speak of translation as a mode of writing. This mode of writing also struggles to belong to the higher strata in a literary system. At the same time it contains elements of other cultures and therefore is always already involved in a multitude of relationships with other systems (at the margins as well as at the center of a cultural whole). The level at which these multiple relationships will unfold is the main question which attracted the attention of Even-Zohar’s successors, Gideon Toury, for example, who began to look into the norms of translations that shape texts. Toury goes a step further and tries to better detect and describe all those laws and norms—linguistic, literary, and sociological—which govern translation. By avoiding a predefined notion of what a translation should or shouldn’t be, Toury works on a behavioural or performance approach to translation and posits that translation activities should rather be regarded as social, but also having cultural significance as he puts it in his essay “In Search of a Theory of Translation:”

…”translatorship” amounts first and foremost to being able to play a social role, i.e., to fulfil a function allotted by a community—to the activity, its practitioners and/or their products—in a way which is deemed appropriate in its own terms of reference. (198)
The socio-cultural constraints are anchored, according to Toury, between two extremes in translation—‘absolute rules’ (objective conditions) and ‘pure idiosyncrasies’ (subjective ones). The multiple intersubjective factors that occupy the space in between those two poles are, in Toury’s terminology, norms acquired during the process of the socialization of an individual (“In Search” 199).

Toury sees translation as a social activity governed by norms. Since translation involves two languages and two cultural traditions, i.e., two norm-systems, the value behind them also consists of two sets of value-elements—one set has to do with the position in a source culture, i.e., ‘being a text in a certain language,’ another refers to the translation’s position in a target culture. Adherence to the first set determines translation’s adequacy as compared to the source text; adherence to the second determines acceptability in the target culture. Toury elaborates on the impossibility of sticking to only one of the two sets. Shifts from the source text are inevitable, as is subscription to the norms originating in the target culture.

…even the most adequacy-oriented translation involves shifts from the source texts. In fact, the occurrence of shifts has long been acknowledged as a true universal of translation. However, since the need itself to deviate from source-text patterns can always be realized in more than one way, the actual realization of so-called obligatory shifts, to the extent that it is not-random, and hence not idiosyncratic, is already truly norm-governed… non-obligatory ‘shifts’ occur everywhere in real-life translations and tend to constitute the majority of shifting in any single act of human translation, rendering the latter a contributing factor to, as well as the epitome of regularity. (“In Search” 201)

Following the popular sociological assumption that there could be no absolute regularities, especially in a behavioural domain, Toury argues that translation decisions will necessarily involve an ‘ad hoc combination’ of source and target norms. The act of placing one-self between source and target constitutes an initial norm in the translation process. Toury argues that whether the source or
target norms prevail, depends on the social and historical conditions that surround the translator, and that subsequently influence all other translation decisions: “…it is norms that determine the (type and extent of) equivalence manifested by actual translations” (“In Search” 204).

Positing two hypotheses—that of total acceptability in the target culture at the one extreme and total faithfulness to the source text at the other—Toury locates translation and the very concept of translation in the middle space. The universal definition of translation suggests that no translation is ever entirely acceptable to the target culture because it will always introduce new information and forms defamiliarizing the other cultural system; nor is any translation faithful to the original version, because the cultural norms cause shifts from the source text structures. The main argument that Toury pursues is that translations have no fixed identity. They are always subject to different socio-literary contextual factors and must be viewed as having multiple identities, dependent upon decision-making and the literary energies of a particular epoch. The definition of translation, according to Toury, varies historically, and the only controlling or culturally framing force of translation is the norm. And even the norm always depends on culture and the processes within it:

The difficulties involved in any attempt to account for translational norms should not be underestimated. These, however, lie first and foremost in two features inherent in the very notion of norm, and are therefore not unique to Translation Studies at all: the socio-cultural specificity of norms and their basic instability... In addition to their inherent specificity, norms are also unstable, changing entities; not because of any intrinsic flaw but because of their very nature as norms. (“In Search” 204)

Toury focuses on the socio-literary norms that govern the target culture and directly influence the process of translation. Norms determine what kind of translational relations endure, and the very definition of translation then becomes dependent upon norms and how they work in any given system/society. The translational relationships between the source and target are replaced by networks
of relationships. In other words, Toury raises the question of whether one should study translations as texts, as concepts, or as systems and what is the role of such cases as pseudo-translations (translations when no original exists) and translations via an intervening language (secondary translations).

Even-Zohar’s and Toury’s system theory work has helped Translation Studies break the conceptual barriers and find more elaborated ways of theorizing about translation. To summarize, I can list four aspects of the Polysystem approach that have had an important impact on Translation Studies and on coining the concept of translation of culture. These aspects are:

a) the abandonment of one-to-one notions of correspondence;
b) the acknowledgement of literary tendencies in the target culture;
c) the acknowledgement of intersecting cultural systems;
d) the denial of the “fixed identity of translation” (Gentzler134).

It seems that Even-Zohar and Toury both found it difficult to escape from Formalist roots and still confined their analyses to entities called “literary.” They thus tend to divorce the evolving literary polysystem from other signifying systems in a culture. Nevertheless, in Polysystems one can feel the intensifying tendency to view translations less as an empirical facts, i.e., as concrete texts defined by the target culture, and more as a complex set of translational relations in any given situation. With Polysystems, for the first time in translation theory, the cultural fabric of a society is deciphered as a polyphonic text which, by being such, helps to pinpoint norms and rules that regulate the literary system. This allows for assuming that literary systems themselves are composed of multiple differentiating systems, one of which is the multileveled sphere of translation. Those systems, although they constantly undergo change, form a highly stratified but unified whole. For Polysystems theory the highest organized human structure is culture. The translation of culture is an unavoidable part of life, and the source that feeds the process of creative writing.

**iv. Derridean deconstruction and translation**

The Formalists and the heirs and critics of Formalist ideas--Bakhtin and the theorists of Polysystems—demonstrated how translations are inscribed in the shifting web of intertextuality and how translations as facts seem to be more
constructed than material. Deconstruction, despite and because of energies drawn from their “predecessors”--Formalism and Structuralism—made a considerable move further by suggesting, as Genzler puts it, that the translated text *writes us* and not the other way round (145). Deconstruction shifts translation to a more philosophical level. The entire problematic of translation invariably undergoes change, allowing for new insights and fresh interdisciplinary approaches. Jacques Derrida sets the path for his deconstructionist project in *Of Grammatology*, by pointing to structuralism and essentialism’s limitations. Derrida suggests that the father of structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure, and did not see his project through to its ultimate conclusions, that what was “chased off” by his attempt “to limit and contain” within language has come back “to haunt language” (43-4).

For the purposes of this argument, I shall focus on several aspects of Jacques Derrida’s vision of translation. This is not only because he is most commonly associated with the term Deconstruction but also, because, as with Formalism and Polysystems, I find the work of Derrida to be more an empirical wandering, a journey, not bound to philosophical tradition, to the evolution of language or thought systems. What is at the very foundation of Derrida’s thought is the assumption that there is no deeply rooted and rigid structure or system in which language lives and operates (as Formalists and later Polysystem suggested). There are only different chains of signification (it also concerns the original and its translations) in their symbiotic relationship. In the Derridean approach, what is visible in translation is not language referring to things, but language referring to language itself. Although the original for Derrida contains a structure--the structure that is essential for the future survival of the original—the structure cannot be complete and visible without translation. Derrida talks about such a half-completed structure as related to the ‘law’ governing translation. Walter Benjamin, on whom Derrida draws, also sees that a ‘debt’ (*Aufgabe*) is constitutive of the translator’s ‘task.’ The original, then, survives by its transformation, and matures through its renewal. Moreover, the original is an open structure that grows by being filled with translation. It also echoes Bakhtin’s idea of the openness and responsiveness of culture that finds itself in a dialogic encounter with other cultures. Such “encounters” result not in merging or mixing but in revealing new aspects of source and target cultures and new semantic depths while “each retains its own unity and open totality;” and, by the same
token, “they are mutually enriched” (Bakhtin, “Response” 7). Derrida explains and expands on this idea in the following lines:

The original is not a plenitude, which would come to be translated by accident. The original is in the situation of demand, that is, of a lack or exile. The original is indebted a priori to the translation. Its survival is a demand and a desire for translation, somewhat like the Babelian demand: Translate me. Babel is a man, or rather a male god, a god that is not full since he is full of resentment, jealousy, and so on. He calls out, he desires, he lacks, he calls for the complement or the supplement or, as Benjamin says, for that which will come along to enrich him. Translation does not come along in addition, like an accident added to a full substance; rather it is what the original text demands—and not simply the signatory of the original text but the text itself. If the translation is indebted to the original (this is its task, its debt [Aufgabe]), it is because already the original is indebted to the coming translation. This means that translation is also the law. (Derrida, The Ear of the Other 153)

Derrida extends the notion of the ‘law’ further in his thinking on relevant, that is—oikonomic, translation. In his lecture “What Is a ‘Relevant’ translation?” Derrida refers us to the condition of a certain economy as a measure of the translatable and the untranslatable. The economy of translation--oikonomia--signifies two things, property and quantity, Derrida further explains. Property means ownership (the law--nomos—of the oikos). Translation, one way or another, is an effort to own the original: to provide the translation with a home. It is a ‘law’ of something proper, something appropriate to itself, something that is at home—“and translation is always an attempt at appropriation that aims to transport home, in its language, in the most appropriate way possible, in the most relevant way possible, the most proper meaning of the original text, even if this is the proper meaning of a figure, metaphor, metonymy, catachresis, or undecidable impropriety…” (Derrida, “What Is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” 179).

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On the other hand, when one speaks of economy, one cannot escape calculable quantity: the one who counts also accounts for. “A relevant translation is a translation whose economy, in these two senses, is the best possible, the most appropriating and the most appropriate possible,” notes Derrida further (179). In other words, Derrida questions relevant translation as domestication. As Lawrence Venuti’s reading of Derrida’s lecture suggests, any translation replaces the signifiers constituting the foreign text with another signifying chain, trying to fix a signified that can be no more than an interpretation according to the intelligibilities and interests of the receiving language and culture (Venuti, “Introduction” 172). Venuti notes further that Derrida sees this practice as inevitable, as every translation participates in an “economy of in-betweeness,” positioned somewhere between “absolute relevance, the most appropriate, adequate, univocal transparency, and the most aberrant and opaque irrelevance” (172).

Derrida is acutely aware of the cultural and political implications of relevant translation. His reading of Shakespeare’s play *The Merchant of Venice* gains enormous interrogative power from his view that “everything in the play can be retranslated into the code of translation and as a problem of translation; and this can be done according to the three senses that Jacobson distinguishes: interlinguistic, intralinguistic, and intersemiotic--as, for example, between a pound of flesh and a sum of money. At every moment, translation is as necessary as it is impossible. It is the law... In *The Merchant of Venice*, as in every translation, there is also at the very heart of the obligation and the debt, an incalculable equivalence, an impossible but incessantly alleged correspondence between the pound of [women’s] flesh and money, a required but impractical translation between the unique literalness of a proper body and the arbitrariness of a general, monetary, or fiduciary sign (“What Is a ‘Relevant’ Translation” 184). This impossible translation, this conversion between the original, literal flesh is not unrelated to one of the character’s—the Jew Shylock--forced conversion to Christianity. In the history of Western translation, Christianity has favored free domesticating strategies that render the ‘sense’ or ‘spirit’ of the foreign text, whereas Judaism has been stereotypically associated with literalizing strategies that render the ‘word’ or ‘letter.’ To put it differently, in his reading of *The Merchant of Venice*, Derrida addresses broad themes in the history of translation.
theory, notably the antithesis between ‘word-for-word’ and ‘sense-for-sense’ translation. Derrida suggests that for centuries a so-called literal translation that aims to attain the greatest possible relevance hasn’t been a translation that renders letters or the sense, but rather a translation that establishes itself as a law, as a kind of translation that stays as close as possible to the equivalence of “one word by one word” and thereby “respects verbal quantity as the quantity of words, each of which is an irreducible body, the indivisible unity of a meaning or a concept” (“What Is a ‘Relevant’ Translation” 181). Whenever the unity of the word is threatened or put into question, it is not only the operation of translation that finds itself compromised; it is also the concept, the definition, and the idea of translation that must be reconsidered. In cases of homonymy and homophony that are never translatable word-to-word, such threats occur and translation demands a note which means, in fact, that it fails, faces its end, and becomes the form of memory or commemoration that is called ruin.

Homonymic and even homophonic effects are reflected in the Derridean term differance coined in his essay “Differance” (in Margins of Philosophy) to provoke such an effect, and by the same token to bring translation theory, and the art of translation ever closer to philosophy—particularly, the philosophy of the word. Derrida writes differance instead of difference, deliberately making a mistake. The words (the Latin verb differre means to delay, to defer) sound the same, and even graphically they look similar. Derrida aimed to create confusion in the reader’s mind, or a sense of something lost in the development of language. The technique works to defer traditional notions of reference and reminds us of formalist theories of translation. But while the formalist approach is directed to graphic accuracy and precision of reference, Derrida’s task is more an empirical wandering and game. In terms of translation, he suggests not looking at the original message, nor at its codification, but at the multiple forms and interconnections through which it must pass in order to speak, to refer at all. In Margins of Philosophy Derrida speaks of “a play of forms without a determined and invariable substance,” and in the practice of this play he suggests that we to see “a retention and protection of differences, a spacing and temporization, a play of traces” (15). The problem of traces, according to Derrida, is that the traces can never be presented. They are always differing and deferring, erasing themselves in the act of disclosure. In terms of informing translation theory, Derrida’s “play
of traces” belongs not to a translation which carries identifiable meaning across boundaries, but to a movement along an absent road, an echo disappearing as it is heard. The play of traces therefore can never be presented, for as one tries to stop and grasp it, it disseminates, and moves on, crossing over to another place. Translation can also correspondingly be redefined not only as crossing over in order to grasp something but also as a place for a crossing over which disseminates and escapes. Derrida in fact calls into question any definition of translation as transporting, reproducing, representing or communicating the ‘meaning’ of the original. Instead, he suggests translation might be better viewed as one instance in which language can be seen as always in the process of modifying the original, deferring and displacing it. As Gentzler notes, “from the deconstructionist position, translation is viewed as an activity that continually… thwarts all desire” (163). The thwarting of desire is itself a necessary condition for the desire to unfold. According to Gentzler, in a similar way, translation can be viewed as “a necessary process that distorts the original meaning while simultaneously revealing a network of texts both enabling and prohibiting interlingual communication” (163). Languages for Derrida are interrelated and mutually derivative—by transgressing the limits of the target language translation extends, enlarges, or makes languages grow. The metaphor used by Benjamin and cited by Derrida is that of enlargement through adjoinment along the broken lines of a fragment:

For, just as the fragments of the amphora, if one is able to reconstitute the whole, must be contiguous in the smallest details, but not identical to each other, so instead of rendering itself similar to the meaning of the original, the translation should rather, in a movement of love and in full detail, pass into its own language the mode of intention of the original: thus, just as the debris become recognizable as fragments of the same amphora, original and translations become recognizable as fragments of a larger language (Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator” 21).

Derrida’s writing is never devoid of a sense of love of language and play with language. Life-affirming, Derrida’s writing is quasi-religious, which might
explain his attraction to Benjamin. Deconstruction as such is seen as a positive force extending the body of language not just in a symbolic but in a physical sense too. Translation, more than any other mode or form, complements and reaffirms, enacting survival via a birthing and rebirthing process; hence translation’s importance in the deconstructive scheme of things. Benjamin writes that original and translations become recognizable as fragments of a larger language; Derrida adds that translation behaves like a “child”; it is not just a “product” subject to the law of “reproduction,” but has, in addition, “the power to speak on its own” in a new and different fashion, supplementing language, sounding the “Babelian note” (*Des Tours* 191). Translation, accordingly, ceases to be viewed merely as an operation carried out between two languages, but is viewed as a process constantly in operation within a single language as well. Therein lies the radicality of the deconstructionist project.

Translation theories—from the Formalists on—presume differing and distinct systems. According to Derrida, in translation, impurities manifest themselves, and accidents occur. Significantly for him, translation refers to the sense of roads which lead to a place, conveying also a sense of extension toward the indefinite.

Derrida’s work suggests that translation theory might be the best “field study” to begin to explore these unheard traces, these possibilities that are covered up when one expresses oneself. In *Positions* Derrida prefers the term “regulated transformation” over that of translation, for he argues we will never have the transport of pure signifieds from one language to another:

> Difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion of translation we would have to substitute a notion of *transformation*: a regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. We will never have, and in fact have never had, to do with some “transport” of pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched. (20)

Thus, for deconstructionists no translation strategy can be linked *deterministically* to a textual effect, theme, cultural discourse, ideology, or
institution. Such linkages are contingent upon the cultural or, better put, cultural-political situation in which the translation is produced. Philip Lewis, influenced by Derrida’s thinking, has seen such translations as instances of “abusive fidelity.” This translation practice, Lewis observes, “…values experimentation, tampers with usage, seeks to match the polyvalencies and plurivocalities or expressive stresses of the original by producing its own” (Lewis, “The Measure of Translation Effects” 33). Venuti, referring to his translation of Derrida’s lecture that I mentioned above, notes that this is often “demanded by such foreign texts or materials that involve substantial conceptual density or complex literary effects, namely, works of philosophy and poetry, including Derrida’s own writing” (“Introduction” 172). This kind of translating is abusive in two senses: it resists the structures and discourse of the receiving language and culture, especially the pressure toward the univocal, the idiomatic, the transparent. In so doing, it interrogates the structures and discourses of the foreign text, exposing its unacknowledged conditions.

After Derrida the discussion on the deconstructionist alternative to traditional approaches of translation took various directions (Gentzler 1993). The debate went on in French circles, Translation Studies, Anglo-American literary theory, language philosophy. In fact, in Translation Studies Derrida was met with mistrust and criticism that saw Derridean deconstruction as something very similar and even parallel to Toury’s approach which, by uncovering the norms governing translation, also accounted for the diversity of translation modes and types. Despite this critical attitude in Translation Studies, deconstruction nevertheless has disclosed itself as a radical and revolutionary theory—especially, by being instrumental in Walter Benjamin’s ‘return’ to the theory, particularly, as regards new readings of his essay “The Task of the Translator” (1923). There has been substantial work done in this direction in Anglo-American literary theory by Paul de Man, Carol Jacobs and one of Benjamin’s English translators, Harry Zohn. Paul de Man in Resistance to Theory goes so far as to say “that you are nobody unless you have written about this text” (73). Since my research takes an interdisciplinary approach, I also want to briefly focus on one of the readings of Benjamin’s essay in the field of language philosophy. This is not only because language philosophers in general have been very productive in post-Derridean deconstruction but because of one enlightening and comprehensive text on Walter
Benjamin’s significance in translation theory, namely *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy* by Andrew Benjamin. In the book the author discusses Walter Benjamin and the translator’s task in general, and he does so by bringing it into a context that ranges from Enlightenment philosophy, residues of which still affect the discourse of this age. Moreover, reference to this work, I believe, will allow me in subsequent chapters to more broadly contextualize Walter Benjamin’s thinking on the relatedness of translation, writing and spatial movement that is vital for my research.

In *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy* Andrew Benjamin offers a very thorough discussion of how Heidegger, Freud, and Derrida have contributed to our understanding of the nature of language in general and translation in particular. While not agreeing with Derrida, Andrew Benjamin presents the possibilities of double readings, of *differance* in all its differing, delaying, and conflictual senses. Translation in a post-Derrida discussion, for Andrew Benjamin, ceases to be understood as any simple, definable single activity, but rather as a plurality of activities with a plurality of significations (35). In his discussion of Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” Andrew Benjamin begins from the idea of the displaced original language, by stating that fragments of a broken vessel do not presuppose an initial vessel (100). He then asks how we are to understand the “futural vessel,” and what are the conditions that cause us to think in terms of the “belonging together” of the fragments, and thereby the “belonging together of languages (of the translation and the original).” Andrew Benjamin notes that fundamental to such belonging is “the presence of difference,” and he raises the question whether the presence of difference “recognizable as the broken parts of the greater language” and demanded from translation is the essential quality of language alone. The future task of translation for Andrew Benjamin lies in the answer to this question. For Andrew Benjamin, Walter Benjamin employs the word “translation” in relation to the activity of naming. But he also notes that, according to the Platonic theory of naming, the essential has no essence that can be named.

The task of the translator is therefore to rewrite the passage… ‘to release’ by translating that which is essential to language – to all
language – namely the unnameable essence of language which is the precondition for the possibility of translation. (103)

What names the belonging together of differences is harmony:

...naming - the act - enacts and is hence made possible by a concept of agreement and variance that takes place beyond essentialism and therefore which involves an ontology not of stasis but of becoming. It is within these terms that the belonging together of the fragments of language can be understood. (105)

Andrew Benjamin thinks of pragmatic conditions which allow for interpretation and mutual understanding, which he often calls ontological-temporal conditions. He seeks to identify and describe the elements which allow for thinking about the semantic and interpretative potential that is inherent in words; and he argues that one can think about translation without an origin to be, or not be, retrieved. Meaning and interpretations emerge out of real conditions—they are actual as well as conflictual—and can be positively and empirically described. Difference for Andrew Benjamin always has a specificity. Walter Benjamin, argues Andrew Benjamin, locates after-life, survival, by locating the potential for an after-life within the text itself. Words incorporate a site of conflict, a site of unending after-life, which defers an end or a definite interpretation.

Interpreting Walter Benjamin’s text against the grain of deconstructionist readings, Andrew Benjamin argues that in Walter Benjamin “the possibility of a different understanding of translation and philosophy is beginning to take place” (108).

v. After the Cultural Turn: how the heterogeneous leads the unified

Up to now I have demonstrated how various interpretations of the interconnectedness between translation and culture slowly moved from literary theory to translation theory, finding there more fruitful ground for further branching out and for new quests related to global processes and the role of
culture. The problematics of local culture within the global, and the global culture within the local, is on the agenda of translation linguists, scientists, and philosophers who are looking to make their mark in translation theory. Cultural diversification and displacement, movements of people and flows of travelers raise new questions for language, and for cultural heritage especially. To paraphrase Walter Benjamin and Andrew Benjamin after him, as man falls from an original oneness, so too has translation fallen from claims of recovery of the original. Yet encountering new language and the activity of translation there are attempts by the “fallen man” to recover that original oneness.

A whole range of new questions found their way into translation theory globally along with established systems of ideas that under new conditions had their “turns.” As if re/turning to the idea of dialogism in Bakhtin, for instance, the American translation scholar Douglas Robinson, in his book *The Translator’s Turn*, analyzes the “turn” that the translator takes from the source text to the target text, offering his own “dialogical model.” Robinson analyzes the translator’s dialogical engagement with the source language/original and with the ethics of the target language/receptor; he allows for the translator to intervene, subvert, divert, even be entertaining in the text, emphasizing the creative aspect of translating. Mary Snell-Hornby from Switzerland, in her *Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach*, no longer defines translation as an activity that takes place between two languages, but views it as an interaction between two cultures, as a dialogue. She goes a step further by noting that, as “we are moving toward an understanding of translation that sees it as more a cultural (rather than a linguistic) transfer. The act of translation is not a ‘transcoding’ from one context into another, but an ‘act of communication,’ a dialogue” (39). And culture, therefore, is not just the “arts,” but it has a broader anthropological sense, as referring to all socially conditioned aspects of human life (Snell-Hornby 39). Susan Bassnett and Andre Lefevere, on the other hand, have for some time been looking at macro-structural phenomena such as institutional power structures as well as the micro-level shifts they induced. Bassnett and Levefere argue that Translation Studies is taking a historic cultural turn. Since translation is recognized not only as

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5 I refer here to W. Benjamin’s paper “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,” and Andrew Benjamin’s *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy* where he elaborates on theological themes and on the books of Genesis.
interlingual but also as intercultural, descriptive research during the eighties made scholars aware of the cultural complexities involved in describing and defining literary texts and, particularly, translations. Jose Lambert, for instance, raises the idea that many literary texts are not recognized as literature because they contain discursive elements which are not translated, pointing thereby to the possibility of the category of non-translation, i.e., mistranslations, misrecognitions, errors and mistakes in translation that were dismissed by traditional translation theory (“In Quest of Literary World Maps” 137-141). And Umberto Eco decisively views translation as identical to culture, which is conceived less as a static phenomenon and instead as the endless “translation of signs into signs” (Experiences in Translation 71).

If Snell-Hornby and Eco propose to move from the “text” as a translation unit to culture, Bassnett and Lefevere, taking a materialistic position, argue that those who want to understand texts and their repertoires in historical paradigms also need to look at those institutions which influence their production. In an essay titled “Systems Thinking and Cultural Relativism” Lefevere notes that by looking at the factors through which a culture shapes works of literature, we can quickly arrive at the important role played by “rewriters”—critics, translators, anthologizers and historiographers. Never forgetting that all choices of “rewriters” one way or another are circumscribed by power and restricted by the poetics of their time, Lefevere suggests that “neither ideology nor poetics, neither patronage nor rewriters are monolithic entities. Those who feel unhappy with the ideology and/or poetics of their own system will plan to use (rewrite) elements taken from the other system to further their own ends” (“Systems Thinking” 64). The ideological dimension however has remained crucial in translation theory since the time of Bakhtin, and Susan Bassnett welcomes its restoration in theory by stressing that it was ignored for too long. Now, she says, it “has been restored and our knowledge of cultural history has consequently been enriched” (Bassnett, “Translation, Tradition, Transmission” 1-2). In her study Comparative Literature: A Critical Introduction, Bassnett refers to poets and translators Haroldo and Augusto de Campos from Brazil who use Derrida to develop a somewhat non-Eurocentric approach. In their approach to literary translation, the de Campos brothers refuse any sort of preordained original, but instead view translation as a form of transgression, a form of “cannibalism.” Cannibalism though is not to be
understood in Western terms as abomination, an act of sacrilege, but as a symbolic act of taking back out of love, of absorbing the virtues of a body through a transfusion of blood. Translation in this sense is seen as an empowering, nourishing act, the result of which would be the creation of something entirely new. From this point of view the receiving culture will interpret and transform the original one, and translations therefore “are no longer a one-way flow from the source to the target culture, but a two-way trans-cultural enterprise” (155).

The ideological dimensions of translation are developed in the creative and rather philosophical approach of Lawrence Venuti. Venuti demonstrates that there is an ongoing debate between foreignizing and domesticating ‘advocates’ of translation. The debate has its history and particular reasons which are hidden in the nature of the text or, to borrow the Formalist expression, in the “literariness” of the text. In other words, the choice of translation strategy always depends on a particular historico-cultural situation:

Textual production may be initiated and guided by the producer, but it puts to work various linguistic and cultural materials which make the text discontinuous, despite any appearance of unity, and which create an unconscious, a set of unacknowledged conditions that are both personal and social, psychological and ideological. Thus, the translator consults many different target-language cultural materials, ranging from dictionaries and grammars to texts, discursive strategies, and translations, to values, paradigms, and ideologies, both canonical and marginal. Although intended to reproduce the source-language text, the translator’s consultation of these materials inevitably reduces and supplements it, even when source-language cultural materials are also consulted. Their sheer heterogeneity leads to discontinuities—between the source-language text and the translation and within the translation itself—that are symptomatic of its ethnocentric violence. (The Translator’s Invisibility 24)

Venuti’s concept of ethnocentric violence has more to do with such phenomena as the cultural heritage of the translating subject. My reading of Venuti suggests that the potential of translation is hidden in the material itself and
the outcomes of translation have to do with the ways the translating subject relates the material to the source and the target culture. Our understanding of culture, as it was demonstrated in the sections on Bakhtin and Polysystems, reflects diachronic structures, a sum of pasts and presents influencing our attitudes and behaviour. It is in the process of relating material or texts to culture historically that the elements of ethnocentric violence become evident. If these are, for instance, thematic elements, then ethnocentric violence reveals itself through the process of translation of thematics through time. Translations of Shakespeare’s “Hamlet,” for instance, demonstrate how at each epoch, translators and theatres rewrote and restaged the work to adjust the thematics to their own epoch, society, political climate and culture. This approach has become known in the theater as “intervention,” some discussion of which can be found in Lorna Hardwick’s *Translating Words, Translating Cultures* (67).

To end the chapter on Venuti’s line of thinking is to point to new spaces for viewing the ethical problematics of translation strategies. Domestic inscription, for instance, moved translation towards ethical reflection on the preservation of the foreign. The cultural difference of the foreign can only be signalled by their displacement in the translation, i.e., through domestic differences introduced in domestic institutions, canons, etc. Motivated by this “ethical politics” of difference, as Venuti puts it in his essay “Translation, Community, Utopia,” and having a feeling of “insufficient agency,” the translator seeks “to build a community with the foreign culture, share understanding and collaborate on the project, going as far as to revise domestic values and institutions” (469). This process exceeds the genre of translation itself. To translate is, in fact, to invent a new readership which is aware that its interest in translation is shared with other foreign readers. Translation, therefore, is also ideological because it releases a domestic remainder, an inscription of values, beliefs, and representations linked to historical moments and social positions in the domestic culture. In the remainder lies the hope that it will create community, and it is only through the remainder that community can occur either in the source, or in the target culture. The remainder is diachrony within synchrony that stages the return of social contradictions and struggles through language. In supplying an ideological resolution a translation projects a utopian community, Venuti argues. In expressing the hope for the harmony between domesticating and
foreignizing politics, Venuti echoes Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch who, in his work *Heritage of Our Times*, repeatedly referred to the idea of “anticipatory illumination,” that is to say, a way of imagining a future reconciliation of linguistic and cultural differences (108).

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I have demonstrated how the interrelationship between culture and translation arrived at a theory of translation that is transfer-oriented, rather than target-oriented; that is focused not solely on the source text or on the target text, but looks instead at the possibility of different discourses and semiotic practices to be mediated through translation.

From Formalism to Deconstruction and to Translation Studies, by working out and making the concepts and terms practical, by establishing repertoires of translations as cultural phenomena, informative and innovative connections and patterns have been revealed. Questions on the contacts/non-contacts, unidirectional/multidirectional relations and hierarchical relations in any given culture or language have been raised, and this quest has created further echoes, and ramifications in academic fields such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, cultural studies, literary theory and philosophy that will be discussed next in relation to travel literature. Viktor Shklovsky’s formalist concept of *defamiliarization* and Bakhtin’s *dialogism* and *polyphony* are the key concepts for understanding how monophonic authority and hegemonic culture are questioned and recast, as well as how the questions we put to cultural descriptions are altered in anthropology, ethnography and post-colonial theory. On a cultural level, defamiliarization can be defined as something that penetrates hegemonic culture by breaking down its defences, while dialogical processes proliferate in complexly represented discursive spaces (those of ethnography or, in my case, travel literature). Polysystems theory and Toury’s normative approach view the possibility of the birth of new genres and subgenres, endowed with their own characteristics and norms such as the traveller’s subjectivity, curiosity towards the ‘other,’ new interpretations of sensuality and new understanding of the contemporary world. In the wake of Derrida’s initiative and after the ‘return’ of Walter Benjamin’s thought to translation theory, the philosophical problem of
translation is studied as one of the central problems in philosophy. In the nineties, those translation theorists who worked through the contribution of deconstructionists were not only at the forefront of their own field, but began to engage in meaningful exchanges with scholars from other fields. By recognizing limits imposed by the receiving culture, as Venuti suggests, and by problematizing those discursive constrains, we can hope not only to open up the discourse of translation theory to its own possible transformation, but to also help open the receiving culture for possible social change (through the practice of translation).

The implications of such claims for translation theory are far-reaching. For they break down the distinction between written and other discursive practices; and, finally, they open up the possibility of exploring non-Western discursive practices that may impinge upon translation as defined in the West. Modern translation theory stands on the threshold of a new phase where it is beginning to sort through the relations in which meanings are constituted; thus it will better inform our post-structuralist conceptions of language and literary discourse, as well as ourselves and, most importantly, it will open ourselves to alternative ways of perceiving the world.
CHAPTER TWO

Translation, Travel, Globalization

Moving does not seem to indicate what something is, but rather a state of doing or of undergoing.
---Aristotle “Topics”

In chapter one I demonstrated how the theoretical understanding of translation gradually has changed from treating translation in terms of a lexical transfer to perceiving it as a complex process of cultural shaping and interpretation. Contemporary globalization, the changing perception of time and space, unavoidably put translation theory into interaction with other areas of thought, and transformed the concept of translation into a movement which takes place not only across languages, but across cultures, time, place and beliefs. As I stressed in chapter one, the diachronic interaction of theories shapes them and makes them mature, leading to renegotiations of boundaries and inspiring further discoveries and even adventures. Interaction presupposes movement that causes change. The translation of culture refers to the act of change, to the series of events and associations occurring in the course of movement. This partially answers the question why the term ‘translation of culture’ is most frequently associated with texts about travel and situations where one finds himself or herself encountering otherness and alterity.

The term ‘translation of culture’ is multilayered. It suggests, on one level, that translating words and signs also involves translating and transplanting into a receiving/target culture the cultural framework within which the text is embedded. Furthermore, different cultures (and sub-cultures such as those represented by artists, politicians, academics, readers and the larger audience) may create and enact their own translational strategies and norms; in that sense, then, translation is an activity which enables movement across boundaries in both real and metaphorical senses. The material to be translated does not arrive by itself, alone—it is introduced to the receiving/target culture by an individual traveller who chooses it because of specific (often personal) life circumstances and
reasons. At a deeper level, the term ‘translation of culture’ suggests that cultures are actually created, defined and constructed by various translators-on-the-move, both in the metaphorical and non-metaphorical sense.

My intention in this chapter is to demonstrate how translation theory began to be practiced in various contexts that were dealing with the multifaceted problematics of culture. With this chapter I would like to highlight several influences on translation theory—anthropology and ethnography, post-colonial theory, and philosophy.

Before I proceed to the study of the interrelationships between translation theory and the above-mentioned areas of thought, I have, for my purposes, to stress that at the heart of the cultural problematics of all those areas lie the changing attitudes to travel, time, and distance. In an extensive work on the phenomenon of globalization, *Economies of Signs and Space*, Lash and Urry, for instance, emphasize that “modern society is society on the move” and that “the modern world is inconceivable without...new forms of long-distance transportation and travel” (252). In *Globalization and Culture*, John Tomlinson, on the other hand, had stressed that local life, nevertheless, “still occupies the majority of time and space” and globalization, therefore, is to be conceived as something that transforms our understanding of culture as local, which often means “staying in one place but experiencing the ‘dis-placement’ that globalization brings to them” (9).

It’s not my intention to define what culture is, but in order to avoid abstractions I would suggest that culture, for my purposes, can be understood as the order of life in which meaning is constructed through practices of symbolic representation. My assumption is partly based on the above-mentioned work of John Tomlinson, as well as on Roland Robertson’s study of the model of global unicity, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, where he suggests that globalization in the context of culture does not imply uniformity—something like ‘world culture’ -- but rather a complex phenomenological condition, i.e., “the global-human condition in which different orders of human life (individual; national societies; world system of societies; collectivity of humankind) are brought into articulation with one another: globalization involves increasing interaction between these orders of human life” (26). Robertson’s model of unicity is one in which cultural differences may become more accentuated as they
are identified in relation to the world as a whole. When someone falls into complex connectivity from this perspective, then what he or she finds is how much globalization alters the concept of translation as meaning construction: how it affects one’s sense of identity, the experience of place and self in relation to place, how it impacts the shared understandings, values, desires, myths, hopes and fears that develop around source and target cultures. The cultural dimension, therefore, spans what Antony Giddens has called “fundamental” to globalization, both the “out-thereness” and “in-hereness” of globalization (95).

Culture for my purposes, therefore, refers to something ordinary, to all these mundane practices that directly contribute to the “great time” of our life-narrative in which we, diachronically, translate our byt (every-day life). Focusing on the concept of ‘translation of culture’ then, I am inclined to refer to Robert Welch’s study, Changing States: Transformations in Modern Irish Writing, where he draws the following analogy:

…telling a story is translating it… all legitimate intellectual enquiry is translation of one kind or another: it takes a text, a phase of history, an event, an instant of recognition and proceeds to understand it by reliving it in the process of recreating it. (Welch x-xi)

The translation of culture then is not only a “carrying across” between two cultures but also “carrying over” of the depth of associations.

i. Anthropology, ethnography and the author of translation

In anthropology the term ‘translation of culture’ was in usage decades ago, but the real transition from culture to culture-as-text occurred when the notion of language in its diachronic sense--as the precondition of the great time of works, to use Bakthin’s expression-- came to dominate the perspective of social anthropology.

Presumably, the term was first coined by anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard in his work Theories of Primitive Religion written in 1965, and it meant “making the experience of other peoples understandable without domesticating
that experience or turning it into something other than it really is for the people who live it” (Morris, “With Translation in Mind” 88). Before, much of the writing about other peoples was simply not translated or, as Marshall Morris puts it, was a collection of unexplained exotica, i.e., shocking rituals, strange practices, and irrational behaviour of creatures not fully human:

Since Evans-Pritchard there has been a concerted attempt to understand these same rituals, practices and behaviour in such a way as to grasp human experience, to see the human problems and perplexities, to reduce the false exoticism that distances people from understanding other people who are fundamentally alike, but whose lives are shaped – both facilitated and constrained – by different circumstances. (“With Translation in Mind” 88)

Talal Asad, in his essay “The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology” points to the text of Godfrey Lienhardt, “Modes of Thought” first published in 1954, as also being one of the earliest works to describe the task of social anthropologists in terms of translation. He therefore quotes Lienhardt:

The problem of describing to others how members of remote tribes think then begins to appear largely as one of translation, of making the coherence primitive thought has in the languages it really lives in, as clear as possible in our own. (Lienhardt [96] quoted in Asad 142)

As it seems from the times of Evans-Pritchard and Lienhardt, the problematics of the translation of culture initially were closely related to travelling elsewhere, encountering the other and writing about all that in the language of the target culture. Two decades later, in 1986, James Clifford’s Writing Culture addressed the questions of writing culture at length. Most importantly, Clifford marks the radical shift from maintaining a scientific stance of objectivity to acknowledging the subjectivity in written cultural accounts and self-consciously foregrounding that subjectivity. In his later work, Routes: Travel and Translation in the late Twentieth Century (1997), Clifford begins to explore
the anthropologist’s recognition of the relationship of ethnography to travel and travel writing by approaching anthropological fieldwork as a series of *travel encounters*. The study examines how new conceptions of spatial issues and practices have complicated anthropological practices and traditions. Clifford suggests that “one way to understand the current ‘experimentalism’ of ethnographic writing is a renegotiation of the boundary, agonistically identified in the late nineteenth century, with ‘travel writing’” (66). Although Clifford notes in the same work that there are still “important generic and institutional distinctions” between fieldwork and travel, such as the injunction to learn local language, he argues that ethnographic writing now shows “the increased prominence of practices and tropes commonly associated with travel and travel writing” (68).

In other words, by challenging the terminological and theoretical boundaries of anthropology and examining contested concepts of culture, Clifford defamiliarizes and, in a way, metaphorizes the concept of translation: “There is no cure for the troubles of cultural politics in some old or new vision of consensus or universal values. There is only more translation” (*Routes* 13). What Clifford points out here is that one could obtain a much broader vision and better understanding of contemporary cultural phenomena associated with movement and displacement if one sees those phenomena in the light of ongoing translation. Especially, he suggests further, if the mode of translation is applied or “the terms of cultural comparison” are utilized: “By ‘translation term’ I mean a word of apparently general application used for comparison in a strategic and contingent way” (*Routes* 39). Clifford brought to the interdisciplinary field an interesting study in which culture appears as translation, and the term ‘culture’ is used as a term of translation:

> It offers a good reminder that all translation terms used in global comparisons… get us some distance and fall apart. *Tradittore, traduttore*. In the kind of translation that interest me most, you learn a lot about people, cultures, and histories different from your own, enough to begin to know what you’re missing. (*Routes* 39)

Clifford’s central idea in *Routes* is to translate culture into the vocabulary of travel. Then, as he argues, the “organic, naturalizing bias” of the term ‘culture’
seen as a rooted body that grows, lives, dies, and so on is questioned, and many new problematics come more sharply into view (25). Among them, as he points out, are “constructed and disputed historicity, sites of displacements, interference, and interaction” (25).

James Clifford’s work on travelling cultures has focused on culture as a term that has to be considered separately from such terms as ‘source,’ or ‘location.’ Speaking of intercultural crossing and foreignization, of events and habits that troubled the common understanding of localism of culture, Clifford highlighted the lack in history of cultures where “dwelling was understood to be the local ground of collective life, travel a supplement; roots always precede routes” (*Routes* 3). Clifford seeks to demonstrate how the practices of anthropological fieldwork themselves have contributed to domestication/localization of the concept and meaning of culture. The traditional research methods of anthropology—the village taken as a “manageable unit” for cultural analysis, the practice of ethnographic dwelling within the community—have contributed to the worldview in which a limited location is taken for culture. Such perception of the place as culture has also endured into contemporary ethnographic fieldwork practices where locations, as Clifford assumes, may be hospitals, labs, urban neighbourhoods, or tourist hotels rather than remote villages. The informing assumption for the researcher and his/her subject will be one of specific sources, one of localized dwellings.

Resisting the idea of culture as conceptually tied to location, Clifford also resists treating practices of displacement as constitutive of cultural meanings. Nor can translation of culture be thought of as mainly domesticating or foreignizing, for meanings are equally generated by people on the move and in the flows and through the interconnections between cultures. Clifford rather insists on seeing “roots” and “routes” as always coexistent in culture and translation—both subject to transformation in the contemporary globalization process.

The point I want to stress here is that contemporary globalization promotes much more physical mobility than ever before, but the key to its cultural impact is in the transformation of localities. Following this line of reasoning, I’d like to assume that processes of ‘translation of culture’ are evoked not so much through the trope of travel as through deterritorialization—that “complex connectivity,” to use John Tomlinson’s expression, which weakens the
ties of culture to place (106). The influence of distant forces and meanings on local worlds estranges them: to put it existentially, it could be said that the place around us changes gradually, subtly, losing its power to define the terms of our existence. The estrangement, the contamination of localities by the global is double-edged: it breaks the defences of local culture and offers the possibility for new understandings of the world in wider—planetary—terms. It has its post-modern consequences too, as Stephanos Stephanides notes in his study of contemporary Indo-Caribbean rituals, *Translating Kali’s Feast*: it “breaks down belief in a sense of linear, progressive, rationally obtained and irreversible progress in cultures that are hegemonic” (171). The post-modern concerns of ethnographic discourse open up possibilities for blurring its boundaries with cultural translation and literary genres.

Like translation, ethnography is also a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages—of culture and societies—and the ethnographer produces translations of this culture. Although an ethnographer, as Vincent Crapanzano noted, “has no text that can be read and translated and despite its frequent ahistorical pretences, ethnography is historically determined by the moment of the ethnographer’s encounter with whomever he is studying” (51). Talal Asad goes on to insist that translating another culture “is not always done best through the representational discourse of ethnography but needs to seek other genres; as one of the problems is that professional social anthropologists have been trained to translate other cultural languages into texts rather than introduce or enlarge cultural capacities” (157). The ethnographic representations then are not “scientifically neutral” and are tempted to be target oriented in their formations (Stephanides 170). Stephanides proposes a creative approach, i.e., an understanding of the life of translation in relation “to the constraints and cultural processes of the target culture,” on the one hand, and “to our sensitivity to differences, to…what cannot be measured,” on the other (171). Clifford came to a similar conclusion speaking about the creativity of an ethnographer as an author, as “a character in a fiction,” as the actor “at center stage” (*Writing Culture* 15). He used Bakhtin’s idea of creative understanding as a dialogue between epochs, an idea that presupposes understanding the life of a literary work as related to remembrance, unforgetfulness, and liberation of a writer from the captivity of the epoch and of
the genre. Ethnographers, notes Clifford, “stage dialogue or narrate interpersonal confrontations” (*Writing Culture* 15). The fictions of dialogue have the effect of transforming the “cultural text” (a ritual, a life story, for instance) into a speaking subject who sees as well as is seen, who evades, argues, probes back:

The principle of dialogical textual production goes well beyond the more or less artful presentation of “actual” encounters. It locates cultural translations in many sorts of reciprocal contexts, and it obliges writers to find diverse ways of rendering negotiated realities as multi-subjective, power-laden and incongruent. In this view, “culture” is always relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of power. (Clifford, *Writing Culture* 14-15)

Dialogical modes, as I shall demonstrate through the travel writing of Jonathan Raban, are not merely autobiographical though: they need not lead to self-absorption. As Bakhtin has shown, dialogical processes proliferate in any complexly represented discursive space (that of ethnography, or in the case of Bakhtin’s study, a realistic novel). Many voices seek expression in the ethnographic text. In traditional ethnographies this polyphony was restrained and orchestrated by giving an authorial function to one voice, and to others the role of sources to be quoted or translated. In the ethnographic approach of the above-mentioned theorists (Asad 1986; Crapanzano 1986; Clifford 1997; Stephanides 2000) dialogism and polyphony are recognized as modes of textual production, and monophonic authority therefore is questioned and revealed to be characteristic of a science that has claimed to represent cultures as exotic, “othered.”

The tendency to specify discourses historically and inter-subjectively recasts this authority, and in the process changes the questions to cultural translations that seek beyond the limits of ethnographic discourse. One of these questions is the question of language. It terms of translation theory, as I have demonstrated in chapter one, language is a diverging, contesting, dialogical set of discourses that no native inhabitant – let alone visitor – can ever control. An ethnographer thus works on or learns only a part of the language, and this, as
Clifford puts it, “does not even broach the question of multilingual/intercultural situations” (*Writing Culture* 20).

The ethnographer, says Crapanzano, is a little like “a messenger” who, “given methodologies for uncovering the masked, the latent, the unconscious, may even obtain his message through stealth. The ethnographer clarifies, renders the foreign familiar, and gives meaning to the meaningless” (52). He or she decodes the message, translates. Like the Benjaminean translator, he or she aims at a solution to the problem of foreignness and, also like a translator (a point missed by Benjamin, as Crapanzano notes), he must communicate that very foreignness: he or she must make his or her message convincing; his or her words must be transparent; he or she uses every persuasive device to convince the reader of the truth of his or her message.

Talal Asad, on the other hand, suggests that cultural translation is far from being a matter of transparency of the text, i.e., “matching sentences in an abstract”; rather, it is a matter “of learning another form of life and…another kind of language” (149). Since nothing is meaningful in isolation, Asad raises questions about the relevancy of contexts. Which contexts are relevant in different discursive events is something one learns in the course of living, and even though “it is often very difficult to verbalize that knowledge, it is still knowledge about something ‘in the nature of society,’ about some aspects of living, that indicates (although it does not dictate) just how much context is relevant to any given utterance” (151). Translators of culture face the problem of determining relevant kinds of contexts--a problem that is solved by skill in the use of languages concerned, as Derrida has demonstrated in his essay on the “relevancy” of translation analysed in chapter one. In terms of society a skill is a kind of behavioural norm, as Gideon Toury suggested, a social practice rooted in a mode of life, and society is also a text that communicates itself to the skilled reader. The task of the translator of culture is to find combined solutions for the problems rooted in the cultural environment he or she works with as well as in the social conditions he or she comes from, i.e., both in ‘the field’ and in ‘his or her own society.’ By pointing to the natural priority of “the social” over “the personal” Asad points (although not directly) to the ethnographer’s agency and the translator’s or ethnographer’s defences which he or she has to break while advancing in alien territory. By the same token Asad points to the limitations of
ethnographic discourse, because these limitations test not only the tolerance of the ethnographer toward “the original” (this is also an ethical dilemma), but also the tolerance of his or her language for unaccustomed forms. Stephanides suggested that ethnographers and translators constantly face the situation of the natural inequality (of languages and cultures), and defined translation, whether ethnographic or interlingual, as a process of inevitable othering:

…since languages cannot be equal, one needs to focus on difference.
Translation, whether ethnographic or interlingual, is about ‘othering’ and intercultural transfer. (Kali’s Feast 196)

If translation is about othering, then in the context of contemporary globalization the dialogue between cultures seems to be debatable. At the turn of the third millennium such debate becomes interdisciplinary, and one of its most expressive forms concerns the meeting point between anthropology and hermeneutics, ethnography and translation. In the world of homologation and sameness, not only does dialogue become questionable but so does the “alterity” of other cultures as a basis for their analysis and translation. A post-modern thinker, Gianni Vattimo, proposes a really interesting formulation of the contemporary condition of cultural encounters:

The hermeneutic—but also anthropological—illusion of encountering the other…finds itself faced with a mixed reality in which alterity is entirely exhausted. The disappearance of alterity does not occur as a part of the dreamed-for total organization of the world, but rather as a condition of a widespread contamination. (The End of Modernity 159)

Vattimo infers from this that post-modern ethnography cannot be taken as a dialogue with otherness that results in a new unity, because the homogenization of the world makes dialogue between cultures loose and superfluous. Westernization, suggests Vattimo, does not entail the simple disappearance of cultures that are other. Perhaps it is more important now to see, he suggests, how these same cultures have nevertheless produced their own specific ways of
entering into the Western universe. The contemporary world as “an immense
collection site of traces and residues,” as Vattimo puts it, lives in conditions
which have still to be analysed (The End of Modernity 158). Even texts belonging
to the Western tradition as the “measure of our humanity (that is, ‘classics’ in the
literal sense of the term), progressively lose their cogency as models and become
part of the same vast construction site of traces and residues”… (160).

The vast “construction site of traces and residues” is not very different
from the warehouses of theatrical costumes that Nietzsche compared to the
“garden of history,” in which nineteenth-century humanity wanders without
discovering any stable identity, only an array of masks (“Disadvantages of
History” 57-123). Interacting with the unequal distribution of power and
resources at the global level, this “vast construction site” sometimes gives rise to
the growth of marginal conditions and circumstances that also need to be
analysed. The texts about cultural survival and marginality—i.e., about the
problematics that surely go beyond anthropology as episteme—could shed more
light on those conditions. The travel themes of Jonathan Raban that I will examine
in the next chapter suggest that the translation of culture in an era of
contemporary globalization focuses more on foreignizing sameness rather than on
“othering.” Stephanides has suggested that authorial reflexivity in cross-cultural
counters shapes ethnography as well as travel writing, because the knowledge
ethnography and travel writing transmitted by lies in the translation process and
not in reportage: “…personal narrative and romance coexist alongside with
objectifying description and science” (172). The result of cultural translation
usually is reconciliation of resistances between foreign and domestic.

This correlation between imagination and objectifying observation is
perhaps better and more fully revealed by a post-colonial perspective of
translation. The post-colonial approach gives a view on power relationships in the
process of translation of culture and reaffirms the Bakhtinian concept of culture as
ideologeme, that is to say, the translation of culture as always already socio-
political practice. In the next section I will try to demonstrate that neither
transmittable text nor culture can be fully unified since both are enmeshed in
relations of power, and both, therefore, have to adhere to more than one strategy
of translation.
ii. Post-colonial perspective of translation and the translating subject

The translation of culture in ethnography, as I have tried to demonstrate above, is a process of not only translating specific cultural texts but also of consolidating a wide range and variety of cultural discourses into a target text that in some sense has no “original,” no source text, so to speak,—at least no single source text. The relationship between the source-culture discourses that ethnographers study and the texts they transmit to the target culture is far more problematic than that between the source and target text in translation. In this case what is involved is more than a structural difference. It is also a question of the degree of power, authority, domination and collaboration, or, as in friendships, of intimate understanding between friends. As Asad remarks, “if the anthropological translator, like the analyst, has final authority in determining the subject’s meaning—it is then the former who becomes the real author of the latter” (161). The question of power differentials steps in, demanding a different look at the problematics of cultural translation and a more elaborate schematization of such questions.

One of the scholars of contemporary translation theory Jose Lambert, to whom I referred in chapter one, in his article “Translation and (De)colonization” distinguishes “basic import/export rules” intrinsic to the translation of culture, and traces them to Polysystems (109). Among such rules he mentions the idea that the more a given society imports texts, the more it tends to be unstable, and the more a given society exports texts, the more stable it will be, at least in its relationship with receiving systems. The active or passive selection of value scales and especially the role of import in people’s values scales are symptomatic of their autonomy or colonization, accordingly. And finally, any explicit discourses on the importation (translation) phenomena are likely to be produced on the side of the exporter rather than on the receiving end, at least as long as the moment of “decolonization” has not started. Translation for Lambert is a strong colonizing factor, and Lambert’s insights seem to fit the new work on translation being done by post-colonial theorists Tejaswini Niranjana (1992), Douglas Robinson (1997), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2000). Douglas Robinson, in
particular, summarizing Lambert’s contribution in *Translation and Empire*, suggests that the observations of the latter are extremely useful “because the ‘moment of decolonization’ is never exactly a moment, and it begins with the beginning of colonization—indeed it is always attendant upon colonization” (38). The power differentials across which the above-mentioned translation scholars theorize are just as complex as those across which whole cultures and individual translators translate. In general terms, the post-colonial aspects of translation highlighted by those authors point to writers’ and translators’ desire to avoid cultural polarization. The basic premise upon which those aspects are based is that the act of translation involves much more than language. It involves, as was pointed out by Bakhtin, and later by Polysystems the entire socio-political system, culture and history.

Tejaswini Niranjana in her work *Siting Translation: History, Post-structuralism, and the Colonial Context*, for instance, notes that “translation as practice shapes, and takes shape within the asymmetric relations of power… What is at stake here is the representation of the colonized, which needs to be produced in such a manner as to justify colonial domination” (2). She questions the traditional views of interlingual translation as “a humanistic bridge between people,” and the idea of translation used by anthropologists and ethnographers when providing Western audiences with knowledge about unknown cultures. In Niranjana’s assumption one foundational drive for cultural translation is the desire to find out something more about “the civilizational other.” For that “primitive thought needs to be translated into modern” (69-70). It is a short distance from this desire to the assumption that “savage speech” is a form of silence that must be translated into European speech before it can be heard. Behind this, for Niranjana, there is the simple idea that those “civilizational others” are earlier stages in an evolutionary process that ultimately produces the European self. The post-colonial approach, in other words, questions the transparency of translated knowledge: “Translation functions as a transparent presentation of something that already exists—an original, although the original is actually brought into being through translation” (71-72). The process of “bringing into being” masks the inequalities between cultures and this is why the post-colonial perspective along with ethnographic discourse suggests envisioning a significant difference between the experience and the report in the process of translation of culture (Niranjana
79). The cultures share the same time—that is the understanding that a translator of culture should seek. Without it the Bakhtinian principle of dialogism would be denounced. It would remove the other from the dialogic situation and contribute to an intellectual justification of colonialism.

Post-colonial approaches, then, suggest that translation really is able to produce new political and textual strategies. By employing certain modes of representing the other, for example, translation might reinforce different hegemonic variations between languages and cultures. Translation as mode thus can be utilized in various discourses—ethnography, philosophy, historiography, education, missionary writings, travel writing, etc.—to renew and perpetuate various hegemonies. The rethinking of translation in such a spirit becomes an important task. Such a rethinking makes sense of various conditions that are caught in translation or affected by colonial ways of seeing. The post-colonial framework also seeks to reclaim the notion of translation by deconstructing it, in a wider sense, by taking the act of deconstruction as a strategy of resistance, especially in the sphere of culture where, as Niranjana also notes, “decolonization is slowest in making an impact” (8). In post-colonial contexts translation therefore is often used to name the problem.

Translating, like rereading or rewriting history, involves a citing or quoting of words from one context to another. This means that the words of the colonized can be cited or translated or reread/rewritten by colonizers in ways that reframe the colonized culture in the interests of colonial domination. On the other hand, it also means that post-colonial subjects can use the same processes to decolonize their own individual and collective minds.

One of the central aspects of decolonization, as raised in the post-colonial context of translation, is precisely the question of language. Language itself is charged with power, and when, for instance, post-colonial writers write, the choice of what language to choose to write in is increasingly fraught. The phenomenon that Robinson explores is the appearance of the strategic middle ground between writing in a major world language and writing in a local language, that is, creating a language in-between:

Language is hierarchized by empire… The deep-seated notion that some languages are intrinsically better than others, better suited by
nature to government, or science or culture, does not die easily. The strategic creation of a hybrid ‘in-between’ language, a creole is one suggestive escape route out of these old squabbles… (102)

Foreignizing or domesticating translation strategies could serve as a kind of solution for decolonization. As I have mentioned in chapter one, Venuti spoke of two kinds of translation strategies, which he widely discussed and explained in his work, *The Translator’s Invisibility* (1995): communicative, domesticating and foreignizing, defamiliarizing. From the perspective of post-colonial translation, foreignizing and domesticating translations make equal impact on a target culture (Robinson 111-113). Foreignizing translation does not necessarily add to the existing diversity of global situations, and the strict distinction between foreignization and domestication appears to be based on some one-sided presuppositions. To my mind, translation into something familiar or ordinary—a language of one’s own—always carries the unavoidable imposition of a hegemonic straightjacket on a text, the situation that Venuti in *The Translator’s Invisibility* (1995) repeatedly describes as invisibility or fluency of translation. But, as Robinson notes, there are also infinite varieties of familiarity or ordinariness in language that do not “imprison their users in hegemonic or colonial prison cells of the mind” and to insist on foreignizing strategies of translation might be too elitist (111-13).

The post-colonial approach also raises the question of what happens when post-colonial originals and translations begin to inhabit the middle-ground to produce hybrid texts. What happens when the distinction between the original and translation begins to break down, and groups of people simultaneously produce and consume originals and translations, as Robinson puts it, in “a playful creole slippage between languages, interchangeably occupying roles between writer and reader, speaker and listener” (112)? Often this distinction seems difficult to define as it is difficult to tackle the problematics of hybridity. Hybridity is a slippery term, or, as Homi Bhabha suggests:

Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal (that is, the production
of discriminatory identities that secure the “pure” and original identity and authority). Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination. (Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders” 154)

The hybrid, therefore, involves translation, deformation, displacement. Clearly, the notion of hybridity, which is of great importance for a critique of traditional notions of translation, is a double-edged issue. Niranjana outlines the importance of cultural hybridity and points out that through hybridity cultures can be invented in other, non-essentializing ways:

To restrict “hybridity” or what I call “living in translation,” to a post-colonial elite is to deny the pervasiveness, however heterogeneous, of the transformations wrought across class boundaries by colonial and neocolonial domination. This is not to present a meta-narrative of global homogenization, but to emphasize the need to reinvent oppositional cultures in non-essentializing ways. Hybridity can be seen, therefore, as the sign of a post-colonial theory that subverts essentialist models of reading while it points toward a new practice of translation. (46)

Post-colonial translation theory seems to stress that competition between translational strategies—foreignization and domestication—on the level of power arises because of social factors, of inclusion/exclusion and has much less to do with anything inherent in the texts themselves, in the linguistic decisions made by their translators. To a great extent, however, it means that, as in every other area of post-colonial experience, colonial tendencies survive here as well. For instance, in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), Pierre Bourdieu’s broader analysis of symbolic domination through language (recognition that the dominant language is legitimate; and misrecognition of the fact that it is imposed as dominant) warns about the possible dangers of re-colonization again and again through the participation of the colonized and the post-colonial in the discursive practices of everyday life. On the other hand, many post-colonial theorists writing on the
diasporic or displaced cultures find that new hope for the future is possible in the metaphorics of the road, of exile, of transit and of diaspora (Eric Cheyfitz 1991; Samia Mehrez 1992; Carol Boyce Davies 1994; Vicente Rafael 1993, 1995). Decolonization for them is something happening out on the road, in movement, in flux. As long as one stays in the place that feels most familiar and comfortable, he or she will continue to acquiesce to various surviving traces of colonization.

Although post-colonial scholarship seems to view the idea of movement and the road as decolonizing, Susan Bassnett draws attention to the implicit imperialist discourse in a great deal of travel literature.

Travel writers create portraits of other cultures explicitly for home consumption, thereby setting them up as the Other. While an account of a journey may seem to be innocent, there is always an ideological dimension, for the traveller is approaching his or her material from a particular perspective, the perspective of the outsider (for the time and space of the journey) writing for an inside group back home.

(Bassnett, *Constructing Cultures* 33)

Bassnett suggests that the imperialist discourse is recreated in travel writing through the role of translation. Since the texts are written for a readership that may be assumed not to have the same access to other culture as travel writers do, linguistic difference is often signalled as such in the text. For instance, in travel writing, dialogues may contain traces of foreignness, or they may be written in such a way that presupposes some kind of translation. Frequently, travel writers recount dialogues that they claim have taken place between themselves and inhabitants of other lands. In some cases, travellers cross a great many borders and encounter speakers of several languages, all of which are transcribed in the travel writer’s language. Moreover, travellers in isolated places obviously encounter dialect speakers, and enter into conversations with them, etc. Authenticity of the truthful account by travellers of what they see is presented as “a fundamental element of travel writing,” notes Bassnett (*Constructing Cultures* 35). Readers are invited to share an experience that has actually happened. One assumes that the author will be documenting his or her experiences in another culture. The receivers, for instance, are invited to accept dialogues with foreigners
in the text, and these dialogues are presented as authentic. The quality of authenticity is conveyed by means of defamiliarization, by making them look like translations that actually took place. On the other hand, the fact that they appear to be translated dialogues may simply serve to blur the lines and make it impossible for anyone to deduce whether an original conversation ever took place at all. The receiving end is asked to believe in the truthfulness of the traveller’s tale, obscuring any question of linguistic competence as such. The receiver/reader is left with the idea that traveller can manage direct speech and record in its form any conversation and anywhere.

The post-colonial perspective not only turns its attention to the themes of travel and the road, but also addresses a whole range of complex issues related to such forms of travel as nomadism, exile, cosmopolitanism and their important implications for cultural translation. Edward Said’s work on exile, for instance, explores the terrains of his own displacement, forming a powerful translation of autobiography into theory. Said’s writing on exile poses a provocative methodological challenge to theoretical, particularly, to critical practice, the practice of a “re-writer,” to use Lefevere’s term (Lefevere, “Systems Thinking” 64). The personal and the political are constantly translated into each other to forge the practice that Said calls (in his introduction to The World, the Text and the Critic) “post-colonial secular criticism” (3). On the one hand, Said argues that by remaining silent about history and politics, the re-writers would encourage a belief in the division between art and action, between culture and its real connections with power. On the other hand, he observes how the prevailing culture imposes on the individual its canons and historical-political views. Culture dominates “from above,” its canons and standards are invisible to the degree that they are natural, objective and real. In order to translate culture with “creative affiliation” one has sometimes to withdraw from it (3). The formulation of literary practice as a process of displacement and creative affiliation is illustrated by Said in the same introduction. He translates Auerbach’s activity as a willed act of cultural construction in the face of displacement:

In other words, [Mimesis] owed its existence to the very fact of Oriental, non-Occidental exile and homelessness. And if this is so, then Mimesis itself is not, as it has so frequently been taken to be,
only a massive reaffirmation of the Western cultural tradition, but also a work built upon a critically important alienation from it, a work whose conditions and circumstances of existence are not immediately derived from the culture it describes with such extraordinary insight and brilliance but built rather on an agonizing distance from it (8).

The maxim at work here seems to be that one needs to be situated on the boundary which marks the division between home and away in order to produce a truly resistant as well as affirmative account—a powerful credo for an author who identifies himself as alienated, as distanced, as well as deeply tied to both Western and non-Western cultural elements. Said, therefore, defines culture as “an environment, process, and hegemony in which individuals (in their private circumstances) and their works are embedded as well as overseen at the top by a superstructure and at the base by a whole series of methodological attitudes” (*The World, The Text* 8). Such a notion of culture implies not just passive belonging but also possession. The significance of culture as “possessive possession,” Said writes, is its power to “authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate” (9). That is, culture works to make *distinctions*. Due to the fact that Western culture seeks to naturalize concepts of belonging and identity, the best manner of recognizing the organizing principles or elements of a culture is to embrace displacement. Thus, exile becomes the situation *par excellence*, the desired homelessness, for an author. As Caren Kaplan in *Questions of Travel* interestingly observes on Said’s work, exile for him is “a ‘norm’ as well as a compensatory artistic standpoint” (116). This is why—matured in exile—an idea or work is conceived by Said as a travelling/moving entity.

The way cultures translate each other is not bias-free, because often the process is being carried by travelling cosmopolitan subjects—displaced intellectuals—who are, as I indicated above, marked by cultural distinction, or happen to be “not accidental individuals, but selected by a Western literary establishment” (Brennan, “Cosmopolitans and Celebrities” 2). In other words, they are selected as interpreters of geopolitical change, and often are found among those authors who are as similar and sympathetic to Western values and concerns as they are different. In fact, as “cosmopolitan authors,” they can construct
“authentic public voices of the Third World,” appear exotic, and their writing can be appropriated for hegemonic uses to manage diversity in the context of globalization (Brennan, “Cosmopolitans” 6).

Belonging everywhere perhaps also expresses a will to power, as Caren Kaplan polemically suggests in her study on postmodern discourses of displacement *Questions of Travel*. She addresses this problem in the work of V.S. Naipaul. She envisions in him an effort to construct himself as eternal immigrant in a “cultural struggle for political survival” (126). Kaplan suggests that Euro-American modernist literary conventions have encouraged such a stance: if the cosmopolitan subject is “‘a citizen of a world’ by virtue of independent means, high tech tastes, and globe-trotting mobility,” then “the cosmopolitan intellectual or writer is especially culpable, proclaiming liberation politics from that safety zone of privilege, travelling to accrue and control knowledge in the name of multiculturalism” (126). Naipaul’s “explicitly conservative politics,” she says, sever him from the diasporic predicaments explored in “more admittedly progressive” writers such as Salman Rushdie (125). Perhaps, because of this difference in their positions Rushdie called one of Naipaul’s latest novels, *The Enigma of Arrival*, “a bloodless prose,” deprived of love and sad (“V.S. Naipaul” 148). Although migration, for Rushdie, is “a form of rebirth,” he also believes that an immigrant is surrounded by forces in the new world that might cause a disastrous personal drama. “The dark clouds that seemed to have gathered over Naipaul’s inner world would not… be easily dispelled,” writes Rushdie, and under these circumstances fiction abandons its place and gives way to mere autobiography (“V.S. Naipaul” 148). As for himself, Rushdie claimed to be not a ‘cosmopolitan writer,’ but a ‘translated’ man, for the reason, as he explains it, that he has physically been “borne across the world” (“Imaginary Homelands” 17).

James Clifford, on the other hand, investigating the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitan modernities, rather defends the cosmopolitan intellectual:

Their is not a condition of exile, of critical ‘distance,’ but rather a place of *between-ness*, a hybridity composed of distinct, historically-connected post-colonial spaces… Theory is always written from some ‘where,’ and that ‘where’ is less a place than *itineraries*:
different, concrete histories of dwelling, immigration, exile, migration. (“Notes on Theory and Travel” 184-185)

In marking the necessity of analyzing histories of “dwelling,” Clifford helps to move away from the aestheticized tendencies of theories of displacement towards cultural studies, and bring to light the phenomenon of dwelling in language, another important theme worked through by post-colonial thinkers. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Mary Louise Pratt both elaborate on this phenomenon, and a traveller for them, on the one hand, seems to be always at home in language and translation and, on the other, inherently, naturally displaced. Translation for Spivak is so inherent in the human system, in the erotic and ethical codes of humans that the term “translation” risks surrendering to a sort of *catachresis*. But, as she says, “no other word would do” instead:

The human infant grabs on to some one thing and then things. This grabbing of an outside indistinguishable from an inside constitutes an inside, going back and forth and coding everything into a sign-system by the thing(s) grasped. One can call this crude coding ‘translation.’ Thus ‘nature’ passes and repasses into ‘culture,’ in a work or shuttling site of violence…: the violent production of the precarious subject of reparation and responsibility. (Spivak, “Translation as Culture” 13)

The constitution of the subject, as Spivak argues further, is a certain “genealogical scripting,” a process of translating, and the body itself is a script. When a translator translates from language, whose system of inscription is ‘her/his own’—i.e. from the mother-tongue--this act of translation becomes “a peculiar act of reparation toward the language of the inside, a language in which we are responsible, the guilt of seeing it as one language among many” (15). The loss of language through displacement leads not to its forgetting but to cultural translation. Simply collecting examples of diasporic hybridity or reading books about other cultures is not enough to understand cultural translation. Hybridity is a gesture of silencing that operates on an ideological level, indicates Spivak. If someone is really interested in translation as a phenomenon rather than a mere
convenience he or she must work “at the screen,” i.e., on the boundaries of “individual areas of language and culture” (Spivak, “Translation as Culture” 18).

The question of dwelling in language is also found in an influential study of Western travel writing, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (1992), where Mary Louise Pratt offers a critique of American travel writer Paul Theroux’s *Old Patagonian Express* (1980). She writes: “Theroux constructs Patagonia out of paralysis and alienation… If he knew Spanish, would he have had something better to do? Would everything have been less interchangeable?” (218). Since the writer does not engage in dialogue with inhabitants of Patagonia, his views, as Pratt implies, remain monocultural and monolinguistic, those of an observer rather than participant.

Space is never neutral; neither is one’s individual mapping of space. Given the ways the post-colonial perspective raises questions about cultural and spatial representations, one might ask what significance they hold for someone’s perceptions of travel at the turn of the third millennium. The work of Pico Iyer informs my belief that contemporary travel literature offers an important measure of current spatial practices, both geographic and textual, at a time when such practices are subject to close scrutiny throughout the academic disciplines. More important than their fruitfulness for academic study, however, is the way travel narratives make us reexamine our conceptions and negotiations of global and local space. Man’s relation to language and space is such, as Spivak indicates, that he or she is never merely a passive reflector of collective speech, and Pico Iyer’s travel writing deepens that sense of complexity of belonging and non-belonging. Iyer focuses on the questions of homelessness and stresses the major role of writing in the place and language of home, arguing that place and language must be approached with a sense of consistency. Otherwise, if not recorded and used, they (home and language) might fade away. His hybrid genre represents a mixture of reportage, autobiography and travel writing. Travel becomes his only culture, and that disrupts his sense of community and commitment, and encourages him to search for a utopia outside. Not naming himself a cosmopolitan writer or a writer in exile, he nevertheless invents the term, of “the global soul,” i.e., the only form of soul which can be taken as having continuity, the soul of the whole.
iii. Translation and virtual travel in cyberfiction

The ethnographic traveller, as I have mentioned in the section above, was involved in the translation of a given social environment (that under study) as well as unavoidably caught in the interdisciplinary debate on the ‘faithfulness’ of cultural translation. Classical ethnography did envision the traveller as faithful translator, but the ethnographically self-critical work of James Clifford and the post-colonial perspective of translation have not only completely changed the way cultural translations are perceived, but have also made a serious attempt to elaborate on the translation of culture as a mode of writing and a particular way of envisioning and imagining the world. Post-colonial theorists, as I have suggested above, demonstrated it via variable notions of travel--migration, displacement, exile.

Two major theoreticians of culture, namely Homi Bhabha (1994) and Stuart Hall (1996), have used the concept of translation in analyses of cultural constructs. Referring to the question of cultural identity, Homi Bhabha, in *The Location of Culture*, has stressed that cultural identities are continuously translatable and negotiable, and if one attempts to understand or start thinking about the phenomenon of international culture, he or she needs not to focus not on diversity or multiculturalism but, precisely--on translation. Bakhtin believed that culture reveals itself the most in the intermediate spaces, on the borders (“Response” 2). “The cutting edge” in the inscription and articulation of cultural identity is, Bhabha suggests, this “Third Space”:

It is…the ‘inter’… the in-between space—that carries the burden of the meaning of culture. It makes it possible to begin envisaging national, anti-nationalist histories of the ‘people’. And by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves. (38-9)

Ethnography, post-colonial perspective of translation and postmodern genres of literature have a similar aim--to challenge the claims of faithful representation. This, as Susan Bassnett noted speaking on travel accounts as exemplary constructions, led to the recognition of the importance of secondary,
smaller genres and discourses (*Comparative Literature* 93). Bassnett spoke not only about the necessity of a “different reading” of travel accounts but also about their changing character, the historical move from the “registration of information” towards a more independent “individual activity of constructing” the culture (93).

This change was followed by a change in the main intentions which led to a different kind of travel writing conceived as cultural translation of individual experiences: from the desire to provide target readers with useful information about another country, its population or its history, it became a translation attempting to convey a picture of another country for the target audience. Travel books, apart from listing and recording, started to express the author’s personality and his or her social curiosity towards the Other. Thus the focus of writing shifted to the traveller’s self, his or her emotions when faced with the unseen and the unknown, his or her reactions towards the customs of other peoples, and his or her growing interest in anthropological or sociological analysis and adventurous invention or inventive adventure rather than mere collection of facts. The emergence and strengthening of the traveller’s subjectivity, therefore, was instrumental in acknowledging travel writing as a literary genre and in the gradual change of readers’ horizons of expectations. As Dea Birkett and Sara Wheeler in their recent and joint analysis of the new tendencies in travel writing reflected:

> It doesn’t make any difference where you go; it’s your interpretation of it that matters… Now that writers have been everywhere, this feature—the inward-looking eye—is more important that ever. More important than anything else. The journeys writers make are slip roads to the private colonies of the imagination […] It is the psychological journey that is paramount. ‘The most foreign country,’ Alice Walker wrote, ‘is within.’ (*Women’s New Travel Writing* ix)

Hans Robert Jauss (Jauss 1982) suggested that genres are often identified through the reader’s expectations. The horizons of expectations give rise to different, not necessarily historical, interpretations of the text, interpretations that are based, first of all, on an aesthetic of literary reception. As a consequence of changes in the “horizons,” taking place on both a diachronic and synchronic level,
innovation is introduced through the disappearance of what are perceived as familiar elements and the introduction of new features. As a result of his analysis, Jauss did not aim to identify ‘pure’ or absolute genres, but to find out those genres whose works are perceived by readers as belonging to the same category. In one of his works Jauss noted that readers’ expectations might introduce new elements into genres and therefore alter them substantially:

This shift from a preconceived horizon of expectations to a sketch of new experience struck me as the embodiment of the principle of aesthetic mediation that, in the literary-historical process, permits a contemporary reorganization of the canon that also renews the way in which all works from the past are seen. Understanding the shift in horizons in this way also permits one to grasp the artistic character of a work in proportion to the aesthetic distance it implies, that is, the distance between expectation and experience, tradition and innovation, and to separate a work’s constitutive negativity from the affirmative aspect of that which in consumer literature merely satisfies a norm. (Jauss, *Question and Answer* 224)

As Paul Fussell (Fussell 1980) claims, travel accounts are therefore usually characterized by such elements as autobiographical data, a factual tone, some kind of exotic quality (both in far-off countries and in unknown territories, full of legends and mysteries), a picaresque narrative structure, possibly a first-person narration, and a certain amount of intertextuality (due to the introduction of quotations from and references to previous travellers and writers). In *Abroad* he suggests that travel books “are a subspecies of memoir in which autobiographical narrative arises from the speaker’s encounter with distant or unfamiliar data and in which the narrative—unlike that in a novel or romance—claims literal validity by constant reference to actuality (203).” In other words, the travel writing does not seem to belong to any genre in particular, a fact that does not stop it from being a genre in its own right, as Mary Baine Campbell suggests (Campbell 1988). Indeed, one may note, as Genette does, that “the mixing of or contempt for genres is a genre amongst others” (*Théorie des genres* 158).
It is tempting to infer then that genres are also cultural, i.e., that they occur at certain stages of a culture’s strengthening or weakening, and any changes in them reflect, as it was argued by Polysystems theory, fluctuations in a cultural system. Travel accounts, being a sum of various autobiographical, journalistic, and fantasy elements, demand attentive critical readings and analyses that would encompass not only the unique contributions of individual writers but also their resistances to the genre. These resistances and revisions also comprise a significant contribution to literature and culture.

This part of my project, therefore, is devoted to the idea of resistance towards and revision of the conventions associated with the genre of travel writing at the break of the new millennium. I am less interested here in the books that are most associated with this genre, than I am keen to find new forms of travel writing illustrating alternative methods of travel. In this section I aim to explore some non-traditional practices of travel—futuristic or virtual travel, for instance, where the realities of the immediate cultural environment nevertheless play a crucial role. In doing so, I hope to reveal strong cultural tendencies prevalent in understanding travel in the contemporary epoch of globalization. Drawing attention to such postmodern genres as cyberfiction will help me to focus on details revealing the new realities of travel and showing that such realities derive from a specific culture.

Culture is a form of translation, as I indicated throughout chapter one, that is dependent on the interrelationship between time and space. It is Bakhtin who proposed to translate this “time/space binding” into the term *chronotope*. In his words, “we will give the name *chronotope* (literally, ‘time/space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (*The Dialogic Imagination* 84). Although chronotopes exist in all areas of culture, he noted, “in the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole”:

Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. (Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* 84)
While Bakhtin remained sensitive to the metaphoric uses of space-time in the case of literary chronotopes (“The special meaning it has in relativity theory is not important for our purposes; we are borrowing it for literary criticism almost as metaphor (almost, but not entirely)” [The Dialogic Imagination 84]), in the conclusion to his study he argued for its extension well beyond literary boundaries:

For us the following is important: whatever these meanings turn out to be, in order to enter our experience (which is social experience) they must take on the form of a sign that is audible and visible for us (a hieroglyph, a mathematical formula, a verbal or linguistic expression, a sketch, etc.) Without such temporal-spatial expression, even abstract thought is impossible. Consequently, every entry into the sphere of meanings is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope. (258)

What I wanted to emphasize with this reference to Bakhtin is that culture being translation is also a spatial-temporal expression, a chronotope. Therefore, our thinking on travel in this era of globalization, connectivity and space-time compression is still very much bound to culture, even in cases when this thinking expressed in imaginary and fantastic forms. Travel writing scholar Alison Russel in her study on postmodern travel, Crossing Boundaries, notes that the struggle to find unexplored territory and new ways to travel, leads to “perilous journeys” and the most unusual modes of transportation through “invented geographies”:

Significantly, throughout the 1960s and 1970s many innovative novelists experimented with fictional space by deconstructing or remapping it through shifting frames of reference, nonlinear “plots,” and other manipulations of traditional fictional devices. These novels explored different kinds of spatial movement and boundary crossing as a way of testing or subverting conventions about representation… Not surprisingly, many of these novels were about travel, whether the journey was to a geographical place or through the fictional space of the text. (8)
While it is important to recognize an attempt to innovate travel writing by taking unconventional trips, the trend toward remapping and inventing geographies, as I shall demonstrate in individual case studies, raises the two-edged question of whether such efforts reveal a nostalgia for earlier times, when difficult journeys offered the rewards of discovering strange new sights, or whether they relate to the satisfaction of post-tourist playfulness. The term “post-tourist” was coined by Maxine Feifer in *Tourism in History* to describe the self-conscious contemporary traveller:

> Above all, the post-tourist knows that he is a tourist: not a time traveller when he goes somewhere historic; not an instant noble savage when he stays on a tropical beach; not an invisible observer when he visits a native compound. Resolutely “realistic,” he cannot evade his condition of outsider. (271)

As both of the above-mentioned studies suggest, post-tourism is a postmodern enterprise, a spatial practice socially and culturally inflected. John Urry, for instance, adds that “postmodern culture involves a dissolving of the boundaries, not only between high and low cultures, but also between different cultural forms, such as tourism, art, education, photography, television, music, sport, shopping, and architecture” (82).

As I shall demonstrate in a number of studies, postmodern culture influenced the perception of space, movement and writing about travel, but these perceptions was not free from outside ideological bias. Even hybrid literary genres such as cyberfiction, for instance, function simultaneously as accounts of journeys and as self-conscious explorations of language possibilities that construct the space through which one travels. Travel in cyberfiction provides an especially reliable tool to investigate the relationship between culture and travel, language and spatial practices, representation and domination, mapping and politics. Travelling to either real or virtual locations one explores, on the one hand, how people and places are appropriated through the act of translation of culture and marginalized through the establishment of boundaries. On the other hand, by using an immense range of geographic, cultural, and scientific information, such hybrid genres can constantly generate new forms of writing
sensitive to new concerns about global exhaustion, alienation and profanation in the sense that Giorgio Agamben deploys in “Profanations” (82).

Fredric Jameson, in *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, identifies one of the largest issues postmodern travel writers confront. Jameson argues that space has renewed significance in our time, and he observes that “our daily life, our psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism proper” (64). Jameson notes the current problematic nature of representation and its implications for cartography and concludes that this confusion leads writers to find new ways to map the world space of multinational capitalism, or to find new modes of representing it, “in which we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion” (92). Although Jameson’s conception of postmodernism has been criticized in studies of postmodern theory (Best and Kellner, 1991; Connor, 1997), his commentary on the spatial disorientation of postmodern society certainly captures the sense of dislocation created by the global network of electronic communications and multinational corporations. Jameson calls for new methods of mapping that seek “to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system” (92). As Steven Connor explains, “Jameson suggests that a postmodern map of the world must do two contradictory things at once, rendering the sense of placelessness even as it suggests new ways of orienting ourselves to that placelessness” (256).

The novels of William Gibson that I will examine in relation to this section demonstrate how perceptively and imaginatively the crucial problem of global orientation in the post-industrial era might be resolved. It is not only a sense of placelessness that motivates the writer to find new ways of orienting himself in relation to global space, but also the problematics of cultural translation. The ratio between travel information and lived experience at the break of the millennium has drastically changed. Information intervenes in culture; but culture, as a mode of translation with its norms and shifts, remains a powerful tool for directing information. Arjun Appadurai, in particular, notes that culture in contemporary globalization is “a powerful notion,” and that although, in
his opinion, “the epicentre of current debates about culture” has been formed around the “turbulent” poststructuralist positions of Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and their many subschools, the debates it evokes are of crucial significance. These debates, as I suggested above, circle around the relationship between the word and the world. This is why, referring to Geertz’s (1980) term of “blurred genres,” Appadurai called the contemporary epoch—the epoch of “postblurring” (51). The subject matter of cultural studies now, he insisted, could roughly be taken as the relationship between the word (meaning, all forms of textual expression) and the world (anything from means of production to the organization of life-worlds). To translate the tension between the word and the world into any productive strategy of representation requires “a new understanding of the deterritorialized world that many persons inhabit and of possible lives that many persons are today able to envision” (52).

One of the principal shifts in the global cultural order has to do with the role of the imagination in social life, concludes Appadurai, and if recently imagination and fantasy were antidotes to the finitude of social experience, now it is a social practice that enters into the fabrication of social lives for many people in many societies.

Writings on virtual travel, cyberspace, cyberbodies and cyberpunk (terms that came into prominence in 1980s as indicated in the discussion of Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows in “Cultures of Technological Embodiment” in Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk 1-17) belong not only to the realm of fantasy or imagination that Appadurai talks about, but are also translations of the cultural present into the future and vice versa: they involve the future as something domesticated, the present as something foreignized. In terms of cultural translation one could speak of a construction of a new reality, as Susan Bassnett described in her study Comparative Literature (92-114). Travelers, whether virtual or real, whether characters of cyberfiction or travel writing, tend to construct the cultures they experience:

From travelers’ accounts of their journeys, we can trace the presence of cultural stereotypes, and the way in which an individual reacts to what is seen elsewhere can reflect tendencies in the travelers’ home culture. (93)
V.S. Naipaul’s observation when describing his most recent travel books in an interview with Ahmed Rashid (“Death of the Novel”) appears to be especially relevant to Bassnett’s theoretical position:

My books have to be called ‘travel writing’, but that can be misleading because in the old days travel writing was essentially done by men describing the routes they were taking... What I do is quite different. I travel in a theme. I travel to make an inquiry. The books I write now, these inquiries, are really constructed narratives. There is the narrative of the journey and within that there are many little narratives that are part of the larger pattern. (16)

As a form of cultural translation, cyberfiction has been taken up as a useful resource for cultural theory in comprehending the shifts towards a new epoch. For Frederic Jameson, for example, cyberfiction (and the work of Gibson in particular) represents “the supreme literary expression if not of postmodernism, then of late capitalism itself” (419n). While it seems unusual to amalgamate travel writing and cyberfiction, it does seem to be useful to clarify what may be actually meant by cyberfiction as travel account. One way of doing so consists in looking for dominant aspects in a given genre, an idea suggested some years ago by Hans Robert Jauss: “To introduce a dominant that organizes the system of a complex work, allows one to transform into a methodically productive category what one called “mixed genres” (Jauss [“Litterature medievale” 44] gtd. in Hooper and Youngs 17). Thus, while certain genres consist of a mix of different genres and forms of writing, their identity can be defined in terms of new dominant aspects. However, according to Jauss’s theory, any work “supposes prior information or orientation of expectations against which originality will be measured” ([“Litterature medievale” 41] gtd. in Hooper and Youngs 17). Concerning the travelogue, the reader will presume that the author is predominantly concerned with the account of a journey.

In cyberfiction’s focus on virtual realities, on the non-spaces of computer-based networks and the postmodern hyperreality of the “culture industry,” one
might expect that the physical world would carry little importance by comparison, if not be displaced outright, as cultural theorists have observed (Jean Baudrillard 1983; Fredric Jameson 1991; Debord 1994). Such theorists also claim that the “simulacrum,” the “postmodern condition” and the “society of spectacle,” accordingly, are some of the articulations of the subject’s removal from a direct and unmediated experience of the world. Yet this is not the case, because there is an assumption that:

At the very moment when Baudrillard dropped the theoretical ball, losing his initiative, Gibson and cyberpunk fiction picked it up, beginning their explorations of the new future world which Baudrillard had been exploring. (Kellner 327)

Real space is a surprisingly important axis for the unfolding of cyberfiction, and spatial metaphors are an important part of the virtual worlds they depict. Ironically, in describing new possibilities of distance-transcending technology, these narratives reinscribe old geographic interpretations of space. The readers’ expectations and narratives rely not on the abstract dimension of cyberspace but on the mapping and control of real space—that is to say, geography and travel. Real space structures cyberfiction through settings that recognizably correspond with the geographic organization of the world in the present. Travel through reality is crucial to plots which require the characters to go somewhere physically to achieve a narrative aim.

What cyberfiction offers as narrative form is as old as Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*: the adventure narrative, the travel tale. Here another aspect of translation of culture from a post-colonial perspective emerges: traditionally, adventure narratives served an imperialist aim, sustaining empire, justifying colonization over larger distances. It could be supposed that, like the earlier adventure tales, cyberfiction projects an imperialist organization of the world in mapping the physical world. In cyberfiction, however, imperialism concerns the Americanization of cultural domination rather than European governmental colonization, as E.L. McCallum suggests in a recent essay “Mapping the Real in Cyberfiction” (2006). As our new adventure narratives, cyberpunk fictions map
the same old world with new codes: the world where national governments are being outmaneuvered by transnational corporations.

Cyberpunk narratives largely follow the adventure formula in mapping the body’s relation to space as well, recognizing the impact of these changes on the body and the developments in technology that point towards the possibilities of post-bodies and post-human forms of existence (Haraway 1990, 1991; Featherstone 1982). Since adventure narratives feature a split between home and away the theme of the body is controversial. For instance, Kathleen Woodward’s article criticizes “technocriticism” and sees in the technological development of Western culture a “story about the human body:”

Over hundreds of thousands of years the body, with the aid of various tools and technologies, has multiplied its strength and increased its capacities to extend itself in space and over time. According to this logic, the process culminates in the very immateriality of the body itself. In this view technology serves fundamentally as a prosthesis of the human body, one that ultimately displaces the material body, transmitting instead its image around the globe and preserving that image over time. (50)

As we increasingly translate our desires and thoughts into modern technologies of perception and communication, our subjective awareness of our own bodies diminishes. There is a direct relationship between the progressive vanishing of the body and virtual travel. This increased translatability of the material body into unlimited space leads to a sense of extension beyond materiality and the greatest technological illusion, that is to say, translational delusion. Cyberfictional texts’ reliance on translation of physical space with its cultural elements situates them perhaps most notably in terms of translation of culture.

iv. Metaphors of translation

In his extensive study devoted to metaphor, *The Rule of Metaphor*, Paul Ricoeur stated that it is actually Aristotle who “defined metaphor for the entire
subsequent history of Western thought, on the basis of a semantics that takes the word or the name as its basic unit” (3). Ricoeur, being an Aristotelian thinker, related metaphor to an action, activity. As he emphasizes in italics, “*something that happens to the noun...is defined in terms of movement*” (16-17). He conceives metaphor as a borrowing from the realm of movement, from some original and already existing meaning that is designed to fill a semantic gap. The most important destination of metaphor is described by Ricoeur as the process whereby a “borrowed word takes the place of the absent proper word where such exists” (18). In other words, metaphor, says Ricoeur, “sets a scene before our eyes,” places things in the field of vision, making things visible. Such a formulation of metaphor, i.e. of “depicting the abstract in concrete terms,” has been present in Western thought since Aristotle (Ricoeur 34). “To place things before the eyes” seems to be not a secondary function of metaphor, but the natural function of imaginative language. Thus, according to Ricoeur, the same metaphor can carry both “the logical moment of proportionality and the sensible moment of figurativity” (34). Ricoeur notes further that Aristotle enjoyed combining these two seemingly contrasting moments: “‘Liveliness is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and by being graphic [literally: making your hearers see things]’ (1441 b 21)” (qtd in Ricoeur 34). The same strategy prevails in travel writing when this is conceived as cultural translation: to put into play analogy and comparison, the power of placing things ‘before the eyes and the capacity of signifying active reality. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines metaphor as a transference of the name, as an abbreviated or implicit comparison, as an analogy from which the word as or like is omitted, for example, “All the world’s a stage” (1406 b 20-4; 2243).

Travel and translation both presuppose movement—*kinesis*—and if someone is to give the definition of each, s/he will define travel and translation as movement across time, place, beliefs and culture. The Aristotelian conviction, clearly expressed in *Physics*, is that movement should not be conceived as something that happens “above the things,” but rather as something potentially inherent in all things whether they move naturally or are being “actually moved” (201 a 3; 342). In Book VIII of *Physics*, Aristotle quotes Empedocles and raises the question of the First Principle, according to which all other principles are organized and ordered:
Since One hath learned to spring from Manifold,
And One disjoined makes Manifold arise,
Thus they Become, nor stable is their life:
But since their motion must alternate be,
Thus have they ever Rest upon their round:
(251 a 30)

If the principles are not organized like this, then their outcomes will be even more disordered and the world will be in chaos: “that which is contrary to nature will exist while that which is in accordance with nature will not exist” (“Fragments: I. Dialogues,” 2393). Aristotle applies the First principle to motion, kinesis. Recalling Empedocles he notes that to move is one of the most natural things that unifies and disjoins the universe at every single moment. The universe is in motion “when Love is making one out of many, or Strife is making many out of one”; and it is “at rest in the intermediate periods of time” (Physics 250 b 27; 419). The term “alternate” in the first quote means transition from one form of motion to another.

Movement, on the other hand, is unthinkable without the involvement of its opposite--the state of rest (and vice versa). But even the state of rest is always a movement to another state of rest, for example, from disease to health, and to other potential alterations. Kinesis therefore is an interaction of the same [condition, state] and the other leading to alteration: “Alteration is the fulfilment of the alterable as alterable (or, more scientifically, the fulfilment of what can act and what can be acted on)” (202 b 24; 345). Movement, in Aristotelian thinking, has to be understood as infinite and continuous, a process conditioned by infinitely divisible continuity, i.e., by place, void and time which are thought to be necessary conditions of movement (200 b 20; 342). If the place and void are natural conditions of movement (in fact, the void is defined by Aristotle as “a place to be deprived of the body” [214 a 18; 364]), time is a necessary measure against which kinesis as such is measured. There are no motions, nor states of rest that do not involve time, and to measure kinesis against time means that it also involves a number of changes, whereas “change removes what is” (221 b 1; 374). By stating that travel and translation both focus on movement, it could be
supposed that both involve time and cause change. If time by its nature is a cause of decay, in the Aristotelian line of thinking, so are travel and translation, if conceived as movements. If movement is the First principle then, according to Aristotelian reasoning, it demands a certain organization and order that--before it leads to a change--necessarily involves the persistence of something to be transformed or transferred. Most commonly, as Aristotle demonstrates in various paragraphs of Prior Analytics, this persistence is related to memory, but he urges us not to forget that memory is never a “state that is retentive to a belief as perception is” (125 b 19; 211).

Aristotle’s work ranged over many areas of theory and laid the foundations of most of them, and his main themes and ideas have always been illuminating and never out of fashion. His concept of movement can be instrumental and enlightening in understanding how travel and translation in modern times became a theoretical quest linked to time, knowledge, experience and historiography. This multidirectional link will be demonstrated in my case studies section, where in the philosophical travelogues of Alphonso Lingis, Western philosophy and Western thought in general becomes a metaphor of travel and cultural translation. Jacques Derrida, in his essay “White Mythology: Metaphor on the Text of Philosophy,” is even more radical. At the end of this essay on white or blank mythology stands a stone, a sort of gravestone in the memory of the death of philosophy as metaphor “which always carries its death within itself” (272). What is relevant to the themes of my research is Derrida’s presupposition in the essay that philosophy’s death “is sometimes… death of a genre belonging to philosophy which is thought and summarized within it, recognizing and fulfilling itself within philosophy; and sometimes the death of a philosophy which does not see itself die and is no longer to be refound within philosophy” (ibid).

On the other hand, in the essay “Translation as Culture,” Spivak speaks of the ethical side of philosophy, referring to a “discourse of the gift a la Levinas,” that is—of an idiom given to each singular context: “the idiom is singular to the tongue; it will not go over…This element of transcoding is what locates the recognizable violence of the recognizably political within the general violence of culturing as incessant shuttling translation, a point much harder to grasp without familiarity with the discourse of the gift” (15). Levinas’s “gifts” are untranslatable
idioms pointing to the desire for something absolutely other, to the metaphysical
desire that is turned toward the “elsewhere” and the “otherwise” and the “other,”
toward an alien outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder,” absolute and therefore
absent other (33).

The death of the genre of philosophy and of philosophy as signification is
questioned in the travelogues of Alphonso Lingis, but the solution for Lingis is to
be found in an attempt to approach philosophy as a form of the translation of
culture. Lingis finds a way into it through the wide usage of Nietzschean and
Levinasian ideas in his travel writing. Friedrich Nietzsche relates metaphor to the
question of the truthfulness and falsity of philosophy in general. He employs the
word ‘illusions’ as an equivalent to ‘lies in extra-moral sense’, that is, lies told
unconsciously or without realizing that they are lies: lies in this sense are not lies
in our sense at all (Clark 21). In Nietzsche’s understanding, lies seem merely false
assertions and, perhaps, all assertions one can call truths are actually false. This is
why “our drive” towards metaphors is so strong, as Nietzsche elaborates in his
essay “On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense” written in 1873.

Metaphors for Nietzsche are more than proper functions of imaginative language;
they are also “a sum of human relations” based on truth as a lie which goes “in
accord with a fixed convention”:

What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymys, and
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which
have been enhanced, transposed, and embelished poetically and
rhetorically, and truths are illusions about which one has forgotten
that this is what they are; metaphors which have lost their pictures
and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (42)

The task of the new philosopher-artist, as demonstrated in Lingis’s
travelogues, is recoinage, neologism, translation, the reintoxication of truth via
new metaphors. Since the meaning of a word or sentence is not a singular event,
i.e., translations do not happen in a vacuum, this recoinage/translation becomes a
recreative selection made according to principles of kinesis. George Steiner, in his
extensive study of the history of translation theory After Babel, notes that “the
illocutionary force of a statement is diffused in a complex pragmatic field which
surrounds the lexical core. Different ages and civilizations work differently with words, with verbal taboos, with levels of vocabulary. They probably attach differing truth-values and postulates of reality to their designation of objects” (142-43). Translation overlaps with the general investigation of sense and meaning and forces on us a fuller awareness of notions like identity and otherness, intentionality and signification, and more generally, mortification and revitalization.

It is in these moments of tension, mortification and revitalization, or to use a Benjaminean term from “A Berlin Chronicle,” of “discontinuities,” that translation reveals itself not only as a metaphor but as a process at work, an action (316). Memory is an activity, moreover--a transformative activity. Translation and travel are also about the strolling memory. The memory cannot register and select everything because it would lead to “a condition of madness,” as George Steiner notes in After Babel (30). One moves, selects, memorizes and remembers according to certain intentions and criteria that are not necessarily conscious. Steiner also makes it clear that one’s moves in translation are spatial, as they are individual, and led by various conventions such as emphasis, foreshortening, and omission. He notes, for instance, that the landscapes described in the past tense, the semantic organization of remembrance, are stylized and coded by different cultures differently (After Babel 30). In this sense, in the sense of memory as movement, Walter Benjamin’s insights are especially enlightening. In his essay “The Storyteller” he distinguishes between two kinds of memory: comprehensive-domesticating and creative memory. The former is the “epic faculty par excellence;” it absorbs the events and “with the passing of these, makes its peace with the power of death” (96). It creates the chain of tradition which passes on an event from generation to generation. It is like “Scheherazade who thinks of a fresh story whenever her tale comes to a stop” (97). The creative, foreignizing memory travels outside time.

This split between memory and time was one of the central themes in Benjamin’s writing, and also one of the central axes for him in interpreting and understanding travel-as-autobiography. In the linking of two necessary conditions of movement--space and time—Walter Benjamin employs metaphors of travel to speaking of the journeys of his life. For instance, “a map,” “strolling,” “topography,” “detour,” “U-turn,” “one-way street,” “passage” in his essays,
“One-Way Street” (1925) and “A Berlin Chronicle” (1932). His literary and theoretical essays seem to be a continuation of the Aristotelian line of thinking about movement as infinitely divided continuity. Benjamin thinks and writes about fragments in fragments of movement, balancing between time and space, and at the same time indicating how closely connected the perceptions of space, time and movement can be in one person.

Autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and what makes up the continuous flow of life… I am talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities. For even if months and years appear here, it is in the form they have at the moment of recollection. This strange form—it may be called fleeting or eternal—is in neither case the stuff that life is made of. (“A Berlin Chronicle” 316)

As Susan Sontag wrote in her “Introduction” to the collection “One-Way Street,” Benjamin would write about things more directly when he started from memories, not contemporary experiences, as if indicating that memory has a tendency toward selective translation and travel (7-28). He would refer to a memory as to “a chartable space”: “How far a child has access to the past is difficult to tell, and depends on many things—time, environment, its nature and education…” (“A Berlin Chronicle” 317). At a distance one can survey his or her life as a space that can be mapped.

What Benjamin seeks to emphasize using travel terms is that the degree of meaning is in exact proportion to the presence of the power of decay. Only because certain experiences die in movement is one able to read them as a translator reads the original. For Benjamin the written experience was another space in which to stroll. To understand something, for him, is to understand its topography, to make it chartable, and to know “how to get lost.” Time for Benjamin is the medium of constraint, inadequacy, repetition. In time, one is what one has always been, but in space, one can arrive at another form. Benjamin’s poor sense of direction and inability to read a street map, says Sontag, turned into his passion for travel, and “his mastery of the art of travel is straying” (13).

It seems that the notion of time, for Benjamin, does not give much leeway, as it was emphasized in the section above: time might thrust one forward from
behind, blow one through the narrow tunnel of the present into the future. But space is broad, teeming with possibilities, positions, intersections, passages, dead ends and “things appear[ing] at a distance” (Sontag 14). The more lifeless things are—see, for instance, Vattimo’s reference to “ruins and residues” in chapter one, the more potent and ingenious the mind which contemplates them. Sontag observes that fidelity for Benjamin lies in accumulating things, especially in the form of fragments or ruins. She noted that Benjamin as a collector remained faithful to the idea of the materiality and immortality of things, or “thickness of time-space” (to borrow Bakhtin’s expression), to the things close at hand, graspable. Sontag wrote: “…he loved playful miniaturizations of reality as the winter world inside a glass globe that snows when it is shaken” (19). The desire to miniaturize made the concept of distance one of the key concepts in Benjamin’s thinking, at once binding and freeing when one deals with textual realities:

The power of a country road is different when one is walking along it from when one is flying over it by plane. In the same way, the power of text is different when it is read from when it is copied out… Only he who walks the road on foot learns of the power it commands, and of how, from the very scenery that for the flier is only the unfurled plain, it calls forth distances, belvederes, clearings, prospects at each of its turns like a commander deploying soldiers at a front. Only the copied text thus commands the soul of him who is occupied with it, whereas the mere reader never discovers the new aspects of his inner self that are opened by the text, that road cut through the interior jungle forever closing behind it: because the reader follows the movement of his mind in the free flight of day-dreaming, whereas the copier submits it to command. (“One-Way” 50)

Translation also travels the same road as the original but in different directions. When one travels the same road but in the opposite direction the landscape looks different. The direction is as constraining as time, and one is always naturally tempted to reverse it. In many cases in where someone hesitates about which path to take, once he/she has chosen, he/she might wish to go back
and annul what he/she had done, start from scratch and move on. This is what happens with translation, this constant shuttling back and forth. A difficult act of will is required to overcome the hesitation, and sometimes it is possible only with help from outside. On the influence of the outside Benjamin’s position is clearly social--in order to move one needs not only space but also “filling stations”:

Opinions are to the vast apparatus of social existence what oil is to machines: one does not go up to a turbine and pour machine oil over it; one applies a little to hidden spindles and joints that one has to know. (“One-Way” 45)

This graphic metaphor of little drops of oil as revitalization of the community’s joints alludes to the space of literature, and to its breakdown into various forms that better fit the moment, and have influence in active communities. Benjamin alludes to the vitality of fragments, of any singular, individual translation, minor work of art or genre--everything that seems hidden and embryonic but nevertheless represents vital connections and establishes relations. In his classic essay, “The Tasks of the Translator,” Benjamin clearly demonstrates how translation as such represents a hidden relation—kinship--among languages “realizing it in embryonic or intensive form” (17). Speaking of the intentionality of languages he notes that translation is its most graphic example. While individual translations might be temporal and secondary in nature, they were granted, he said, a vital spark by the source, “catch[ing] fire on the eternal life of the works” (17).

If the question of history and time is one of the central questions in translation, then how would a philosopher-artist relate him/herself to the ideas to be transmitted to the target audience if not by picking up concepts, words and phrasing intrinsic to his or her own community in the target culture (as was indicated in the discussion on Venuti in chapter one). The relation between image and writing that was central to Benjamin’s thinking on space is one of the leading directions in any traveller’s account. In his “A Berlin Chronicle,” for instance, adequacy and coherence were often sacrificed in the name of a certain space, intentionally, in order to demonstrate the unavoidable failure of knowledge and
certainty in travellers’ accounts. To read a map is not necessarily to read the place the map depicts and to find a goal is not necessarily a goal:

Not to find one’s way in a city—that could be uninteresting and banal. It requires ignorance—nothing more. But to lose oneself in a city—as one goes astray in a wood—that already requires a completely different schooling. Then sign boards, street names, passersby, roofs, kiosks, or bars must speak to the wanderer like a cracking twig under his feet in the forest, like the startling call of a bittern in a distance, like the sudden stillness of a clearing with a lily standing erect at its center. Paris taught me this art of straying; it fulfilled a dream that had shown its first traces in the labyrinths on the blotting pages of my school exercise books. (298)

Here Benjamin discloses a very important idea that was also continuously worked out in Lingis’s philosophical travelogues’—the impossibility of knowledge because of the limits of an educational system—that becomes almost nullified when one moves to an unknown place. An unknown place is a kind of forest: the unknown language that speaks to a visitor there is like a ‘silent’ language. A traveller is bound to translate. Other places teach the visitor all these hidden, foreignizing interconnections that lead to revelation. A trip reveals to a traveller the nature of social relationships, so immersed in a world of familiar things as to have become grammatically indistinguishable from them, disclosed only in the context of a different place.

Travel accounts often seem as though written by another hand, like memoirs of an invisible artist in which the image of other culture is, possibly, an outcome of something mistaken. As a scholar of Benjamin’s work, Pierre Missac, puts it, “in the gallery of types, sketches” of Benjamin’s writing, one of the central places is taken by a gambler, who is the flaneur, the collector, the forger—outside time and history—playing games that Benjamin “preferred and played as some sort of melange of the genres” (76-77). In “The Storyteller” Benjamin contrasts travel and non-travel stories: the traveller is a storyteller who comes from far away (as it was traditionally imagined by people), or the one who stays home and knows local tales. Both attract the great interest of their listeners. Each
one produced his or her own tribe of storytellers. The Benjaminian figure of the storyteller, the protagonist of his essay—Nikolai Leskov—is “at home in distant places as well as distant times, …[he] finds his way about the world without getting too deeply involved with it” (85).

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By focusing on the concepts of translation and travel, I have attempted to demonstrate how four distinct and at the same time overlapping areas—ethnography, post-colonial translation theory, cultural studies and philosophy—arrive at the meeting point with translation studies. With the integration of such a classical discipline as philosophy into translation studies through the travelogues of Alphonso Lingis, one can say with certainty that the moment of philosophy’s isolated academic sitting in an ivory tower is over. What I shall demonstrate in coming chapters is that in such multifaceted interdisciplines, isolation is indeed counterproductive. The moment of meeting of those areas of thought is unavoidable. For the great debate at the break of this millennium is the relationship between globalization, on the one hand, between the increasing interconnectedness of the world-system in commercial, political and communication terms and the rise of nationalisms, the alienation of consumers from producers, the museumization of the world. Globalization is a process, but there are also multiple resistances to it. Translation is often used as one of the methods for imposing the meanings, very often concealing the power relations that lie behind them. The problems of decoding a cultural text for a writer and translator involve so much more than language then. The importance of understanding what happens in the translation process lies at the heart of our understanding of the world we inhabit. And if Translation Studies has been increasingly concerned with the relationship between individual texts and the wider cultural system within which those texts are produced and read (chapter one), it is not surprising that within ethnography, cultural studies, and post-colonial theory in particular, translation is increasingly seen both as actual practice and as metaphor.
Translation as a sign of fragmentation, of cultural destabilization and also of negotiation is a powerful image for our epoch. It is not accidental then that the genre and idea of travel provides such a rich field for scholars in all the above areas, for this is the genre in which individual strategies employed by writers deliberately (or not) in order to construct images of other cultures for a target culture’s readership can be most clearly seen. But translation as a method, on the other hand, is dialogic in its very nature, involving as it does more than one voice. The study of translation and travel within the context of culture needs multiple voices—the situation best expressed perhaps through Bhabha’s reference to Paul de Man in *The Location of Culture*:

The ‘time’ of translation consists in that *movement* of meaning, the principle and practice of a communication that, in the words of de Man, ‘puts the original in motion to decanonize it, giving it the movement of fragmentation a wandering of errance, a kind of permanent exile.’ (228)
PART II

CHAPTER THREE

Centripetal Forces of Translation in the Travelogues of
Jonathan Raban

From the perspective of journey’s end, the wayfarer recognizes the necessity of the way stations.
---Mark C. Taylor

i. Ethnographic translation and modern American tours

In my previous two chapters I have made an effort to review the theory of translation focusing on the problematic of culture. In chapter one I demonstrated how the concepts of defamiliarization, dialogism and polyphony led to the incorporation of the notion of culture in translation theory and, subsequently, to the formation of a separate discipline of Translation Studies. I highlighted that Translation Studies is a discipline associated with the Cultural Turn in translation theory in the 1980s. Taking the above ideas into consideration, I tried in chapter two to coin a definition of translation of culture, and arrived at a formulation that points to translation of culture as a carrying over of the depth of associations of one culture with another. This means that the translation of culture is not only an interlingual process, but can be associated with a variety of genres and modes of writing when a writer/translator takes a text, or a phase of history, or an event and proceeds to understand it by reliving it in the process of its recreation.

As I also pointed out earlier (section one of chapter two), one of the areas closely associated with such an understanding of cultural translation is ethnography. Ethnography, as my analysis of the recent history of ethnography in travel writing suggests, served as a basis for the emergence of the initial categories of cultural translation. For instance, a translator of culture selects his or her field that in the process of translation undergoes a series of transformations,
because, first, it is transformed by the translator—either domesticated or 
foreignized according to how he or she perceives it linguistically and culturally. 
Secondly, transformation occurs in the target culture when the product reaches the 
target audience and is received by it according to its “understanding of the world.” 
I am using the concept “understanding of the world” in the sense deployed by 
Gianni Vattimo. In chapter two I referred to Vattimo as a translator of postmodern 
culture who observed that the subject is always already limited to a cultural 
situation into which he or she “is thrown” (*Beyond Interpretation* 8). It might 
have been, and still is, the case that we experience the world through categories 
and concepts, Vattimo holds, but they are not universal—they are determined by 
the situation and inherited through the community, through tradition and 
language: “The subject is the heir to a finite-historical language that makes 
possible and conditions the access of the subject to itself and to the world” 
(*Beyond Interpretation* 8). We therefore translate and interpret not words and 
meanings but a “cradling substratum of values,” as Vattimo puts it in his study 
*Etica dell’interpretazione*:

> The various logoi—discourses of specialized languages, but also 
spheres of interests, regions of autonomous rationality—are to be 
referred back to the logos-common consciousness, to the cradling 
substratum of values shared by a living historical community and 
expressed in its language. (106-07; qtd. in Rose “The Ethical 
Claims”)

Departing from the idea of culture in *Routes: Travel and Translation in 
the Late Twentieth Century* (1997), James Clifford notes that there could be no 
consensus for the troubles of cultural politics, no universal values in it, “only 
more translation” (13). Translation, as he elaborates further with reference to 
ethnographic writing, can be strategic as well as contingent (39). In chapter two I 
have approached ethnography as a form of cultural translation, as an area of 
thought, that along with the extensive studies of cultures, gradually began to move 
from being a scholarly discipline to being a boundary-free travel account that 
acknowledges the subjectivity of the traveller. What I tried to demonstrate is that 
ethnography, especially, shows the increased prominence of such practices and
tropes that become more and more associated with travel and travel writing. An example of the amalgamation of such tropes is the recurrent interest shown by travel writers in a variety of topics such as national or racial temperaments, economic activities, political order and justice, religion, marriage, rituals, navigation and other areas of socio-cultural life. As Joan Pau Rubies notes in his essay “Travel Writing and Ethnography” (2002), the coverage of the above topics in travel writing has always varied greatly “because not all were equally applicable to different societies, but it is remarkable that many were already present in Marco Polo’s descriptions of Asia, and would continue to dominate the ethnography of travel writing until the twentieth century” (252).

The interplay of various ethnographic topics and details in travel writing raises the issue of blurred genre, which is close to the idea of genre-in-translation, speaking metaphorically, or to put it otherwise, the production not of a genre, but of a specific mode of writing. In other words, travel writing could be described as an in-between genre incorporating fiction as well as non-fictional travel accounts. As I have pointed out in chapter two with reference to reception theory, genres are often identified with readers’ expectations; travel writing, being a fluid, versatile, borderless genre, is bound to change according to who looks at it. Perhaps the most lucid association with what the genre of travel writing is can be found in words of the novelist and travel writer, Paul Theroux, who illustrates the in-betweeness of travel writing and the impossibility of its clear definition by means of his personal experience in *The Great Railway Bazaar: By Train Through Asia*:

> The difference between travel writing and fiction is the difference between recording what the eye sees and discovering what the imagination knows. Fiction is pure joy—how sad that I could not reinvent the trip as fiction. (379)

It appears that strictness in distinguishing between travel writing and fiction proves to be very problematic in general. For instance, travel books may include fictional accounts or stories, and myth. Conversely, documents as well as historical events, can also be used in novels (in the historical novel, for example). The relationship between the genres remains close and at the same time always in transition.
From the perspective of translation, travel writing departs from the source culture and reaches for the target culture that sometimes can be a different layer of one and the same culture, which in the process of translation, becomes transformed and defamiliarized, redomesticated and recoded. Language difference in such a process is as primary as it is manifold. The blessings of Babel, the enrichment of humanity by the multiplicity of its tongues and cultures, are the underlying subjects throughout the history of translation theory. The varieties of a single language and culture, though, are as likely to excite the interest of artists and intellectuals as are the complex transactions between one language or culture and another.

Taking the work of Jonathan Raban as an example of travel writing, I would like to demonstrate how ethnographic elements in literary texts result in cultural translation, and how the mode of writing as intralingual translation as well as actual interlingual translations lead to the construction and deconstruction of American culture in Raban’s travel writing. Referring to the history of European immigrants in the Americas, Raban--as the translator of translations--demonstrates the significance of translation for the promise of migration to America. With its promise of a ‘New World’ and in particular of land opportunities, America was largely constructed through letters, newspapers, advertisements far away from America, in Europe, and all this involved translation and sometimes intentional mistranslation for the purposes of attracting a massive labour force to the uncultivated American lands. As more migrants came, more land was needed to sustain the myth of a promised land for prospective settlers. By moving westwards, it was possible to make large plots of land available for the Europeans who were arriving in their millions from a world perceived as restricted in both space and opportunity. The problem was that Europeans discovered that the New World was not so New at all, in the sense that for its native inhabitants this world was in fact an Old World. The new settlers were not so much discovering a virgin territory as a highly contested space, sometimes risking their lives and largely being exploited by previous generations of immigrants who had acquired the economic standing, power and ability to control the processes of further division of properties and wealth. The frontier, then, as well as borderlands and unexplored wilderness, became zones of risk as much as they were places of promise.
Raban himself is European-British, and moved to America decades ago, for the standard reasons—imagined promise of opportunities, if not economic, at least creative. As a writer he soon transformed American space into a field of close study, comparative analysis, travel and discovery. It could be said that he is an American writer because of his passionate adherence to American topics. What betrays an ethnographic bent to Raban’s writing is, first of all, the detailed description of American everyday life in a specific timespan, at the turn of the millennium. America in Raban’s travel writing is associated with the full impact of globalizing processes in all spheres of social, cultural, political and economic life and with his personal life story as a concomitant part of those processes. Modernity and rapid change in America excite Raban. Attracting a rich variety of documentary, autobiography and historical material, he reinvents America while also reinventing himself as an American resident.

For instance, in one of his recent interviews for *Granta Online*, Raban reflects on the idea of American wilderness: “It always seems to me odd to call a place a wilderness when every wilderness area in the U.S. bristles with rules and regulations as to how you can behave, what you’re allowed to do, and is patrolled by armed rangers enforcing the small print. They’re parks, of course, not wildernesses at all. A wilderness that’s truly wild is beyond human rule, which is something I’ve always loved about the idea of the wilderness of the sea… Byron said much the same thing: ‘Man marks the earth with ruin – his control/ Stops with the shore…’ Now we’ve marked the ocean with ruin, I guess we in a sense control it, so that’s our last true wilderness gone” (Gordon, “Interview”). The result of Raban’s reinvention and discovery is not so much the particular place, but his own outsidedness, intertextualized within stories told or written by other people about the same routes he travels. His intertextual writing offers a unique map of the south and northwest of America. Fundamental in it is the preservation of difference, since Raban sees his task as cultural translator as something that involves seeking to rewrite “the same thing,” to use Walter Benjamin’s expression, releasing something that hasn’t been named yet (“The Task” 15).

Many other authors and travel writers are his constant companions as he reveals what they have said earlier about the places he travels visits. Raban’s journey seeks to provide an opportunity to relive earlier passages along the same route, to meditate on travel meanings, to read and write. Such a strategy makes
Raban’s narrative not only metaphorically rich but also apparently reflective on the centrality of the self. The centrality of the self is one of the levels at which Raban’s travel writing achieves translational effects. Covering American themes, Raban arrives at something like redomestication of English—the same language in different cultural environments acquires foreign meanings and allows for the communities of understanding, as Venuti explained in the essay “Translation, Community, Utopia” (469). Motivated by the ethical politics of difference, such writers would seek “to built a community with the foreign culture, share understanding and collaborate on the project founded on that understanding, going as far as to revise domestic values and institutions” (469). The search for community goes along with the translator’s expectations for a new readership which is aware that their interest in the text is shared with the source culture.

Translation in Raban’s travel writing is intertwined with autobiographical accounts as well as with fictional characters to enhance the sense of community he is reaching for—the community of those who are caught in the process of creating America. Creating America in Jonathan Raban’s travel writing, as I have said, goes along with translation, autobiography, and fiction as well as with the transplantation of his British English language into a different Anglophone environment. The definition of travel writing suggested by Jonathan Raban is more about the mode of translation than the practice of writing as such. In one of his earlier books For Love and Money: Writing—Reading—Travelling 1968-1987 (1988) he noted:

As a literary form, travel writing is a notoriously raffish open house where different genres are likely to end up in the same bed. It accommodates the private diary, the essay, the short story, the prose poem, the rough note and polished table talk with indiscriminate hospitality. It freely mimes narrative and discursive writing. (253-54)

Raban’s definition pleads in favour of a free mix of different kinds of writing within the category of travel writing. It is therefore even more supple than Theroux’s in stepping beyond the notion of clear-cut boundaries between fiction and non-fiction. If the translation of culture can be defined as carrying over the
depth of associations of one culture with another (chapter two, section one), then one of these associations in Jonathan Raban’s travel writing about America is the history of European emigration with which he associated his own life’s story.

Raban’s travel writing shows how the cycle of migration repeats itself in the era of contemporary globalization, reflecting new swings of the global economy and power. There is a variety of comparisons between Europe’s past and America’s present in Raban’s texts and the constant emphasis on America as travel culture. In the travelogues *Old Glory: a Voyage Down the Mississippi* (1981), *Hunting Mister Heartbreak: A Discovery of America* (1991), *Bad Land: An American Romance* (1996), *Passage to Juneau: a Sea and Its Meanings* (1999), Raban traces as well as ‘de-layers’ the socio-cultural history of America. The history and culture of European migration became a part of American cultural history in which Raban’s own personal story is dissolved. Raban’s attempt to rediscover the silent parts of American history belongs not only to a translation of culture which carries identifiable meaning across boundaries, but also to something that can neither be presented nor represented. Cultural translation, accordingly, can be redefined as not only crossing over, but also as a space for crossing over, which escapes, leaving behind the abyss of associations. In the case of Raban’s travel writing, the definition of translation as transporting, reproducing, representing or communicating the meaning of the original isn’t complete. Instead, the translation of culture might be additionally defined as a process of modifying the culture.

**ii. Translation and alienation**

Because of his attempt to re-discover America, Raban appeared to me was as an exemplary case for the ethnographic approach to translation of culture. As I indicated in my section on ethnography (chapter two) with reference to Gianni Vattimo, in the world of globalization and sameness, even one’s own culture has become marginal and waits for rediscovery. The fast-changing source culture becomes a target culture for itself. Talal Asad, as I have discussed earlier (in the same section) also suggested that cultural translation is far from being only a matter of the transparency of the text, but more “of *learning* life and…another kind of language” (149). Since nothing is meaningful in isolation for Asad, he
points to the relevancy of contexts. Which contexts are relevant in different discursive events is something that one learns in the course of living, and even though it is very difficult to verbalize that knowledge, it is still knowledge about “the nature of society,” about some aspects of living, something that “indicates (although it does not dictate) just how much context is relevant to any given utterance” (Asad 149).

In Bad Land: an American Romance and Passage to Juneau: a Sea and Its Meanings Raban recreates a vanished episode of American history at the turn of the new millennium by, as I have just said, contextualizing the place within what he calls life—within its own ruins, myths, memories, its own heroes and heroines. America rests on the imagination of those who travelled there to settle, but, as Raban demonstrates, for decades in the history of European migration this imagination was intensified by texts, mainly translations and interpretations, arriving from America itself. He himself was one of those immigrants whose idea of America was built on on the variety of images outside it. His emigration in 1990 to the United States was a self-conscious gesture of, as he says in one of his online interviews, “sloughing off an old-world skin and taking on the new” (Campbell, “Northern Exposure”). Further, as he points out in the same interview, it was “easy to leave England in 1990. I hated England under Thatcher, although in a funny way I shouldn’t have. I mean, she was as antagonistic to the old system of England as I was” (Campbell). In the new world of the Pacific Northwest where he moved to settle, Raban said he was less likely to meet the patterns of life that he was raised in: “I don’t think I feel acid about England. I love England’s intricacy and its landscape. But the narrow England, the white England, the England of the rigid class system - I was raised in a house that revered all that. So it became my job to do a little deconstruction” (Campbell).

In his travelogue, Bad Land, Raban uses personal stories of others, translated letters and documents to look at European emigration diachronically. The diachronic approach is employed to reveal the habits of immigrants, their life-styles and their transition to life in a new place. In trying to convey what uprooted people from their homelands and awoke their resolve to cross the ocean in the first place, Raban goes a hundred years back and digs at the root of the European route to America. Referencing to the habits of everyday life helps him
to show how, on the one hand, the American dream, the attractiveness of travel tales and rumours affected people’s daily routines and transformed them, and on the other, how the whole idea of America was grounded on mistranslations, erroneous assumptions and constant failures:

In 1910, people had to furnish their American daydreams from a relatively scant supply of arousing details. There were letters home, articles in newspapers and illustrated magazines, and a great deal of hearsay. The would-be emigrant was required to create an imaginary America that was palpable enough to become a real destination. By the time he bought his steamship ticket, he was bound for a land that existed in his head in rich, intricate and erroneous particularity. (22)

Using historical documents, Raban identifies the particularities of life styles in various American regions. He describes how in the beginning of the last century maps still identified eastern Montana the Great American Desert. At that time Congress, lobbied heavily by railroad companies, offered 320-acre tracts of land to anyone “naïve enough” to stake a claim to them. Drawn by inventive informational and promotional brochures in a variety of the languages of European countries, countless immigrants arrived in America and went West to make their fortunes. The majority of them failed. Raban focuses on the fact of the failure of adventurers as well as on how translation was used for disinformation by the brutal local socio-political system. In towns named Terry, Calypso, and Ismay and in the landscape in between, where Raban takes a trip, he also tries to envision the importance of the past. Translation helps him to find home in the landscape and among the history of others.

The “others” in Bad Land and, later, in Passage to Juneau, are travellers from “the past.” The translation and recreation of America as a land of travellers in Raban’s travelogues gradually forms a part of the immigrant culture that the idea of America rests on:

An emigrant myself, trying to find my own place in the landscape and history of the West, I took the ruins personally. From the names in the graveyards, I thought I knew the people who had come out here: Europeans, mostly of my grandparents’ generation, for whom
belief in America, and its miraculous power of individual redemption, was the last great European religion. Faith in a bright future was written into the carpentry of every house. To lay such a floor as that, tongue in chiselled groove, was the work of a true believer… Looking now at the fleet of lonely derelicts on the prairie, awash on grass and sinking fast, I could guess at how that faith had been shaken… Lacking an American past of my own, I hoped to find someone else’s cast-off history that would fit my case. (Bad Land 9)

The process of contextualizing culture is relational—an inscription of communicative processes. Although from the ethnographic point of view, the writer may use supporting tools, language and other media to communicate what he knows, the significance of the latter lies in the pursuit of the cross-personal, cross-cultural and cross-historical. Communication involves the negotiation of meanings and dialogues, and although there are actual dialogues inscribed in the novel, the word “dialogue” in such an intertextual travelogue as Bad Land is more a suggestive metaphor, for the whole text was written when a level of understanding had been attained in the process of cross-cultural communication.

Long after the emigrant has become an immigrant, he or she retains a compulsively similitudinous cast of mind. Everything here is seen in terms of how things are done there. We’re always translating back and forth between the old and the new. I still can’t rid myself of the reflexive tic that converts all dollar transactions back into the real money of the England pound. In the supermarket, I carry the day’s exchange-rate in my head. And so it goes for more important things, like one’s sense of space and distance. The shadow of one’s home country falls, unbidden, across almost every inch of American soil. (22)

Such understanding for Raban can be attained through learning numerous details of byt, everyday life, to use Bakhtin’s term, as he demonstrates in the text, describing and contrasting habits that the people he writes about brought from the places they left.
One of his characters in Bad Land, Evelyn Flower, who moved to Montana from London in the beginning of the 20th century to raise polo ponies for the British market, is described as one of those intrepid British aunts “who slipped the traces of the English class and gender system,” and made their names adventuring in far-away continents. Evelyn is described as “a cousin” to famous women travellers Mary Kinsley, Freya Stark, Gertrude Bell. She sends letters and pictures of her new life to her relatives in England who can only view things in English terms:

The British relatives were used to seeing agriculture through the rose-tinted spectacles of the English pastoral landscape painters. The farm, in this English way of looking at things, is the centre of the true, the beautiful and the good. Evelyn’s Montana ranches, though, look like improvised camps, pitched by none-too-particular soldiers, and under the constraints of war. (76)

In the subsequent section of Band Land Jonathan Raban describes his first contact with American schoolbooks, which he finds in one of the old schools of Montana as he is travelling through the Pacific Northwest. Peripheral life in Raban’s novel reflects on the central values of America. The periphery here is the cental space:

The America of the schoolbooks was a realm of lonely but invigorating adventure, where poor farm-boys grew up to be President; land of the brave, the true and the clean, where a beckoning star stood permanently above the western horizon and poverty and ill-health were mere tests of one’s American mettle. To prairie children, this schoolbook America must have seemed reasonably close to home… Here, though, you could see your own experience intimately reflected in the books. The Grade 3 Learn to Study reader (1924) had a chapter titled “How to save”: “Some children think that they cannot save, because they are not working and earning money. You can save money by saving other things.” (12)
In one of his most recent, and most adventurous sailing books, *Passage to Juneau*, again the central space is the preriphery. *Passage to Juneau* is the tale of a journey from Seattle to Alaska, through the extraordinarily complicated sea route known as the Inside Passage (part open ocean, part modest river, the passage is 1,000 miles long). In the travelogue Raban describes the unusual lifestyles of sailors and fishing communities:

The fishing community really was a tight, intimate, memorious society, cruel and kind in equal parts. It gave its members ribald nicknames—Pus-gut Chadwick, Three-Finger Bob, Truthful Tom. It rejoiced in cutting people down to size. It nourished old slights and grudges over the decades, and was divided by resentful factions—seiners versus gill-netters, Sons of Norway versus the rest. (14)

Along with the description of immigrant communities in *Passage to Juneau* Raban inserts detailed studies of the maritime culture of the Northwest Indians, almost in the manner of Levi-Strauss whom he repeatedly refers to:

High mountains and impenetrable forests crowded in on the coastal Indians and kept them within yards of the sea. The water was safer, more easily travelled, more productive, than the surrounding land. The Indians lived in an exclusively maritime culture, centred on the lavishly painted cedar canoe. Babies were rocked in miniature canoe-craddles; the dead were despatched in canoe-coffins. In their masks, rattles, boxes, woven blankets, and decorated hats, they created a marvellous, stylized, highly articulate maritime art. (24)

The Shklovskian idea of extraliterary reality contributes to the understanding of culture as a system, and it might be considered as enriching the ethnographic approach to culture as always relational and communicative. Culture needs an approach via events and texts that bind different sign systems, according to Formalist thinking, and Bakhtin has developed the idea further by adding that the most powerful factor in understanding culture is the distance from it (“Response” 2). To understand things in diachrony, according to Bakhtin, one needs to develop a creative understanding that presupposes remembrance and
unforgetfulness (2). Raban demonstrates it through his continuous reference to other travel authors, historical books and textbooks—Baudelaire and Conrad provide his epigraphs, Vancouver and Cook are his constant references. Raban’s writing is close to the combination of travel account and personal memoir. If, to follow the Bakhtinian idea, culture reveals itself most fully on the level of an individual (“Response” 2), then Raban is an interesting embodiment of a global culture which exceeds the boundaries of America and his native England. In Hunting Mister Heartbreak he notes:

How easy it sometimes seems to walk out on one’s life and into a new one. You reify your marriage, your mortgage, your job contract, the appointments in your diary—those precious chains that make your life seem merited, inexorable, yours. Yet put a thousand miles or so between yourself and home, change your clock by a few hours, feel a more indulgent climate on your skin, and the view alters. From here, home looks makeshift and arbitrary, a sandcastle on a distant beach. The tide could wash the whole thing away in no time at all. It wasn’t much of a life anyway, says your old demon, that unreconstructed addict of risk and roulette. Why not? (153)

In Bakhtinian thinking this possibility of the self-determination of an individual embodied in a creative act is the highest expression of culture. And if we add that each individual carries a unique “speech energy” as prerequisite to dialogue, then the translation of culture is a graphic illustration of this dialogue. As I indicated in chapter one, in place of comfortable synthesis Bakhtin suggests a dual character to permanent dialogue: a dialogue through the gap of time and space. The translation of culture rests upon the preservation of this gap, and the continuum of dialogue is dependent on neither speaker knowing exactly what the other means. As if to illustrate the presence of this gap Raban chooses to reveal in his travelogues the most intriguing moments of American daily life, the moments that surprise him and form the confusion from which cultural translation begins. For instance, in Bad Land he arrives at the contextualization of his personal amazement when he finds in daily American newspapers evidence that
the American perception of the world differs from his own, and their tendency in
them to believe the unbelievable:

The eroded moonscape stood for everything that is inhospitable in
Eastern Montana: it would be hardship to be leaving *that* behind. In
1994, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Apollo moon-landing,
the *Washington Post* published the intriguing results of recent poll:
20 million Americans appeared to believe that the moon-landing was
a hoax, perpetrated in the Arizona desert by the US government, for
the financial benefit of the big corporations who were the NASA
contractors. A side-handling was that westerners were twice as likely
as easterners to subscribe to this conspiracy theory, which was a fine
example of how gnarled scepticism, carried far enough, eventually
turns into innocent credulity. (276)

Raban’s translational moves suggest that the travel writer sometimes
raises new questions about culture, and culture responds by revealing new
aspects and new semantic depths. Raban’s travelogues demonstrate that a
recorded or retold fact sometimes can turn to literary fact or to the fact of *byt*,
a detail of everyday life. The creative understanding of everyday life is also a
kind of dialogue which surmounts the insularity or one-sidedness of culture.
Such dialogic encounter does not result in merging, mixing or assimilation.
Each retains its open totality, as Bakthin puts it, but they are mutually
transformed and enriched (“Response” 2).

This interplay of literary and extraliterary discourse, as I have put it in
chapter one, was called *ustanovka* by the Formalists: “intention,” or
“orientation,” or “the positioning of oneself in relation to some given data.” In
this sense Raban seems to be a creative memoirist of places, inscribing and
creating a memory of place, connecting life and place—the technique that he
calls “life-writing.” In Campbell’s review Raban remarks on what he means
by such writing:

I was interested in ‘life-writing’ - the shape of the journey, with its
beginning, its middle and end. It's a completely open form, and you
can do pretty much anything in it that you want: reportage, criticism,
sociology. It was the perfect form for me because I was floating between the genres anyway. (Campbell, “Northern Exposure”)

Raban’s counterpart, British travel writer Robert MacFarlane says in the same review that he is not surprised about Raban being sometimes resistant to the label “a travel writer.” MacFarlane says that “all good writing either works against the grain of its genre, or transcends it altogether. Good travel writing is never just an information-gathering exercise; it must also have an emotional trajectory. Raban is one of the few who has been unwilling to let the genre relax its muscles” (Campbell, “Northern Exposure”).

iii. Ongoing auto-ethnography as translation

For a man whose family background, as I have said earlier, was supposed to nurture rationality and emotional control, Raban offers a surprising degree of self-exposure and self-translation in his travelogues. His memory opens up the most while travelling—not just any kind of travel, however, but a journey followed by the acknowledged possibility of no return. Then memory, as if it is an experienced translator, enters into dialogue with the past, and brings up images that transform the actual scenery of the trip. This is why the most universal definition of translation would suggest that no translation is ever entirely acceptable to the target culture because it will always introduce new information aiming at defamiliarization, at the breaking the resistances of the cultural system of the target; nor is any cultural translation entirely adequate to the original scenery, because cultural norms always cause shifts, distance themselves from the source structures. In chapter one I referred to Gideon Toury’s suggestion that translations have no fixed identity; they are always subject to various contextual factors of the social and cultural environment and therefore must be viewed as having multiple identities.

In Passage to Juneau, for instance, Raban finds himself travelling by boat though the 1000-mile Passage between Seattle and Juneau in the Northern Pacific and is overwhelmed by memories of his childhood, his
home-country—England, his complicated relationship with his father, his father’s homecoming from the war, his father’s death. “Memory,” Raban writes, “always has its own dark purpose, often hidden from the rememberer; and it is a ruthless editor, with a facile knack for supplying corroborative details” (309):

It’s impossible to draw hard-and-fast distinctions between deep-dredge memory, retrieving material directly from the silt in which it has lain for many years, and the shallow-dredge variety, in which one remembers only an earlier act of remembering… In fifty years, I’d had ample time to revisit the day when my father came home—going there on each occasion with a different agenda. Now that my father was dead, I wonder if the scene might not be a work of self-serving fiction. Approaching the memory for the nth time, with a new agenda, I wanted to fault it, but could find no flaw…” (309)

There is his youth’s fascination with Shelley’s major poem, *Alastor*, in which the hero, named Poet, as Raban quotes, “…left/His cold fireside and alienated home/To seek strange truths in undiscovered lands” (266). Shelley’s Poet, says Raban in the travelogue, takes his deliberate voyage of death. *Passage to Juneau* is framed by the author’s own little death. At the end, on the beach in Juneau, Raban’s wife tells him she wishes to separate. “I have to take charge of my own life. I can’t go on depending on you for handouts like I’ve been doing.”... Her voice was dry, curt, void of tone and color. Jean had many voices. This was her Manhattan voice... ‘I need to forge a new identity,’ she said. I was lost. This was all wrong. I wanted to put Jean on rewind, yet the words kept coming, as if memorized by rote, with no inflection at all” (334). In attempt to contextualize himself in America Raban pursues the commitment to self-disclosure, finding the way to this through communication. Raban discloses himself in entirety, as a complex web of social, historical, cultural relations. His travel writing as a whole is not only richly intertextual, but also detailed, arbitrary or, to use Derrida’s term, “adequate translation” (“What Is a ‘Relevant’ Translation?” 182), i.e., adequate translations of cultures he meets on his way—the culture of seamen communities, of North Pacific Indians, of the fatherland,
England—all contextualized in the American landscape. For a better illustration of the above, one of his references to the history of sea travel might suffice. Raban approaches the sea as an integral part of American space, culture and identity. In *Hunting Mister Heartbreak* he describes it as follows:

What turned the Atlantic passage into the great European adventure was not so much the character of America as the character of the ocean. It was simply a space too big for you to be able to imagine your ways across it. It was as deep as the highest mountain you’d ever seen. It was a place of terrible winds and weather, with waves as big as crashing churches. That gigantic desolation of angry water was a source of terrible stories of shipwreck, sickness and death. The moment you stepped on to the gangplank, you committed yourself—not to America, but to a strange and frightening sea ritual, which would ineluctably transform you from the person you had been on the dock into the person you would eventually become when, and if, you reached the far shore. Over there, after the ocean had done its job, you’d have a different identity, and very probably a different name. You would not be you, at least not as you had known yourself to be up to this extraordinary moment. (2)

The sea itself is the finest symbol of the uncertainties of travel, and Raban’s “passage” in *Passage to Juneau* turns into more than he aimed for when his father dies during the course of it, and then his wife makes her own journey to Juneau to announce that their marriage is over. Raban moves closer than in his other travelogues to the combination of travel account and personal memoir, and the book’s emotional heart emerges in the long passages recalling his relationship with his father, and describing the old man’s death and funeral alongside an evocation of Shelley’s death by water. The sea for Raban is also an all-embracing metaphor of “life-writing” and he uses historical sources on the sea and its cultural meanings ranging from the Bible, Renaissance cartographers, German Romantic philosophy, and English Romantic poetry to Arendt, Freud, Emerson, Auden, and many others.
I thought it might be possible to think of a sea as the sum of all the reflections it had held during history. You’d never know the half of them, of course; but in the clashes and contradictions of image against image, you might at least catch something of the provocative power of the sea, which has meant so much, so variously, to us. To put oneself afloat on a sea-route as old and heavily travelled as the Inside Passage was to join the epic cavalcade of all those, present and past, who’d found some meaning in these waters. (*Passage* 35)

Weaving other authors with his texts, Raban evinces a skill that suggests the experience of a cultural translator. Speaking about the norms of translation, Gideon Toury suggested that in terms of society, a social skill is a kind of behavioural norm, a social practice rooted in a mode of life (“In Search” 199). When Raban refers to the documented history of sea culture, including anthropological accounts of life habits of the Indians of the American northwest, he is obviously referring to translations or even translations of translations as an integral part of American history: “I dipped and skimmed, jumping from the physics of turbulence to the cultural anthropology of the Northwest Indians, to voyages and memoirs, to books on marine invertebrates, to the literature of the sea from Homer to Conrad, trying to wrest from each new book some insight into my own compulsion” (*Passage* 22). Raban’s reflections on the texts he found that described frontier zone of the Northwest and its nature reveal the almost absent relationship between the region’s culture and of the English American community: “My Englishness, in part, made me a poor reader of such modern Northwest writers as Gary Snyder, Barry Lopez, and Richard Nelson, who celebrate their at-oneness with the habitat of the wild… Reading the Northwest nature writers, I found myself an agnostic in their church” (*Passage* 191).

These are not just some autobiographical dilemmas reflected in a travel text rich with references. James Clifford noted that autobiographical accounts can also be sociological; they can move systematically between personal experience and general concerns, and can even be recognized as characteristically anthropological. Clifford also noted that the only constituent of fieldwork that will always be certain is travel “redefined and broadened” (*Routes* 89).
Raban’s travel writing combines autobiographic and ethnographic elements. He discloses in his texts the procedure of writing travel accounts in its every stage, sometimes in the smallest detail, with verifications and references to names and sources. First of all, he works with sources; he compares what he finds in texts about the particular place with what he discovers in the place itself, outside the texts. The mediation between narrated and documented material and his actual interaction with the place forms his travel story. A reliance on others’ texts makes him dependent on translation and the foreign, as in the case of the books he finds on the Northwest Indians. As James Clifford said, maintaining a distance from the source as well as the target culture and translating differences is a part of research, analysis, and writing (Routes 89). The more one gets to know the source culture and language, the less one is able he or she becomes to render this difference in his or her own language, notes Michael Cronin in Translation and Globalization (38). Raban’s travel writing reveals the distance from source and target culture that can be maintained within the limits of intralingual translation. The fact that Raban tries to establish a distance from his own English culture is an indication that he is still very much rooted in it and that the American culture that he is translating into British English is in many ways still foreign to him. Travelling through America evokes in him strong anti-nostalgic feelings, and in the vast American territories he remembers how “narrow” England’s spaces were, how “directing and commanding” the roads seemed to be:

At intervals of every mile or so, giant placards stood on the verge of the carriageway, saying KEEP YOUR DISTANCE! Keeping one’s distance on this overcrowded island had always been a thorny problem. Within my own living memory the vast and labyrinthine intricacies of the class system had helped to compensate for England’s chronic absence of breathing space. (Passage 250)

Mediation is Raban’s method of writing. If the travel writing of Jonathan Raban demonstrates how he embarked upon his journey to selfhood through the translation of other cultures, then the recreation of the vanished parts of that other’s history in travel writing shows concern with the afterlife of that culture, in particular the culture of immigrants. At the end of Passage to Juneau, quoting
Marcus Aurelius’s saying that “Loss is nothing else but change, and change is Nature’s delight,” Raban seems to fully identify his personal life with the pace of the vanishing of history (432).

Raban explains his autobiographical bent in travel writing with reference to Robert Lowell, the biggest influence of his life since he became a writer: “It was his example of turning the turmoil of his life into art that inspired me. Especially in the family poems in Life Studies (1959), and in the prose memoir, ‘91 Revere Street,’ at the centre of that book. There’s a remark in a later poem that made a deep impression on me: ‘One life, one writing.’ I read it as: life is writing and writing is life… Yet, you only have your own life. It’s a matter of trying to see yourself as a representative figure, trying to make yourself your own leading character. It’s the reverse of confessional. You hope that people will become part of that life and recognize their own lives within it” (Campbell). In the same review Campbell quotes Theroux’s theory of Raban’s travel writing: “…life is his obsessive subject. He’s always done it… He’s fortunate, in having such a precise measure of himself, that he can describe his own life so well” (Campbell).

What makes autobiographical accounts resemble ethnographic writing is, again, a measure of distance from the self—the capability of translating ongoing experience into something “distanced and representable,” to use Clifford’s words from Routes (57). In Raban’s travel writing it is contextualization, not merely observation, that attests to an interest in the “field” that transcends the clear-cut historical and rhetorical determinations sometimes so much welcomed in ethnographic writing. Redefining the borders between ethnography and travel writing, James Clifford recognizes that this task in contemporary globalization is difficult as never before: “‘Literariness’ held at a distance in the figure of the travel writer, has returned to ethnography in the form of strong claims about the prefiguration and rhetorical communication of ‘data.’ The facts do not speak for themselves; they are emplotted rather than collected, produced in worldly relationships rather than observed in controlled environments… Travelers, not scientists tell tales. Elements of the ‘literary’ travel narrative that were excluded from ethnographies now appear more prominently” (Routes 67). The method of writing becomes a central axis of attention.
This turn of attention in ethnography is related to the Cultural Turn in translation theory and to the new possibilities of viewing certain texts as “cultural translations,” in other words, with the possibility of the diffusion of the borderlines between the original and translation. It was Polysystems theory which actually began to speak about translation as “text making.” In his essay “The Position of Translated Literature in the Literary Polysystem,” Itamar Even-Zohar indicated that at times, when a translation “takes a central position, the borderlines are diffuse, so that the very category of ‘translated works’ must be extended to semi- and quasi-translations as well... Periods of great change in the home system are in fact the only ones when a translator is prepared to go far beyond the options offered to him by his established home repertoire and is willing to attempt a different treatment of text-making” (197).

The example of Jonathan Raban shows that what is important is not so much the home system but what Andrew Benjamin, whom I referred to in chapter one, regards as a temporal dimension in translation. Andrew Benjamin’s reading of Walter Benjamin suggests that the potential of an afterlife, i.e., of the survival of the text/culture is located within the text/culture. Words, for Andrew Benjamin, incorporate a site of conflict, a site of unending afterlife, which defers an end or a definite interpretation. For Andrew Benjamin this temporal distinction is central. In the book Translation and the Nature of Philosophy, he points to Walter Benjamin’s phrase “no poem is intended to the reader...” and reveals two inadequate conceptions of translation in Walter Benjamin (87). They concern the opposition between information and story, as Walter Benjamin puts it in “The Storyteller,” and most importantly--their connection to time: “The value of information does not survive the moment in which it was new. It lives only at the moment... A story is different... It preserves its strength and is capable of releasing it even after a long period of time” (90). The reference to information and the impossibility of reducing a literary work to information is an important moment not just in clarifying what is to be understood by the literary as such but also because it implicitly introduces time into the problem of cultural translation as well.

Jonathan Raban in his travelogues refers to time as a “brief sojourn in an alien land” (a phrasing that is, he says, borrowed from Marcus Aurelius),
acknowledging new dimensions of time and space in an epoch of rapidly advancing globalization:

One of the bad legacies of Romanticism was this greedy prizing of one’s own solitude in an increasingly crowded nature. The central conceit of the “traveller,” as distinct from the mere “tourist,” was that he was alone in the landscape; its sole, original discoverer… The Inside Passage… was a sharp reminder that I was a tourist among tourists. When the time came to go home, we’d each extol the cavernous solitudes we’d discovered and keep mum about tangling anchor chains with other sole discoverers in silly boats loud with silly music. (Passage 342)

Raban’s Passage is an indication of the fact that the process of acculturation of the wilderness in America is complete. Journeys to selfhood deprived of the wilderness and the possibility of discoveries produce a different meaning and are saturated by the overwhelming presence of cultural codes. Soren Kierkegaard in The Point of View of My Work as an Author described the journey to selfhood as winding along a solitary path, narrow and steep, where the individual wanders without meeting a single traveller. To follow the way, according to him, is to embark upon an extra-ordinary pilgrimage, a venture that suspends one “above seventy thousand fathoms of water, many, many miles from all human help” (15). Even if from an existential point of view a solitary wandering and individual routes are always possible, the experiences of each individual traveller in an Anglophone world in an era of massive tourism and domination of pop-culture are rendered with silence, “kept mum.” Culture, at least in that part of the Anglophone world that Raban attempts to scrutinize, seems to be self-protecting and indifferent to the difference that Raban aims to preserve, reminding himself of the history of immigrants in a country that was established on differences.
iv. The excesses of American translations

Immigrant America, its diversity and transformations, is an inspiration to Jonathan Raban in his later travelogues, where he begins his experimentation with the genre. Raban’s latest works, *Waxwings* (2003), *Surveillance* (2006) and *Holy War: Dispatches from Home Front* (2006), are less associated with actual travel, but all of them go further in their scrutinizing and questioning of twenty-first century American culture. The works could be evaluated as travel novels or autobiographical accounts (or a mixture of both), expressing sets of political-cultural ideas and concerns about American ideology. As for the political bent of Raban’s later work, it is necessary to remark that the importance of political concerns in shaping and influencing ethnographical thinking was always clear. For instance, European travelers, by recording their observations of other lands and peoples, became essential contributors to the interest in empire and to the growth of a new, empirically informed discourse about both man and nature. Joan Pau Rubies’s essay “Travel writing and Ethnography,” offers dozens of examples of how travelers departed from Europe with a sense of the existence of debates to which they could contribute: Montaigne, Rousseau, Diderot and Montesquieu used the actual observations of travel writers to elaborate on their ideas (256-258).

From the globalized perspective, cultural purity is a romantic reification of non-European cultures as static, isolated systems, since the direct contact with them outside Europe was not possible. The extinction of the pure has created a blurring of cultural traditions which requires redefining the whole enterprise of both ethnography and travel writing. There is therefore much potential for the ethnographic analysis of varieties of cultural hybridization. In other words, more cultural translation in various directions is necessary. Significant changes have less to do with what to translate or with why translate than with emphases of interpretation at the present time and with the emergence of new ideology and sensuality.

Jonathan Raban’s travel books weave distinctive variations on the stand-off between continuity and dissonance of the above-mentioned tendencies. In translation Venuti calls it an ongoing debate between foreignizing and domesticating advocates of translation. The debate has its history and particular reasons which are hidden in the nature of the text or, to borrow the Formalist
expression, in the “literariness” of the text. In other words, the choice of strategy always depends on a particular historico-cultural situation:

Textual production may be initiated and guided by the producer, but it puts to work various linguistic and cultural materials which make the text discontinuous, despite any appearance of unity, and which create an unconscious, a set of unacknowledged conditions that are both personal and social, psychological and ideological. Thus, the translator consults many different target-language cultural materials, ranging from dictionaries and grammars to texts, discursive strategies, and translations, to values, paradigms, and ideologies, both canonical and marginal. Although intended to reproduce the source-language text, the translator’s consultation of these materials inevitably reduces and supplements it, even when source-language cultural materials are also consulted. (Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility 24)

Venuti speaks of how domesticating strategies are especially prevalent in situations like Raban’s, when someone is unhappy with the ideology at home, and “plan to use (rewrite) elements taken from the other system to further their own ends,” as Lefevere has indicated in his essay “Systems Thinking and Cultural Relativism” (64). The ideological dimension is crucial when someone works in between two cultures. Referring to travel writing as “culture constructing,” Susan Bassnett stressed that with the restoration of the ideological element in the theory, culture “has been restored as well, and our knowledge of cultural history has consequently been enriched” (Beyond Translation 1-2). Since then the work between two cultures is no longer considered an one-way translation, and translation is “no longer a one-way flow from the source to the target culture, but a two-way trans-cultural enterprise” (Comparative Literature 155).

In his works Raban reflects on his changing attitude towards his home country, England, and his changing Englishness which interweaves with the uncertainties of his new American identity. His later writing also demonstrates how someone changes his/her political views, growing into American culture as one of the “displaced children” of Europe. Focusing on life in a metropolitan space—Seattle—these texts are also interesting cases of “urban ethnography.”
Waxwings is a story about exile and the search for community and place. The significance of the title becomes apparent only during the last scene of Waxwings, when the main character catches sight of a flock of waxwings—birds with a highly developed social system: they share berries, passing one back and forth until one bird eats it, continuing this over and over again. They display the kind of community that Raban’s immigrant characters are seeking in America. Surveillance is the more radical critique of American technological culture. As the title suggests, modern metropolitan culture in America, through internet communities, turns city people into “voyeurs” by making personal espionage a norm of life and part of a cultural whole. The book begins with the main epigraph of the eloquent quote from Gaston Bachelard’s Applied Rationalism: “In order that self-surveillance be fully assured, it must somehow be itself held under surveillance. Thus, there come into existence forms of surveillance of surveillance to which, for the sake of brevity, we shall give the exponential notation (surveillance squared). We shall, moreover, set out the elements of a surveillance of surveillance of surveillance in other words, of (surveillance cubed)” (2).

What is unusual in these Raban’s texts is that the stories in them unfold exclusively through direct speech and extensive dialogues between characters. Such a dense usage of direct speech creates the impression of documentary, not fiction, of something that actually took place in language. The direct speech creates the effect of the writer’s skillfulness in the polyglossia of culture, his direct participation in events.

This is further observed in Raban’s Surveillance. An active observer of American metropolitan life, Raban proposes the idea of the vulnerability and fragility of American identity, one that is especially palpable in such a domain of culture as political culture and the language of politics. The traditional European classification of political trends, such as right, center, or left, has been translated into other codes, including statist, uncommitted, and anti-statist positions. It is almost a documentary novel, in fact, about the seeds of fear, suspicion and the presence of an enemy implanted into American culture by Bush era politicians.

The main story of Surveillance circles around the phenomenon of the recollection genre in American culture. It is about a best-seller based on Holocaust memoirs - Boy 381 - written by a loner, an aged writer, a WWII immigrant from Latvia, August Vanags, a “famously shy and elusive” professor...
of history, who is tracked down by freelance journalist Lucy doing an assignment about the book: “Lucy loved to lose herself in other people’s worlds. It was what she did the best, being a chameleon, taking on the color of new and strange surroundings until she could write about them as if they were her natural home” (12). Her freelance situation evokes the a picture of rapidly shifting focuses of the American mass media that make even such a heavily inhabited American city as Seattle sink into oblivion and peripheral existence. Seattle had always been Lucy’s “emerald city,” a kind of “Oz city,” but in the tense atmosphere of post-9/11, Seattle creates contradictory and rather melancholic feelings (9): “Back in the nineties, when East Coast editors had thought of the Pacific Northwest as the new big thing, Lucy was offered far more work than she could possibly take on, but since then the region had lost much of its “sexiness,” Seattle was beginning to look like déjà vu all over again. The old-new public library, the international toast of 2004, had long slipped into Yesterdayland…” (9). Lucy’s research on Augie Vanags’ biography—visiting him at home and interviewing him, working with library sources and googling--brings on a moment of doubt about Vanags’s real identity. Lucy feels even worse for having to invade Vanags’s privacy to do research for her article. She realizes that the more friendly you get with someone, the more you feel like a spook in America. “We’re all spooks now. Look at the way people Google their prospective dates. Everybody does it. Everybody is trying to spy on everybody else” (225).

Tad Zachary, Lucy’s best friend who passionately protests against the government’s corruption, “mostly reads foreign media to find out what was happening in his own country” and is devoted to his Google world, “the virtual counter-world” (113). After he loses his partner to Aids and finds out that he is HIV positive, he begins to “hit blogs and forums to keep company with like-minded internal exiles” (113). He looks for a “community of people hidden behind pseudonyms—those lonely late-nighters, as full of rage as he was, tapping out their latest intelligence on the administration’s mendacities and misdeeds…. The virtual suited him. Untroubled by libido or desire, he thought of himself now as post-sexual, almost disembodied, as if each day brought a measurable lessening of his specific gravity in the actual world” (113). Tad’s character forms the essence of Surveillance, which is about both the mundane and the more sinister focus of espionage.
As I have suggested above, spying, and being spied upon, is one of the novel’s main themes. Spying on the internet is a way of living in an era of technology and globalization—almost everyone who has access to the internet turns into a spy, and in that sense almost everyone is American. The hypothesis that “there were still people in the world with lives so obscure that they were not to be found by Google…” is raised as outdated (270). Although the idea of accessibility of spied information comes nearly without questioning, still the question of power and control—of what one can do with this spied information, use it or only consume—remains open. Along with the question of power and control there arises the problematics of language and translation—who makes the information available on the net and in what language. Perhaps the best symbol of Raban’s world of internet spying then is the open museum with its dead objects and languages. Giorgo Agamben, in his essay “In Praise of Profanation,” argues that the the “museification” of the world is already “an accomplished fact” precisely because of the impossibility of using the museified objects (Profanations 84). Making a distinction between the concepts of use and consumption, Agamben indicates that “consumption is always the past or the future…it cannot be said to exist in nature, but only in memory or anticipation. Therefore, it cannot be had but in the instant of its disappearance” (84). The world coincides with the Museum that is “not a given physical space or place but the separate dimension…an impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experiencing” (84).

What is special about the museum is that individual or collective memories are not represented there; only certain selections in chronological order. This is what Raban’s Surveillance tries to emphasize about American culture—if it is not perceived as a place of dead and preserved objects, it does somehow erase the memory of a newcomer, completely integrating him into its “networks.” For instance, the main character, Vanags, the subject of research, a Latvian immigrant who in his childhood witnessed the atrocities of Stalin and Hitler, wrote a book on the Holocaust, but nothing of that experience showed in his face. “He didn’t even have an accent. The crafty, vulnerable little European ragamuffin in Boy 381 had turned into a dapper little American retiree” (186). In his conversations with the journalist Lucy, Vanags never speaks of his childhood experiences, as if his identity had begun from the moment he landed on American soil at the age of
nine. “It was like whole memory began that day, and everything that happened before was kind of dead to him” (186). On the other hand, people like him become the most devoted supporters of the American state. Vanags is convinced that America’s strength is hidden in “networks” which erase individual memories, but at the same time he recognizes this is also the weakness of the United States: “You really want to injure the United States…you go for infrastructure. You have to put a crimp on one network here, another network there… and bingo! You’ve got civil unrest, martial law, no food, no power, no water. Plus, you’ve got the biggest world recession in history because you’ve just brought international trade to a screaming stop” (61). Vanags sees the war against terror as a war against “the foreign force,” and he represents the advocate for the “War against Terror”: “Unless we can win this war, we’re going to see the end of the modern nation state, which would be a catastrophe for mankind… It is the first moment in modern history when a bunch of private individuals have it in their power to take down a state. The state’s set up to defend itself from other states, in the old fashioned kind of warfare, but when it comes to fighting you, and me, the state’s clueless” (64).

In contrast, the journalist Lucy represents the hesitant middle. “She oscillated uncomfortably between being somewhat scared and somewhat skeptical, never quite the one or quite the other: an agnostic on this as on so much else, a little envious of the true believers for their easy certitude” (79). Lucy’s vision of her biographical profile of Vanags is a vision of American identity that is in the process of becoming. Her idea of the profile resembles the Flaubertean line “Folly consists in the desire to reach conclusions” (Surveillance 306). Her profile of Vanags therefore has no decisive resolution or conclusion:

It would consist of snapshots, nothing more, disjointed from one another like the capricious jumble of images that every camera-toting traveler brings back from a trip, some more in focus than others. They wouldn’t add up. They would not form a narrative… Rather, the reader would find herself in the same position as the writer—perplexed, fascinated, drawn to, sometimes repelled by August Vanags, and aware of her own shortcomings, as the writer
was: aware that facets and surfaces were just facets and surfaces; aware that she, like the writer, could not conclude. (307)

*Surveillance* reads as if this, or something very similar, was Raban’s initial vision for what he was going to write—notes, full of dialogues which he either couldn’t, or wouldn’t use. To be more precise, it reads like notes for a wider reportage, as fieldnotes. Writing about ethnographic representations, James Clifford noted that there is always something that cannot be measured, translated and ultimately concluded in them; “there is only more translation” (*Routes* 13).

As ethnographic representation is not scientifically neutral, nor is it isn’t politically neutral either. In this sense *Surveillance* reflects equally on the political and as on the cultural processes of the “field.” The distance of the writer from American culture, which in Raban’s case is his Englishness, his liberation from the tradition of the genre of travel writing, makes the writer “a character in a fiction,” the actor “at center stage,” to use Clifford’s expressions when he speaks of Bakhtin’s dialogical novel (*Writing Culture* 15). Some ethnographers, notes Clifford, really “stage dialogue or narrate interpersonal confrontations” (15). These fictions consisting of dialogues have the effect of transforming the “cultural text” (a ritual, a life story) into a speaking subject who evades, argues, probes back.

Raban’s *Waxwings* is an attempt to argue about the phenomenon called Americanness and look into its linguistic, cultural and social-political aspects. Again Raban’s field is the Pacific Northwest metropolis, Seattle. *Waxwings* tries to depict the cultural realities of a fast-growing American city in transition, as well as the illusions that distract its inhabitants from the most basic human impulse: to create a place one can call home. *Waxwings* is an attempt to make a multilayered reportage about American alchemy (networks which erase memory of newcomers, as they do in *Surveillance*) and the culture of exiles. In the beginning of the work, which is as richly encrusted with direct speech as *Surveillance*, there is a brief remark: “It is sexy to be an exile these days. Everybody wants to be the one” (12). Reflecting on the specificity of America, Raban observes: “As for here, just about everybody comes from somewhere else, so one can’t even be an outsider, exactly—and you can’t really be in exile from a country that you have no memory of…” (*Waxwings* 12). The phrase is spoken by
the main character, Tom Janeway, a person with mixed background, a Hungarian-born British citizen, professor of creative writing and the bestselling author who lives with his wife Beth and son Finn in Seattle. Seattle is once more the focus of Raban’s inquiry and the place where his characters live: “Tom was happy in Seattle, whose ambiguities suited him perfectly. It wasn’t all that big, but it wasn’t all that little, either. And unlike most American cities that Tom knew, there was a *here* here, where herring gulls were a traffic hazard and all streets led down to the water, where the older buildings pursued a guileless infatuation with the architecture of ancient Rome, and ungovernable greenery rose up defiantly from every crevice and scrap of waste ground, as if to strangle the city fathers’ vain Roman ambitions” (21). In Seattle, it is said, Tom “has at last learned to live in the present” (21).

Tom and a second main character, Jin Peng (renamed as Chick), a Chinese immigrant, who arrived in a container ship that docked in Seattle, are literally aliens—one legal, the other not. More importantly, both of them are in another country, not in the country of their origin. Raban draws a parallel between one type of American immigrant and another, disclosing and focusing on a great variety of details of everyday life in Seattle. Tom, an introverted and self-absorbed person, is shocked when his wife Beth asks for a divorce. Adjusting to life without his wife and without the comforting routines of caring for his son, Tom becomes the main suspect in a child abduction case. Although familiar with the ways of America, Tom is in a place that he never thought he would be: an outcast, with the feeling of unearned guilt, the one who must learn the customs and ways of this new condition in the same environment. Chick, as an illegal, must learn to be an American in a much more literal way, and so he begins to learn something more--like what it means to be a part of a community. In contrast to Tom, Chick quickly absorbs concrete reality. Being a persevering and friendly character he gradually develops his own contractor’s business, and meets Tom when he comes to re-roof Tom’s house. Chick’s story gives an interesting insight into Seattle’s America. When he first steps out on the soil of Seattle, he feels, “the air smelled empty—not like a city, more like soap, with its faint tang of woods and sea. That’s how money is, he thought: it smells of nothingness. It smells like America” (54).
Through Chick’s character Raban touches on the very sensitive theme of the invisibility of immigrants. Raban exploits the idea of the ignorance of American audience as an uneasy mirror image of the ignorance of the foreign, which bedevils American everyday life and culture in general:

Americans were striding past, looking straight through him with no suggestion in their eyes that they saw a man in the space were he was standing. He felt mysteriously gifted. The thought crossed his mind that if he were to look into a mirror, there might be no answering reflections in the glass. His invisibility excited him. He knew there must be power in this ability to remain unseen in broad daylight on a crowded street. Putting his new discovery to the test, he selected an old woman who was walking alone with a stick. He stared her in the eye, grinning fiercely at her, ready to run if need be; but her gaze travelled clean through the middle of his face… He hugged his secret to himself, moving boldly now, a sighted person in a city of the blind. (Waxwings 66)

There is another kind of contrasting blindness that pierces Tom: “Tom was just utterly thoughtless in his bookish self-absorption, believing himself to be observant because he could observe things that happened in novels. In reality, he was so blind that someone ought to make him carry a white stick” (88). Nevertheless, Tom’s abilities as an observer are disclosed on another level where he appears as deeply insightful. For instance, when Tom hears radio commentary he goes on thinking how “aliens were figures as necessary as cowboys” in American culture (134). His rationale on immigrants discloses Raban’s rather conclusive approach to some American realities: “…the great polyglot sprawl of America… people constantly needed to be reminded of their Americanness. The day began with small voices reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. One nation indivisible? The children had to say it every morning because it was such an entirely unlikely proposition of faith in a mystery that confounded the observable fact of the case. So America required strangers as proof of its own always-slippery existence” (134).

In America it means translating the world into English. This way the world becomes a safe and recognizable place with nothing to disrupt the
monoglot vision. Because the multilingual world is the past in America, the novel’s bitterest ironies in this respect surround Tom’s claim to live, successfully, in this indivisible nation in the present. An ironic account about the interfering hand of the past appears in theme of the mother-tongue. Some of the sharpest exchanges are between Tom and his old Hungarian mother back in Britain: loneliness, deracination and, above all, again, exile. There are Tom’s language memories, memories of English being Tom’s not-quite-first language, but as his parents encouraged him to think, “an exotic possession—a chest of treasures he could store up in his bedroom at the back of the house” (116). Until, finally, language divides the family: his parents had their own language; he had his own. “Each time Tom talked with his mother over the phone, it seemed that her accent had grown a little thicker, her grasp of English more unsteady, and she nowadays appeared to have entirely forsaken Romford, Essex, for—where? Budapest? Or Eger, where she’d grown up? He no longer knew where she was, only that she ceased to live at her official mailing address” (110).

As Raban pointed out in one of his interviews, in writing *Waxwings*, he was distracted by his language of writing: “I am an English writer living in America, but very much an English writer. I see *Waxwings* as an English novel set in America. While I was writing it, I put myself on a solid diet of PG Wodehouse, Evelyn Waugh and EM Forster - a diet about as English as you could get” (Campbell). What he hoped to do was to take a part of Englishness—the English social drama—and transplant it to the most improbable soil. “English social comedies are all about worlds thoroughly established, families that go back generations and so on. It’s very difficult to imagine an English social comedy written about a society as improvised and temporary as that of the Pacific Northwest coast.” Raban compares *Waxwings* to an idyllic novel set in an English country house in 1939: “They don’t know what we know about the era they’re living through. The Nasdaq will crash. The election of George W Bush will follow. Then the events of September 11 and the Bush administration’s response to them. I have the sense of living in a world horribly changed for the worse. It’s a historical novel, in that sense” (Campbell, “Northern Exposure”).

The similarity of Raban’s travel and non-travel-based works in the sense of autobiography and introspection is obvious. Raban’s Englishness is his constraint and freedom. In one of his earlier essay collections, *For Love and
Money, he referred to the danger, for the writer, of living in a world made up of literary tradition as it is the case with his native England: “By the time they reach the third-novel stage in their career, they drift into writing a book about a character... who is writing a novel, because that is the only kind of character they really know” (qtd. in Campbell, “Northern Exposure”).

**v. Insufficiencies of the travel genre**

Raban’s documentary work, *My Holy War: Dispatches from the Home Front* (2006), differs from his other texts thematically and stylistically. I repeatedly stressed in chapter two that ethnography, while attempting the critique of exactness in representation, exploits widely the mode of translation. Referring to texts about other cultures in her study *Comparative Literature*, Bassnett speaks of translation as construction of cultures. She points to the necessity of a “different reading” of travel accounts, their ever changing character, and the historical move from the registration of information towards a more independent individual activity of construction of culture (*Comparative Literature* 93). This is apparent in Raban’s *My Holy War*, a selection of seventeen intertextual essays, written in the manner of irregular personal diary that, at the same time, makes for an observant and engaging guide to the politico-cultural terrain of America after the events of September 11. In those neatly connected essays Raban not only reflects on the post-9/11 America that, “once famous for the openness of its government, has under the Bush administration become the most secretive state in the history of modern peacetime democracy” (71), he also brings in, as in his previous books, a variety of foreignizing elements to enrich the image of post-9/11 America. Borrowing those elements from three different cultural spaces—American, British and Middle Eastern--and combining them, Raban involves himself in the comparative analysis of cultures. To actualize this project he sets himself the task of grasping the moment of a rapidly changing balance of forces in the world by focusing on the place of an individual observer in it. Elaborating on the privacy of writing and on his alienation from the language spoken by the U.S. administration, Raban briefly reflects on the ability of the private person to grasp public events “in importantly different ways from the professional pundit…” (13). The focus on difference makes him define his position as a
cultural translator who chooses to distance himself: “I jumped at the chance to write something—anything... I’m not a political journalist, let alone an Arabist: I’m an idiot, or ἱδιότης, in its old Greek meaning of “private person…” says Raban (13).

Focusing on difference allows Raban to draw a clear distinction between the place of an individual in the West and the near East. The strikingly different perception of the self, community and nation in Arab culture is demonstrated by Raban through the use of historical, literary, and ethnographic sources, as well as and personal travel experiences:

The post-Enlightenment, post-Romantic self, with its autonomous subjective world, is a Western construct, and quite different from the self as it is conceived in Islam. Muslims put an overwhelming stress on the idea of the individual as a social being. The self exists as the sum of its interaction with others. Broadly speaking, who you are is: who you know, who depends on you, and to whom you owe allegiance—a visible web of relationships that can be mapped and enumerated… What they register is not the vicarious outrage of the anti-war protest in the West but a sense of intense personal injury and affront, a violation of the self. Next time, look closely at the faces on the screen: if their expressions appear to be those of people seen in the act of being raped, or stabbed, that is perhaps closer than we can imagine to how they actually feel. (My Holy War 60)

The names of Edward Said, Naguib Mahfouz, Lawrence Rosen, Sayyid Qutb and his famous Milestones, the bible of jihad, repeatedly appear in Raban’s pages as references supporting his own lines of thinking. Raban notes that jihad is not an ancient passion, but a modern one, which is seeking to become global in scale. The central text about jihad for Raban, was written by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb after a stay in America in 1948-50. Qutb’s critique of Western decadence would be familiar to anyone who has ever nurtured “homegrown strains of alienation” and rebellion: “Like many homesick people, living outside language in an abrasive foreign culture, Qutb aggrandized his loneliness into heroic solitude. In Milestones there’s a passage that is unmistakably a portrait of Qutb in America: ‘The Believer from his height looks down at the people drowning in
dirt and mud... If even a drop of the filthy water enters the clear water, the clarity diminishes” (My Holy War 29). A powerful fear of kurf (disbelief), notes Raban further, helps “the believer to live in Western exile in the necessary state of chronic persecution, from which his theology was born, and on which its survival depends” (29). “Scouring” jihad-related websites, Raban observes that Milestones exhibits an intense disgust at the fallen morals of the modern Western city: “The moral indictment of the West, central to the Islamist case, has impeccable Western credentials” (37). Referring to the Orientalist project by Edward Said and to his idea of how Occidentals feminized and infantilized Arabs, investing them with “feminine” traits like intuition and an incapacity for reasoning, Raban counter-posit the picture of the infantilization of the West: “The ordinary citizen is infantilized. Government knows best and its well-brought-up children don’t question the parental decisions that are made on their behalf. This compact works (Churchill made it work in Britain during the Second World War) so long as the children don’t have reason to believe that their parents are liars, or motivated by mere cupidity…” (73).

Raban draws numerous contrasting parallels between America and England where he happened to find himself at the time of the 9/11 events, which as he notes, evoked a strange reaction in Britain with “no communal sense of shock, or grief, or great occasion” (4). He reaches to his childhood, to the Church of England where his father served as a pastor, and to his own atheism as his ultimate weapon in the Oedipal war: “When I was growing up in England, churches were still by far the tallest buildings in the landscape, built as much to intimidate as to inspire... full of emblems of Christianity’s violent past... Ministering to the alienated and the displaced, my father wore his beliefs thin to the point of transparency. The idea that alienation and displacement might themselves constitute the basis of a religious awakening would have been repellent to him” (19-33). Overwhelmed by memories of his own adolescent atheism, Raban perhaps felt he had some understanding of why people suffering from cultural alienation and moral uncertainty might turn to religious radicalism as one way to resist the upheavals of modernity. As for himself he noted that his own atheism also “was really a dissident religious creed, full of furious conviction and an inchoate, adolescent hunger for the battlefield” (33).
Most of Raban’s references to England, America, and the Arab world are based on actual research and finding an adequate wording for cultural translation. He never actually encounters the “infantilized citizenry” of which he speaks, and he reads Bush’s and Al Qaeda’s “religiosity” only through his Oedipal rejection of religion. He chooses the tactics of a messenger, “a messenger [who] given methodologies for uncovering the masked, the latent, the unconscious, may even obtain his message through stealth. He clarifies, renders the foreign familiar, and gives meaning to the meaningless” (Crapanzano 52). Like the Benjaminian translator who aims at the solution to the problem of foreignness, Raban communicates the foreignness trying to make a message convincing (a point missed by Benjamin, Crapanzano notes, as I have put it chapter two).

The place where Raban is located—the city of Seattle—influences his views: “My corner of the U.S.” Seattle’s metropolitan space once more serves him as his field, and his source culture. Transforming Seattle into a foreignizing element for “the rest of America” he manages to reflect on the United States as “the least monolithic country on earth,” and he does not deny that “you’re bound to get a skewed picture of the nation at large from inside the perspective of just one of its myriad quarrelsome constituencies” (55). To strengthen the translational effect Raban involves himself in a long line of contracting shuttles: “From where I live, there appears to be no very significant gulf between American and European opinion…I sometimes felt as if I were on an offshore island, looking across a mysteriously widening strait to a mainland coast that was fast turning mauve in the distance… Pacific voices—louder and more numerous here than on the East Coast—argued that the answer to violence was not escalation of violence… When Seattle’s sleep is disturbed by geopolitical bad dreams, it is more likely to be by the spectre of Pyongyang [to which it is the nearest big city on the American mainland] than Baghdad” (44-55). Raban notes how the American war on terror gradually distorted his view of the domestic scene: “Our world is being continuously rearranged around us in deceptively small increments. Though we like to pretend that the emerging new order is normal, that daily life proceeds much as it always did, with a few small novel inconveniences, we keep bumping uncomfortably into the furniture” (16). Raban notes that even the “most surly Bush-haters” find their doubts checked by the fact of 9/11, and that most Americans have grown adept at fashioning their own local
versions of catastrophe. He writes that “this strange and disorienting redisposition of things is not the inevitable consequence of the September 11 attacks, but has been engineered by a political administration that could, and should, have responded to the attacks quite differently” (165). Nicholas Lezard in his review “To Fight the Unbeatable Foe,” suggests that Raban captures “another strand of American belief, one that, in alliance with, and rejection of, certain other kinds of belief, could come to destroy us all. He [Raban] recalls Don Quixote’s song from *Man of La Mancha*: ‘To dream the impossible dream,/To fight the unbeatable foe,’ and so on. As Raban glosses it: ‘Only an entrenched belief in one’s own exceptionalism and a wonder-working Providence could justify such otherwise self-evidently futile activities.’ It is rather chilling to have it spelled out for one like that” (Lezard).

In *My Holy War*, a book written in light of the war in Iraq, in a new era of religious ferocity, and in the context of modern-day jihad, Raban employs a backward-looking technique. He works on themes, he as a devoted outsider of American life he finds absent from the U.S. government and political discussions on the Middle East issue. Inserting detailed descriptions of the Arab world and touching upon the complex loyalties of religion and ethnicity, he aims at filling the gap in the discussion on the Middle East in the U.S. He reaches for the target audience. In *My Holy War* he not only mixes the genres of diary, reportage, and literary essay, but also utilizes the possibility of mixing cultural translations whereby several cultures meet and clash in his text. He steps out of line this time more clearly that in his other books: one idea would obviously be a magazine piece, another a play, another--a part of novel and so on. This time he divides himself between them as well as between the continents. “Travel writing seems to me a too-big umbrella, full of holes to let the rain in,” he says in his interview with *Granta Online* (Gordon, “Interview”). “Travel writing” seems an insufficient term to describe what sometimes really happens in the text, especially if the text aims to house or is about several cultures. I suggest the term “translation of culture”—a term more spacious and more indicative for finding a way of mediation between cultures.
In an epigraph to his book *Old Glory*, Jonathan Raban quotes from memory Jean-Francois Millet’s contemplation on landscape painting: “one man may paint a picture from a careful drawing made on the spot, and another may paint the same scene from memory, from a brief but strong impression; and the last may succeed better in giving the character, the physiognomy of the place, though all the details may be inexact” (9). On the one hand, the epigraph describes what Jonathan Raban’s travelogues are about and, on the other, taken more broadly, it indicates that some travel resists being immediately perceived.

I have chosen Raban’s work to illustrate of the fact that boundary crossing is not only an American phenomenon. Raban’s work allows me to cross boundaries in my own text whenever I talk about the translation of culture—metaphorically or directly. By making the distinction between fiction and non-fiction Raban creates a hybrid in-between genre. His intellectual and intertextual wandering posits a parallel between geographic and linguistic travel that was noted in the ethnographic context by George Marcus, Vincent Crapanzano, James Clifford, and Talal Asad--the ethnographers who are important as pioneers of the linguistic turn in anthropology. Fusing travel narrative, autobiography, and ethnographic style, Raban negotiates between cultural meanings occurring not only in geographic space, but also in the space of the text. Because of his Englishness and at the same time his life outside England, he often emphasizes in his books his bicultural background. In a sense Raban writes about something familiar, already discovered, and his travel narratives therefore do not map geographic space, but culture. Raban crosses and negotiates boundaries of American subcultures rather than defines them. Through his perception of culture, as I have tried to demonstrate, many other voices, other authors and travel writers, are given expression in his texts. As Clifford noted, in conventional genres and traditional ethnographies any kind of polyphony was restrained, but “in ethnographic approach dialogism and polyphony are recognized as modes of textual production, and monophonic authority therefore is questioned and revealed to be characteristic of a science that has claimed to represent culture” (*Writing Culture* 14-15).
Raban’s works are self-reflective, they illustrate the author’s acknowledgement of the erasure of the border between fiction and non-fiction and the foregrounding of the ways that texts are socially and culturally constructed. Raban’s travel writing and especially his later documentary and autobiographical works are about mediating between the already discovered and the experimentation with something new. In Raban’s work it shows through the intersection of many fields of study—literature, history, geology, archaeology, and mass media—through writing and close reading, travelling and observing.

Gianni Vattimo’s observations on the ethical decisions of the author seem to be very appropriate in relation to Raban’s travel writing. The writer, as Vattimo indicated and as I have mentioned in the entries of the chapter, is always already limited to a “cultural situation into which he/she is thrown” (Beyond Interpretation 8). It might have been and still is the case that he or she experiences the world through categories and concepts, but they are not universal—they are determined by the situation and inherited through the community, tradition and language: “the subject is the heir to a finite-historical language that makes possible and conditions the access of the subject to itself and to the world” (Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation 8).

In terms of translation, Vattimo’s indication of “finite-historical language” places the subject and his/her understanding of the world onto a level of ethical decisions and claims, where he or she does not refuse their “heritage” but, by means of translation, reformulates it. Such a position would demand cultural translations to be done in a manner that the other can understand and, therefore, dispute them. For disputes to be possible in an era of contemporary globalization, a degree of pluralism is necessary: “Respect of the other is above all recognition of the finitude that characterizes us both… An ethics of finitude is that which seeks to stay faithful to the discovery of the finite setting of its own origin without forgetting the pluralistic implications of this discovery” (Vattimo, Etica della provenienza 77-80). Vattimo’s writing provides two new terms grounding the above assumption: “weak thought” and “enfeebled truth.” Instead of a rejection

6 The metaphor of “weak thought” serves to describe the philosophy of postmodernity that is concerned with some sort of fictionalized experience of reality. The infinite translation incorporating ethics, history and tradition is what allows us to speak of the “weakening,” or another term—“enfeebled” truth. The wider discussion on these ideas can be found in all chapters
of inherited truths and subjectivity, Vattimo offers a kind of liberating ethics that allows a new, weaker formulation of truth. “Weak thought” still means a link. In terms of translation, “weak thought” would not be a distortion of the source but would presuppose a creative selectivity allowing a looser translation. At the same time, it would presuppose openness to novelty, to otherness and to the otherness of novelty. Following this line of thinking, translation does not depend on knowledge of rules and norms—on laws guiding one’s mind—but on the way one experiences those values. It depends on our being informed by those values that enable the best translation. The originality of “weak thought” resides in an act of translation. In this way, therefore, with the recognition of the “weakness” of one’s truth, comes the claim to the validity of other truths. Raban’s travel writing and novels reverberate with similar ethical and cultural concerns, the search between living and dead truths, the negotiation between the author’s Englishness and his Americanness.

If, to follow Clifford’s idea, translation of culture is displacement, then, to translate is to travel through the reading of the other, to travel in ways that allow the traveller to recognize the unique qualities of the self as well. America as a “New World” and a “Dreamland” that has grown on the promise of new opportunities continues to haunt the imagination of writers and artists aiming to understand and translate the perplexing and multiple meanings of its cultural space and themselves in relation to that space. To understand it is not all; misunderstanding, too, is part of the experience of translation and what is more, it is rich in centripetal as well as centrifugal forces. As Alison Russel posited in her study of postmodern travel writing, Crossing Boundaries, “the earth is a text that we have forgotten to read” (21).

In the next chapter the focus will be on the variety of translations of America beyond its boundaries and frontiers.
CHAPTER FOUR

Pico Iyer: Centrifugal Translation—America Abroad

*Travelling is a fool’s paradise.*

*Our first journeys discover to us the indifference of places.*

---Emerson

i. Rereading of cultural translation

The previous chapter has dealt with the problematics of intralingual translation and travel within the U.S. by an English-speaking author, Jonathan Raban. In his travel writing Raban demonstrated how the promise of America was largely constructed by translations and mistranslations that brought immigrants to settle in undiscovered lands or to move to the borderlands of America. In this chapter I will look at how the U.S. culture outgrows its boundaries, moves outside to the world, creating new transformations and forms of adaptation. In one of his earlier travelogues Pico Iyer clearly sets the task of the traveler who aims to disclose the centrifugal forces of cultural translation: “I was interested to find out how America’s pop-cultural imperialism spread through the world’s most ancient civilizations. I wanted to see what kind of resistance had been put up against the Coca-Colonizing forces and what kind of counter-strategies were planned. And I hoped to discover which Americas got through to the other side of the world, and which got lost in translation” (*Video Night* 11).

Some post-colonial aspects of translation seem to be especially enlightening in understanding the phenomenon of the centrifugal force of translation with reference to dominant and hegemonic cultures such as that of the United States of America. In the section about post-colonial perspectives of translation in chapter two, for instance, I have suggested that employing certain modes of representing the other might reinforce different hegemonic variations between languages and cultures. According to that perspective translation can be used in various discourses—ethnography, philosophy, historiography, travel
writing—to renew, to perpetuate but also to resist and break through various
hegemonies. Rethinking translation in this direction is an important issue in
contemporary globalization since the questions of global domination, global
empire, shifting hierarchies in national and global spaces, power tensions between
centre and periphery, and the unequal distribution of power are on the main
agenda. Since translation is also an ideological issue, as I have underlined in
chapter one, the post-colonial way of looking at the problematic could be helpful
in understanding the centrifugal forces of translation.

One of the most important ideas for the post-colonial context is that
translation involves a taking and bringing of cultural elements from one context to
another. It could mean that the words of the colonized, for instance, can be cited
or translated or reread/rewritten by “colonizers” in ways that reframe the
colonized culture in the interests of colonial domination. At the same time it could
mean that post-colonial subjects can use the same processes to decolonize their
individual and collective minds and bodies. In other words, translation can be
used equally to colonize and to decolonize, to oppress and fight oppression.

If the idea of transmission refers to something inessential, then the naming
of the problem does not occur on the level of information. It is the transforming
potential of translation that refers to the naming of the problem. To explain what
the naming in the context of translation is, I referred in chapter one to Andrew
Benjamin’s work Translation and the Nature of Philosophy. Elaborating on
Walter Benjamin’s idea of translation, Andrew Benjamin looks to the Platonic
theory of naming and defines the task of the translator as releasing “the
unnameable essence of language” which is a precondition for the possibility of
translation (103). According to Andrew Benjamin, the unnameable essence of
language names the belonging together of differences: “…naming - the act -
enacts and is hence made possible by a concept of agreement and variance that
takes place beyond essentialism and therefore which involves an ontology not of
stasis but of becoming. It is within these terms that the belonging together of the
fragments of language can be understood” (105).

The differences, as defined above by Andrew Benjamin, are characterized
by specificity, and, as he points out, to the pragmatic conditions--the ontological-
temporal conditions--out of which meanings and interpretations emerge. Andrew
Benjamin’s idea is that by locating the potential for afterlife within the text,
Walter Benjamin locates that potential in ontologico-temporal conditions as well. Being a part of ontologico-temporal conditions, languages and translations incorporate sites of conflict, sites of afterlife, which negate an end or any definite interpretation. The ideas of naming and an afterlife are important for the context of post-colonial translation because they turn attention to transculturation processes. Transculturation, as Stuart Hall puts it in his essay “When was ‘The Post-Colonial?’ Thinking at the limits,” marks the transition to the post-colonial, but, as he notes, “it is not only marking it in a ‘then’ and ‘now’ way. It is obliging us to reread the very binary form in which the colonial encounter has for so long itself been represented. It obliges us to reread the binaries as forms of transculturation, of cultural translation, destined to trouble the here/there cultural binaries forever” (247). According to Hall, the necessary condition of transculturation is reciprocity, a situation where each party recognizes the other as an architect of cognitive and intellectual traditions (247).

Another aspect of the post-colonial perspective of translation is that it is helpful in looking at how a hegemonic culture spreads around the world and what results from its spread. The post-colonial approach to translation allows us to see the continuous redistribution of power through both mobility and locality in a contemporary era. Zygmunt Bauman in *Globalization: The Human Consequences* suggests that being “local” in a globalized world is a sign of social “deprivation and degradation”: the discomforts of localized existence are compounded by the fact that with public spaces removed beyond the reaches of localized life, localities are losing their meaning-generating and naming-negotiating capacity and are increasingly dependent on interpreting actions which they do not control (2).

The relationship between the local and the global in the context of post-colonialism is one of the main focuses of travel writer Pico Iyer. Iyer’s interesting biography shows that he is neither a member of the “global elite,” to use Bauman’s term, nor is he among those who can be called “locals.” His Indian parents, both academics, moved from the country of Iyer’s birth, England, to California when he was a boy, and sent him back to England to boarding school. So from an early age Pico Iyer regularly crossed between the old world and the new. In an interview with Rolf Potts he said: “I think I was lucky enough to be a traveler from birth… And once the movement was in my blood, I could never get
it out!” (Interview” 1). Pico Iyer’s travel writing emphasizes his repulsion for the processes of current globalization, which he finds alienating. On the other hand, he finds it the most fitting to his own condition, the condition that he names “being a global soul” to which he devotes a collection of essays gathered in the book, *The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home* (2000). Focusing on issues of the global, Pico Iyer remains deliberately oblivious to the local and the historical in this travel writing, and to the lived space of everyday. Perhaps the best terms to describe Iyer is to call him at once diasporic, migrant and hybrid subject caught in the process of new world order and increasingly global experience described as “transculturation” (Stephanides, “Transculturating for Worldliness”).

One more aspect that makes Pico Iyer’s travel writing interesting from the perspective of the translation of culture is that, along with the issues relevant to naming and mimesis in his work, he posits the problematic of multilayered, transcultural identity as connected to the idea of exile, or perhaps more particularly, the traveler’s self-exile. Perhaps the best way to look into it is through Edward Said’s notion of exile as it is discussed in *The World, the Text, And the Critic*. The prevailing culture is colonizing, suggests Said throughout his study, and imposes on the individual its canons and historic-political views. Culture dominates “from above,” its canons and standards are invisible to the degree that they seem “natural,” “objective” and “real.” In order to approach culture with “creative affiliation” one has to distance oneself from it (3). The formulation of literary practice as a process of displacement and creative affiliation is illustrated by Said with reference to non-Occidental exile and homelessness. Writing on Auerbach’s *Mimesis* Said suggested that sometimes analytical work about culture, from which the writer has distanced himself or herself, does not necessarily mean the “reaffirmation” of that culture. Such work may be built upon “a critically important alienation from [culture],” or it may be “a work whose conditions and circumstances of existence are not immediately derived from the culture it describes…but built rather on an agonizing distance from it” (8). The maxim at work here seems to be that one needs to be situated on the boundary that marks the division between home and away in order to produce a powerful text. The significance of culture as “possessive possession,” Said writes, is its power to “authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and
validate” (9). That is, culture works to make distinctions. Further, in the same paragraph Said explains that the best manner of recognizing the organizing principles or elements of a culture is to embrace displacement. Exile then can become willed homelessness for a travel writer, as it is in the case of Pico Iyer who calls himself an exile by birth. Incorporating two dominant cultures—British and American—that is, dwelling in the English language, he departs from America to find the signs of American popular culture in the most distant and ancient places and cultures. The point of collision and collusion between two different and distant cultures is named in his travel writing an “anomaly” because the differences sometimes are incompatible, and in the process of collisions and collusions, sometimes strange, incompatible combinations result. The idea extends in his texts to embrace the question of varied cultural translations as well as linguistic choices, adventures and transformations. Since Pico Iyer’s travel writing speaks more about the collision and collusion of cultures rather than of languages or texts, in certain cases I will apply the metaphor of “cultural translation” in reference to his texts.

ii. The translatability of America

Pico Iyer’s travelogues show that travel writing today is beginning to take on a multicultural ethos. Iyer serves as a good example of what happens to travel writing in an age of what Homi Bhabha calls “transnational dissemination,” at a time when the idea of a national culture seems to be outdated. His travel writing responds to these issues, first, by recognizing the conflictedness of cultural origins and focusing not so much on encounters between the traveller and the target culture as on the process of translation and transculturation—of mutual exchange and modification—that takes place when different cultural forms collide and intersect. Iyer himself, a British-born Indian, and resident of the United States, is an embodiment of transculturalism, and besides his intention to search for American signs outside America, his work also is an interesting example of what happens when travel writing adjusts to a postimperial world. As Patrick Holland and Graham Huggan put it in Tourists with Typewriters: Critical Reflections on Contemporary Travel Writing, such cases of “adjustment” are symptomatic of the “postimperial” era that “has yet to deliver itself from the recrudescence of its
beliefs:” the discourse of “post” implies, according to these authors, an ambivalent relationship with what precedes it, and a sense of temporal flux that argues against decisive break” (23). On the other hand, the authors infer that travel writers such as Pico Iyer are inevitably caught in this hiatus because of their multilayered identity that at the same time might put them in a rather strategic position to document the new identity that is forming in this context, i.e., the identity of the hybrid subject who, like himself, exists between several cultures at once (Holland and Huggan 23). Because Iyer’s identity bridges Indian, English, American and Japanese culture (the last by marriage), Iyer also seems to be well-positioned to interpret how different cultures are adapting to the forces and anxieties of globalization and, more particularly, how they translate and are being translated.

As I have said earlier, some aspects of post-colonial translation might be very helpful for looking at Pico Iyer’s travel writing and evaluating how he positions himself in relation to such phenomena of globalization as American cultural expansion and, in a new context, the problematics of translation and language. On the one hand, while looking for signs of American culture around the globe, Pico Iyer re-translates America, but in quite an idiosyncratic way. On the other hand, he demonstrates how various cultures translate American culture for their local needs, cannibalizing it and by the same token weakening the hegemony of the Center.

The travelogue that initiated these concerns is Video Night in Kathmandu: and Other Reports from the Not-so-far East written in 1988. This book points to the particular problem of adaptation and adoption of American pop-culture by various countries in Asia. More specifically, Iyer looks at strategies of domestication and foreignization of American pop-culture by Asian countries and at the very translatability of American culture on the level of byt, everyday-life and language. At this point, it is useful to underline the question of translatability as it is perceived by Walter Benjamin. In “The Task of the Translator” he postulated that translatability has a dual meaning: either it answers the questions “Will an adequate translation ever be found among the totality of its readers?” or, more pertinently, “Does its nature lend itself to translation and, therefore, in view of the significance of the mode, call for it?” (16). Benjamin suggests that the second question can be decided “apodictically”: “It means rather that a specific
significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability” (“The Task” 16). Benjamin, in other words, posits that the purpose of translation is to express “the central reciprocal relationship” between languages and cultures. While Walter Benjamin poses the problem on the theological level, using theological metaphors and imagery to describe essentially secular processes, translation works in the same way on the level of byt: it enters the target culture by transforming it, while at the same time the source culture is being transformed and re-translated in multiple ways. In the introductory part of Video Night, Pico Iyer speaks of an agency of cultural translator who is able to register such cultural transformations and retranslations on the level of personal encounters and intellectual inquiry:

The American empire in the East: that was my grand theme as I set forth. But as soon as I left the realm of abstract labels and generalized forces, and came down to individuals the easy contrasts began to grow confused. If cultures are only individuals writ large, as Salman Rushdie and Gabriel Garcia Marquez have suggested, individuals are small cultures in themselves. Everyone is familiar with the slogan of Kipling’s “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” But few recall that the lines that conclude the refrain, just few syllables later, exclaim, “But there is neither East nor West, border, nor breed, nor birth, When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!” (21)

Using the terms “First World” and “Third World” Pico Iyer also brings a political character into his text which helps him trace the process of re-translation that occur between these Worlds. What he particularly notes is that the First World does not invariably “corrupt” the Third, but there is a process of retranslation, and the Third World, in fact, begins to “hustle” the First: girls who live off their bodies, merchants who use friendship to lure tourists to their stores, touts who live off their wits—the asymmetry between these Worlds grows and governs every encounter and meeting between the Worlds (Video Night 15). What has to be distinguished in this encounter, as Pico Iyer puts it, is that the First World travels in the spirit of “pleasure, adventure and romance,” in other words,
by choice, while the Third World is there “by circumstance, and is mired in the more urgent business of trying to survive” (15). He writes, “we, often courted by the government, enjoy a kind of unofficial diplomatic immunity, which gives us all the perks of authority and none of the perils of responsibility, while they must stake their hopes on every potential transaction” (15). This difference between the Worlds in light of the cultural intervention of the West in the East is the dominant thread in Video Night: “if pop culture was, in effect, just a shorthand for all that was young and modern and rich and free, it was also a virtual synonym for America” (7). Demonstrating the centrifugal force of American culture that results in its spreading to the East and putting himself in the picture, Iyer with his Video Night not only challenges the source culture and its foreignizing variations, he also shows that on the level of individual, even with the command of English as a “global” language, the world and its cultures are as demanding and constraining as they are for any “deprived and degraded” local, to use Bauman’s terms (Globalization 2).

In many ways, from the post-colonial perspective of translation, Pico Iyer’s texts, as I have said, are re-translation. Re-translations, according to Niranjana, express, first, a post-colonial desire “to re-write history” (172). Re-writing is based on an act of reading, and reading, because it is interventionist, can be both critical and dangerous, as it is noted further in Niranjana’s study (172). Taking a cue from Derrida’s essay “Otobiographies,” it could be supposed that post-colonial readings “will not be readings of a hermeneutic or exegetic sort, but rather political interventions in the political rewriting of the text and its destination” (32). Reading, then, is a model for the translator who chooses to read certain “texts” over others.

In Pico Iyer’s case, “to read” Asian cultures against the grain, to search and find in them the elements of American pop-culture, is also to read from a post-colonial perspective, and the translator’s alertness to the cunning of colonial discourse can help uncover the resistances of those cultures. Reading and translating go along with investigating and deconstructing. In the translator’s foreword to Mahasweta Devi’s “Draupapi,” Spivak stresses that “deconstructive practice” shows precisely this: one needs “provisional and intractable starting points in any investigation effort” (180).
Pico Iyer begins his investigating process in *Video Night* with the idea of the translatability of America, the fact that American culture finds itself “uncensored in even the world’s most closed societies, intact in even its most distant corners” (5). The transporters/messengers of American culture are not only the compact and easily manageable devices of high-technology that he mentions briefly in the introductory sections, but more so the industry of tourism. There is a slight distinction in *Video Night* between the crowds of tourists, i.e., all the other tourists, and Pico Iyer himself—the individual tourist. While he labels the crowd as “terrorists of cultural expansionism,” as “soldiers of new invasion,” and “lay colonialists with credit cards,” he posits himself as a lone traveller who is led to travel in order to give the self “the space to think and the chance to meet strangers” (8-28).

As the postmodern tourist Pico Iyer attempts to give a written account of his experiences. He produces a written record--half-memoir, half-fiction--of the exterritorial and the globetrotter. As John Hatcher notes in his essay “Lonely Planet, Crowded World,” *Video Night* is “the first postmodern Asian travel book” (131). Pico Iyer then is a “post-tourist,” according to the term coined in *Tourism in History* by Maxine Feifer to describe the conscious contemporary traveller “who knows that he is a tourist” (271).

John Urry elaborates further in *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies*, speaking of gazes that are socially constructed and related to other social practices. Urry is most interested in the playfulness of Fiefer’s post-tourist—his/her delight in the “multitude of choice,” “his freedom from the “constraints of ‘high culture’,” and his/her awareness that “tourism is a game, or rather a whole series of games with multiple texts and no single, authentic tourist experience (100). Since post-tourism is a spatial practice socially and culturally inflected, it is not free of the politico-ideological dimensions inherent in a post-colonial approach.

### iii. Norms and “anomalies” of travel

Pico Iyer’s travel accounts perhaps are less important as forms of critical engagement with postmodern realities, as they are as indicators of the failure/impossibility of such engagement, translation, or more precisely as
remainders of translation. Michael Cronin, in *Globalization and Translation*, distinguishes several strategies that the travel writer may adopt when faced with problems of interlingual communication in a foreign country. The most common are periphrasis as a form of indirect translation, or paraphrase of the contents, and *translation* as a direct translation of the foreign into the language of the narrative (159). The usage of those strategies is closely related to the naturalizing and exoticising manner of writing, and the tension between those two approaches often discloses what cannot be assimilated or translated—the remainder of translation/the failure of translation. In *Video Night*, the failure of translation begins from the encounters with the Orient, whose impenetrability makes Iyer follow domesticating or naturalizing strategies in his travel writing—the kind of traditional strategy of a “colonial” writer.

On the other hand, as a postmodern travel writer Pico Iyer employs self-irony in describing his position as a tourist. He thus reveals how he participates in recreating the symbolic domination of one part of the world by another. He perceives himself as being the one who unavoidably spreads corruption in “the developing world” like every tourist. By the same token, like every tourist, he exhibits a kind of imperial arrogance. He expects “the discovered” place to remain “unspoiled,” as fixed as a “museum piece” for the visitor’s inspection: “No man, they say, is an island; in the age of international travel, not even an island can remain an island for long... our laments for lost paradises may really have much more to do with our state of mind than with the state of the place whose decline we mourn...” (*Video Night* 14). Pico Iyer’s *Video Night* is about the idea of change, the change caused by the American cultural “invasion” of the Third World. America is constantly translated and retranslated, domesticated and redomesticated—“nothing is ever what it used to be.” Iyer spaces out his trips through the countries of the Far East in order to give himself a chance to change according to the changing world. Iyer departs from American cultural space driven by the tension of inquiry to see how America was regarded and reconstituted in Asia, to measure America, as he says, “by the shadow it casts” (12). He undertakes the task of confronting other cultures, using the mode of translation to convey how distant, opposite and battling cultures translate each other and how the consequences affect a “decidedly unmythic traveller, tourist or...
expatriate” like himself (12). To confront the challenges raised by the task of the “cultural translator,” Pico Iyer chooses “the fiercest and most complex” spaces of American invasion – Asia – “the site of the world’s most vexed and various colonial struggles,” a continent “unmatched in its heterogeneity,…home of history’s oldest and subtlest cultures” (7-8). Pico Iyer is seeking to fulfil the task through personal inquiry, as a “casual traveller” who is at once a “journalist,” an “Indian relative,” a plain tourist “free from media or academy orders,” writing a travel diary:

I went to Asia not only to see Asia, but also to see America, from a different vantage point and with new eyes. I left one kind of home to find another: to discover what resided in me and where I resided most fully, and so to better appreciate—in both senses of the world—the home I had left. The point was made the best by one great traveller who saw the world without ever leaving home, and, indeed created a home that was a world within—Thoreau: “Our journeying is a great-circle sailing.” (9)

Thoreau is not the only author Iyer quotes on the themes of homelessness. Home for him seems to be a “target culture” that is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. In his trips through Asia, the target culture for Iyer appears to be permanently out of reach. His essays on Asian countries are tinged with a sense of an odd juxtaposition of the elements of the First and the Third World in the Far East, the plexus of American and Asian cultures and their disconnectedness. He names this juxtaposition “anomaly,” which he borrows from Paul Fussell’s Abroad and which becomes a hallmark of his travelogue. Iyer wrote:

“Travel itself,” observes Paul Fussell in Abroad, “even the most commonplace, is an implicit quest for anomaly,” and the most remarkable anomalies in the global village today are surely those created by willy-nilly collisions and collusions between East and West. (10)

It seems worth looking at other definitions in Fussell’s Abroad since they mark Pico Iyer’s intertextual travel writing. Travel writing for Fussell is “a sub-
species of memoir in which the autobiographical narrative arises from the speaker’s encounter with distant or unfamiliar data” (203). Fussell’s definition makes more sense, though, when the memoir is seen as a discontinuous narrative revolving around a plural subject. Subjectivity in the memoir is fragmented, or at the very least incomplete; in travel memoirs, this sense of fragmentation—of psychic dislocation—is reinforced by physical distance and the experience of estrangement/defamiliarization. Such understanding of travel writing disrupts conventional oppositions between the self and others, the domestic and the foreign, between the individual self and the position of the home country with respect to the outside world. In that sense, Iyer’s *Video Night* is a fragmented, intertextual memoir, which is also a feature of a postmodern narrative. Almost every theme is guided by quotes from various authors, mainly Western (a fact that betrays his familiarity with the Western system of thought). As a cultural translator he seems to be selective and at times spontaneous, not burdening himself with the questions of translation equivalence and precision. He seems to enjoy what he finds on the way, lets himself be led by the circumstance: “Serendipity was my tour guide, assisted by caprice. Instead of seeking out information, I let it find me” (24). This trait leads him to discover examples of “anomaly”:

Most of my intelligence, in fact, came from the kind of locals that a tourist is likely to meet—touts and tarts and black marketers, cabbies, store-keepers and hotel workers. Such characters are hardly typical of their countries; but they are, in many ways, representatives of the side of the country that the visitor sees. What results, then, is just a casual traveler’s casual observation, a series of first impressions and second thoughts loosely arranged around a few broad ideas. (25)

Writing about Nepal, for instance, he demonstrates, sometimes through the usage of absurd details, including the grammatical mistakes of the local restaurant owners made in describing dishes in their menus, the density of presence of the foreign in Nepalese everyday life:
Nepal had long been famous for adapting to Western tastes and fashions with unparalleled swiftness and skill… Nepal’s prodigious versatility was most apparent, however, in the smorgasbord of its menus, which could easily have put the United Nations cafeteria to shame. Every one of them, so it seemed, offered everything from borscht to quiche and sukiyaki to soyburgers. The Jamaly Restaurant served up “Mexican food,” Italian, American, Chop Suey, Moussaka, Curry and “Viena Schnitzel.” Shiva’s sky, in the Continental section of its menu, provided “Mexican Takos,” Vegetarian Chops Suey and Chow Mein… spaghetti, lasagne, mousake a ‘La’ Greece… Everything of every nationality was available here—except things Nepalese. (95)

Contemporary travel writing often plays on notions of authentic experiences, either showing how the traveller imposes subjectivity on the narrative or laying bare the power structures underlying claims to truthful accounts. There is this danger in travel accounts that aim, especially, at detailed “cultural translation.” In Pico Iyer’s travel writing, though, this danger dissolves in the peculiarities of his style. Whenever Iyer seems to register the cases of “anomaly,” the outcomes of the American cultural invasion and its symbolic domination in the East, the dramatically changing local cultures as well as his own nostalgia—all of it then overlaps in his text and coexists. In his section on Bali in Video Night, Iyer offers a self-reflective account of nostalgia over the lost paradise in Bali:

I reminded myself too that all paradises are the subjects of as many elegies as eulogies, and all accounts of travel, as Levi-Strauss observes, “create the illusion of something which no longer exists, but should exist.” For at least fifty years now, Bali had been the ultimate once-upon-a-time idyll, the traveler’s favourite requiem. (55)

Bali has long been considered a tropical paradise in the minds of Westerners. Iyer arrives in Bali and notices at once the mix of restaurants and tourist clubs with Western and non-Balinese names, menus and entertainment
offerings. What Iyer finds in Bali is that it is becoming a vacationland for everybody. He is caught between the feeling that the tourists are ruining the “paradise,” and that it is Bali that is “too easy” for the tourist as well. He begins to wonder whether or not it really ever was a paradise. In the narrative Iyer keeps returning to the problematic of expectations of the tourist, of the preconceived idea about the location, and how it differs from the reality. It is worth mentioning that the nostalgic trend in Video Night is obvious—the “imperialist” kind of nostalgia that Renato Rosaldo described as the reluctance to see the world as having irrevocably changed. If tourism and paradise come to co-exist, Pico Iyer’s travel writing demonstrates that the illusion of such coexistence is created by the source culture of tourism itself:

Say Bali, and two things come to mind: tourism and paradise. Both are inalienable features of the island, and also incompatible. For as fast as paradises seduce tourists, tourists reduce paradises ... Hardly has a last paradise been discovered than everyone converges on it so fast that it quickly becomes a paradise lost. (32)

Iyer’s ability to question the correlation between the source and the target cultures is what distinguishes his travel writing. His texts are not only intertextual and fragmented, they are also full of invented dialogues that take place in his mind as he travels. Lack of knowledge of local languages makes his interaction with the place and culture only partial. Although he offers very detailed descriptions of so-called anomalies as well as details of everyday life of the local people, his interaction with them and actual dialogues clearly seem to be invented as they are directly incorporated in the narrative. One of Iyer’s obvious limitations seems to be the positioning of himself as a casual traveller, living out his experiences with enjoyment and satisfaction:

And the beauty and the curse of Bali was that a piece of this paradise was available to everyone who entered. For $2 a night, I was given my own thatched hut in a tropical courtyard scented with flowers and fruit. Each sunny morning, as I sat on my veranda, a smiling young girl brought me bowls of mangoes and tea, and placed scarlet bougainvilleas on the gargoyle above my lintel. Two minutes
away was the palm-fringed beach of my fantasies; an hour’s drive and I was climbing active volcanoes set among verdant terraces of rice... And all around were dances, silken ceremonies and, in a place scarcely bigger than Delaware, as many as 30,000 temples. Thus, the paradox remained: Bali was heaven and hell was other people. (32)

As Susan Bassnett suggested in her essay “Constructing Cultures: the Politics of Traveller’s Tales,” contemporary travel accounts “expose the subtexts beneath the apparently innocent details of journeys” that offer a clearer picture of the ways in which travellers construct the cultures they experience (93). Although Pico Iyer departed from the U.S. with the critical disposition of finding and seeing into the signs of a “global empire,” he gradually begins to enjoy the variety of American cultural ramifications in Asia and weaves out of them worlds of his own discovery. As the narrative proceeds it becomes obvious that each part of his itinerary in *Video Night* distances him from the point of departure—that of the potential post-colonial critic—and leads towards a new condition of being in the world and identity as a citizen of the world, as he repeatedly calls himself.

Nevertheless, the tendency to stereotype puts Iyer’s openness to the world and the status of the citizen of the world into question. The tendency to stereotype is also felt in *Video Night* when the author attempts to elaborate on Asia’s resistance/non-resistance to American cultural imperialism. Although Iyer sees various degrees of this over the course of his travel, the way he articulates this does not reveal his actual engagement with the environment. It rather shows that he is guided by the norms he brought with him, and not by actual findings. Susan Bassnett also warned against cultural stereotypes, and how the way in which an individual reacts to what is seen elsewhere can reflect tendencies in the traveller’s home culture (“Constructing Cultures” 93).

For instance, Iyer draws conclusions about China and Burma, countries subject to communist regimes, as pursuing a “careful courtship” with the West. He draws such conclusions as a Westerner or, more specifically, as a tourist arriving from the U.S. whose political convictions are influenced by the ideology prevailing in the U.S. Local cities seem to him “impersonal” and drafted by “committees,” and local people look as alienated as “tourists in their own country” (131). Iyer’s personal observations and absence of dialogues with local
people in the narrative are there only to emphasize the effects of the regime’s policy. The details of these countries’ movement towards and adaptation to the West as described by Iyer remind of the tendency to stereotype:

Erected as a Trojan horse within the very heart of the old China was a New China, designed to encourage all the influences that the country had long worked hard to keep out: capitalism, individualism, fashion, freedom, the flash and grab of the West. The rationale was simple: China wanted progress and progress meant the West. In return for giving foreigners a precious glimpse of the past, the country now hoped to gain a lucrative taste of the future; by attracting the outer world, it planned to bolster the inner… And as the country began hawking its tradition to the outsiders it had long distrusted, it also set about importing Western goods, methods and funds—everything, so it hoped, but Western values. (124)

Just as China in Iyer’s text had opened its doors enough to take “what it wanted, and nothing more,” Burma had “calmly closed” to the world (124). Reflecting on Burma, Pico Iyer discovers yet another phenomenon of the post-colonial world, the absence of local people’s memories of an Empire. The word “anomaly” in Burma’s context is used perhaps more often than in other sections of the book, and anomaly in this case refers to the double nostalgia suggested by the past of Burma—the nostalgic continuation of an age of nostalgia:

Burma had most succeeded in locking in the fading legacy of the long-ago outside world… Almost alone among the countries of the Third World, it seemed not to seek more Western sophistication, convenience and flash, but less… Having freed itself from servitude to the Empire, it has chosen to commit itself to a self-created ideal… there were no glass buildings or fast-food joints; there were no girls on sale, and no drugs… and there was no danger, no meanness in the frayed and scruffy streets. Smuggled cans of Coke could, it was whispered, be produced for $3 at a few blue-chip black markets, but for the rest, one had to settle for rusty-capped bottles of “sparkling” Vimto that looked as though they had been fresh on the occasion of Churchill’s final visit. (218)
Gradually Iyer discloses something rather paradoxical—the doubt of whether there really is American domination. Although American culture seems to be easily transportable and culturally translatable, it leaves behind no signs of afterlife—nothing that endures and nothing of value:

Perhaps the ideas and ideals of America had proven too weighty to be shipped across the seas, or perhaps they were just too fragile. Whatever the nobility of the world’s youngest power and the great principles on which it had been founded were scarcely in evidence here, except in a democratic system that seemed to parody chicanery of the Nixon years. In the Philippines I found no sign of Lincoln or Thoreau, or Sojourner Truth; just Dick Clark, Ronald McDonald and Madonna. (183)

iv. The “canibalization” of America

The question of Asia’s non-resistance to American cultural domination becomes even more vexing when Iyer arrives in India, and is well received by his Indian relatives. The India that Iyer discovers has the “right mix” of adaptation and resistance—rather than refusing America (like China and Burma) or embracing it, India has developed a complex and ambiguous relationship with American culture based on a vision of cultural exchange. “India, I had always felt, was humanity itself, an inflammation of humanity, an intensification of humanity... Indian movies were India, and more so... Hindi cinema had penetrated every level of society, in the First World and Third... Every movie becomes a mulligatawny stew in which all genres are thrown together to make what is known as a masala (mixed spice) movie,” so Pico Iyer commences his analysis of Indian-American cultural amalgamation in the movie industry (265). Perhaps because of the size of India, its heterogeneity, diversity, political divisions and its cultural kaleidoscope, Pico Iyer chooses to explore one dimension of it— the movie industry, its colonizing and de-colonizing effects, the staggering resemblance of India and America at the level of pop-culture: “The Indian movie industry is the biggest, the most popular, the closest to the heartland
of any in the world… Bombay takes its cues from Hollywood; what goes down well in America goes up quickly on the screens of India. And what is today in India is tomorrow around the world” (270). The cultural exchange at work in India begins to take the form of domestication of American pop-culture; Rambo, for instance, is remade accordingly to Indian tradition to enhance the effect of the target—Indian—audience:

The process of turning an American movie into an Indian one was not difficult, Sippy explained, but it did require some changes. “The Americans like a straightforward story line,” he explained, “something uncomplicated. An Indian audience likes everything complicated, a twist and turn every three reels.” In addition, he continued, the Indian hero has to be domesticated, supplied with a father, a mother and clutch of family complications. “Take Rambo, for example, Rambo must be given a sister who was raped. He must be made more human, more emotional. His plight must be individualized—not just an obscure vendetta against the system. (271)

Pico Iyer depicts India as a country that is too heterogeneous, diverse, and divided to be easily assimilated and re-colonized, a country striving to cannibalize Western culture in the sense of a “symbolic act of taking back out of love, of absorbing the virtues of a body through a transfusion of blood” (Bassnett, Comparative Literature 155). To speak of cultural translation, it is seen in this sense as an empowering, nourishing act, the result of which would be the creation of something entirely new. From this point of view the receiving culture interprets and transforms the original one, and translation is no longer a one-way flow from the source to the target culture, but a two-way transcultural enterprise. Engaging in the conversation with one of the literary critics from Bombay, Iyer shows that transculturation, is a strong desire for any Indian intellectual who has travelled abroad: “You can say that above wine, women and song, the great dream of the Indian intellectual is to go abroad. He hungers for it. Even I feel more at home in New York or Paris than in Bombay or Delhi” (292). Nevertheless India, as Iyer writes, refuses to simply adopt American ways of life, and chooses instead, as I
have mentioned above, “to cannibalize” them, creating its own versions of America: “For where Thailand, the Philippines, Nepal and Bali all excelled, in their different ways, at re-creating every rage from the West, India simply naturalized them… India had not imported McDonald’s, as most countries had done, but had created instead its own fast-food emporia, Pizza King and Big Bite, which offered hamburgers without the beef… Prodigal, hydra-headed India cheerfully welcomed every new influence from the West, absorbing them all into a crazy-quilt mix that was Indian and nothing but Indian” (299, 381).

As Iyer recounts his routes, the term “globalization” begins to replace the term “empire,” or perhaps the former appears instead of the latter, because his cultural inquiry in Video Night ends with the notion of the Empire striking back. The essays about Hong Kong and Japan are especially good examples of how the cultural translator, who departed from America to look at American cultural empire from the outside, begins to doubt whether the idea of “empire” remains viable at all. “…the Empire was being eclipsed by the International style,” posits Pico Iyer:

The age of the Impersonal Computer was bringing with it, of course, an entirely new set of values. Quantities counted more than qualities now, function overruled form. Suburbs were beginning to swallow up cities. And as fast as the sun was setting on the Empire, it was being replaced by fluorescent lights. The Empire had always stressed character and distinctions; in the new technological village, however, convenience and communications were everything, and the world was being made generic… Like New York, above all, Hong Kong seemed to prize energy before imagination and movement more than thought. The place had a one-track mind—and it was decidedly the fast track. (244)

Iyer’s writing on Hong Kong takes a different style than his essays on other Far East Countries. There are no dialogical engagements with people, and even the improvisations of dialogues are absent. To highlight the sharp difference between Hong Kong and the other countries he visited, Iyer uses special terminology--commodification, classlessness, dehumanized pragmatism, circumnavigation of the world, hucksterism, flawless utopianism, overachiever,
arriviste, head-hunters, etc.—that continue to multiply as he moves to Japan. His arrival in Japan dissipates his thoughts about the oneness of global empire. From the post-colonial perspective, his arrival in Japan is a non-arrival. He begins a totally new and subjective account of finding himself in a country that is the world’s “great Significant Other,” as he names Japan (352). As Holland and Huggan suggest, the subjectivity of travel writing might be seen as a form of “willfull interference,” though it is not that “travel writers try to veil their personal interpretation.” On the contrary, they “impose” it on their writing (11). Iyer’s Japan then is a sum of observations that “miraculously conform,” to use Holland’s and Huggan’s expression, “to a cultural ‘essence’ each writer believes he has discovered” (11). As it is remarked on further by the same scholars, “there is something Socratic about inquires made by many travel writers: they seek after ‘truths’ they imagine they already have in their possession” (11). Elaborating on the impact Japanese ideas and products have on American culture and the West, Iyer demonstrates that Japan has most successfully “cannibalized” America and the West—it has taken what America and the West had to offer, and developed it further. Even such a traditional American game as baseball is adopted by the Japanese to perfection—as “American rite, living drama, a healthy slice of the All-American pie” (342). As Iyer spends more time in Japan, the country increasingly appears to him as the culture most difficult to translate. He finds that every foreign interpretation of Japan seems finally to revolve around the same features—a reflection of the place’s homogeneity, but also of its impenetrability; on the perfectionism, politeness and correctness of the Japanese, but also their way of keeping the world at a distance (360). Iyer is haunted by the question: how could a culture so promiscuously import everything from the West, yet still seem impenetrably Eastern?

The contradictions that haunted Japan’s uneasy importing of baseball were very similar to those that shadowed all the goods and techniques that it had brought over from the West. For even as the Japanese omnivorously cannibalized the world outside, they never appeared to defer to it, or to worry that Japanese integrity might be compromised by the feverish importation. Their willy-nilly consumption of foreign goods seemed less an act of homage than the
way of making their own land a composite of all that was best in the world. (373)

In terms of translation, the cannibalizing strategy of Japanese culture seems to Iyer to have reached perfection. America’s cultural intervention is not only confronted but also answered back with extreme robustness. In Iyer’s encounter with “the most significant Other” the issues of language, translation and the imaginary take on an especially acute tone. Iyer’s Japan supports Ali Behdad’s assumption expressed throughout his study *Belated Travellers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution*: the Oriental other is either feared or desired but is always a projection of writer’s fantasies and anxieties. For instance, in his only travel novel, *The Lady and the Monk* (1991), Iyer takes inspiration from Japan and offers a lengthy outsider’s analysis of the country’s traditions and culture. The narrative is dominated by the writer’s romantic imaginary about Japan, which he splits into two—solar Japan—“a nation poised to control the global economy… a collective rising sun of economic power (7),” and lunar Japan—romantic and mystical. Iyer makes his first home in Japan in the Buddhist monastery, but soon he finds out that the place belongs to solar Japan: its two resident monks wear Mickey Mouse T-shirts, scooting around on a tricycle, showing snapshots of themselves in famous world cities; both of them are mass media addicts. Immersion in such a world of monks practicing Zen under these circumstances becomes impossible. Nostalgia for “something lost” makes Iyer refer extensively to the past of Japan—back to the celebrated “Heian court culture” of nearly a thousand years ago (40). This vision provides scope, in turn, for Orientalist feminizing. The tendency strengthens when Iyer meets a Japanese woman (Sachiko)—married, mother of two children, housewife, and passionate fan of American pop-culture—who embodies not only the mystery of the Japanese woman, but also of Japan itself (89). For Iyer, Sachiko personifies both past and contemporary Japan. Gradually she realizes her subjection to the dream world of the media, her living in the captivity of her own situation, her being “captive to Japan in fact” (265). Commenting that classical novelists dwelt upon young women “mostly for the use they made of them, pygmalionizing them, treating them as flowers almost” (332), and fantasizing that Sachiko “was a kind of sleeping beauty awakened by romance” (122), he locates himself in the literary
tradition of the West. This leads us to assume that Iyer’s construction of Oriental culture seeks those familiar satisfactions of travel writing that the post-colonial perspective criticizes—nostalgia, fantasy, power. It also focuses on rather selective and conventional modes of experience. Holland and Huggan, in *Tourists With Typewriters*, remarked on the novel: “No matter how sensitive, self-reflective, and knowledgeable he is as traveller and cultural commentator, Iyer fails to challenge enduring Orientalist myths of strong manliness and soft femininity and the doctrine of male supremacy invented during the samurai-militarist periods” (85). Holland and Huggan recognize, however, that Iyer succeeded in “evacuating the Japanese male from the oriental zone,” i.e., there are no main male characters in the novel (85). The biggest contradiction in this narrative is that although he criticizes “the most significant Other’s” subjection to the world of American pop-culture, Iyer himself remains loyal to the canon of the dominant culture. By the same token, he reinforces in his work the cultural and aesthetic values of the dominant/target/American culture domesticating the source, no matter how “significant” it seems to him. The contradiction perhaps might be explained with words of Douglas Robinson who, taking his cue from Freud, notes that “what we most despise on ourselves we repress and then magically ‘rediscover’ in someone else (*Translation and Empire* 122).

Feminizing, fantasizing, and fearing the most Significant Other of Japan, Iyer also speaks of the risks the Western traveller finds when facing Japanese culture. For Iyer, in a global age those risks are lived, first and foremost, on the level of notions of home and language. The question of language in Iyer’s travel writing is neatly intertwined with the question of home and intimacy.

In Japan, the place that is most foreign to him, Pico Iyer discovers the feeling of home, and yet this feeling is endangered by the absence of language. Referring to Simone Weil in his later book, *The Global Soul* (2000), Iyer contemplates: “No human being should be deprived of his *metaxu*, that is to say, of those relative and mixed blessings (home, country, tradition, cultures, etc.) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not possible” (283). Most people are not entirely comfortable in another language, but Iyer goes further, and suggests that what unknown language discloses to a foreigner is that, for the most part, the foreigner has no access to subtexts, to the shadows and hidden stings that words can carry: “Speaking across
a language gap means speaking less to win than to communicate… And living a little bit away from words means living a little bit away from the surfaces they carry…” (291). Iyer discovers that “the global village,” by giving us a chance to move among the foreign, creates new forms of intimacy though the absence of translation:

Every couple has its private tongue—that could be said to be the distinguishing sign of being a couple; but, in my case, the setup is even stranger, since I share no public tongue with my partner. Because my Japanese has never been good enough to teach her English, nor her English good enough to teach me Japanese, we can communicate only in a kind of fluent pidgin, with English words thrown into Japanese constructions… Neither of us can read a word the other has written, and so we have to apprehend one another, to a small degree, in some way deeper than the known. (The Global Soul 291)

Iyer’s departure for Asia made him revise his initial convictions about American cultural domination and brought him to the conclusion that every culture, along with the tendency toward adaptation/adoption, bears in it the forces of strong resistance, self-protection and self-possession. From a translation perspective, it is possible to argue that globalization in Pico Iyer’s travel writing is depicted as a process involving both homogenization and diversification. Perhaps this is why Iyer avoids responding to the problem of “symbolic domination” (including linguistic domination), as it was raised by Pierre Bourdieu in his Outline of a Theory of Practice, and preserves his political neutrality.

v. “Global soul”: zero translation

The metamorphosis of Asia under American influence in Iyer’s travelogues is the creation of some entirely new culture. At the break of the millennium Iyer remarks: “Madonna and Rambo might have ruled the streets…; but every Asian culture I had visited, was in its way, too deep, too canny or too self-possessed to be turned by passing trade winds from the West… Masters of adaptation and design, they [Asians] had so faithfully reproduced the models they
took from America that they were, in effect, producing forms more American than the American... The Orient, then, was taking over the future, a realm that had long seemed and been exclusively Western dominion. More and more, indeed, the West was looking to the East not just for its spiritual but also for its material and technological needs” (381-85). East and West, tourist and local, American pop-culture and local religion—all become part of the whole. Pico Iyer’s post-colonial inquiry ends with the idea of globalism. Iyer does not view globalism as a form of domination by the First World though. Upon his return to the West, he notices the growing influences of the Third World in London and California. “If the nineteenth century was generally regarded as the European century and the twentieth as the American, the twenty-first, I thought, would surely be the Asian” (Video Night 386). One of his acquaintances from China visits him in New York, and takes special notice of urban poverty and crime, viewing it as a tourist commodity. Iyer’s arrival therefore is a formation of a new kind of subject and, in fact, new identity—not just culturally hybrid, but also perpetually in motion:

In relation to the combination of globalization and identity, the ‘new’ Pico Iyer wrote:

So the deepest truth, perhaps, is that the globalism I was describing has migrated inwards... The culture clashes that were once striking to me in the bars of Manila or the markets of Hong Kong are now to be found inside those international beings who don’t know where they come from, or to what culture they belong. (Video Night 401)

Iyer’s travelogues demonstrate not only another side of being in the world, i.e., the formation of a new identity, but also disclose the possible political consequences and dangers of that identity. This is especially evident in Iyer’s enjoyment in travel experiences and fascination with globalization’s open-endedness and the horizons it opens up. The pleasure in being a casual tourist however is never politically free. In The Metastases of Enjoyment, Slavoj Žižek suggests that emphasis should be laid on the “inherent political dimension” of enjoyment – on the way the enjoyment functions as a political factor: “One must not therefore go a step further and take into account that there is no way simply to step aside from ideology: the private indulgence in cynicism, the obsession with
private pleasures, and so on—all this is precisely how ideology operates in non-ideological everyday life, how this life is determined by ideology, how ideology is ‘present in it in the mode of absence’…” (64). Enjoyment therefore does not function as the free domain of innocent pleasures, especially in the intercultural domain. This is especially obvious in Iyer’s contrasting descriptions of “paradise” in *Video Night* and global “hell,” the signs of which he begins to register in his following book, *The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home* (2000): the Third World full of rubbish, unemployment, high mortality rates, endemic violence and women “relieving themselves along the main streets…” (*The Global Soul* 32). Holland and Huggan view this as “moralistic voyeurism,” one that is a well-established trope of both colonial and post-colonial travel writers who are “quick to register distaste for the “degenerate” practices of other cultures, but are less inclined to recognize their enjoyment of the tawdriness those cultures display” (*Tourists with Typewriters* 19). The post-colonial inquiry of Pico Iyer in *Video Night* and his formation of a new identity in *The Global Soul*, place him under scrutiny from the post-colonial perspective, raising the question of whether his obviously domesticating strategy can be used in a new global empire for the confirmation and fixation of identity and for the consolidation of its status as a neo-imperial international subject. Coming back to Žižek’s insights about the individual’s transformation into a subject, one can find a simple answer in the sphere of ideology or, as Žižek puts it, in the obedience to the voice/ustanovka, i.e., positioning oneself according to some data: “The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (60). Speaking of translations, Venuti calls the process of translation “ethnocentric violence,” meaning that the target culture always subdues the source.

Ideological-political factors seem to be one of the main explanations for why in much of Iyer’s subsequent travel writing, including *The Global Soul: Jet Lag, Shopping Malls, and the Search for Home* (2000), the search for a polemical voice of resistance between the target and the source fades away. In his later travelogues Iyer continues to explore the varieties of intercultural transfer, while increasingly projecting his own subjectivity outward and suggesting that his own hybrid cultural position might be suitable for many like him:
...in the modern world, which I take to be an International Empire, the sense of home is not just divided, but scattered across the planet... I began to wonder whether a new kind of being might not be coming to light—a citizen of this International Empire—made of fusions (and confusions) we had not seen before: a “Global Soul.”  

(The Global Soul 18)

At this point several questions demand an answer. These questions involve: how Iyer defines this new inhabitant of the International Empire; where one’s place is on a ladder of hierarchy; whether one has his or her own “voice;” by what means do those beings communicate with each other? In his discussion on Auerbach’s Mimesis, Said, for instance, has pointed out that displacement and alienation from a cultural tradition, an agonizing distance from the culture, could bring a writer to a willed act of cultural construction. The maxim at work in Said’s theory seems to be that one needs to be situated on the boundary which marks the division between home and away in order to produce a truly resistant as well as affirmative and powerful text for an author who identifies himself as alienated, as distanced, as well as deeply tied to both Western and non-Western culture. Pico Iyer being both Western and non-Western by birth, and feeling homeless and at a distance from every culture, does make an effort to create something entirely new in his The Global Soul – a picture of a new identity.

...the Caribbean islanders would call me “Nowherian;”... A person like me can’t really call himself an exile (who traditionally looked back to a home now lost), or an expatriate (who’s generally posted abroad for a living); I’m not really a nomad (whose patterns are guided by the seasons and tradition); and I’ve never been subject to the refugee’s violent disruptions: The Global Soul is best characterized by the fact of falling between all categories… (23).

In The Global Soul Pico Iyer presents himself as an eclectic translator whose aim is to find several micro-worlds within the culture and on the basis of these findings to develop his ideas about the nature of hybridity and homelessness that are characteristic of a new kind of citizen of the world. He backs up his definition of this new kind of citizen of the world with the ideas of philosopher
Ralph Waldo Emerson. Intertextualizing Emerson in *The Global Soul*, Iyer says: “there is a ‘universal soul’ behind us… and shining through us… that is ‘not mine, or thine, or his, but we are its’” (17). Not only does this global soul have a different sense of the self (as he or she is both hybrid and homeless); it also has a different sense of otherness, as Iyer observes:

Our shrinking world gave more and more of us a chance to see, in palpable, unanswerable ways, how much we had in common, and how much we could live, in the grand Emersonian way, beyond petty allegiances and labels, outside the reach of nation-states… the Global Soul would be facing not just new answers to the old questions but a whole new set of questions…His sense of obligation would be different, if he felt himself part of no fixed community, and his sense of home, if it existed at all, would lie in the ties and talismans he carried around with him. Insofar as he felt a kinship with anyone, it would, most likely, be with other members of the Deracination-state. (19)

With *The Global Soul* Iyer leaves behind the stories about Asian cultures and their resistance to American cultural imperialism and moves to a new kind of culture that is becoming home for subjects in perpetual transit. Thus, while each chapter in *Video Night* detailed the variety of national responses to America, each chapter in *The Global Soul* examines the sites where these subjects-in-transit dwell – airports, the global marketplace, the multicultural city, shopping malls and the Olympic games. These are small worlds within the larger culture, subtexts of larger texts, but in Pico Iyer’s view they are vital for the deeper understanding of the contemporary processes of globalization. Pico Iyer creates the identity of the Global Soul not from predictions and speculations of what this new citizen of the world might be, but from descriptions of the places where such global souls feel themselves at home. Iyer’s most original contribution to postmodern travel writing may lie in what he makes of his own sense of dislocation. He maps the space where global souls move, and by doing so he also looks for the homes where they dwell. In that sense his strategy seems to be domesticating. In fact, he doesn’t look for difference, but for sameness. The domesticating strategy of
creating a product that can be easily recognized by a domestic audience has political consequences as well.

Although to ground his idea of the global soul Pico Iyer chooses the philosophical thought of Emerson, an American philosopher, he does not elaborate on whether these global souls have exclusively American origins. Iyer’s global souls seem to be dwellers of metropolitan spaces, but those spaces are not marked in his travel writing as exclusively American either. There is an indication in *The Global Soul*, though, that America as a metropolitan center is weakening because of the growth of many more international metropolitan centers around the world, but as far as linguistic domination is concerned, the tension between English and non-English, as it seems reading Pico Iyer’s texts, grows. Speaking of the global souls that reside in places of anomalies, Pico Iyer in fact refers to a monolingual situation, to “zero translation,” as Michael Cronin puts it in *Translations and Globalization* (97). Zero translation presupposes the end of translation or a censored translation wherein the mode of translation as such is no longer alive, and translators as active agents withdraw “into the worldlessness” (97). For instance, *The Global Soul* offers the generic picture of an international airport, a space where global souls “reside.” The modern airport, in particular, LAX, the Los Angeles International Airport, where Pico Iyer often gets caught in jet lag, stands as a prime example of multiculturalism and Westernized uniformity: “…the airport is based on the assumption that everyone is from somewhere else, and so in need of something he can recognize to make him feel at home; it becomes therefore, an anthology of generic spaces… McDonald’s, The Body Shop, Holiday Inn, Muzak…” (43). It is the product of a “mixed marriage” between “border crossing” and a “shopping mall” where “global souls” spend more time than they spend at home (43). What Iyer misses though, is the fact that most signs and ads in the places target to the reader who speaks the international language—English. Those spaces are already restricted, giving access only to those with command of the English language. These generic places, as Cronin remarks, admit the best--those with an “exclusive membership,” i.e., those who speak “the international language of business, science and social advancement” (97).

If this is the case with most metropolitan airports, it also applies to global marketplaces and malls--another space of residence for global souls—that are
associated with such places as, for instance, Hong Kong. In this traditional and at the same time ultra-modern city--“a kind of Platonic Everyplace, a transit lounge, an empire of capital, a digital city of the future…” Iyer tries to control his confusion by quoting Kazuo Ishiguro: “‘I begin to feel increasingly at home in big cities,’ Kazuo Ishiguro once told me when I asked him if he felt a foreigner everywhere. ‘Perhaps because big cities have become the place where people of different backgrounds tend to congregate.’ I think I know what he meant, though he, of course, is 100 percent Japanese, just as I who’d seldom been in India, was 100 percent Indian” (106). But visiting Toronto, Iyer offers some idealized notions of local culture in the manner of an outsider eager to find a postmodern utopia. Toronto is named by Iyer as the “postmodern multicultural place” that embarked upon a “multicultural experiment with itself”:

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\text{Accepting newcomers from developing countries as readily, it claimed, as from Europe, and spending hundreds of millions of dollars to encourage them to sustain their different heritages, it was daring to dream of a new kind of cosmopolis—not a melting pot, but a mosaic… For a Global Soul like me—for anyone born to several cultures—the challenge in the modern world is to find a city that speaks to as many of our homes as possible. (124)}
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Again there is no indication of the possible symbolic expressions of the identity of the Global Soul through any language other than English. Perhaps, as Cronin suggests, this “zero,” or “censored translation” is inherent in the very structure of the global metropolis (98). Richard Sennet, in The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, elaborates on some of the consequences of contemporary city-building. Much energy is devoted to walling off the differences between people, on the grounds that differences are now seen to be “mutually threatening rather than mutually stimulating”; the result is often “bland, neutralizing spaces, spaces which remove the threat of social contact” (xii).

Iyer’s Global Soul is certainly a complex subject – hybrid, fractured, in-transit – but it also seems to be based on privilege. Looking from the post-colonial perspective, the central problem with Pico Iyer’s travel writing seems to be that
cosmopolitans like him define and try to erase cultural differences on their own particular terms. Both *Video Night* and *The Global Soul* are efforts to overcome the tensions between different accounts of subjectivity through an inclusive cosmopolitan identity. The difficulty is, though, as Timothy Brennan puts it, that cosmopolitan subjectivities can be both provocative and problematic: “Cosmopolitan travel writers cannot be only admired for their new stay just because they offer a departure from the colonial vision so embedded in the work of writers like Theroux,” Brennan remarks. He says further, the “colonial erotics” of cosmopolitan travel writers might not be as crude as those of their predecessors, but “the function of these narratives remains the same” (*At Home In the World* 185). As Debbie Lisle points out writing about Pico Iyer in the collection of essays *The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing*: “While Iyer’s travel writing might be seen as counternarrative, insofar as it puts itself against the various forms of Western cultural imperialism still dominant in the genre, it also bears significant traces of V.S. Naipaul’s nostalgic Englishness and superiority” (116). This leads to the assumption that these travel writers—cosmopolitans from mixed cultural backgrounds—are not the exceptions. On the contrary, looking from the post-colonial perspective again, they are becoming the general rule, and if this is so, then their “counternarratives” do not really chart new ground in travel writing. Holland and Huggan, for instance, suggest that texts like *Video Night*, which they describe as “an attractive and superior travel book”—prompt questions about the tension between “standpoint and post-structural accounts of identity” (62-3). Their critical engagement with Iyer’s travel writing reveals important points about his obligation to his economic and literary patrons. In fact, Holland and Huggan offer an interesting insight about Iyer’s status as a travel writer by explaining how “his travels – and their literary by-product, his travel writing – are complicit with the very processes of commodification they seek to document and explore” (63). Holland and Huggan point to Iyer’s “reluctance to come to terms with his own technologies of representation and to admit their investment in the ideology of consumerism he sets out to critique” (63). As they suggest, perhaps it is the ideology of Iyer’s patron and sponsor—*Time* magazine—that prevents him from “examining his own complicity in the asymmetrical circuits of both tourism and publishing” (165).
On the other hand, such writers as Pico Iyer—documenting the world at the break of the millennium—witness and elaborate on one unquestionable fact: the blurring or dissolution of national and cultural boundaries despite the new division of the world—something that demands new practices and responses. As Stephanos Stephanides has noted in his article, “Transculturation and Wordliness,” “artists and intellectuals have played key roles at the intersection of culture and state, and in the politics in the translation and mediation of cultural demands and desire” (2).

Travel denotes more or less voluntary practices of leaving familiar ground in search of difference, wisdom, power, adventure, and altered perspective. There is truth in the cliché “travel broadens the mind,” and often, getting away from the homeland lets uncontrollable, unexpected things happen. Iyer records a new kind of the oneness of the world in the current globalization which, on the other hand, creates an increasing sense of fragmentation within the individual. Through his texts runs the alarming assumption: if we’re not sure where we are from, can we know who we are or where we are going?

Stuart Hall offers an insightful critique of such standpoints as Iyer’s. Stuart deploys a Marxist argument that rejects the idea of a “universal essence” of man and points to the structural, historical and material conditions that affect men in particular circumstances (The Question of Cultural Identity 281). Hall argues further that the modern subject was de-centred – and indeed split in two – by Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. A subject can never be fully conscious to and in control of itself; he is always haunted by unconscious desires and repressed fantasies. It is for this reason that difference is understood as a projection of the self, which means that the travel writer’s efforts to secure his/her subjectivity might be governed by fantasy. As Ali Behdad, in his book Belated Travellers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution stated, this is the case while encountering the Oriental--the Oriental other is either feared or desired but is always a projection of the writer’s fantasies and anxieties. The third de-centering of the subject, according to Hall, may involve a more general point about the indeterminacy of language and meaning. Departing from the work of Saussure and Derrida, Hall suggests that the subject cannot be guaranteed in language because “there are always supplementary meanings over which we have no
control, which will arise and subvert our attempts to create fixed and stable worlds” (*The Question of Cultural Identity* 288).

In one of his later travel books, *Sun After Dark: Flights into the Foreign* (2004), written after the break of the millennium, Iyer begins to withdraw from the responses to source or target cultures in his travel writing into more self-reflexive texts. Although the intercultural still prevails in his travel writing, it is more and more shadowed by his autobiography: “The physical aspect of travel is, for me, the least interesting; what really draws me is the prospect of stepping out of the daylight of everything I know, into the shadows of what I don’t know, and may never know. Confronted by the foreign, we grow newly attentive to the details of the world, even as we make out sometimes, the larger outline that lies behind them” (8). By the same token it deepens the conundrum that however geographically remote one can be, s/he is never far and free from him/her self who is being tested and challenged in the encounters with other cultures:

The traveller, if he comes from a place of comfort, travels, in part, to be stood on his head; to lose track of tense, or at least to be back to essentials, free of the details of home...if he [the traveller] is to travel far enough away from the places he knows, the traveller is obliged to see everything in two ways, or two languages, at once. On the one hand, he’s a newcomer who’s walking down the street, unable to read the signs, with the map in his hand held upside down; on the other, he has traveled to look at himself (and his world) through the eyes of the local, for whom the real source of comedy and strangeness is that newcomer, walking the wrong way down the street. (*Sun After Dark* 97)

In *Sun After Dark* Iyer writes about his trips to some of the poorest countries of the world--Haiti, Ethiopia, Cambodia--in order to carry himself in an “expanded sense of possibility” that strangeness brings: “I know a trip has been really successful if I come back sounding strange even to myself; if, in some sense I never come back at all... I bring back receipts, postcards, the jottings I have made, but none of them really tells the story of what I’ve encountered; that remains somewhere between what I can’t say and what I can’t know” (8).
Spivak, in her essay “Translations as Culture,” calls this process of personal encounter with other cultures the “shuttling site of violence” whereby both sides—the one which challenges and the one being challenged experience violence (13). She suggests that the person “translating the incessant translation shuttle into that which is read, must have the most intimate knowledge of the rules of representation and permissible narratives which make the substance of a culture, and must also become responsible and accountable to the translating presupposed original” (13). The responsibility and accountability then is turned towards nurturing this intimate relationship between two cultures within the “translator” him/herself. Although there are no indications of extensive dialogues with people Iyer meets in these countries, there is another kind of dialogue always present in literary works, and this kind of dialogue reveals itself on the level of ideology reflected in or through the work.

Incorporating quotes from the well-recognized Western writers Albert Camus and Susan Sontag in *Sun After Dark*, Iyer fully identifies himself with the Western literary heritage. Quoting Susan Sontag, he more and more takes a trip as a pilgrim where path is guided by a specific space—the Western canon: “I will visit a place entirely other than myself, whether it is the future or the past need not be decided in advance” (qtd. in *Sun After Dark* 14). Referring to Camus, Iyer defines his own relationship with the other again as a Western traveler: “Explorations of the poorest lives became one of the great adventures of his [Camus] mind. And in the process… he threw into question what was central, what was the margins, and saw how the two circle around one another like fascinated strangers, each haunted by the Other” (7). His attempt is to use the Western literary tradition for being in the world, for transculturation of the self, on the one hand, and, on the other, to somehow define the prevailing “foreignness,” within as well as outside, in the world:

These days, when the whole world is accessible to us, we are still finding new ways to test ourselves against Everest or Antarctica. Travel remains a journey into whatever we can’t explain, or explain away… The Other is everywhere today. The foreignness is flooding into our rooms, a stranger is always at our door, with inquiry and
offer and we don’t know what to make of him. We are in the dark even when the room is brightly lit. (7, 11)

Although it seems from *Sun After Dark* that encounters with “the most foreign places” become a supplement to Iyer’s biography, the constant presence of “the foreign” in his texts allows thinking of him as immersed in “translating.” There is no Pico Iyer travel writing without the living foreign. And although he deliberately distances himself from the source and the target in his later travel writing and seemingly goes deeper into the self, the element of the foreign, constantly present, allows one to assume that his travel writing is about worldliness. It could be supposed that Iyer’s travel writing involves representations which, as Said puts in his essay “Criticism Between Culture and System,” sometimes are “unavoidable, sometimes merely convenient substitutes of the original, which for any number of reasons cannot be present to be itself or act itself” (200). The representative or substitute is thus qualitatively different from the original. As I pointed out in chapter one, Derrida saw difference as being added, on the one level, to objects when they are designated as representative, but on another level, on the strictly verbal level of designation, difference is already differed and therefore cannot be thought of as a quality or an idea or a concept having originals and copies.

Said, in his selection of essays *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, focusing on Derrida’s concept of dissemination, explains: “Dissemination does not mean. It does not require the notion of a return to a source of origin... Quite on the contrary, it entails a certain figurative castration, showing the text in its writing... Dissemination maintains the perpetual disruption of writing, maintains the fundamental undecidability of texts whose real power resides not in their polysemousness...but texts whose power is in the possibility of their infinite generality and multiplicity” (205). In this sense, Iyer’s texts could be called disseminating.

In his latest book, *The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama* (2008), and already in some essays of *Sun After Dark*, Iyer combines the intensifying emphasis on his literary identity with a new kind of journey—an intellectual journey to Buddhism, which he perceives as global religion. From foreign cultures his attention shifts to characters that he recognizes as instances of
global souls, only this time—as ones expressing religious belonging. Iyer begins to articulate his journeys as pilgrimages. Still, journeying remains his mode. Even spirituality, as he suggests throughout the book, involves a different way of moving in the world. Iyer’s wandering begins to take paths towards religion, and one of his favourite themes—worldliness—now circles around the portrait of a spiritual man. Quoting the Dalai Lama in his newest book, Iyer contemplates: “…we have enough religions. Enough religions but not enough really human beings…” (15). The portrait of the Dalai Lama—the postmodern Buddhist monk combining traits of the past with the openness of the spiritual road—is a new point of arrival in Pico Iyer’s travel writing. Iyer demonstrates how this temporal—past and present—dimension works in one person if he or she is truly a Global Soul: he introduces the Dalai Lama as a global figure, a world celebrity, and then goes on to contrast his different faces as philosopher, healer, simple talker, disciplined monk, even student, and as a forward-looking human being. Iyer’s Dalai Lama is as “translatable and mobile” as American culture, or purposefully “constructed” in such a manner as to resemble the so-called model of Global Souls:

The Dalai Lama impresses, or disarms me by doing away with many of the categories with which we imprison ourselves. The only truths that can possibly make sense to us, he suggests, apply to all human beings, as much as Pythagoras’s theorem or the laws of thermodynamics do; if they pertain only to a specific tradition or culture, they’re not human truths at all. And the only thing that an Easterner—or Westerner—can offer is a window on these truths that allows the rest of us to see them more clearly than we have done before. To someone like me, who’s grown up in many cultures but refused to believe that lacking a physical home means lacking an inner center, this is all as encouraging to hear as the idea that we don’t have to define ourselves by differences. (15)

Iyer’s portrait of the Dalai Lama is associated with what Said, writing about Auerbach’s Mimesis and non-Occidental homelessness called the “executive value of exile” (The World 8). Once the Dalai Lama moved from Tibet to Dharamsala with its large global community, once he was cut off from his
Tibetan culture as possessing possession, he became, what Iyer calls “a truly
global man”:

Dharamsala is a global community based on ideals and the
possibility of pledging oneself to something better; but—of course—
realities swim all around it, like sharks. In Tibet Dalai Lama was an
embodiment of an old culture that cut off from the world, spoke for
an ancient, even lost traditionalism; now, in exile, he is an avatar of
the new, as if, having travelled eight centuries in just five decades,
he is increasingly, with characteristic directness, leaning in, toward
tomorrow. (201)

The portrait of the Dalai Lama, as I have said, is Pico Iyer’s new arrival
point and also a space of escape from an initial idea of homelessness into
worldliness. Resisting the idea that homelessness relates to the absence of center,
Iyer takes the road of spirituality by tracing biographical turns of the Dalai Lama.
What Pico Iyer does not escape though is being a connoisseur of globalization, on
the one hand, and being “colonized” by American popular culture, on the other.
His portrait of the Dalai Lama is a portrait that bears the traits of a “celebrity” as
represented by an insightful travel writer: the Dalai Lama is translated into Global
Soul.

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Applying some aspects of post-colonial translation I have also tried to
provide a political bent to the analysis of Pico Iyer’s travel writing. His systematic
denial of origins, his appreciation of those who leave their homes and stay away
like Global Souls are constituent parts of his biography. He is a second-generation
Indian, born in England, to a family of academics, a graduate of British schools,
located in California and working as a columnist for Time magazine. It seems that
in Pico Iyer’s life and work the literary co-exists with commercial or celebrity
journalism. In his interviews Pico Iyer has repeatedly espoused the belief that his
travel writing offers a generic alternative to the canon:
I think really the definition of a travel writer is someone who would never think of himself as or call herself a travel writer, partly because he or she doesn’t want to live in boxes… A travel writer has to rethink what discovery means, and exoticism and movement. That’s why, having done a lot of descriptions of other countries, I went and spent two weeks in the Los Angeles airport as a way to claim it as a different kind of destination. Of course, you could do the same with a shopping mall or a hotel or a hospital. And all that I regard as travel writing. It’s important to push the material inwards, because that is the unclaimed, unchartered territory, more and more… The main practical thing I do is to map out a kind of outline in advance and an itinerary in advance, confident that both will get exploded as soon as I travel. Just having them, though, is a kind of reassurance. It’s like mapping out a way to get to an airport in advance, which gives you the freedom, in some ways, to get lost en route. (Davis, “Interview”)

A prevailingly domesticating strategy and the commitment to move inwards, toward the self, may highlight the presence of manipulative intentions. Iyer’s images are brought into acute visual focus one moment, and then without further explanation, they vanish the next. Iyer’s dialogues are in constant flight from prolonged involvement with the other. As he passes from one experience to the next, his style engenders a calculated distance from what it portrays, but a distance that implies awareness of the self-control that is about to attend the act of representation. The sense of plurality of experiences that prevails as one reads Iyer’s travel writing is attended by a sense of what is missing: the practicalities of travel, a more serious engagement with local culture.

Even his self-representation is inaccurate, full of impetuous questions and statements. In this case, mobility and deracination, homelessness within an alien terrain, and the diversity of each culture he visits is left notably unexplored. Responsibility for authenticating discovery or research is partly transferred to the reader. It is not that coherence is necessarily impossible to achieve, but this discovery and search are substitutions for his argument rather than arguments themselves. Pico Iyer’s self-image in this case becomes metonymic in relation to
other cultures. All this propels the focus of attention back to where he departed from--America.

The pretensions of the connoisseur of globalization perhaps should also include human suffering as the genuine constant of the post-colonial environment, and in Pico Iyer’s travel writing melancholy is felt but human suffering is almost absent. Suffering perhaps should be not only transcribed as evidence of one’s own aesthetic tools, as he has done in *Video Night*, but transmuted into adequate complicity.

Maybe this melancholy of the connoisseur of globalization is the most outstanding achievement of Pico Iyer’s travel writing: the post-imperial observer acknowledging his irreconcilable distance from what he sees but no longer possesses. Whether one reads this politically as a sign of empire or aesthetically as a pretentious move, Iyer as travelling voyeur retains his apartness from things. If he wasn’t a post-colonial subject himself this would not seem so strange.

In forming a certain kind of subject, translation brings into being overarching concepts of reality and representation. The “philosopheme” of translation, to use Niranjana’s term, therefore, grounds a multiplicity of discourses, which feed into, as well as emerge out of, the colonial context. And just as translation is overdetermined so is the translating subject--overdetermined in the sense that it is produced by multiple discourses on multiple sites, and that it gives rise to a multiplicity of practices. George Steiner posits that within the class of practices of multiple semantic exchanges, translation is the most graphic example wherein the inequality of languages and cultures becomes visible (*After Babel* 39).

Although Pico Iyer’s travel writing is rather domesticating in the sense that it involves hegemonic representations and strong othering of the Orient, his almost confessional search for the self, on the other hand, suggests that his travel writing perhaps cannot be analysed only from the perspective of a post-colonial translation. He himself proves the existence of post-colonials “in translation,” and since they already exist, “our search,” as Niranjana suggested, “should not be limited to looking for origins or essences but for a richer complexity, a complication of our notion of the ‘self,’ a more densely textured understanding of who ‘we’ are” (186). In this sense, Pico Iyer’s travel writing is an attempt to show one’s roots as always already fissured.
CHAPTER FIVE

Translation as Petrification and Virtual Travel in the Cyberpunk of William Gibson

Tomorrow is the first day of the rest of your life.
---Baudrillard

i. Cyberpunk as the withdrawal from translation

In chapters three and four I have tried to demonstrate how two authors--Jonathan Raban and Pico Iyer--elaborate on the problematics of language and translation in travel, attempting to de-center and de-layer America from within and from outside. The justification for their departure was, one way or another, the promise of alterity and, as their work shows, the traces of this otherness are linguistically marked. If Jonathan Raban’s travel accounts are inward looking, and America appears in his texts to be largely constructed and affected by the centripetal forces of translation, Pico Iyer’s texts, offering an outward look, speak of the opposite—of the centrifugal, disseminating and deconstructing forces of translation. Because of this capacity to grasp varying forces within the limits of a small genre, and because of such exemplary cases of construction of cultures in travel writing, small genres, as Susan Bassnett indicates in her study Comparative Literature, began to draw the ever wider attention of scholars (93). In the same work Bassnett pointed to not only the necessity of a “different reading” of travel accounts but also to their changing character, the historical move from “registration of information” towards a more independent “individual activity of constructing” (93.). She pointed to Foucault’s delineation, in The Order of Things, of two types of comparison: that of measurement, which establishes equality and inequality; and that of order, which establishes differences. Bassnett states that comparative literature has traditionally been concerned with the former, but has more recently focused on the latter (92). As it challenges the claims of faithful representation, it opens up space for translation as cultural—this trend was also
pursued by ethnography, post-colonial translation theory and smaller genres. It is in this context that one might begin to ask whether in an era of globalization the representation of a translator ought to be fundamentally reconfigured as well. In other words, the mediator may not only be the messenger for the new century but, as Michael Cronin suggested, “it is also up to the mediator to understand the full implications of the messages of the century…” (Translation and Globalization 64). It could be supposed that this is the message that both travel writers—Jonathan Raban and Pico Iyer—were trying to convey. However, with the information overload in an era of contemporary globalization the horizon of problematics that must be considered in relation to such implications is much wider. There are not only problems with the quality and quantity of translation, with the communicating and transmitting role of a translator, but there is also the phenomenon of the intervention of technology in the translation process. With reference to Bauman’s essay, “Identity in the Globalizing World,” Cronin notes that in our global age one of the main problems concerns the “ends” of translation. Bauman remarks on the great surges in productivity in the modern period, the phenomenal increase in the means at the disposal of many (though by no means all) human beings. Cronin points to the present situation in translation when “we may be producing (and translating) larger and larger quantities of information but we may not quite know what to do with it… New technologies have led to an exponential growth in our translation means, but it is not always clear in a global age what our translation ends are” (Translation and Globalization 65).

The genre that is especially indicative of such “alleged shifts towards a new epoch” is cyberfiction or, more particularly, its subgenre: cyberpunk—the term that was first used to describe the work of William Gibson (Featherstone and Burrows, “Cultures of Technological Embodiment” 7). Gibson offers a gloomy perspective of what might happen when the ends, which Cronin talks about, become more and more diffuse, scattered and uncertain, and when, as a result of this, people’s lives are filled with the great unknown that is quickly used by the technologically powerful to make their lives controllable by means such codified culture or, more precisely, translation of lives and culture into the code. Cyberpunk, in other words, points to the problem of control in translation—a problem that from the geopolitical perspective seems to be crucial in translation: it
is who says what and in which language. Locating himself in the urban spaces of America, Gibson tries to glimpse at the near future when America as “the center” disseminates and disintegrates, and a new geopolitical order is established in the world with several centers of unlimited corporative power that communicate with each other through a code language. E.L. McCallum, in the essay “Mapping the Real in Cyberfiction,” puts it more clearly, stating that cyberpunk is a new adventure narrative that maps the same old world with new codes: the world where national governments are being outmanoeuvred by transnational corporations (57-78). The method is known in translation theory as the “construction of a new reality,” as Susan Bassnett calls it in *Comparative Literature* (92-114). In those narratives, in other words, the authors “construct the cultures they experience”:

> From travelers’ accounts of their journeys, we can trace the presence of cultural stereotypes, and the way in which an individual reacts to what is seen elsewhere can reflect tendencies in the travelers’ home culture. (93)

The same applies to works on cyberculture as dystopian culture (Featherstone and Burrows, “Cultures of Technological Embodiment” 9) where the explorations of virtual and internet reality demonstrate how the code and artificial knowledge enter private lives-restricting them, limiting movement, creating new forms of localism and communication. In their study entitled *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment*, Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows describe cyberpunk as the term that con/fuses the techno-sphere of cybernetics, cybernauts, and, most of all, computer hacking, with the countercultural socio-sphere of punk, the embodiment of anarchic violence and fringe mentality (1-19). Besides that, cyberpunk seems to be a short-lived trend, as Lance Olsen puts it in the review of Gibson’s *Virtual Light* (1), it is rather a “simulacrous eighties echo” of the imaginary and the futuristic. Janet H. Murray, on the other hand, in her study of the cyberdrama *Hamlet on the Holodeck*, defined William Gibson’s cyberpunk as a metaphor of virtual travel: “Cyberpunk surfers are outlaw pirates on an endless voyage of exploration throughout the virtual world, raiding and plundering among the
invisible data hoards of the world and menaced by the stronger pirate barons who reach in and reprogram their minds... The popular entertainment form in Gibson’s gritty world is the “simstim,” a way of riding in someone else’s consciousness and thus experiencing the world through that person’s sensorium by seeing, hearing, and feeling whatever he or she does... The illusory world has become so powerfully enticing that it has subsumed physical reality itself” (22-3).

Virtual reality as simulation of space and objects in space is, as Jean Baudrillard outlined in Simulations, an “odd entity” (3). “[S]imulation,” as he says, “threatens the difference between the true and the false, the real and the imaginary” (3). A simulation, in contrast to representation (which need not resemble the objects it represents) re-creates some of the characteristics of the simulated object, even while it is a copy or fake. For this reason simulation, as I have said, seriously threatens the difference between the real and the non-real, making it the central issue of the whole enterprise of simulations: “Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay in bed and make everyone believe he is ill. Whoever simulates an illness produces in himself some of the symptoms” (Simulations 3). Simulations are fakes, but they are fakes made by appropriating qualities of the real, and the very reality of simulations lets one assume that virtual reality is gradually changing the boundaries of the real. Virtual travel then, when taken as a Bakhtinian chronotope, takes on the qualities of real travel by changing not only the means of travel but also the very thinking about what travel is. To the extent that virtual reality has the qualities of actual reality, it can become such reality and produce its own culture of simulated simulacras, which Baudrillard names hyperreal culture. Hyperreal culture relies on virtual spaces, and marks and era where due to technology our relation to language and text changes. This in turn changes the role and the place of translation as well, and indicates the collapse of the distance between the original and the translation. Derrida in Of Grammatology suggests that “scientific language [e.g., computer code] challenges intrinsically and with increasing profundity the ideal of phonetic writing, the logocentric relation of voice to mental experiences” (10). Baudrillard goes a step further, stating that hyperreality leaves “no room for any kind of transcendentalism” and completely transforms the understanding of the world (“Two Essays” 310). Baudrillard and Derrida focus on the death of the foundations of Western culture, as they are replaced by technology—progenitor of hyperreal culture. Virtual
reality as a cultural construct demands that along with phonocentric culture—the individual voice—the user subsumes his or her body within technology, abandons the right of the original and becomes the other, the product of totalizing translation, the code.

I felt that this introduction was necessary and I went to underline that William Gibson’s work is, an exemplary case of cyberculture narratives. His writing is centred around virtual space, cyberspace, or “the matrix” as it is alternatively called. This is the representational innovation for which his work has become famous. In his first novel, *Neuromancer* (1984), Gibson offers the following definition of cyberspace: “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts… A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights receding…” (67). This concept of virtual space evokes what Fredric Jameson has called “the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (*Postmodernism* 44). Gibson’s work embraces a much greater problematic than just the space in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects. It is a problematic that concerns the metamorphosis of space--its volatility and change. This metamorphosis, as Jameson puts it, “has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world” (*Postmodernism* 44). Pointing to the postmodern novelist’s encounter with such a problematic, Jameson invents the concept of cognitive mapping. In this respect, one may see cyberpunk fiction as an attempt at postmodern cartography, as a representational strategy for domesticating Baudrillardian hyperreality. Central to this attempt is, as Gibson’s reference to the city lights suggests, recognition of the change in how we experience contemporary space. In Gibson’s cyberpunk, as I have said above, what is involved is a prevailingy American urban space in the age of globalization.
Gibson’s work is preoccupied with American urban space and reveals the ideological force hidden in postmodern temporality. For if one accepts that cyberpunk functions as a form of Jameson’s “cognitive mapping,” it does so, as Tony Myers puts in the essay “The Postmodern Imaginary in William Gibson’s Neuromancer,” only insofar as it fixes the relationship between the individual and the totality of late capitalism in a permanent embrace: “In trying to concatenate the relationships between the individual and the totality, cyberspace subjects the latter to the imaginary dynamic of the former. The operations of this dynamic result in the subjectification of the totality… The consequence of this is that, lacking any point of opacity in the signifying chain, the subject also disappears. All that is left is the existing symbolic network, a kind of imaginary symbolic, petrified and no longer subject to change” (905). On the level of language the subject is replaced by the code, and on the level of translation the subject is ultimately controlled by the uncontrollable. If translation is the key to survival in multilingual world, the codification of the world or its translation as code is the key to the petrification and marginalization of multilingualism and to the control of language and culture.

In many ways, therefore, William Gibson’s cyberpunk stands at the center of the clash between the volatility and the petrification of language. The words and concepts Gibson invented—“cyberspace,” “jacking in,” “computer cowboys”—words that originated in American culture, are now widely used and translated into other languages (Murray, Hamlet on the Holodeck 21). The terms he invented presuppose movement and action in some dystopian future that he depicts in his earlier works such as Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986), Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988), and later ones—Virtual Light (1993), Idoru (1996), and Pattern Recognition (2003). In his later works, though, the future-present appears as a universe rooted in the world of realistic characters and events. The center of cyberspace shifts from America towards other places, such as Japan, Russia, England—countries, which in Gibson’s text acquire the qualities of American cultural deterritorialization and weightlessness—the near tomorrow in Gibson’s works becomes a metaphor for today. The sense of time in Gibson’s work resembles something that can be defined by Baudrillard’s assumption about American time:
Having known no primitive accumulation of time, it [America] lives in a perpetual present. Having seen no slow, centuries-long accumulation of a principle of truth, it lives in perpetual simulation, in a perpetual present of signs. It has no ancestral territory… no identity problem. In the future, power will belong to those peoples with no origins and no authenticity who know how to exploit that situation to the full. (*America* 76)

Speaking about time in science fiction in an interview with Olsen Gibson remarked: “It’s kind of a tragic artefact of science fiction that some people are naive enough to think that science fiction writers are predicting the future” (qtd. in Olsen “Review”).

**ii. Virtuality of translation and American dystopia**

In *Virtual Light* Gibson presents the map of a rather dreadful contemporary urban condition, a kind of completely codified post-cyberspace. In retrospect *Virtual Light* could be evaluated as a text of striking predictive power. It has been characterized as a “conventional dystopia set in San Francisco in 2005” (McCarron 272). *Virtual Light* explores a narrative space in which California is divided into two states, NoCal and SoCal, an African-American woman is president, there’s massive inflation and economic depression that results in the growth of the most impoverished layers of society—the lumpen-proletariat. There is international crime, enhanced measures of security in the state, the disappearance of the middle class and the critical polarization of society.

“Rich people, had to be, and foreign too. Though maybe rich was foreign enough.” (43)

“There is only two kind of people. People that can afford hotels…, they are one kind. We’re the other. Used to be, like, middle class, people in between. But not anymore. What happens when we touch? Crime, …sex. Maybe drugs.” (146)

“…when we were kids, man, money was money.” (120)
Represented this way, America evokes a radically dystopian image, or at least it might seem that way if, as Gibson says in the Olsen interview reviewing *Virtual Light*, “you are a very comfortable middle-class citizen… There’s stuff happening to people, lots of people, right now, all over the planet, that’s incredibly worse and so much more depressing than anything I’ve ever written about” (qtd. in Olsen “Review”). Thus not only has the seemingly ubiquitous Gibsonian concept of cyberspace (as urban environment and as a digitized parallel world) of his earlier trilogy transmuted in *Virtual Light* into tangible reality, but many of Gibson’s fictional perspectives on cultural, economic and social phenomena find their way into social and cultural analyses as viable characterizations of the contemporary world. One of these phenomena is the replacement of multilingual communication and translation by brain stimulating images in the world ruled by mega-corporations. To dramatize the “conflict between the individual and the brutal power of 21-st century capitalism,” as Kevin McCarron notes (272), Gibson utilizes a female character, Chevette Washington, who works as a bike-messenger for the offices of mega-corporations that produce codified information blocks:

The offices the girl rode between were electronically conterminous—in effect, a single desktop, the map of distance obliterated by the seamless and instantaneous nature of communication. Yet this very seamlessness, which had rendered physical mail an expensive novelty, might as easily be viewed as porosity, and as such created the need for the service the girl provided. Physically transporting bits of information about a grid that consisted of little else, she provided a degree of absolute security in the fluid universe of data. With your memo in the girl’s bag, you knew precisely where it was; otherwise, your memo was nowhere, perhaps everywhere, in that instant of transit. (101)

Moving physically through space and carrying the grids of data, Chevette’s body is completely commoditised and utilized to transmit information. It becomes the medium (like paper, magnetic disk or stone) without which the act of data transmission cannot be effective. The body is removed from the process of
translation and put in the position of transmitting already translated information. In other words, the alienation of the body from language is complete; the social function of language is replaced by codified machine translation, which is given supreme power. The agency of the human translator is erased. If in cyberspace the individual can still express his/her creativity and imagination through language, in post-cyberspace s/he is deprived even of cyberspace and is fully subjugated to a translation that takes place without his/her participation. This is why Chevette becomes a focus of attention for the agents of mega-corporations after she steals for fun from an unknown person’s jeans pocket a pair of virtual light glasses which produce images in the brain by stimulating optic nerves. An expensive piece of information coded in virtual light glasses makes her, without her realizing it, a criminal persecuted by mega-corporations. It is again the question of control by the dominant power structures. The glasses are extremely important because looking at things with them one can see the data-feed at the same time. The glasses “affect the nerves directly. It’s a virtual light display… Anything can be digitized. You put those glasses on a man who doesn’t have eyes, optic nerve’s okay, he can see the input. That’s why they built the first ones. For blind people” (Virtual Light 142). Virtual light glasses symbolize the vision towards the future, a product of the technological gaze, rapid translation of one form of information into another. In America Jean Baudrillard has called such movement an achievement of (un)culture that results from the extermination of the source culture as such:

Movement which moves through the space of its own volition changes into absorption by space itself—end of resistance, end of the scene of the journey as such… In this way, the centrifugal, eccentric point is reached where movement produces the vacuum that sucks you in. This moment of vertigo is also the moment of potential collapse. (11)

Nevertheless, two key metaphors in Virtual Light suggest that there are some angles through which the destiny of culture can be perceived optimistically. First, is the San Francisco bike-messenger service, where Chevette Washington is an employee. Second, is the Oakland Bay Bridge, abandoned by
the city after an earthquake, slowly taken over by the homeless, and becoming the research topic of a young Japanese scholar, Yamasaki, who attempts to understand and describe American culture by studying the lifestyle of bridge-dwellers. Gibson’s message hidden in Yamasaki’s quiet monologue, is about a new, post-cyberspace era coming:

We are come not only past the century’s closing,… the millennium’s turning, but to the end of something else. Era? Paradigm? Everywhere, the signs of closure.

Modernity was ending. (105)

The character of the Japanese student is not accidental. Throughout Virtual Light there is a tendency of movement from the centrality of America towards other spaces. There is an intentional marginalization of America which parallels the appearance of marginal, non-heroic characters and the division of the world into little police states full of surveillance: “There’d been countries big as anything: Canada, USSR, Brazil. Now there were lots of little ones where those had been… America had gone that route without admitting it” (85). Virtual Light’s focus shifts from the space of movement towards the means of movement, and the latter is embodied in a simple fact of Bakhtinian byt, of “everyday life”--the bicycle. Bikes are emblematic of environmentally conscious freedom and energy. They are the embodiment of techno-hip, an attitude developed almost by all characters of Virtual Light--an attitude of resistance that creates parallel sign and communication systems:

They had clothes and hair like nobody else, and bikes with neon and light-up wheels, handlebars curved up and over like scorpion-tails. Helmets with little radios built in. Either they were going somewhere fast or they were just goofing, hanging, drinking coffee.

“Call that an amphalang. Septum spike. Labret stud. That’s a chunk ring. This one’s called a milkchurn. These are bomb weights. Surgical steel, niobium, white gold, fourteen carat…
Sugawara frame, Sugawara rings ‘n’ railers, Zuni hydraulics.

*Clean.*” (153-4)

Skirting society’s periphery, bikers seek their self-definition in a world of complete alienation. The bike and the bridge become important signs both of the volatility of modern culture and of its collapse. Gibson’s use of the bicycle further indicates the appreciation and appropriation of the major means of movement/transportation in the anarchic world of skateboarding, underground economies, and computer networks. If the bicycle is a means of movement, the broken bridge is a transit form—a hanging, temporary structure filled with temporary dwellers. The vividly described lifestyle on the broken bridge—from bars to tattoo parlours, sushi shops to rag-tag shelters, inhabited by those living on the edges of a multicultural society—evoke Bakhtin’s vision of the carnivalization of the world. Carnivalization is for Bakhtin the political embodiment of play which breaks the monopoly of established order, the canonical order of truth, the official order (Holquist, *Dialogism* 22). Carnivalization is the name for a necessary multiplicity in human perception, as the metaphor of the bridge in *Virtual Light* eloquently suggests:

Its steel bones, its stranded tendons, were lost within an accretion of dreams: tattoo parlors, gaming arcades, dimly lit stalls stacked with decaying magazines, sellers of fireworks, of cut bait, betting shops, sushi bars, unlicensed pawnbrokers, herbalists, barbers, bars. Dreams of commerce, their locations generally corresponding with the decks that had once carried vehicular traffic; while above them, rising to the very peaks of the cable towers, lifted the intricately suspended barrio, with its unnumbered population and its zones of more private fantasy… Everything ran together, blurring melting in the fog… Telepresence had only hinted at the magic and singularity of the thing… that neon maw and all that patchwork carnival of scavenged surfaces… Fairyland. Rain-silvered plywood, broken marble from the walls of forgotten banks, corrugated plastic, polished brass, sequins, painted canvas, mirrors, chrome gone dull and peeling in the salt air. (70)
The dwellings on the bridge are created spontaneously, through the use of every imaginable technique and material. The result is something amorphous, startlingly organic. The bridge, broken after an earthquake, becomes a seismic form itself in the Baudrillardian sense, the form that dominates the West Coast in general: “This spectral form of civilization which the Americans have invented, an ephemeral form so close to the vanishing point, suddenly seems the best adapted to the probability – the probability only – of the life that lies in store for us. The form that dominates the American West, and doubtless all of American culture, is a seismic form: a fractal, interstitial culture, born of a rift with the Old World, a tactile, fragile, mobile, superficial culture – you have to follow its own rules to grasp how it works: seismic shifting, soft technologies” (America 10). At night, “illuminated by Christmas bulbs, by recycled neon, by torchlight, [the bridge] possessed a queer medieval energy” (69). Elsewhere, Gibson shows the bridge as something that “had just grown, it looked like, one thing patched into the next, until the whole span was wrapped in this formless mass of stuff, and no two pieces of it matched. There was a different material anywhere you looked, almost none of it being used for what it had originally been used for” (194).

The result of Virtual Light is a social emblem of contemporary urban America. It is what Jameson had in mind when he remarked about the urban system: “Where the world system today tends toward one enormous urban system… the very conception of the city itself and the classically urban loses its significance and no longer seems to offer any precisely delimited objects of study, any specifically differentiated realities. Rather, the urban becomes the social in general, and both of them constitute and lose themselves in a global that is not really their opposite either (as it was in the older dispensation) but something like their outer reach, their prolongation into a new kind of infinity” (Seeds 28-29).

In Virtual Light, city culture overgrows the space, and expands into infinity. By the same token it creates a problem of definition of otherness and, therefore, of translation. The expansion of city spaces erases any need for translation, offering instead an internationalized and standardized code. As Sharon Zukin, for instance, says, “Despite local variations, …the major influence on urban form derives from the internationalization of investment, production and consumption. In socio-spatial terms… internationalization is associated with the concentration of investment, the decentralization of production, and the
standardization of consumption” (436). Zukin cites McDonald’s and Benetton as examples of this standardization and notes that “their shops are ubiquitous in cities around the world,” and therefore help to make those cities over in the image of each other (436). Such a process, as I have said, occasions a problematic definition of otherness.

In terms similar to these, Marshall McLuhan has written of the annihilation of the space-time definition as well: “After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the Western World is imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a century of electronic technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned” (3-4). For Terry Eagleton, though, these temporal and spatial projections are parts of each other and if they are erased by omnipotent technology, then not only does the definition of otherness become problematic but so do those of diachrony and history:

The fantasy of total technological omnipotence conceals a nightmare; in appropriating Nature you risk eradicating it, appropriating nothing but your own acts of consciousness. There is a similar problem with predictability, which in surrendering phenomena into the hands of the sociological priests threatens to abolish history. Predictive science founds the great progressive narratives of middle-class history, but by the same stroke offers to undermine them, converting all diachrony to a secret synchrony. (*Ideology* 74)

For Jameson, the present as history is in general the generic function of science fiction, which, in presenting possible futures, thereby “transform[s] our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come. It is this present moment [. . .] that upon our return from the imaginary constructs of SF is offered to us in the form of some future world’s remote past, as if posthumous and as though collectively remembered” (Jameson, “Progress Versus Utopia” 152).

Given the dystopian qualities of Gibson’s near future, it may be argued that in *Virtual Light* the historicizing tendency offers itself more in the guise of
redemption or, perhaps, humanity’s survival in general. Gibson achieves such an
effect by freely borrowing details from the contemporary American cultural
hypermarket--nanotech birth-control devices, foetal tissue injections that build
muscle and make workouts obsolete, hip fashion details such as Chevette’s bike, a
piece of assemblage art, etc.—all that is a retranslation of the present in order to
revaluate the future: “She stuck her hand through the recognition-loop and tried to
pull her handlebars out of the rack’s tangle of molybdenum steel, graphite, and
aramid overwrap. The other bikes’ alarms all went off at once, a frantic chorus of
ear-splitting bleats, basso digital siren-moans, and one extended high-volume
burst of snake-hiss Spanish profanity, cunningly mixed with yelps of animal
torment. She swung her bike around, got her toe in the clip, and kicked for the
street, almost going over as she mounted” (114).

Gibson’s shift of focus, his stylish and densely interactive sentences, are
indicative of the change in the manner of expressions, which become more and
more compact. For instance, Virtual Light begins: “The courier presses his
forehead against layers of glass, argon, high-impact plastic” (1). The pace of the
opening sentences immediately translates into action: “He watches a gunship
traverse the city’s middle distance like a hunting wasp, death slung beneath its
thorax in a smooth black pod. Hours earlier, missiles have fallen in a northern
suburb: seventy-three dead, the kill as yet unclaimed” (1).

In review of Virtual Light, Lance Olsen noted that Gibson’s text is an
example of Termite Art (Olsen “Review”). Olsen mentions that the term itself
was first used in 1962 by the film critic Manny Farber and indicated freedom and
multiplicity, going “always forward eating [its] own boundaries, and, likely as
not, leav[ing] nothing in [its] path other than the signs of eager, industrious,
unkempt activity” (qtd. in Olsen 12). The same is true of Gibson: a literary
bricoleur, he obtains his ideas from the infinite cultural hypermarket at the break
of millennium. Perhaps one of the most surprising results of Virtual Light, when
considered in terms of Termite Art, is the bright cartoonish play that often
emerges in the text. For example, a surveillance and command satellite is
nicknamed the Death Star by those it watches over; a wind-surfing boutique is
called Just Blow Me; there’s a psycho-killer with the Last Supper tattooed on his
chest; a youngster who believes TV is the “Lord’s preferred means of
communicating,” a “kind of meditation” (Virtual Light 296). Elsewhere, in the
book there is a brief reference to a woman who “had flown up to San Francisco… to get her husband move to a different cryogenic facility,” that means, to move his frozen brain “to this more expensive place that would keep it on ice in its own private little tank, and not just tumbling around in a big tank with a bunch of other people’s frozen brains…” (260). The exploration of cyberspace in *Virtual Light* gradually gives way to a dark parody that seems to take nothing very seriously, a kind of Baudrillardian “extermination of meaning” designating the “aesthetics of disappearance” (*America* 10). The infusion of humour undermines the seriousness of the style and destabilizes futuristic ideas in the manner, perhaps, of Termite Art. The intensity of Gibson’s vision—from the anarchist hacker underground networks to the rise of religious fundamentalism, from cryogenics to surveillance satellites, from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, from the multinational control of information to techno-angst, from the Japanization of Western culture to the decentralization of governments around the world—shifts across a terrain of crucial cultural issues involved in contemporary globalization. The dystopian approach creates the effect of immediacy. The collapse of distance between source and target, departure and arrival, answers to something that Jameson called “the geographies of enclosure,” which are especially at work in the contemporary metropolis: “The new space that emerges involves the suppression of distance… and the relentless saturation of any remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the postmodern body… is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening mediations have been removed” (*Postmodernism* 412-13).

iii. The postvital translation: code and clone

The “suppression of distance” is the organizing principle of Gibson’s cyberpunk. And it is performed intentionally, to imagine the world without the angelic mission of translation as transmission of messages that requires time and involves distance. The problematic of suppressed distance is clearly raised in *Idoru*, the novel that followed *Virtual Light*. The codification of the world becomes the tool for the suppression of distance, and the novel’s story about the omnipotence of the media goes on about how “life” is shifting from the biological (DNA) and language to something “postvital” and coded. The code comes to
function as the transcendental, unifying, and ideal substance of life for the nonreferential and the unmediated, replacing the body with a less mortal code. One of the airport scenes in *Idoru*, for instance, indicates:

The soldiers were taking hair samples and slotting people’s passports. Chia assumed that was to prove you really were who you said you were, because DNA was there in your passport, converted into a kind of bar code. (18)

This replacement of the biological by a code allows the user to fantasize about the unmediated consciousness, a virtual walk through the field of unlimited possibilities. In *Idoru* Gibson reveals the destructive sides, the dangerous effects of cyberspace in the realm of the social. He sees cyberspace as a concept intended to suggest: “...the point at which media [flow] together and surround us. It’s the ultimate extension of the exclusion of daily life. With cyberspace as I describe it you can literally wrap yourself in media and not have to see what’s really going on around you” (qtd. in Woolley 122). One may read this statement as an acknowledgement of the function of cyberspace as an the imaginary resolution of real problems, a conversion of imaginary to the social as Appadurai puts it in *Modernity at Large*: if recently imagination and fantasy were antidotes to the finitude of social experience, now they compose a part of “a social practice that enters into the fabrication of social lives for many people in many societies” (52). For Bukatman this conversion is an “open acknowledgement of the supersession of individual bodily experience” that cyberspace offers as compensation for the impoverished self: “Cyberspace certainly hyperbolizes the space of the city, projecting the metroscope into an exaggerated representation that accentuates its bodiless vertigo, but it permits the existence of a powerful and controlling gaze” (149-150). For Žižek this situation is exemplary of both the fantasy-gaze and, as he puts it, the Cartesian *cogito*:

*Cogito* designates [the] very point at which the “I” loses its support in the symbolic network of tradition and thus, in a sense which is far from metaphorical, ceases to exist. And the crucial point is that this pure *cogito* corresponds perfectly to the fantasy-
gaze: in it, I find myself reduced to a non-existent gaze, i.e., after losing all my effective predicates, I am nothing but a gaze paradoxically entitled to observe the world in which I do not exist (like, say, the fantasy of parental coitus where I am reduced to a gaze which observes my own conception, prior to my actual existence, or the fantasy of witnessing my own funeral). (Tarrying 64)

In this respect, the Gibsonian cyberspace, one might say, is a computerized cogito, a fantasy construct. Looking at everything from all sides, the cyberspace gaze embodies what Miran Bozovič describes as “the unbearable experience of the absolute point of view” (166). It is called unbearable because, as Žižek notes, “self-consciousness is the very opposite of self-transparency: I am aware of myself only insofar as outside of me a place exists where the truth about me is articulated” (Tarrying 67). The “absolute point of view,” in other words, occasions the disappearance of the subject. In this respect, Žižek argues that what brings about the “loss of reality” in cyberspace is not its emptiness but, on the contrary, its very “excessive fullness”: “Is not one of the possible reactions to the excessive filling-in of the voids of cyberspace therefore informational anorexia, the desperate refusal to accept information, in so far as it occludes the presence of the Real?” (Plague 155).

Idoru, as a socially mimetic text, explores what might happen to certain aspects of humanity as technology, information, and a new reality converge within the global infrastructure, as the world transforms into a high-density information-governed datasphere. Idoru reflects further on the theme of movement towards the near future, although this time the center intentionally shifts from America to Japan. The distance and difference between San Francisco and Tokyo are blurred by the theme of earthquake and new globalized electronic networks that offer a broader spectrum of lifestyle and body-image options. There are lively scenes of twenty-first-century Tokyo in Idoru, after the millennial quake, neon rain, light everywhere, the new buildings, the largest in the world, erect themselves unnoticed, move towards the artificial islands in the sea like slow-motion sea creatures:
It’s so strange… Since the quake… they’ve built it all back now… they did it all so fast, most with the nanotech, that just grows… you could see those towers growing, at night. Rooms up top like a honeycomb, and walls just sealing themselves over, one after another. Said it was like watching a candle melt, but in reverse. That’s too scary. Doesn’t make a sound. Machines too small to see. They can get into your body, you know?… Look at a map. A map from before? A lot of it’s not even where it used to be. Nowhere near… They pushed all the quake-junk into the water, like landfill, and now they are building that up, too. New islands.

Architectural constructions serve as an allusion to what Susan Bassnett calls the “construction of culture” (Comparative Literature 93). Behind the details of this futuristic journey there are “subtexts” that “enable us to see more clearly the ways” in which cultures are constructed, as Bassnett suggests (93). Not only are these cultures constructed, but as Michael Cronin indicates, they are cloned: “The darker side of globalization is usually presented as duplication… The death of diversity then is the spread of the double. The colonialism of the nineteenth century and its fear of the Double as the colonial subject who was too human for comfort gives way to what we might term the ‘clonialism’ of the twenty-first century…Doubles in the form of translators who produce that other double, the translated text. This is globalization-as-homogenization, as McWorld bereft of difference because under clonialism everything turns out to be a replica, a simulacrum, a copy of a limited set of economically and culturally powerful originals” (Translation and Globalization 129).

Like the architectural environment, the body in Gibson’s novel is also deployed for a succession of the demands of (Japanese) pop-culture. *Idoru* explores a tendency of sampling from a multiplicity of mediated options and the question of received identities that are further disaggregated by videographic technologies seeking to create, for instance, only desirable body parts and features. One of the characters of the novel Rei Toei—the *idoru*—is a completely virtual media star, a synthespian (Gibson’s term from *Idoru*) who has been created and animated entirely on computer. The *idoru*, though, exhibits humanlike
traits and emotions and translates as “idol singer” in modern Japanese. *Idoru* speaks of software agents and organizations that have found a way to use televised media to create those idol singers that are a “copy-cat phenomenon,” a “flagrantly commercial” Japanese product with “extremely watered-down Western pop influences” (44). The process of information gives life to both the software agents and the *idoru*. The basis of Rei’s life is found in an ongoing serial creation, the process, akin to human consciousness. As another character in *Idoru*, software researcher Laney, studies the nodal points in Rei’s data, he begins to realize that the *idoru* is more complex and more powerful than any Hollywood synthespian. She is more than just an artificial idol, made for amusement. Rei is a conscious entity that interacts in the real world. Further analysis allows him to see the *idoru* as acquiring the sort of complexity and randomness of humans, or in other words, the human traits, and that she is capable of learning:

If he’d anticipated her at all, it had been as some industrial-strength synthesis of Japan’s last three dozen top female media faces. That was usually the way in Hollywood, and the formula tended to be even more rigid, in the case of software agents—*eigenheads*, their features algorithmically derived from some human mean of proven popularity. She was nothing like that…

In the very structure of her face, in geometries of underlying bone, lay coded histories of dynastic flight, privation, terrible migrations. He saw stone tombs in steep alpine meadows, their lintels traced with snow. A line of shaggy pack ponies, their breath white with cold, followed a trail above a canyon. The curves of the river below were strokes of distant silver. Iron harness bells clanked in the blue dusk. Laney shivered. The eyes of the idoru, envoy of some imaginary country, met his. (176)

What the novel intends to convey is that the duplicate, the copy, is not adequate to the original but it nonetheless reflects a deep truth about the original. Everyone’s life is information—that is the message of *Idoru*; and everywhere one goes, all his or her actions can be watched, recorded, translated and used to construct subjective desires:
Don’t look at idoru’s face. She is not flesh; she is information. She is the tip of an iceberg, no, an Antarctica, of information. Looking at her face would trigger it again: she was some unthinkable volume of information. She induced the nodal vision in some unprecedented way; she induced it as narrative… Even the movement of her chopsticks brought on peripheral flickers of nodal vision. Because the chopsticks were information too, but nothing as dense as her features, her gaze. (178)

With idoru, as a protagonist, Gibson perhaps was looking for the ideal metaphor of technology as transformative event, of a figure that stood at the cross-section of art, commerce, technology, and spirituality. In parallel Gibson captures the nuances and layered meanings/complicities of being a Japanese pop fan (or any kind of dedicated music fan). That is seen in his handling of the fan club members of one of the Japanese bands, “Lo Rez.” “Lo Rez” was turned into a celebrity with the help of idoru, who inspired the love and dedication of the fans. The whole perspective was “human in every detail but then not so” (229): “Everything scrupulously, fanatically accurate, probably, but always assembled around the hollow armature of celebrity… the quantity of data accumulated here by the band’s fans was much greater than everything the band themselves had ever generated. And their actual art, the music and the videos, was the merest fragment of that” (229).

The opening dialogue between the manager of the international television corporation Slitscan, dealing in celebrity-manufacturing, and the data specialist Laney, points to the direction the story is going: the prophetic Idoru refers not only to 21st-century Tokyo with its promises of technology the disasters of cyber-industrialism, it also reveals the destructive force of information and fame:

“…there is not much fame left, not in the old sense. Not enough to go around.”

“The old sense?”

“We’re the media, Laney. We make the assholes celebrities… We learned to print money off this stuff… Coin of our realm. Now we’ve printed too much; even the audience knows. It shows in the ratings… Except when we decide to destroy one.” (5)
Lives were destroyed here, and sometimes re-created, careers crushed or made anew in guises surreal and unexpected. Because Slitscan’s business was the ritual letting of blood, and the blood it let was an alchemical fluid: celebrity in its rawest, purest form. (38)

The question of fame’s manufacturing remains in *Idoru* an ideological one, because of the manner in which, as Julian Stallabrass in his essay “Empowering Technology: The Exploration of Cyberspace,” in one of *New Left Review* issues, argues, “…a number of old bourgeois dreams are encompassed in the promise of this technology: to survey the world from one’s living room, to grasp the totality of all data within a single frame, and to recapture a unified knowledge and experience” (4). Stallabrass warns that if cyberspace serves as a kind of cognitive map of the city (that is as a way of representing the relationship between the subject and the metropolis), then this is merely a mediation. It is, to recall Jameson and his *Postmodernism*, a “representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of capital itself” (38).

Elaborating on the late twentieth-century in “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” Donna Haraway goes a step further and notes that the late twentieth-century opened an era of the post-natural present: “…machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are frighteningly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert” (152). But this seems to be too optimistic. Haraway indicates that the human capacity to generate or make sense of information has been surpassed by computers, and challenged by the “deluge” of texts (literal, aural, visual) that surround us. Baudrillard’s response to this deluge is “a quick spin of the radio dial” and it seems adequate to after-millennium reality as well: “I no longer succeed in knowing what I want, the space is so saturated, the pressure so great from all who want to make themselves heard” (“The Ecstasy of Communication” 132).
Rather than attempting to define virtual reality in *Idoru* Gibson lets software rhetoric to spin out of its boundaries, in order to see where it leads, what it produces. Virtual reality is marked in *Idoru* as a code, as a fast-moving cultural force or agent. Consider that materially, virtual reality barely exists: it is a cultural co-construct. The fame constructed via high technology, the crime that aims to deconstruct and destroy it, the software analyst transformed into a “better piece of software” and used for searching information on DatAmerica--are the main socio-cultural themes of *Idoru*:

Laney was not, he was careful to point out, a voyeur. He had a peculiar knack with data-collection architectures, and a medically documented concentration-deficit that he could toggle, under certain conditions, into a state of pathological hyperfocus. This made him an extremely good researcher… He was an intuitive fisher of patterns of information: of the sort of signature a particular individual inadvertently created in the net as he or she went about the mundane yet endlessly multiplex business of life in a digital society. Laney’s concentration deficit, too slight to register on some scale, made him a natural channel-zapper, shifting from program to program, from database to database, from platform to platform, in a way that was, well, intuitive… Laney was the equivalent of a dowser, a cybernetic water-witch. He couldn’t explain how he did what he did. He just didn’t know. (25)

Haraway though reminds us, with hope and pragmatism, that in fact “we are not dealing with technological determinism, but with a historical system depending upon structured relations among people” (“Manifesto” 165). This “historical system” includes the interaction between bodies and technologies and the implications of these encounters, which are referred to in her “Manifesto” as “cyborg politics.” The origin of cyborg politics doesn’t emerge in the late twentieth century, however, but in the broad tradition of positing scientific and technical solutions to tackle the problems of the human condition, particularly problems that originate not with the machine or technology, but within the body. Foucault has provided a description of the emergence of bio-technical power in
the eighteenth century, and his description of this power maps onto the contemporary concern with bodies and technologies:

Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, a technology. (*The Archaeology* 206)

An Artificial Intelligence in *Idoru* indeed roams cyberspace and wields enormous power. Power resides not in any kind of technology but in finding “nodal points,” as Gibson demonstrates: “…nodal points, infofaults that might be followed down to some other kind of truth, another mode of knowing, deep within gray shoals of information” (39). Nodal points are a kind of code, like the virtual light glasses in *Virtual Light*, which provides the immediate translation of information about various phenomena, including individual lives. What Gibson warns against is robotic translation and the dreadful consequences of its usage by the powerful. In fact, Gibson refers to the externalization of translation functions that alters the identity of translators, turning them into translational cyborgs that, as Cronin notes, “can no longer be conceived of independently of the technologies with which they interact” (*Translation and Globalization* 112). *Idoru*, then, is about emerging technologies, shifting boundaries between “the living and the nonliving, optional embodiments…in other words, about the everyday world as a cyborg habitat” (*The War of Desire* 37). Cronin also suggests that translation, like every other sector of human activity, is “affected by economic and technical developments and so the move towards automation, though it brings with it many problems, cannot simply be rejected as the malevolent action of technocratic Philistines intent on the dumbing-down of culture” (113).

**iv. The future of translation: footage communities**

It is this individual resistance to the apocalyptic forces of high technology and codification as totalizing translation that is more widely explored in one of Gibson’s latest works, *Pattern Recognition*. In *Pattern Recognition* Gibson speaks
of the human capacity to adjust to a world of omnipotent codes and establish their own, alternative and resistant communities that would contact each other throughout the globe in the signs of their own language--recognizable patterns. “Homo sapiens are about pattern recognition,” says Gibson in one of his opening sections (Pattern 23). What Pattern Recognition suggests, in other words, is that the weakening of older national and regional borders, along with the explosive growth of new communication technologies, has made possible the emergence of original patterns of cultural, or, more precisely, subcultural belonging and their forms of communication and expression. Venuti writes in “Translation, Community, Utopia” that the very impulse to create broader communities, communities abroad, is related to the aim of compensating for “a defect in a prevailing domestic culture” (469). He supports his argument through Maurice Blanchot’s thought about communities as things arising out of an “insufficiency” that puts “individual agency under question” (The Unavowable 56). Pattern’s most prominent example of this emergent global form of community is the “cult” surrounding the footage, a community in which the main protagonist—Cayce Pollard—is herself a prominent participant. Pattern’s footage exists primarily in the virtual world and connects people from various parts of the world:

It is a way now, approximately, of being at home. The forum has become one of the most consistent places in her life, like a familiar café that exists somehow outside of geography and beyond time zones. (4–5)

On the one hand, due to her unusual profession, Cayce does very well within what Hardt and Negri called the “immaterial labor” regime of contemporary global capitalism (War and Democracy 108–15): Cayce is a freelance “coolhunter,” “a ‘sensitive’ of some kind, a dowser in the world of global marketing” (Pattern 2). She searches and explores neighbourhoods like Dogtown, which gave a start to the skateboarding culture, in the hope of finding whatever the next cultural novelty might be. And, as she learns, it is largely a matter of being willing to talk, discuss and ask the next question that allows new things to come into being. It is Cayce herself who acknowledges the way some talents are put to work by global consumer capitalism. The main activity that
Cayce is involved in is to locate the makers of what is known as the “footage,” a series of mysterious film clips that have begun to appear at various anonymous locations on the World Wide Web. Are they “fragments of a work in progress, something unfinished and still being generated by its maker,” or “snippets from a finished work, one whose maker chooses to expose it piecemeal and in nonsequential order?” she asks herself (49). Are they originals or copies of copies, a “student effort, however weirdly polished and strangely compelling”? Cayce’s quest, backed by the financial resources of another character in *Pattern Recognition*, Bigend, necessitates that she circulate among the elite of the global informational economy—advertising executives, designers, filmmakers, computer programmers, etc.—whose world is not that of the old nation-states but of “global cities,” to use Saskia Sassen’s term from *Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*.

On the other hand, Cayce becomes involved in an alternative shadow community of footage. At first she understands her alternative community to be a place of escape (“It is the gift of ‘OT,’ Off Topic. Anything other than the footage is Off Topic. The world, really. News. Off Topic” [48]), but as the narrative progresses it becomes clear that this form of communal life, if given the chance to flourish, has the potential to displace those already existing in the world. Her online universe starts manifesting itself “physically in the world” (206). These early passages from the *Pattern* already suggest that new subcultures are no longer limited by natural culture or geography. Unlike the dominant forms of communal belonging—family, nation, and religion—these new communities are not ones we are born into but rather those in which one can freely choose to participate: “Footageheads seem to propagate primarily by word of mouth, or, as with Cayce, by virtue of random exposure, either to a fragment of video or to a single still frame” (55). What defines the bonds of such communities of choice is their fidelity to the pattern—footage—itsel, a process similar to what Žižek described in *Tarrying*: “a shared relationship toward a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated” (201). That this Thing is, as Žižek notes, perceived by the community to always be under the threat by indefinite others is also made clear in *Pattern*: “…they [CNN] showed a slightly compressed version yesterday and now every site on the planet is clogged with the clueless, newbies of the most hopeless sort, including ours” (76).
The fact that those communities can put anything else “off the topic” and replace the existing ones, becomes especially evident in the Pattern’s culmination point—Cayce’s marriage to her virtual companion Peter Gilbert, whose online embodiment, “Parkaboy,” had long been one of her constant correspondents. If, as Franco Moretti suggests, the marriage plots of Jane Austen’s classical realist novels narrate the transformation of a “local gentry” into a “national elite” bourgeoisie, then in Gibson’s Pattern they mark the achievement of a global community transcending the national one (Moretti, Atlas of the European Novel 18). In Pattern Recognition it is clear that new media productions, like the footage, are displacing the former, privileged, artistic forms with new kinds of communities. Footage is some sort of remainder of a crosscultural communication, and it is based entirely on editing—as some sort of fragment consisting of other fragments—but like Walter Benjamin’s great ruin of the The Arcades Project it becomes the site of a “collective production of meaning” (348). The “edits” that Cayce undertakes can become, as she acknowledges, originals in their own right: “Sometimes when she watches a good edit, and this is one of the best, it’s as though it’s all new; she sinks into it with joy and anticipation, and when the edit ends, she’s shocked” (125).

“How do you feel when you watch it?”
He looks down at his noodles, then up at her.
“How lonely?”
“Most people find that that deepens. Becomes sort of polyphonic. Then there’s a sense that it’s going somewhere, that something will happen. Will change.”
She shrugs.
“It’s impossible to describe, but if you live with it for a while, it starts to get to you. It’s just such a powerful effect, induced by so little actual screen time. I’ve never felt convinced that there’s a recognized filmmaker around who can do that, although if you read the footage boards you’ll see different directors constantly nominated.”
“Or maybe it’s the repetition. Maybe you’ve been looking at this stuff for so long that you’ve read all this into it. And talking with other people who’ve been doing the same thing.”
“I’ve tried to convince myself of that. I’ve wanted to believe it, simply in order to let the thing go. But then I go back and look at it again, and there’s that sense of…I don’t know. Of an opening into something. Universe? Narrative?” (111-12)

Making new footage therefore requires a momentary escape from “the original,” from what you have been “assembling,” consciously or unconsciously:

The one hundred and thirty-four previously discovered fragments, having been endlessly collated, broken down, re-assembled, by whole armies of the most fanatical investigators, have yielded no period and no particular narrative direction.”  
(Pattern Recognition 24)

There is a larger historical trajectory in the bricolage that underlies Gibson’s text: it is perhaps the movement from the novel, through mass culture, and into the emergent forms of twenty-first century literature that are only beginning to be realized through the new media technologies. The new technological and literary possibilities suggested by the footage in Pattern Recognition are possibilities for which there is “no name” yet and which are, as Pattern demonstrates, unrepresentable and therefore untranslatable. The fact of untranslatability indicates that translation is awaiting a new role in subcultures.

v. Genres defeated

There is a deeply polemical element at work in Pattern Recognition, as Phillip E. Wegner notes in his essay “Recognizing the Patterns”: “…for Gibson, the novel, like the nation-state to which it is inextricably linked, is a residual form, and the unfinished projects of modernist innovation and Utopian communal formation will be continued only through new electronic media forms allegorized in Pattern Recognition by the footage” (184). The next question Gibson asks, therefore, concerns the canon itself. In a world of contemporary globalization, in the midst of dramatic political, economic, and technological changes, nation-states are vanishing and national languages are replaced by omnipotent codified
translations that are being resisted by alternative communities. In *Pattern Recognition* Gibson attempts to identify who those communities are. One of them is Internet community, the community of visual communication which is based on a different perception of movement though space and time. *Pattern Recognition* reflects on the phenomenon of mutation in our experiences of time that occurred because our, to use Cronin’s expression, “hardware has reached its natural limits”: messages transmitted can approach “near-instantaneity in transmission,” and, in general, the natural limits of “how fast one can travel” are erased (*Translation and Globalization* 106). Gibson indicates just how near and fast tomorrow is using the metaphor of the jet flight:

…her mortal soul is leagues behind her, being reeled in on some ghostly umbilical down the vanished wake of the plane that brought her here, hundreds of thousands of feet above the Atlantic. Souls can’t move that quickly, and are left behind, and must be awaited, upon arrival, like lost luggage.

She wonders if this gets gradually worse with age: the nameless hour deeper, more null, its affect at once stranger and less interesting? (2)

One of the central characters in *Pattern Recognition*, Bigend, the founder and owner of the global advertising agency, “Blue Ant,” describes the status of the future in today’s world as follows: “We have no idea, now, of who or what the inhabitants of our future might be. In that sense, we have no future. Not in the sense that our grandparents had a future, or thought they did. Fully imagined cultural futures were the luxury of another day, one in which ‘now’ was of some greater duration. For us, of course, things can change so abruptly, so violently, so profoundly, that futures like our grandparents’ have insufficient ‘now’ to stand on. We have no future because our present is too volatile” (58–59). This claim also resonates with Gibson’s *Virtual Light* and *Idoru*. But whereas this earlier critical attempt cleared the way for the transformations that would occur within cyberpunk, Bigend’s statement seems to signal Gibson’s break with the genre—cyberpunk--in which he had established his reputation. However, if Jameson’s insight that cyberpunk science fiction was a kind of “literary realism” is
acceptable (*Postmodernism* 286), then Bigend’s statement can be understood in two ways: as an acknowledgement that the present marks a transformation of, or perhaps a break with the genre, and a call for a new kind of aesthetics appropriate to the new historical situation; secondly, as a new mode of writing, a new kind of novel.

In a 2003 interview with Andrew Leonard, Gibson illustrated how political events can enter the work of literature and change it. The events of September 11, 2001, immediately transmitted via media, affected his work on *Pattern Recognition* and for a while created a crisis in his work:

> I was about 100 pages into the book on Sept. 10… When I came back to the manuscript, I had this sense that the back-story world my character had been tentatively inhabiting for me, clicked off—it had forked and diverged like Borges’ ‘Garden of Forking Paths.’ It had become like nothing… my world no longer existed and the meaning of everything—I felt that just as strongly as I’ve ever felt anything in my life—the meaning of everything, ever that had gone before had to be reconsidered in the light of something that had happened. At that point I had a choice of abandoning the narrative—it was very clear to me I was just sitting there looking at the screen: I either erase this and go elsewhere, or I go back right now and go back to Page 1 and go back through it... I opted to go back and go through it, and I’m as glad that I did that as I’ve ever been of any artistic choice, mainly because I don’t have to do it again. Mine’s done. (Leonard, “Nodal Point”)

As a result of this decision to continue, *Pattern Recognition* became the first novel to incorporate directly the events of September 11, 2001. *Pattern’s* main protagonist, Cayce, describes the events of 9/11 as “an experience outside of culture” (40). Moreover, the events take on a deeper personal resonance for Cayce, as the story leads to her father, Win Pollard, who—“twenty-five years an evaluator and improver of physical security for American embassies worldwide”—“went missing in New York City on the morning of September 11, 2001” (46 and137). As Cayce struggles to find both the maker of the footage and to learn the fate of her father, the story attempts at once to map out the parameters of a newly
emergent global order, and to come to grips with the consequences of 9/11 for this new world. Cayce’s reflection on her father’s “missingness” provides an important clue to her understanding of the significance of the event: “His very missingness becoming, somehow, him. Her mother had once said that when the second plane hit, Win’s chagrin, his personal and professional mortification at this having happened, at the perimeter having been so easily, so terribly breached, would have been such that he might simply have ceased, in protest, to exist. She doesn’t believe it, but now she finds it makes her smile” (362). September 11 in Gibson’s work is the sign that the old order has finally and definitively come to an end, clearing the way for the emergence of something new. As Phillip E. Wegner suggested in his essay “Recognizing the Pattern,” the fact that it is only when the second plane strikes the towers that Cayce’s father vanishes is also no coincidence: for just as it is only with the second strike that the nature of the attack becomes truly apparent: “until that moment it seemed an accident, a plane off-course--so it takes the collapse of the Twin Towers, a repetition of the fall of the Berlin Wall nearly twelve years earlier, to mark the true end of the cold war and the closure of the transitional moment…” (196). What may be coming to take its place we cannot yet fully know—“It’s all being made up as it goes along” (356). Yet it will be a history outside of the old closures.

These passages also suggest a strong association between Cayce’s activity and the work of the novelist: if the present is rendered so fluid and unstable as to make the realist novel impossible—any picture of the present being hopelessly obsolete long before the novel is finished—the novelist’s task shifts to one of pattern recognition, to the constant dialogization and rewriting of immediate situations, the mapping of broader trends and directions in which the global situation tends. With this too, literary production and consumption (the making of patterns by the readers out of a text) converge, the central and peripheral positions of genres merge. Gibson recognizes that there is a fundamental danger in such a process--what Cayce’s father, Win, describes as apophenia: “…the spontaneous perception of connections and meaningfulness in unrelated things” (116). Jameson underlines a similar point in Postmodernism when he refers to the spontaneous decisions of the author: the unconscious is “what exceeds intention, what is not mastered by the intentional act or the intentional expression; in short, it is chance, accident, the unforeseeable” (213).
From one perspective, Gibson in his *Pattern of Recognition* seems to offer no radical novelty. As Jameson in *Postmodernism* maintains, cyberpunk always represented the transformation of “a formerly futurological science fiction . . . into mere ‘realism’ and an outright representation of the present” (286). Leonard’s interview with Gibson begins with the statement, “Gibson has always maintained that science fiction writers write about the present, and in *Pattern Recognition* he decided to dispense with the pretence, without metaphor or misdirection” (Leonard “Nodal Point”). One of the last scenes of *Pattern* suggests confidence in such a conclusion: “She’d [Cayce] gone with Peter to visit Stella and Nora in the squat in Moscow, and then on to the dig, where Damien’s shoot had been winding down, and where she’d found herself, out of some need she hadn’t understood, down in one of the trenches, furiously shoveling gray muck and bones, her face streaked with tears. Neither Peter nor Damien had asked her why, but she thinks now that if they had she might have told them she was weeping for her century, though whether the one past or the one present she doesn’t know” (367). This also signals a major shift in *Pattern Recognition*.

Gibson himself, alluding to the activity of advertising in *Pattern Recognition*, acknowledges his role as mediator. One of his protagonists involved in the advertising business says: “I want to make the public aware of something they don’t quite yet know that they know--or have them feel that way. Because they’ll move on that, do you understand? They’ll think they’ve thought of it first. It’s about transferring information, but at the same time about a certain lack of specificity” (65). Mediation is a kind of angelic task of transmission and annunciation, as Cronin suggested in his study *Translations and Globalization* (64). Quoting Serres in the same study (64), Cronin points to the idea that it is a “notable truth” that “fallen angels are the parasitic hierophants of the media where it is messenger, not the message, that is all-important” (64). But with reference to McLuhan, Cronin notes that the Mediator may not only be the Message for the new century; it is also up to the Mediator to understand the full implications of the Message(s) of the century for the Media the world will use. To recognize existing cultural patterns and emerging global patterns and meanings and convey them is one of the angelic tasks that Gibson undertook with his *Pattern Recognition*. 
Hans Robert Jauss suggested that genres are often identified through the reader's expectations. Those “horizons of expectation” give rise to different, not necessarily historical, interpretations of the text, interpretations that are based, first of all, on “an aesthetic of literary reception” (Jauss, *Question and Answer* 224). As a consequence of changes in the “horizons,” taking place on both a diachronic and synchronic level, innovation is introduced through the disappearance of elements perceived as familiar and the introduction of new features. As a result of his analysis, Jauss did not aim to identify “pure” or absolute genres, but to find those genres whose works are perceived by readers as belonging to the same category:

This shift from a preconceived horizon of expectations to a sketch of new experience struck me as the embodiment of the principle of aesthetic mediation that, in the literary-historical process, permits a contemporary reorganization of the canon that also renews the way in which all works from the past are seen. Understanding the shift in horizons in this way also permits one to grasp the artistic character of a work in proportion to the aesthetic distance it implies, that is, the distance between expectation and experience, tradition and innovation, and to separate a work’s constitutive negativity from the affirmative aspect of that which in consumer literature merely satisfies a norm. (224)

Gibson’s cyberpunk might be an exemplary case of aesthetic mediation not only within the Bakhtinian *chronotope*—time and space—but also of the constant reorganization of the genre and its dissociation from norms. Genres and canons are cultural, i.e., they occur at certain stages of the growth/decline of culture, and any changes in them reflect, as it was argued by Polysystems theory, fluctuations in the cultural system. Gibson’s cyberpunk, with its wonderful innovative powers demands the most attentive (and critical) reading and analysis in order to understand not only the unique contribution of the writer but also his resistance to the genre.
Travel writers introduce elements from other cultures, while science fiction writers borrow elements from the field of science, which is a separate culture. This borrowing brings cyberpunk closer to travel writing. Cyberpunk narratives largely follow the adventure formula in mapping the body’s relation to space, as does travel writing. Cyberpunk reveals that the impact of technology on the body points towards further spaces—the possibilities of post-bodies and post-human forms of existence. Moreover, being versions of the adventure narrative, cyberpunk and travel writing both feature a split between the sites of home and away: a body setting out to face the unknown and becoming a “ ceaselessly inscribing instrument” (Spivak, “Translation as Culture” 14).

Human bodies react to the environment as receptive surfaces. They react to images projected by the media as the receiving cultures react to the transmitting ones. The tendency to sample from a multiplicity of mediated options creates grounds for received, synthetic identities available through a virtually transmittable lingua franca. As in Venuti’s assumption about translators’ search for their own communities of understanding, virtual reality—as translation par excellence—also invokes its own communities as is clearly shown in the cyberpunk of William Gibson.

For Translation Studies Gibson’s work is interesting and useful as a consistent effort to resist totalitarian forms of translation—the codification of byt, of everyday life. On the other hand, Gibson’s work warns us against translation as a field which lacks the capacity for resistance and therefore is easily absorbed, adjusted and used for the purposes of power. Gibson’s cyberpunk demonstrates, in other words, what can happen—socially and culturally as well as in the political-economical terrain—if language and translation are “privatized” by the power of newly emerging corporate empires. Speaking intentionally about the near future as if it were the present, Gibson points to one of the fiercest problems in the era of contemporary globalization—the problem of time. Space-time compression, which is the result of the application of new technology, helps to disseminate, at ever greater speeds, the language of machines, money and cultural capital. To explain such processes Paul Virilio invented the term “chronopolitics” (32-48). Applying Virilio’s idea of chronopolitics to translation, Michael Cronin speaks of chrono-stratification of languages, suggesting that languages can be allocated to time-zones according to each language’s ability to invent modern and
postmodern vocabularies (*Translation and Globalization* 122). Therefore we have languages of the past, present and future—the latter tending toward zero-translation, a situation where “high-speed language” proves “exhausting” and where languages, because of the lack of resources, of political will and of general sense of urgency, “lag behind” and stop translating or being translated. Cronin does not elaborate on the disadvantages or advantages of such languages, but he does underline that the status and the representation of the translator changes accordingly. Gibson’s imaginative work goes even further and achieves an era after translation where the agency of the translator on the working level is silenced, and on the level of power is completely subjugated to power structures. For Gibson, the capitalization of time trumps everything else, and the technologically advanced have an upper hand in it. As new empires of the technologically advanced emerge and gather force, their language comes to the fore, even if it is a pseudo-language of code. For empire to emerge there must be a certain degree of communicative cohesion and this is best ensured by getting subject peoples to speak the language of empire (Ostler 2005). The plurality of languages (and voices) then becomes increasingly diminished, and the dialogical function of translation dies. Since translation has long been associated with the practice of diplomacy (Roland 1999), the absence of translation as dialogue is indicative of the death of diplomacy too. The absence of dialogue is something imposed by the force and, as Cronin suggests, usually expresses the will of the Empire: “It is possible to see translation as a form of triangular structure which prevents the clash or the violent and dogmatic synthesis of binary opposites. Whether it is the rhetorical maneuvers of the Cold War or the War on Terror, absolutes are all the easier to maintain if there is no attempt at listening to what the other might have to say, if translators are not allowed, in other words, to do their work in the space between languages and cultures” (*Translation Goes to the Movies* 128)

When the working function of translation is completely alienated and usurped by power, language as such moves to the periphery of culture, conceding its place to other spheres of cultures such as Gibsonian “footage,” or, in a wider sense, the screen. The screen often usurps the skills of translators who, finding themselves redundant, begin to serve power. Culture not only moves from being phono- and logo-centric to visual, to the screen; it also becomes light in traveling.
But since power, in the era of globalization, is also associated with lightness and mobility, embodied travel through space becomes increasingly restricted—as illustrates Gibson work through his focus on urban communities that are socially volatile but physically rather settled. When translation becomes controllable by power, the movement of the body is controlled as well, and the effect of such translation is petrifying.

Gibson speaks of the beginning of an era of pseudo-language that replaces the English language as well, despite the fact that its spread in the global market has long been associated with economic liberalism (Nic Craith 2005). With the decline of the nation state and the traditional genres, especially the novel, the English language as a dialogical entity, as a field of translation and art becomes diminished rather than globalized. Even if it is still the most widely used language in the world—the Gibsonian question is: in which world and in which time-zone, and is it possible that it can at any time be replaced by or become the code?
CHAPTER SIX

Exultant Forces of Translation in the Philosophy of Travel
of Alphonso Lingis

_The difference gathers world and things into the simple onefold of the pain of intimacy._

---Heidegger

i. Deconstructing the canon

In the preceding chapters I have tried to illustrate how the three authors that I have so far examined pursue the need and possibility of transformation through translation. The agency of translation is perceived as highly important and in certain cases, as with William Gibson, even dangerously overwhelming. If Jonathan Raban travels to the frontiers, to the liminal spaces of America, to de-layer and de-center America, to discover the hidden and the vanishing elements of American culture and history, to resist oppressive homogeneity, to insist on difference, Pico Iyer then, in contrast, travels outside America to find the signs of America in distant cultures and, lacking the knowledge of local languages, identifies himself with the linguistic and cultural “anomalies,” the spaces of collusions and collisions between East and West, and imagines the possibility of a new--global--identity. And while William Gibson’s cyberpunk speaks of the gloomy consequences of American cultural dissemination in the world, the emergence of new imperial centers, the construction of artificial identities by means of a totalizing codified translation that does not liberate, but restricts boundaries, Alphonso Lingis, in contrast, offers a critique of rational language and, therefore, of totalizing translation, bringing the lived, sensuous and affective body into the picture and offering a more optimistic view about the remainder of translation that is graspable in the excesses of human creativity. Lingis sees translation as something going beyond linguistic and cultural boundaries, something embedded in the context of the cosmic process whereby cultures and languages are charged by each other and convey to each other multiple meanings,
demanding new approaches to translation. His task is to challenge the “closed system” of rationality—America itself—and, by means of translation, to do deconstructionist work in the canon he shifts from.

Lingis departs from America to seek for far away places and cultures as an American traveller, but more specifically, he departs from a rather narrow field—American continental philosophy and its conceptual language—posing himself as a travelling philosopher. His texts demonstrate how, in the process of travelling and encountering a variety of modes of cultural expression—especially their unnoticed, neglected factors—Lingis’ conceptual language changes. Flashbacks, connecting lines between the transmitting and receiving culture, associations, allusions and comparisons become necessary in Lingis’ travel writing. Lingis expresses a confident attempt to transverse the discipline of philosophy suggesting that we ought to live, first, and then think about the way we live: “I think that writing about encounters with things that moved me most deeply is a sort of gratitude, and one form of gratitude is to do it with respect and care,” says Lingis in an interview with his former student, Stephen Janis, explaining why he, as a professor of philosophy, is happy with his new choice (“Mortal Thoughts”).

Stephen Janis points out that the intention behind Lingis’s work is admirable: he is taking Western philosophy out of its “claustrophobic ivory tower” and trying to practice philosophy in the world. In Encounters with Alphonso Lingis (2003), Walter Fuchs goes further, saying that because Western philosophy always leans toward rationality, logics and ethics, Lingis is “a bit of an outsider, which is probably why he’ll actually be relevant in the future” (10). Tom Sparrow in the essay devoted to some aspects of Lingisian travel, “Bodies in Transit: The Plastic Subject of Alphonso Lingis,” puts it more directly, suggesting that Lingis’s texts offer us “translations of unfamiliar customs and peoples, of technical concepts and slippery philosophical jargon” (99). In Lingis’s travelogues, one can witness phenomenological descriptions of individuals and cultures which are laced with the thinking of alterity familiar to Levinas’s readers, and with the phenomenology of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty has handed down to the continental tradition. Placed either between or beyond these two notions—alterity and the lived body—is Lingis himself, a philosopher who not only builds a bridge between American and Continental thought, but who is the literal embodiment of a synthetic brand of Anglo-American Continental philosophy.
The biography of Alphonso Lingis reveals some important facts that made him an original “translator” of cultures. As Michael Cronin explains in his book *Translation Goes to the Movies*, when he writes on the main character of the film *The Interpreter* (2005), Silvia Broome: “The interpreter’s booth is not a glass cage. The interpreter has a body and a history and that embodied history allows her to do what she does” (99).

Lingis is an American with Lithuanian roots\(^7\). He started his professional career at schools of philosophy in Chicago and later did his doctorate in Belgium. For several years he lectured in Pittsburg and after returning to the USA he gained the faculty at Pennsylvania State University as a professor of philosophy. While living and working in Europe he commenced his career as a translator of Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas. Alphonso Lingis is well-known in the Anglophone world for his translations of Levinas’s *Totality and Infinity* and Merleau-Ponty’s *The Visible and the Invisible*. It is quite clear, then, that his life-long journey as a philosopher actually began from translation. Because he spent extensive periods of time in France acquiring in-depth knowledge of the French philosophical and cultural tradition, he is regarded as “the heir apparent of the French tradition in the United States” (Mickunas 13). More recently he has become widely known as an author for his philosophical travelogues *Excesses: Eros and Culture* (1983), *Abuses* (1994), *The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common* (1994), *The Imperative* (1998), *Dangerous Emotions* (2000), *Trust* (2004), *The First Person Singular* (2007).

Lingis himself says that this transformation from a translator to a writer of philosophy occurred to him because of a trip to India. Spending weeks studying the temples, he realized that “practically nothing had been written about them in English” (Janis, “Mortal Thoughts”). It could be supposed that his concern attests, on the one hand, to a sense of responsibility to his language and culture, and on the other, to his recognition of the importance of the silent object. Lingis tells Stephen Janis about the passion he experienced in front of those monuments—the passion for history, the people who built it and the imaginary creators who no longer live but still exist in their creations.

“A powerful element of recognition is the fact of translation,” remarks Cronin in *Translation and Globalization* (168). If Cronin’s statement applies to Lingis, then it must be noted that the recognition for Lingis was twofold—that of the importance of the other, and the language in which he conveyed that importance. Lingis undertakes the task to convey that importance by opening up philosophical language for the other. Challenging the boundaries of one of the most traditional canons—the philosophical treatise—he not only aims to expand the boundaries of the target language but also to enlarge the number of the target audience:

Philosophy is abstract and universal speech. It is not clothed, armed, invested with the authority of a particular god, ancestor, or institution, speech that does program operations and produce results, speech barren and destitute. It is speech that is destined for all, speech that subjects whatever it says to the contestation of anyone from any culture or history or latitude, accepts any stranger as its judge. Then what is distinctive about philosophy is not a certain vocabulary and grammar of dead metaphors and empirically unverifiable generalizations. One’s own words become philosophy, and not the operative paradigms of a culture of which one is a practitioner, in the measure that the voices of those silenced by one’s culture and its practices are heard in them. *(Abuses, ix)*

Lingis departs not only from America to reach out to distant countries and cultures; he also departs from philosophy as an academic discipline and brings into it his concern for the sensuous, affective body and its expressions. The latter—the sensuous, affective body—is one of the central issues of Lingis’ philosophical travelogues. Language in his travel writing moves beyond the symbolic, to the realm of the sensuous and the physical, and translation in his texts is demonstrated to be not merely an operation carried out between two languages, but a process constantly in operation in a single language as well, a process of saying more about the other by silencing oneself:
...what moved one deeply can only be shared through language when one has found the right words. Finding the right words takes time... What I wrote was how places and events spoke to me. What persons my nation and my culture have made enemies said to me. What people my nation and culture have conquered and silenced said to me with their mute bodies... What ruined temples and departed gods said to me. I understood that what they said to me they were also saying to you. When the other is there and able to speak himself or herself, he or she listens to the thoughts one formulates for him or her, and assents to them or contests them or withdraws from them into the silence from which he or she came. One only speaks for others when they are silent or silenced. And to speak for others is to silence oneself. (Abuses viii-ix)

Lingis undertakes the responsibility of a mediator between the source and the target cultures, and although in many ways as an American philosopher he has a rather limited readership, still his striving to travel out of America, to seek out far away cultures and write down his experiences, this move of bravado, this Nietzschean pathos of distance, this responsibility for the language he inhabits--the English philosophical language and its transformations--are worth examining. His travel texts demonstrate that the other, distant cultures teach the traveller of all those hidden interconnections where what is crucial is the revelation and the naming of the unnameable.

Lingis’s writing about silent monuments, plastic objects of art, rituals, bodily expressions found in cultural milieus outside America, and his own emotions when facing the other convey that the process of naming is a type of translation. Speaking of the silent language of things, Walter Benjamin employs the word “translation” in relation to the activity of naming:

The translation of the language of things into that of man is not only a translation of the mute to the sonic; it is also the translation of the nameless into name. It is therefore the translation of an imperfect language to a more perfect one and cannot but add something to it, namely knowledge. (“On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” 117)
The movement from the language of things to the language of knowledge takes place via translation—or rather as a translation—and there can be, as Walter Benjamin indicates, as many translations as there are languages. Andrew Benjamin, in his tribute to Walter Benjamin’s contribution, reformulates the task of the translator by pointing to the significance of the factors that Lingis highlighted throughout his travel writing—the unnameable that forms the surplus of translation: “…to release’ by translating that which is essential to language – to all language – namely the unnameable essence of language which is the precondition for the possibility of translation” (Translation and the Nature of philosophy 103).

Travel, for Lingis, reveals the nature of social relationships, so immersed in a world of familiar things that they become grammatically indistinguishable from them, and disclosed only against the background of a different place. Lingis goes from America to distant, far away places to reveal that America is just another “community of the dying” on this planet, another “community of rationality.” The responsibly and the feeling of guilt, “a peculiar act of reparation toward the language of the inside, a language in which we are responsible,” as Gayatri Spivak puts it in “Translation as Culture” (14), obliges Lingis to bring to the target culture the meanings that generate, what he calls, “invitation—the intoxication of—trust” (The First Person Singular 79). Although it has always been the case that travellers have to trust strangers [“Is anything more universally distributed than trusting a stranger?” asks Lingis (79)], still, in the age of a “high density of produced and translated information” when, as Cronin indicates, “we may not quite know what to do with that information,” the focus on meaning and the specificity of the transmittable message is important (Translation and Globalization 65).

Another valuable aspect in Lingis’s travel writing is that by putting the sensuous, affective body in the picture he demonstrates that languages might be not the only factor forming the “debris” of Benjaminian “amphora” of the original and the translation, as he wrote in the “Task of the Translator.” In his travel writing Lingis raises the question as to whether the presence of difference as recognizable as the broken parts of the greater Benjaminian amphora and demanded from translation, is the essential quality only of language. For Lingis,
the body and sensations are present in every single act of translation, forming its surplus or remainder. To address those issues Lingis often intentionally sacrifices full clarity and coherence as far as his target audience is concerned. I shall demonstrate in this chapter that, by preferring a foreignizing strategy, Lingis escapes the localization of the target culture and creates the effect of referring to humanity at large.

If there is any possibility of fidelity in such translation, then Cronin’s line of thinking that follows from his reading of Delisle and Woodsworth’s study, seems to be the most appropriate to explain how fidelity can contain a dual meaning: “…translation cannot long favour restrictive or bigoted notions of fidelity because its transmissive dimension is always dual. An important function of translation has been to promote specific regional, local or national identities” ([Delisle and Woodsworth 100] gtd. in *Globalization and Translation* 69). This seems to be one of the tasks of Lingis, in which he attempts to find a community of understanding, the kind of a utopian community with the foreign, that Lawrence Venuti writes about: “When motivated by the ethical politics of difference, the translator seeks to build a community with foreign cultures, to share understanding with and of them and to collaborate on projects founded on that understanding, going so far as to allow it to revise and develop domestic values and institutions. The very impulse to seek a community abroad suggests that the translator wishes to extend or complete a particular domestic situation, to compensate for a defect in the translating language and literature, and the translating culture” (“Translation, Community, Utopia” 469).

If Lingis is to follow the Benjaminian strategy and work with the intention of the original, then his strategies must be those of the philosopher whose task consists of “comprehending all of natural life through the more encompassing life of history” (Benjamin, “The Task” 21).

With this chapter, putting the sensuous, affective body in the picture and examining linguistic as well as ethical aspects of bodily encounters as they are represented in the philosophical travelogues of Alphonso Lingis, I hope to contribute to the whole range of questions related to the remainder in translation. Each text of Lingis is structured around specific and intense flashbacks that relate to the touch, the look, the scent or emotion of the human and non-human other. His travel writing is not an attempt to domesticate the otherness he encounters in
travel through narrative closure; rather, his argument is that, in a highly technological and mediated world, learning about difference by looking is beginning to be regarded as an emotional indulgence in a culture which increasingly values fast and disembodied information bytes as knowledge. Lingis takes the responsibility of probing something different—the embodied encounters with other cultures. His particular encounters with otherness and the people living in remote regions of the planet where he travels provide an interesting experience through which one can question not only translation, but also much deeper issues of Western models of knowledge. With respect to the complexity of Lingis’s travel writing I will examine here only aspects relevant to the thesis; that is, the aspects of the travelling body and cultural translation in his work.

ii. Cosmological dialogue and the response of translation

As it was indicated in chapter one, since the ‘Cultural Turn’ in translation theory, translation is no longer defined as an activity that takes place between two languages, but rather between two cultures, as a dialogue, and the translator is allowed to intervene, subvert, divert, even entertain, emphasizing the creative aspect of translating in his/her dialogical engagement with the source culture (Robinson *The Translator’s Turn*; Snell-Hornby, *Translation Studies*). Mary Snell-Hornby in *Translation Studies*, notes that as “we are moving toward an understanding of translation that sees it more as a cultural (rather than a linguistic) transfer, the act of translation is not a “transcoding” from one context into another, but an ‘act of communication,’ *a dialogue*” (39). Culture, therefore, is not just the ‘arts,’ but it has a broader anthropological sense, as referring to all socially conditioned aspects of human life. Umberto Eco decisively identifies translation with culture, which is conceived less as a static phenomenon and instead as the endless translation of signs into signs (*Experiences of Translation* 71).

Along with his focus on language and on new relationships possible through or without language, Lingis reaffirms and further expands the notion of “dialogism” as it was introduced to literary theory by Mikhail Bakhtin. Often lacking the language of the source culture where he finds himself while travelling, Lingis searches for new possibilities of a dialogue—expanding the notion of
translation beyond linguistic boundaries. Pointing to the complexity of such a task Bakhtin stressed that “dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not reside within the system of a language. They are impossible among elements of language. The specific nature of dialogic relations requires special study” ([Dostoevsky’s Poetics](#117)). In many ways Lingis undertakes such study in his philosophical travelogues.

First of all, it must be noted that Lingis’s travel writing represents philosophical thinking; more precisely, a form of “cosmological thinking that is not based on calculative, predictive, and rational but, on a metaphoric and descriptive method” (Mickunas “Two Philosophers”). Lingis’s cosmological approach to cultures as “closed economies” suggests that their survival depends not only on each other but also on a larger, “cosmological economy”; that dialogue—as an exchange of meanings between them—is vital for their existence. Lingis’s preoccupation with cosmology brings him close to the Bakthinian idea of culture as dialogical entity. As it is underlined in chapter one, Bakhtin’s thought is grounded on the idea of dialogue, and Bakhtin’s thinking on dialogue is unified under the notion of culture. Culture is the locus of dialogue. In terms of culture, therefore, dialogue is central. In textual practice or translation, dialogical relations, for Bakhtin, are of a specific nature and reside not only within the language, but also within the socio-political circumstances under which the work of literature is produced. Dialogue, especially in the text, was seen by Bakhtin as a manifold phenomenon. Such an approach allows us to explain Lingis’s preoccupation with body language, bodily expressions, silent monuments, senses and emotions. All of them in their complexity indicate relations, and all of them, in a specific time and space, form an invitation to respond. Holquist, writing of Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue, suggested that for schematic purposes the complexity of dialogue can be reduced to a minimum of three elements that have a structure very much like the triadic construction of the linguistic sign: a dialogue is composed as an utterance, a reply, and a relation between the two ([Dialogism](#19)). For Bakhtin, it is the relation between the two that is most important in this triadic construction. It is this relation which ensures that existence as such is not a separate event but a part of a larger whole—a cosmic dialogue as it represented in travel writing of Lingis.
In the essay-tribute to Lingis’s and Levinas’s work, Algis Mickunas pointed out that in Lingis’ travel writing there is “an effort to overgrow the limitedness of Western philosophy that ranges within the boundaries of Platonism and materialism and their variants” (“Two Philosophers”). As I have pointed out above, Western culture, for Lingis, represents a closed system. Mickunas explains that the closed system or “closed economy” in Lingis means that “all forces, energies and the matter lend themselves to rationality and its calculations whereby all changes and exchanges are compensated for… What is at stake, as Adam Smith’s and Karl Marx’s theories noted, for civilization is the production, circulation and balancing of the wealth” (“Two Philosophers”). Yet such economics, elaborated by intelligent creatures, is a special economics, valid only within these systems which in turn are not self-contained. There is an “open economics”—generalized, cosmological economics—on which the economics of every single cultural system depends. Mickunas’s reading of Lingis shows that to explain his cosmology Lingis refers to a metaphor of the sun, “if we should conceive the laws of wealth from the cosmological point, we should realize that the fundamental law of generalized economics of “solar wealth” is expenditure without recompense, without remuneration. The solar drive is to discharge itself in formations without profit, without recompense far from its center” (“Two Philosophers”). Such interaction and outpouring of wealth, for Lingis, is visible among/in human cultures and their expressions.

If everything is relational, dependent on the other, if everything is a relation and everything is dialogic, closed systems then cannot be considered in terms of relation and are not involved in the process that deals with ratios of the same and different in space and time. Notions of space and time help to articulate the position of the self in the cosmic dialogue. Whatever is observed, then, is shaped by the place and time from which one perceives it. Writing on Bakhtin’s theory Holquist offers an example of one observer looking at another observer: you can see things behind my back that I cannot see, and I can see things behind your back that are denied to your vision (Dialogism 24). To expand the idea, it could be added that we are both doing the same thing, but from different places: although we are in the same event, that event is different for each of us. Our places are different because our bodies occupy different positions in exterior, physical space, but also because we regard the world and each other from
different centers—in cognitive time and space. In the interaction between two cultures, the dependency on the other or the foreign is crucial and one of the most graphic examples of it is translation.

The idea of relativity is important for analyzing Lingis’s travel writing. Lingis is looking for cosmological dialogic connections, where possibilities are large, and he also brings up in his texts the specific cases of dialogue where possibilities are narrow because each party remains enclosed in its own specificity. In other words, in his travel writing Lingis points to such situations where translation does not necessarily presuppose a dialogue. In Lingis’s travel writing translation often means the failure of language because linguistic communication or dialogue is replaced by bodily engagement, action, performance and “participationist theater” as he calls it. Rituals, theatres, masquerades, for Lingis, often reveal meanings that cannot be communicated through language, and yet they are translations. They reveal the cosmological connection of cultures, a cosmological exchange of meanings and energies between cultures.

Lingis takes as an example the rituals of death that are present in each culture. In The Community Lingis posits that the variety of death rituals can be explained by the notion of cosmic existence coming to each culture as a series of events that uniquely occur in it; this uniqueness, for Lingis, finds its highest expression in the uniqueness of the death rituals, the death that, as he says, “will be exclusively mine” (24). The event of death, for Lingis, links every culture to the common community of the dying. The commonness of death is a precondition for relation, that is dialogue. Death, for Lingis, is a transformation causing new formations such as forms of future life and, for instance, some cults and rituals in some cultures make such transformations more visible and translatable than others. The task that Lingis undertakes in his travel writing is to make those rituals readable and transmittable, so he can open up his target culture, conceived by him as a “closed system,” to a better understanding of something that “unites us all” (24). Such understanding of interconnections between cultures was expressed by George Steiner in After Babel when he spoke of an exchange between cultures as a translation process: “To collect the outflow of energy from the source and make an inflow into the receptor altering both and altering the harmonics of the whole system” (317).
In one of Lingis’s travel essays, “Pura Dalem” (“The Temple of Death”) in the book *Abuses*, he tells a story about the Rangda ritual in Bali and how he goes about observing it. At the same time, Lingis resists the idea that observing helps us to know the object under scrutiny. He reflects on a reverse process, as I have just indicated quoting George Steiner--how observing the other impacts on the observer, who is altered by that engagement:

Young Balinese women were lining up in pairs; they wore intricate headdresses of gold and silver filigree in which pale orchids trembled and sticks of incense smoldered. Men were arriving from the side lanes, armed with kris daggers in scabbards led in the sashes bound about their waists. Then bare-chested man advanced in a din of cymbals; among them I saw the female fiend called Rangda, with long cowtail hair, boar-tusk fangs, and long fingernails on her clawlike hands jittery with spells. The dancer behind the Rangda mask was surely already in a trance and was advancing in glides and leaps. (*Abuses* 157)

Lingis tells of how a villager falls into trance and declares that it is time to take out the mask of Rangda, the God of Death. Men assemble, gather in a circle and become a mass of rolling heads; shaking torsos, dancing hands, they turn into gongs, insects, demons and cries of men. Gods appear, dressed in silk with gold and silver; other creatures emerge, for human beings never dance in Balinese rituals. The dancers manifest cosmic forces clashing, assaulting, withdrawing, yielding and vanishing. The ritual proceeds by metamorphoses: demon into priest, into seductress, into ape, queen, as if behind every mask there are other masks and behind these still others. Transformation follows transformation having no fundamental substance under it, except for the overabundant energy which pours across all transformations, leading each formation toward deformation, which constitutes a new formation. Suddenly a dozen men of the village leap up and enter the ritual. They hold daggers in their hands and are in a deep trance; they begin to stab themselves everywhere although their daggers leave no blood. They seem to be enraged, and perform this strange ritual until their rage calms. Then
one by one they vanish into the night. The strange aspect of this death ritual is that all watch it and enjoy it, even the children watch it with a happiness that is a divine-like happiness, a happiness like that of the sun which gives out its wealth.

Rangda ritual strategies, as they are described by Lingis, fit well with Benjaminian translation strategies. Ritual seeks to give new life to the participant’s experience. Rangda is the participant’s other, she is the locus of mediation between the past and future. The climax of ritual desire in Rangda worship is the ecstatic union with death, the trance. Ecstasy and trance form an epiphanic moment in which the ecstatic participant’s articulation is a living on in a new formation—that is a fulfilled act of translation. The play of the deity in the ritual is the play of the signifier, moving from one formation to the other in the dance of trance. The ritualistic “stabbing” of the previous life form opens for devotees the possibility of new meaning by making their story dialogical through a ritual religious aesthetic that enhances awareness of bodily aspects of experience. Besides such awareness there is the complicated process of “thinking through the gap”—which the subject endeavours in her/his “quest for renewed significations of new psychic, social and spiritual relationships” (Stephanides *Kali’s Feast* 190).

As for his involvement in the dialogue, in the negotiation of meanings and participation in the ritual, Lingis speaks of his own difficulties, incompetence, outsideness because the participants of the ritual perceive him, as he calls it, as a man of “white reason” (*Abuses* 169). He is exposed in front of the others by his exteriority as a white man. “Exterior to us we encounter the other,” noted Lingis in *The Community* (28). Lingis is aware of his different appearance and the fact that he is looked at as an outsider by the insiders. He feels disregarded, ignored by the Balinese in the Temple of Pura Dalem, where the ritual takes place:

…I recognized a young man who had leaned against me. In his eyes that level for a moment with mine, I saw only the empty darkness. The contact of our bodies was only mine. Nothing had been communicated. He had not leaned on my white reason; my body had been part of the wall of the dead… I followed him to the far end of the promontory where the others were gathered; he joined the young women who had danced entranced before the
altar. They did not glance at me as I stood looking long at their beauty with my indiscreet unseen eyes... No one greeted me as I passed. (*Abuses* 169)

Lingis surveys various theoretical positions—from psychological to mass psychotic and biological—to account for the ritual and finds them lacking. His “white reason” fails. Through the example of a young man, a participant of the ritual, he concludes that such rituals are best comprehensible in terms of cosmological connections between cultures:

All that comes from distant white shores, all that is bestial, reptilian in the biles of his body had been brought here, far from the discos and television screens and the white beaches of Kuta, and held in the arms of the Temple of Death. All that which, had there been any communication in the contact of my body with his, my white reason would have inscribed on its surfaces—Oedipus complex, assassination of the father, sedition of youth in every established community, ideological mystifications of neocolonial Third World consumer economies—had been inscribed here in the cosmological orbits. (*Abuses* 170)

The Rangda ritual constitutes the cosmic connection with the rest of the world and expresses the very cosmic drive to disseminate one’s life without recompense.

Our bodies are the graves of our ancestors. It was deep-ocean organisms exhaling gases in living and dying that originally produced this damp warm atmosphere about the planet in which we stand upright and with which we speak. Those who had come here to the Pura Dalem this night had come to make of their bodies the organs with which the voices of the dead could be heard. Are there things that are meant to be heard only after they will have died in their turn? Everything we say responds to someone who passed on or passed away. (*Abuses* 168)
Lingis suggests that the ritual reveals the dissipation of life energy in the transformation of figures and masks. The force that creates the plethora of masks and figures is the same force as the one which dissolves them. The name of the new form of life dissolves the name of the giver. The concern with the afterlife is deeply rooted in Bali when it comes to the tradition of name-giving:

The first child in every Balinese home, boy or girl, is named Wayan, the second Made, the third Nyoman, the fourth K’tut, the fifth Wayan, and the circle begins. At the forty day ceremony, the pemangku will write a number of sacred names on leaves, burn them, and whatever might still be legible in the ashes will be the child’s ritual name. But no one will ever call it this name, and before long the father himself will most often have forgotten what it was. Upon the birth of his own first child, he will be called Father-of-Wayan, and his own name will never again be used, and will fade away from the memory of the village. Perhaps his own children will not know what it was. (Abuses 169)

Lingis’s language demonstrates that to translate is to carry across. His story also states the fact of Lingis’ presence in the other culture, i.e., he describes how he joins the ritual as an observer, how he attempts for make contact, how he communicates and writes down what he understood and translated. Although Lingis is immersed in another culture he remains in a monolinguistic situation and his dialogues with the other are limited to sign or body language. Since the self, according to Bakhtin, is not dialogical, translation as a dialogue falls under question.

The absence of language causes a kind of “cultural blindness on the part of the traveler,” as Michael Cronin indicated in his essay about one of the characters in the movie Babel (2006), “who finds he is not so much an empowered citizen of the world as the unwilling denizen of a place” (Translation Goes to the Movies 102). What Lingis’s travel writing demonstrates is that one way or another the negotiation and the exchange of meanings exist, that they are present within the language of “the inside,” within one’s own language. Lingis proposes to look at such negotiation of meanings as a protest against monologue, as a need for diversification of translation and perhaps, in a wider sense, as a possibility of
dialogization of the world. Speaking of the dialogization of the world, Holquist, for instance, suggested that this idea along with the notion of carnivalization was the most radical and imaginative part of Bakhtin’s body of philosophy (22).

At the heart of the Lingisian attempt for dialogization is the assumption that what is exchanged—even if it has no recompense—has an afterlife. Contextually, dialogism, for Lingis, has no limits: forming a nucleus of cosmology it might extend into the deepest past and the most distant future, and meanings born in it will never be finally grasped once and for all, for they will always be renewed in later dialogue. Lingis’ cosmological approach suggests that sharing existence as an event presupposes among other things our dialogic relations not only with other human beings, but also with natural objects and cultural configurations. Together we form the world, and what makes us unique in this world is, according to Lingis, our answerability: we must keep responding as long as we live.

iii. Surpluses in translation: creativity

Participation in cosmological creation, openness towards world, and the passion—all of this composes the significance of human life, for Lingis. By feeling and using these cosmological connections, it is possible to delimit the notion of creativity in human life. Creativity springs from its dialogic nature and depends on human cosmic experience. Creativity is something that, for Lingis, forms surpluses or excesses in translation. As I have mentioned above, Lingis envisions a cosmological connection not only in rituals but also in more advanced forms of rituals—theatres, masquerades, carnivals, transvestitism—as well as in plastic creations such as temples and statues, in other words, in a variety of cultural and natural configurations:

Walking the volcanic rises of Te Pito O Te Henua I felt I was walking among their very ghosts, as though these ghosts had come to inhabit my nervous circuitry and sensibility. In the huge eyes of a thousand moai of volcanic stone turned to fathomless distances, I felt their taste for the impossible. (*Dangerous Emotions* 9)
Lingis refers to opening of minds for life in the world. It is not only a direct invitation to think more globally or in a kind of planetary fashion, but a suggestion to understand the sources of one’s emotions as well: emotions not only discharge their forces on the outside environment--they have their source in it. “People shutting themselves in private properties constrict their sensuality, ‘asphyxiate’ themselves,” and Lingis feels a need to point to a different kind of economy of life, to “excesses” (Dangerous Emotions 9).

For instance, the essay “Lust” in the collection Abuses is a meditation on the power of erotic drives--evoked by watching a transgendered stage performance in Bangkok--to dissolve and erase the apparent certainties of the observer’s gender and sexual identity:

You remember passing by this young guy in jeans and sneakers heading for the backstage entrance. That body, now slippery with greasepaint and sweat, belly cicatized from the tight plastic belt, feet raw in the spike heels, troubles you. He came from a rice paddy in the Isaan, you came from a farm in Illinois, a working-class apartment in Cincinnati. If one could somehow join, immerse oneself in the physical substance of that body, one would have felt for the weight and the buoyancy, the swish and the streaming, the smell and the incandescence of the costumes, masks, castes, classes, cultures, nations, economies, continents that are very different from understanding the signs, emblems, allusions, references, implications. Something in you would like to know how it feels to be that bare mass of indeterminate carnality being stuck in spike heels, sheathed in metallized dress, strapped to a crackling fiberglass wig, become phosphorescent in a pool of blazing light. Something which is the stirrings of lust. (118)

The eyes of lust idolize and fetishize the representation… there is radioactive leakage; the castes, classes, cultures, nations, economies collapse in intercontinental meltdown. Wanton hands liquefy the dyadic oppositions, vaporize all the markers of différence into a sodden and electric atmosphere. (120-1)
In talking about the “liquefying” power of lust experienced and expressed within a different erotic culture, Lingis documents how sexual interaction whether in fantasy or in fact, with someone from that other culture may initiate a dissolution of culturally prescribed self-imagining. As far as the adequacy of cultural translation is concerned, there could be no adequate translation of what one feels before the greatness and the beauty of the acts and works of others. This is why Lingis is careful in choosing words. Lingis’s choice of the word “lust” is rather important. He does not say “desire” or “libido” writing about Thai kathoey. “Desire” and “libido” are theoretically loaded terms, often referring to forms of eroticism in a given culture. The term “lust” does not carry these theoretical associations. It retains its source from some sort of pure impulse, wild energy, excess, pleasure seeking and perhaps a transgressive force in general. The term “lust” is used to describe the simultaneous confusion and liberation of one culturally constituted libido when it meets another, differently constituted form of eroticism. “For Lingis ‘desire’ is a form of libido linked to the affirmation and solidification of identity within a given culture, while ‘lust’ is libido beyond cultural limits and norms which can undermine and liquefy the apparent certainties of who we are as men and women as well as the genders of those we desire,” notes Peter. A. Jackson in his analysis of Lingis’s “Lust” (“Spurning Alphonso Lingis” 3). Lingis’s “Lust” is indicative of the “outpouring of emotions” which, in general forms, his “quintessential travel experience” (Mickunas, “Two Philosophers” 5).

Lingis takes various cultural phenomena and the subject of emotions and, “while attempting to interpret such phenomena within the philosophical framework of Western tradition, shows that such phenomena would be “cramped” within such a framework” (Mickunas). So, Lingis begins, as one of the reviews of his book Dangerous Emotions emphasizes, to ask “hard questions…” (Mischewski 167). He considers that the taken-for-granted aspects of one’s understanding of emotions and feelings can expose some disturbing assumptions about one’s learned responses or one’s thinking about them. In his travel writing Lingis places clear emphasis on the fact that emotions can intervene and change one’s practices, and even one’s hold on things might slip because of emotions’ powerful impact and strangeness.
First of all, Lingis’s travel itinerary itself is strange. Not only are different countries visited but, as I have said earlier, he also visits elemental spaces—such as volcanoes, oceans, and along the way he contemplates ideas drawn from Hegel, Freud, Nietzsche, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. What connects these extremes is Lingis’s attempt to demonstrate how emotions exceed and challenge Western reason’s capacity to understand and deal with them. The emotions in his travel writing are perceived as a defamiliarizing, foreignizing force and because of that they are powerful. Although Lingis gestures towards how one might learn to live better with them, his focus is on the dangerous effects of emotions—not only physically or psychologically but also discursively.

There is an opacity to emotions; they cloud the mind such that it does not see things in their whole context. Emotions color the line drawings with which cognition represents reality. The philosophical distinction between the cognitive senses and private feelings can be traced back to Aristotle; it continues to our day in the concept of objective scientific knowledge. We take emotions to be distinctively human phenomena… The modern philosophy of mind took emotions to be inner states, experiences with only one witness. One infers, on the basis of perceived behaviors, that there are feeling states in others analogous to those one knows within oneself… Emotions are also forces… Our emotions reorient others, disturb their trains of thought, seep into the blueprints of their projects, contest them, and afflict them with misgivings and self-doubt. Power among humans is not simply the physical force with which one material body may move another; it is the force to distract, detour, maneuver, and command. (*Dangerous Emotions* 15-18)

In taking up the subject of emotions, Lingis challenges rational language and rationality in general. While philosophy largely ignores the subject of emotions, Lingis argues that they are integral to what it means to be human. His travel experience allows him to glimpse at the largely marginalized and enigmatic Western understanding of emotions and, as I have indicated above, begin deconstructive work on the discourse that he departed from.
Shifting his focus to emotions and sensations, Lingis invents the language to express them. His language has provoked some discussion around the problem of how far an academic can move from the language he inherited from his profession. John Lechte in a review of Lingis’s *Dangerous Emotions* made his point: “Despite appearances, this is a book of the greatest detachment, one where description of the erotic rubs shoulders with the coolest of analysis. In this regard, it is notable that, stylistically, Marguerite Duras, as much as Bataille, has a key place in *Dangerous Emotions*. On Duras’s style, Julia Kristeva has said that it is a writing ‘without catharsis,’ by which she means that while the subject matter of writing might be of the greatest emotional import (love, death, war), the style is a choice emptied of emotion” (115). Lechte’s remark points to Lingis’s attempt to do the impossible—to bring the language of emotions into a discourse that never looked into the subject of emotions in-depth. Lingis’s style in discussing emotions perhaps can be explained only by the concept of a surplus in translation. Lacking the language of the place he travels to, Lingis puts emphasis on the senses. He is a translator of the senses, and since senses are “tenuous factors,” they make his language incomplete, strange but nevertheless resistant to the discourse of philosophy on which Lingis, as Lechte underlines, remains dependent.

Jose Ortega y Gasset, in his essay “The Misery and the Splendour of Translation,” noted that the incongruity of cultures is natural, and the language affected by the experiences of cross-cultural encounters might produce the phenomenon of “haziness” for the target audience transforming the author of translation into a stranger (49-63). Defending the failures of translators, Ortega y Gasset suggests that certain tasks are impossible in “their very essence, and they will always remain mere intention, vain aspiration, an invalid posture. Nature has simply endowed each creature with a specific program of actions he can execute satisfactorily” (49). On the other hand, Ortega y Gasset poses a question that applies to language more directly: if the target language becomes too rebellious, will it ever reach any audience? The translator, according to Ortega y Gasset, sometimes can be ruled by “cowardice,” and instead of resisting “grammatical restraints” he or she does just the opposite: places the emotions in “the prison of normal expression;” “betrays” them (49). In every translation there is the possibility of never really opening up towards the other. Lingis relates this to strong affections for one’s own culture. Affections put major constraints on an
individual and, in terms of translation, often keep the translator on the line of domesticating fidelity. Such affections, for Lingis, might prevent gift giving and receiving in a wider sense, as he suggests in one of his essays “Gifts” (Dangerous Emotions 179). Giving is “abnegating the ownership of resources” that puts the giver at risk, and one often chooses not to risk in order to strengthen his/her self-assurance and self-satisfaction: that is “a deal” concluded with culture (179). Culture, for Lingis, constrains us within every act of will, and one way or another it aims to ensure that someone who thinks “I do like this town and the job that gives me security” should understand that this decision translates into “I am deciding never to go spend twenty-four hours and see dawn, high noon, and midnight in the sequoia forest! I am deciding now never to hurl a rock at a riot protesting the oligarchy!..” (Emotions 5-10). What gifts give is the ability to give gifts as a natural affect. One of these natural affects, for Lingis, is found in the notion of brotherhood. In The Community Lingis notes that beyond the boundaries of any society and culture there is a brotherhood of individuals who possess or produce “nothing in common,” individuals destitute in their mortality. It is on the level of natural affects that Lingis envisions the exchange not only of goods and resources but the exchange of and the very ability to give “gifts,” that is--meanings:

One night, sick for weeks in a hut in Mahabalipuram in the south of India, I woke out of the fevered stupor of days to find that the paralysis that had incapacitated my arms was working its way into my chest. I stumbled out into the starless darkness of the heavy monsoon night. On the shore, gasping for air, I felt someone grasp my arm. He was naked, save for a threadbare loincloth, and all I could understand was that he was from Nepal. How he had come here, to the far south of the Indian subcontinent—farther by far that I who, equipped with credit card, could come here from my home in a day by jet plane—I had no way of learning from him. He seemed to have nothing, sleeping on the sands, alone. He engaged in a long conversation with the fisherman awakened from a hut at the end of jungle and finally loaded me in an outrigger canoe to take me, I knew without understanding any of his words, through the monsoon seas to the hospital in Madras sixty-five
miles away. My fevered eyes contemplated his silent and expressionless face, from time to time illuminated by the canoe, and it was completely clear to me that should the storm become violent, he would not hesitate to save me, at the risk of his own life. We disembarked at a fishing port, where he put me first on a rickshaw and then on a bus for Madras, and then he disappeared without a word or glance at me. He surely had no address but the sands; I would never see him again. I shall not cease seeing what it means to come to be bound with a bond that can never be broken or forgotten, what it means to become a brother. (*The Community* 159-60)

If on the one hand, in the seductions and dangers of travel Lingis finds the way out from cultural affections that have exceeded the natural ones, on the other, he points out to the prevailing need of rational communities for the safety of the “prepackaged tour:”

Millions of tourists are flown from country to country, bused from temple to temple, landscape to landscape, and return no more socially perceptive, more caring, more awed, or more profound that they were before. On the contrary, the trip, however prepackaged and handled seems only to make them more attentive to discomforts and small aggravations. (*Dangerous Emotions* 5)

Through the experiences of his own travel Lingis emphasizes that affections and sensory habits which constitute the substratum of one’s everyday lives are difficult to depart from. These are the routine, daily practices that we induce in ourselves by habit through a kind of behavioral norm, via popular culture, tradition, and ritual. In his tribute to Lingis’ phenomenology of senses, “Bodies in Transit,” Tom Sparrow posits: “There is no ghostly ego orchestrating the machinery of the body, but rather a gamut of rites, rituals, ceremonies, secret passwords and slang, a whole social circuitry which invests the body with an identity and regulates its sensitivity. This gives the appearance of automation and total integration into nature or culture” (115).
What Lingis does in his travel writing is to try to move in the opposite direction: to search beyond such appearances, for a natural dialogue of the body with nature. While questioning urban culture in *Dangerous Emotions*, Lingis points out that growing up in the suburbs and never seeing nature, one still has movements, senses, passions that are natural and, as he puts it, “bestial,” because one inherits them from animals, not from culture. The same way in Lingis also defines sexuality as natural, not as cultural order, and even what one understands as nobility or noble poise is, first of all, an animal quality before it became human. Likewise, our key human emotions are communicated and learned from the animal world. The impulse to move, to travel and give ourselves to the movement has been contracted by humans from a natural, elemental world of which we are an integral part. Lingis offers a lyric reminder on the ‘belongingness’ of rational beings to the spaces forgotten by them:

What is fascinating is the multiplicity in us—the human form and the nonhuman, vertebrate and invertebrate, animal and vegetable, the conscious and the unconscious movements and intensities in us… What is mesmerized in us are the pulses of solar energy momentarily held and refracted in our crystalline cells, the micro-organic movements and intensities in the currents of our inner coral reef… The speed, slowness, and turns of our movements come from movements we meet about us… the pulse of the wind, the reedy rhythms of the cicadas in the autumn trees, the whir of passing cars, the bounding of squirrels, and the tense, poised pause of deer… If an infant brought up in a highrise apartment, where all the paths he walks outside are paved and even dogs and cats are forbidden, still acquires feelings other than those which purring, growling, or roaring machines transmit to him, it is because he has contact with humans who have made contact with the living forces of nature. (*Dangerous Emotions* 28, 36)

Addressing the issue of emotions Lingis also sought transparency in his “translation” of cultures. It is a deep conviction of Lingis that there is much more transparency in human emotions and senses than in articulated knowledge and reason. Addressing issues of emotion in situations when one is linguistically and
physically displaced is something natural. Emotions are involved in every stage of listening. One needs to be displaced to address these issues, and displacement always crisscrosses with translation and the question of agency. Lingis’s “translation” of culture began, therefore, from the displacement that he considers as a gift. Taking a gift requires as much responsibility as giving, he says in Dangerous Emotions, and it is not “gift-giving unless what you give will come to life” (175):

Years ago, on my first trip outside Europe, I found in the grand bazaar of Istanbul a copper bowl used for ablutions and inscribed with a prayer. The merchant spun an enchanting and improbable tale over it. I sent it to two graduate students who were close friends. Now when I visit them and notice it on a shelf with a few other objects d’art, I want to figure out some way to get it back and give it to someone else. It brings me back abruptly to the year when I first discovered the splendors of Islamic culture and the Islamic soul. My friends teach philosophy and live in New York; their travels take them only to Paris every year or two. They had never, as I imagined when we were young, wanted to discover all of our world. On their shelf this copper bowl no longer purifies and sends forth and its prayer has been silenced. (Dangerous Emotions 175)

With his metaphor of silenced prayers and the bowl on the shelf in New York Lingis refers to dead objects, the museification of the prayers and words no longer subject to translation. Lingis’s concern with the architectonic structure of cosmic dialogue, with its ever adjustable relations and ratios of difference and sameness, shows that the unique sites of cultures are never complete in themselves and never alone in the world. Their existence in history, their “claim, to recognizable identity (style),” as George Steiner puts it, “are based on relations to other articulate constructs. Of such relations, translation is the most graphic” (After Babel 317). Lingis’s target-oriented travelogues arrive through the experiences of his exposure as an American in front of distant, foreign cultures, an exposure that is far from being unproblematic. When he speaks of gift-giving, then it is this illuminating moment of writing that he considers a gift.
If, on the one hand, Lingis’s travel experiences demonstrate that a big lacuna exists in the self-imagining of America, on the other hand, his texts illustrate the Bakhtinian notion of dialogue as a relative process, as a relation that can unfold only in certain time and space. Michael Cronin emphasized that in the situation of the absence of language especially, where there is the impossibility of immediate dialogue, the notion of time becomes important. This is a “particular kind of time in overtly spatialized and visualized models of the global,” says Cronin (*The Movies* 102). “This standard time-space compression thesis lends itself effectively to panoptic ideals of global simultaneity where the variousness of the world can be captured on a multiplicity of screens. However, this perception is in marked contradiction to the intensely local, place-bound existence of the majority of inhabitants on the planet” (102). What the prevalence of local lives does mean, however, is that local languages and cultures have a reality that resists “the easy sweep of the comparative cartographic gaze” (Cronin, *The Movies* 103).

Through his cosmology and language of emotions, Lingis makes a rich borrowing from the “libraries” of cultures. Since cultures mirror each other like the reflecting appearances in Borges’s library, Lingis’s cosmology and the language of emotions have meaning only when there is this reflection, only when the relation between the traveler and the other culture is established. Borges says, “methodical writing distracts me from the present condition of men” (“The Library of Babel” 65). Lingis sacrifices clarity and coherence in his travel writing’s language, perhaps intentionally in order to demonstrate the limitations of rationalized language and certainty in traveller’s accounts.

### iv. Silent languages of Alphonso Lingis

Another place is a kind of forest: the unknown language that speaks to a visitor there is like a silent language. By putting the body in the picture Lingis resists the idea of silence as muteness in contexts where the traveller finds himself or herself in a linguistic minority. Lingis posits that the human voice, coming “from the bowels and tubes of the body,” nevertheless has an ability to connect and evoke a reply, and this is so because “our voice does not produce the sound out of silence” (*The First Person Singular* 24). Even in cases of the absence of a
common language, communication is still possible by means of a corporeal grammar which is a part of the materiality of the world that speaks to us with a variety of voices; the voice then “relays and responds to the voices of things” (25). In feminist theory this is called the sound of the Mother, the sound O, “a cave sound” where language becomes “something that means more than it says,” and it moves beyond orality: “Hearing the O means hearing the process of this continual relation between words and things, sounds and ideas, narrative and history” (Salvagio, The Sounds 10). Lingis posits that on one level there is the flesh of the world and the sound of the Mother that unites us, and, on the other, it is the body that gives shape to sound. In the absence of language the bodies still express, talk and collide.

As I have mentioned above, in his travel writing Lingis articulates the problematics of the lived body, the body living in time, the body and time, and because of time limits any embodied perception is only a partial grip on the world. Embodiment cannot guarantee that the world will always be encountered as a natural whole as long as it maintains its familiar, to use Bakhtin’s term, *chronotopic* coordinates. It becomes obvious when one moves from familiar streets where he or she constantly encounters familiar people to a different cultural milieu and encounters other cultures, or to use Lingis’s term—the imperative of the other. Face-to-face encounter with the imperative of the other, the law of the other guiding his or her thoughts and the obviousness of the exteriority of the other, as Lingis posits, can affect us as a defamiliarizing, decentering and transforming force and, to put it metaphorically, can shake the grammar of one’s body perceived somehow automatically. Lingis speaks of the impossibility and necessity of translation in such situations. There is a silent allusion to a translation that can make the invisible visible:

Exterior to us we encounter the other… I indeed do not see the representation the other forms in his mind… The other comes as an intruder, and an authority, into the order of nature that my thought has represented in obedience to its own imperative. (*The Community* 28-33)
Throughout his work, *The Imperative*, Lingis explains that the imperative is a responsibility laid upon us by our very existence, not because we are situated among other rational beings who demand our respect, but because we could not coordinate ourselves without the stimulation of others (rational and non-rational). The imperative lays claim to us as responsible agents because we are composed of the elements of the material world. That is, we exist because our bodies must respond to numerous directives which sustain and/or diminish our vitality. Either way, we respond to directives which we call sensations. Lingis develops a thesis about our sensuality, which by its very nature commands our bodies to move, travel, open up to the sensations of the other. It is the “immanence of the sensuous” on the basis of which alterity operates for Lingis (Sparrow, “Bodies in Transit” 75). If one can catch sight of Lingis’s debt to Levinas, it has to be added that Lingis has replaced Levinas’s radical otherness with a radical immanence of the sensuous without giving up the notion of responsibility. Lingis takes Levinas’s face/other further, under the notion of the imperative. His primary claim is that we are not automatons, and our perceptions and senses are not part of physiology or subjectivity, but nourish themselves on the elements of the material world that we live from. For both Levinas and Lingis, a condition for our sustenance, and thus for our selfhood, is provided by the elemental world. “The elements are our freedom” (*The Imperative* 22). “Life lives on sensation; the elements are a nourishing medium” (*The Imperative* 17).

The identity of our bodies, explains Lingis in *The Imperative*, then automatic movements and affections are imparted to us from birth; culture invests the body with a corporeal grammar; our culture seizes us and inscribes our bodies as soon as we are born. From birth on, one’s subjectivity is invested with a communal form, a form—a structure, a language—that initiates the body into the stratified world and distances it from the possibility of raw sensation—these Lingis sees as our birth rites. As we mature, our bodies grow more competent; we achieve an advanced level of prakognosis, as Lingis terms it, and we become more familiar with the world, its offerings, and our capacity to manage within it. It is an allusion to Deleuze and Guattari who said of social “strata” that “they consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy…..” (*A Thousand
Plateaus 40). In other words, our culture imparts a form to our bodies as well as lends a form to our sensuality or sensitivity to protect them.

Lingis elaborates that it is because our bodies are made up of an organic material that we are sensitive beings yielding to the world. Because we yield, we can encounter. If it were not so, our flesh would sense nothing. We are vulnerable not only to hostile forces, but to the habitual forms imposed on us by our everyday environment. Our sensations, therefore, are not properly our own, even if they singularize us and make specific appeals to our senses. This is the meaning of Lingis’s imperative.

It is necessary to remark here that Lingis writes about the intuitive encounter between the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world. He makes his argument so because of his indebtedness to French phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Positioning travel as a performative space where the rules of Western culture are rendered uncertain, negotiable and full of possibility, he also gives answers to the queries of Deleuze and Guattari, Nietzsche and Bataille. Moreover, Lingis problematizes any fixed moral position on the nature of travel practices and aims instead to explore the specificity of encounters in terms of an ethics that might open other ways of relating, knowing and engaging with difference, as Alexander Hooke argues in his essay “Faces for a Philosophy of the Morning: Alphonso Lingis and a Wanderer’s Will to Truth” (1998). Travel in Lingis’s travel writing involves an in-between space unsettling Western oppositions of self and otherness, mind and body, through an affective relation produced in the face-to-face encounter with place and culture.

The concept of travel, especially taken in an extended sense, as I have said above, can therefore be considered central to Lingis’s thought. Lingis views travel as a destratifying practice, a practice which bursts our world wide-open. The exposure that comes through travel and through encounters with other cultures and alien forms of life resists affective and perceptual automatism. The desire for or of travel exceeds our formal corporeality. This is the meaning of Lingisian travel. Sensibility, sensuality, and perception, for Lingis, are not “reactions to physical causality nor adjustments to physical pressures, nor free and spontaneous impositions of order on amorphous data, but responses to directives of the material world” (The Imperative 3). These directives come from sensation itself, indeed they are sensation in all of its material manifestations—the humidity of the
air, the scent of an other’s perfume, a tap on the shoulder, the hungry glance of a dog in our care, etc. All of these phenomena make material claims on our bodies.

One’s perception remains sensitive to innumerable demands and signals, and if there is anything that Lingis asks us to take from his travel writing, it is recognition of the reality of sensations. Sensations are never purely one’s own. They belong to the flesh of the world—to the elemental—which unites and separates us while inducing us to move, and that appeals to our sensitivity. Other bodies collide with our own and penetrate through our automatism, intruding on our intentions. These are the promises of Lingisian embodied encounters and travel. “The traveller feels anxiety about his personal safety,” writes Lingis. “He has little confidence in a personal or institutional ethics to hold back the impulses of mass desperation. The trip has something of the feel of an act of recklessness and bravado” (Trust 60). We are met with affects, emotions, and sensations that we are unequipped to accommodate—because we are of the same substance, the same flesh, the same carnal community. For Lingis, this is a community of trust, but a trust which is built between those we trust without knowing or choosing. Lingis posits that in fact we are a community that ultimately “has nothing in common”: the sustenance which circulates between bodies does not come from heaven, but from “the nothing” that sustains the earth, the elements, and the other (Foreign Bodies 24-25). Unlike Levinas, who works over the face-to-face relation with God, Lingis locates the source of the imperative within worldliness. The forces and passions that organize our bodies come from elsewhere, from beyond the world of equipment that we manipulate together: “In the substance of our competence other bodies emerge, ethereal and phantasmal—bodies that materialize forces and powers that are other than those of praktognostic competence” (Foreign Bodies 24). To say that we have nothing in common is not to say that we cannot respond to the unexpected sensation, but rather it is to say that we cannot hope to master it before it makes claims upon us, it is not ours to master, sensation is the derivation, the origin, the departure.

In his essay “Tawantinsuyu” that recounts his journey through Peru to the ruins of Machu Picchu and forms a part of the collection Abuses, Lingis says: “What could any of us learn from looking at Maya inscriptions?... Why go? Places devilishly hard to get to, dangerous” (44, 54). How do we make sense of an encounter with a sacred place such as Machu Picchu where “There are no
inscriptions; they had no writing; their astronomy, cosmology, theology, epics, and chronicles were in the heads of the nobility who were all massacred or Christianized four hundred and fifty years ago… What there is left to contemplate is the Inca walls… Nothing would, nothing could be learned from the people of Tawantinsuyu, if you understood what they said…” (45). In asking those questions Lingis is suggesting that other sensory relations with the world are possible if we leave home and enter the space of the other. Lingis suggests that through travel we do not simply encounter otherness, desired otherness, we are also confronted by the limitations of our own constructions of identity and difference. “The look of the other disturbs and affects the body through its own fundamental excess of alterity,” says Simone Fullagar in her essay about Lingis’s travel writing “Encountering Otherness” (177). It is useful to remark here that throughout his work The Visible and the Invisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty posits that because the body exists intertwined with the flesh of the world rather than as either subject or object, its boundaries or surfaces are permeable, able to be seen, touched and moved by knowledge. Lingis’s experience of the ruins of Machu Picchu suggests that it is not so much the power of visible things, but rather it is the invisible shiver of something absent that pierces the flesh--the invisible as the reminder, the unsayable, the Babelian note.

Along with this Lingis juxtaposes in “Tawantinsuyu” his critique of technological imperialism with the stories of 16th century Spanish conquest, torture and the sacrifice of Inca culture that inscribe themselves upon him not as detached historical facts, but as past events that haunt the present:

The first Inca Pizarro encountered, and captures by treachery, Atahualpa, was told he had the choice of being burnt alive as pagan or strangled as a Christian. He accepted baptism… In the year that followed the Inca nobles who had not been baptized and given in marriage to conquistadors were slaughtered. Vilapampa, never found by the conquistadors but evacuated by its inhabitants, has to this day not been uncovered from its jungle grave. (Abuses 46)
Underlining the importance of translating the past, Cronin notes: “Translation makes us realize that there have been and are other ways of seeing, interpreting, reacting to the world” (Translation and Globalization 70). Fascinated by the towering walls of Machu Picchu, Lingis says, “the grandeur of the Inca civilization was in its walls, not only in the walls of sacred cities but in the terrace walls in the heights of the Andes” (Abuses 49). The stone figures in Lingis as a metaphor for materiality, specifically the relation Inca culture established with the substance of the world. Lingis plays with the metaphor of the wall, in terms of the boundaries that separate self and other: walls divide and distance, protect and enclose the self. Mostly, Lingis is moved by the intimate artistry and engineering of the ancient Inca culture: “Spending but an hour contemplating one of the stones of the sacred Plaza at Machu Picchu, one comes to realize the time and the labour devoted to cutting thirty-two corners into this rock weighing two hundred tons to absolute precision to fit in with the adjacent rock, and it becomes clear that the endless patience and profound spiritual reverence for the stone itself are inconceivable today” (Abuses 51).

Lingis contemplates the walls of Machu Picchu alone, without tourists and photographers, who have been kept away by the threat of terrorism. Simone Fullagar notes in her essay that Lingis “posits himself as anti-tourist, the aesthetic traveler who risks his life to glimpse a mystical moment in the beauty of the unknown” (“Encountering Otherness” 175). It is not simply the visual splendor that Lingis desires in Machu Picchu, but rather it is the unseen, the invisible otherness as well as the unsayable. Lingis is haunted by an otherness that is not necessarily produced by the immediacy of another being. Hence, Lingis’s ethical response to an otherness is a reworking of Levinas’s, which suggested that it is primarily in the face-to-face encounter that the ethical moment is realized. At the basis of Lingis’s attraction to otherness is not knowing and a profoundly decentering strangeness.

Lingis admires the Inca relationship with the flesh of the world, “The Inca cutter did not seek the satisfaction of immortalizing his image on the stone… In them the whole labor, the whole life, the identity of the artisans was absorbed without leaving signs” (Abuses 54). He momentarily experiences the vertigo of non-identity and the pleasure of this location of self within the world, within the materiality of his task as a translator at hand. The flesh of self and world connect
through visual and tactile surfaces and boundaries. This spatio-temporal experience of past and present, seeing and feeling opens up a sense of responsibility and respect for the other’s history. “…you know you came to touch them,” Lingis says, “had to come to touch them. You touch the stones of Saqsaywaman their bodies had touched with such labor and such joy (Abuses 60-1).

There is this moment of recognition of boundedness in touching, because touching means also being touched, the moment that differentiates as much as connects. Luce Irigaray, in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, speaks of the nature of the subject’s openness to the other in terms of porosity; the corporeality of self allows the other to pass through, to be felt, yet the distinctness of each remains always excessive. Porosity is the ability of strange substances to cross the subject’s own boundaries and in doing so change the very contours of identity. Porosity constitutes the body as a threshold or passage, not strictly defined by inside/outside but rather by multiple surfaces open to other surfaces. Irigaray suggests that such an openness of self occurs through the recognition of the strange. This recognition underpins the desire for a form of sociality in which there is a world in common. Lingis has called this commonality a “mortal community” in which the flesh is recognized in our shared mortality rather than codified or rationalized. In his book, The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common, Lingis argues that the rational basis of community relies upon a dominant morality and law, against which he juxtaposes the notion of another community. This notion of community in Lingis has been informed by his travels where the sense of community grows not from the production of something in common, but rather through the interruption of work and enterprise. Alexander Hooke, in his essay on Lingis’ philosophy “An Ethic of Accompanying Dying,” notes that this sense of another community is produced through the encounter with the other with whom one has nothing in common (153). Travel, for Lingis, offers the possibility to catch a glimpse of another sense of community premised on an embodied encounter with difference and to reveal the dependency on the foreign—the problem crucial for translation.

Referring to his immediate American environment, Lingis observes that in its rational collective enterprises, in its public works and monuments “we find nothing alien to us,” foreign to our understanding: we find only ourselves (The
In finding ourselves Lingis sees limitations not only in Western culture but in the understanding of the world by civilized men in general. In other words, Western culture essentially “prevents its members from perceiving themselves as cosmic creatures,” as inhabitants of the planet:

We do not, like the Balinese, find in our institutions...the visitation of alien spirits, demonic and divine forces of volcanoes and rivers and skies... we civilized men... see on everything the form and shape given to the raw material of nature by collective human intentions and effort, which are produced by the practice of rational discourse... In the human community [the individual of modern culture]... finds that his own thought is representative of the whole system of rational thought, he will find in his fellow-man but the reflection of his own rational nature. (The Community 10)

Simone Fullager remarks that “Lingis desires the risky journeys into difference as an experience of embodied transformation, a momentary becoming-other that cannot be explained through the rationality of truth/illusion, subject/object relations in western culture” (175). Lingis emphasizes that Western thought at all times sought to create a “theory of all the theories in every branch of scientific research, the Standard Model from which... the theories could be derived” (2). Western thought somehow missed it, as Lingis points out, that there is another community which can recur and trouble treason. For Lingis, the rational community itself is possible because of those others—the intruders, the strangers, the cultures where rituals are still alive and where the rule of the elemental still exists, aztecs, nomads, guerrillas, enemies, etc. Departing from the rational community Lingis suggests that it finds its roots in Western philosophy. As Lingis demonstrates in his book The Community, Western philosophy, “unlike the wisdom of the sages of pre-Socratic Greece, India, Persia, and China” (1), was initially linked to the cause of building closed systems of collaboration and rationality:
We rationalists perceive the reality of being members of a community in the reality of works undertaken and realized; we perceive the community itself as a work—work as an enterprise and an achievement. The rational discourse we produce materializes in collective enterprises. To build a community would mean to collaborate in industry which organizes the division of labor and to participate in the market. (5)

Western philosophy is grounded on the will of reason as a constructive work, as a production of thought, not as the “sum-total of impressions left on individuals by the action of alien forces” (1). To explain this, Lingis draws an example from the history of philosophy:

In the mercantile port cities of Greece, strangers arrive who ask the Greeks, Why do you do as you do? In all societies where groups of humans elaborate their distinctness, the answer was and is, Because our fathers have taught us to do so, because our gods have decreed that it be so. Something new begins when the Greeks begin to give a reason that the stranger, who does not have these fathers and these gods, can accept, a reason that any lucid mind can accept. Such speech acts are pledges. The one who so answers, commits himself to his statement, commits himself to supply a reason and a reason for the reason; he makes himself responsible for his statement. He commits himself to answer for what he says to every contestation. He accepts every stranger as his judge. (The Community 3)

The “community of the dying”—that is what Lingis calls humans—though it is a community which is marked by the exposure of oneself to another in the sensuous medium; my flesh is nothing other than your flesh; but my body is at the same time exposed to your body, and to the world.

Alasdair MacIntyre makes the following observation in his work, Dependent Rational Animals: “It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing, as we encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition, mental defect and disturbance, and human aggression and neglect” (1).
For MacIntyre, the history of thought from Plato to Moore has been rather unconcerned about the connection between human affliction and our dependence on others, and he claims that “when the ill, the injured and the otherwise disabled are presented in the pages of moral philosophy books, it is almost always exclusively as possible subjects of benevolence by moral agents who are themselves presented as though they were continuously rational, healthy and untroubled” (3). Michael Cronin, referring to MacIntyre, notes that “the denial of dependency leads to the fetish of autonomy and an obsessive concern with unconditional freedoms... To acknowledge the fact of translation is to suggest subjection, indebtedness” (Translation and Globalization 39).

The one becomes the brother of the other when he puts himself wholly in the place of the death that gapes open for the other...To catch sight, beyond kinship, of this community in death, we should have to find ourselves, or put ourselves through imagination, in a situation at the farthest limits from kinship—in a situation in which one finds oneself in a country with which one’s own is at war, among foreigners bound in a religion that one cannot believe or which excludes one, with whom one is engaged in no kind of productive or commercial dealings, who owe one nothing, who do not understand a word of one’s language, who are far from one in age (for even being of the same age-group is a commitment)-and on whom one finds oneself completely dependent, for one’s very life. (The Community 158)

Lingis’s travel writing provides original thinking through which different dimensions of humanness can be identified which, Bhabha suggests, “is crucial for developing connections between local and the global, the poetic and the political” (“Unpacking My Library” 201). Alexander Hooke suggests that Lingis “invites to consider the possibility of encountering others through their singular claims and appeals as mortal beings rather than as mirror images of ourselves” (“Faces for a Philosophy of the Morning” 433). Lingis’s travelogues also answer Derrida’s attempt to subvert the very concept of difference which produces the binary opposition between an original and its reproduction. Since “difference is never pure,” as Derrida suggests in Positions, the notion of transformation is
preferred over the notion of translation: “a regulated transformation… We will never have, and in fact have never had, to do with some “transport” of pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched” (20). If only the opposite case was possible, the translator would expose himself to vertigo. He may find the language so forced and traversed, that it would enclose him in strangeness and silence. As George Steiner, reflecting on the work of Walter Benjamin notes, “Translation is an exemplary case of metamorphosis… In perfect translation there is a paradox of fusion and new form without the abolition of component parts… The life of the original is inseparable from the risks of translation; entity [the original] dies if it is not subject to transformation” (After Babel 273).

With his notion of “communities of the dying” suggesting the intertranslatability of cultures, Lingis demonstrates that any real independence of spirit can only come about through a grateful acknowledgement of our many cultural and linguistic dependencies. Since “each human language maps the world differently,” interdependency involves plurality and complexity (Steiner, Babel xiv). In Globalization and Translation, Michael Cronin also points out that the cultivation of humanity in a world of complexity and interlocking phenomena involves understanding the ways in which common situations and processes (such as dying in Lingis) are differently realized in different circumstances and different linguistic milieus (6). Such understanding of differences is inconceivable without the agency of translation. Writing about feelings, watching and sensing the things produced by others, Lingis’s travel writing sees translation as performance.

v. Translation as performance

The whole idea of the dialogization of the world in Lingis’s travel writing testifies to his deep concern for an active engagement with culture, for participation, or what he calls “a participationist theatre” in which great possibilities of translation are opened up (“Return to, Return of” 165-75). Cronin also noted that usually the encounters with unknown, foreign languages lead to translation performance (Cronin, The Movies 113). In the sense of participation, it could be presupposed that Lingis is a kind of Malinowskian hero. In Argonauts of
the Western Pacific, Malinowski suggested that a researcher/writer has to dwell among those whom he studies and to share his life with them, because only then is he capable of immersing himself in an unfolding series of events in the lives of others. Only then can rituals, rifts, cures, spells, deaths begin to take place “under my very eyes, at my own doorstep…” (8).

Lingis finds himself in a place when direct dialogue is impossible, his focus moves to bodily participation in an act of communication, to emotions and touch, experiences of denial and acceptance by others, and, most importantly, through the texts written about such places and cultures by other travellers. In writing Lingis often returns to places through the texts of others by posing the question: What is it to return? And what happens to you when you return? Those questions haunt him, not accidentally. This is because in Lingis’s travel writing the ability to return associates with translation of visions—the term as such and the transmitted message. In an essay about the chod rite in Tibet, “The Dreadful, Mystic Banquet” Lingis places an emphasis on visions which see what is not physically there in front of one’s eyes. In English, he says, the “vision” can designate the faculty of the perception with eyes: we speak of vision, hearing, touch; “we say he has 20-20 vision. But ‘visions’ designate scenes seen with clairvoyance. What is a vision of visionaries, of seers? In English we also speak of ‘having visions,’ ‘seeing visions’ which are delusional. The visions of visionaries of themselves separate from delusions…” (“Banquet”). To tell the vision, for Lingis, is to translate, and to translate is to return.

Lingis’s essay circles the idea that the essential activity at the core of every individual is that of elaborating meaning. In the western understanding of the world “…our individuality is constituted by a ceaseless spinning of an ever-wider spider web of referentiality. The referring of what is seen to what lies beyond, the referring of means to ends, of causes to effects, of paths and obstacles to goals is the activity that constitutes the perceptual field into a practicable field” ( “Banquet”). But what chod, the vision, stages is the disintegration of all referential connections and contexts into the elemental night—a wild site that evokes emotions of insecurity and terror. Westerners receive their visions in the field of practice and work, in the field of security and instrumentality. These are scientific, poetic or technological visions that, as Lingis puts it, do not make us feel the risks involved. Such visions are translated into transtemporal forms and
concepts and sent to the target audience, while chod translations are performed in conditions that at times even put the life of the celebrant at risk: “All things which the celebrant had perceived, understood, and used as means and nutrients are visualised in a wild, phantasmal, ghoulish form of pure consuming mouths, now consuming the celebrant. There is not the utterance of a new discourse, imbued with a higher meaning, but instead the demented cries and the laughter of the ghouls. Laughter interrupts discourse, breaks with the enchainment of thoughts in the coherent succession of words. There are words, but they are the liturgic words of unreserved surrender… with these words the celebrant makes the ghoulish feats on his body into a wilful act of sacrifice” (ibid).

In “The Dreadful Mystic Banquet” Lingis brings in the story told to him by Alexandra David-Neel, who witnessed the rite of chod practiced in old Tibet. It is a kind of mystery play with one actor only, the celebrant. It has been devised to terrify the participants so much that “men have suddenly gone mad or died while engaged in performance” (“Banquet”). Lingis uses David-Neel’s story and transfers some aspects of it to his own text with such an emotional intensity that it is as if he were witnessing the rite himself. He starts his own story from details of the elemental, from the place of the performance. The sequence in the story from where he selects details is important. He travels, and for him the real experience of travel begins from the moment of mapping the place of interest, landing there, immersing himself in its mystery.

From Alexandra’s story he finds out that the place chosen for the rite is a wild site whose physical aspect awakens feelings of terror and insecurity. Lingis notes that the place is even more suitable for such a performance when it is associated with a terrible legend or if a tragic event had actually occurred there recently. The rite is designed to stir up the occult forces which may exist in such places, generated either by “actual deeds or by the concentration of many people’s thoughts of imagined events” (“Banquet”). During the performance, the celebrant may see himself suddenly surrounded by players from the occult world. The performer of chod, called naljorpa, must first learn the ritual dance steps while keeping time with the liturgic recitation. He must learn to handle several musical instruments as well—the bell, the magic dagger, a small drum and a small trumpet. The ceremony begins with the procedure of the crucifixion of the selfishness of the celebrant. Then he calls a number of hungry demons by blowing
a trumpet. He envisions a female deity, who personifies his own will, and who springs from the top of his head and stands before him with sword in hand. She cuts off his head, skins him, rips open his belly and offers his bowels to the crowd. The blood spills, the guests bite and chew noisily, and the celebrant excites and urges the crowd with liturgical words of surrender:

For ages in the course of renewed births I have borrowed from countless living beings—at the cost of their welfare and life—food, clothing, all kinds of services to sustain my body, to keep it joyful in comfort and to defend it against death. Today I pay my debt, offering for destruction this body which I have held so dear. (“Banquet” par. 6)

There is no indication of who translated those words, but as Michael Cronin has put it in *Globalization and Translation*, “in a foreign country faced with the fact of interlingual communication the travel writer may adopt a number of different strategies, one of which is foreign speech translated directly into the language of the narrative…” (159). This strategy, as per Cronin’s classification, is called *translation* (159). The strategies of the rite described in Lingis’s essay fit with not only with the Benjaminian strategy of translation but also with Lingis’s idea of cosmology. The rite and the process of writing seek to provide new life to the devotee’s experience. The feast is central to the rite: the ghouls feast on the body of the devotee and the devotee experiences not the agony or pain but the plenitude that restores, heals, resurrects the crowd of alien species, the plenitude of ecstatic giving and the exhilaration of emptying himself. The devotee has his own strategies: if the female deity is the devotee’s other, she is the locus of mediation of sacrificing the self. If the devotee is a performing translator, the translation of the text is seen in the play. The climax of ritual desire is a gratitude that gives without limit, a generosity without a thought of recompense. The rite ends with the laughter of consuming ghouls and the silent renunciation of the ascetic who realizes that he holds nothing that he can renounce. Thus vision does not culminate in the glorification of the visionary. The meaning he has given to his act disintegrates. Nevertheless, the wild exultation over the boundaries of the historical body is enacted in the performance—the last extremism of renunciation
and complete forgetfulness. The dismembered past makes sense of the trauma of the dreadful present. Through hearing the laughter of ghouls the ecstatic celebrant acts to release himself from the rhetorical inscription of his body and experience the triumph of disarticulation. The ritual renunciation of the past opens up for the devotee the possibility of new meaning by making the story legible through the rite and the bodily aspects of ritual experience. In this perspective Lingis’s translation sought to replay the play of difference of the *chod* devotee.

Focusing on the meaning of the rite Lingis demonstrates how the vision of his own culture has been transformed. Even the Nietzschean psychogenesis of visions, as Lingis explains, fails in the *chod* rite: Nietzsche had explained the origin of visions out of frenzy, the collective frenzy that intensifies the forces of the Dionysian orgiasts. The *naljorpa*, in contrast, has long pursued asceticism, and goes to the elemental regions alone (“Banquet”). Pointing out the generosity of gift-giving without recompense in the *chod* rite, Lingis draws a dreadfully contrasting parallel to it—the rituality of his own culture and its alienation from visions:

Our old anthropocentric and predatory vision flows on in rituals of our culture. We no longer bless our meals in order not to lose our individualism in carnivals—our modern culture has psychopathologized individual rituals from our own feudal and theocratic past and demythologized and commercialized collective rituals… There are daily rituals of consumption. Our cuisine is the high mass of our global capitalist liberal civilization. In traveling from country to country, being served like the emperor by every alien culture in restaurants where any substance, any plant or animal, is laid out for our consumption, we situate ourselves in the food chain at the top, making ourselves the uneaten ones, the unexchangeable value the cosmic dignity. Our most terrible taboo is cannibalism. We situate ourselves ritually in nature as the species for which all other species are destined as food, but which themselves are not to be eaten. What rituals will we have to contrive, to celebrate in elemental spaces, in order that the visions imparted by our ecological and evolutionary biology and our astronomy today enter into our lives? (“Banquet”)
All these anxieties and questions express a worry about the lack of historically meaningful action in the West. “What we lack is an action,” says Lingis. “For a vision to take hold, it must not only break through the crust of our axioms, maxims, formulas, conceptual paradigms and representations and impose itself in the radiance of its epiphany. It must also pull at the anchors of our practice. What is it about Ireland and Irish Catholicism that made the visions of Milton and Dante take hold on James Joyce? What is it about life in our high-tech archipelago that makes Joyce but not Milton and Dante grip us? And what conveys visions is language, the vision is language reduced to utterance, to an invocation and appeal. An individual voice. Very often it calls up visible beings who have voices and who may be the only voices… The naljorpa hears the laughter and greedy cries of ghouls. The naljorpa receives a vision” (“Banquet”). For Lingis, visions come when someone is capable of delimiting himself or herself, forgetting the self, and that in fact is a feature of the mind of a translator. A visionary is a historiographer articulating his own visions with the visions of others, and a historiographic mind is the mind of a visionary caught in translation.

If we follow Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that the world acts as a living mirror for the self, vision is the sense through which the self sees the world in its difference. Yet the desire returns the gaze to the self as the center of perception, and otherness becomes known through the mirror of self-sameness, objectified though visual distance. It is the effect of this narcissistic structure of vision on our way of viewing the world and our relation to it that Lingis takes issue within his travel writing: “Before going to make contact, with the Aztec ruins or with the migratory whales, we tap the search key on our computer and file in our brain the content of all the relevant library shelves on the topic… Images are not the faces with which the things confront us; things are made perceivable by contexts called high culture, both materialized as digital programming and disseminated industrially” (Abuses 45). Here Lingis alludes not only to technological imperialism, but points to the problem of time in contemporary globalization. As Cronin suggests, globalization generates two forms of time—instantaneous and mnemonic. Instantaneous time requires space-time compression and demands our extremely rapid turnaround of transmitted information. Mnemonic time requires greater remoteness from the original and its translation. It allows time for the
translators’ tasks of bringing the text to its home culture. It makes available materials out of which cultures and societies can construct a future. “If such time is neglected, there may be indeed many communities, languages and cultures for which there is no future at all” (Globalization and Translation 71).

The very assemblage of meanings from other milieus of time and space is what generates further meanings and relationships. But in the rite this assemblage of meanings is historiographic. The ethnographic vision keeps what has come to pass and is already in the course of passing away, while historiographic vision recovers and reinstates the past. In this sense Lingis views translation as more historiographic than ethnographic, more transmitting than communicating.

Speaking of the process of transmitting within historical time Michael Cronin indicates that the main difference between communication and transmission is, precisely, the historical horizon (Globalization and Translation 20). The horizon of transmission is historical and it needs a medium—a body—to make its action effective. Moreover, as Lingis argues, it needs a historiographic mind:

The historiographic mind is comprehending. It encompasses the greatest array of lives and events. It integrates the visions and understanding of others. Events that came to pass long ago and far away lose their distance. The historiographic mind establishes relations of significance between them. It retains from the past not their forces but meanings. It confronts and scrutinizes the events he represents; no longer advancing with the momentum of their forces, he positions, connects, judges evaluates, selects. (“The Return ” 167)

In his essay “The Return to, the Return of, Peoples of Long Ago and Far Away” Lingis refers to Freud, who found that recovering and reinstating the memory of a traumatic event liberated the patient from a compulsive symptom, as he understood then that the symptom was a repetition, disguised or transposed, of the original traumatic event. The symptom of fear, shock, or anxiety recur. Memory is also a repetition of the original trauma, but on another level—that of representation. The patient repeats because he does not represent, does not remember. But does it not follow then that in order for the event to recur, to be
repeated, it must not have been integrated into a representation, it must have been forgotten? “The historiographic mind—that most comprehending mind—retains from the past not its forces but its meanings,” writes Lingis in his essay “Return to, Return of” (167). But if for Freud’s patients to recall a past event and understand its meanings is to dissipate its force, does not the historiographic mind also strip the past, which it remembers and represents, of its force? No longer advancing with the moment of their forces, he positions, connects, judges, evaluates, selects. Events arise as forces newly born, without a past.

Such is the tragic, theatrical, ritualistic and Dionysian culture that Lingis, alluding to Nietzsche, opposes to the optimistic, theoretical and dialectical Socratic culture, which supplanted it, and which was constructed in order to destroy it. In Dionysian rites there is a circulation of roles, gestures, and identities. In trance, the actor is possessed by the instincts, sensibility, and the tastes of heroes of other generations, gods and beasts. The ritual theatre in Lingis’s travel writing produces what Nietzsche first identified in *The Birth of Tragedy* as “metaphysical consolation” (104). Nietzsche found it in the specific nature of the actor’s pleasure: it is a creative pleasure, it is a pleasure of feeling oneself full of force capable of producing significant identities, heroic actions, and not afflicted when these phantasms die by the dawn, “undiminished” because, he knows, he is able to produce them anew (104). Such pleasure is the “metaphysical consolation” the tragic ritual produces—consolation for grief and mortality. In his essays therefore, Lingis speaks of such acting/participation as “theatrical intoxication,” an overwhelming power that embraces the actor/participant:

In the ritual...each participant dreams up a satyr identity and projects himself wholly into this appearance, knowing not only the joy of producing a hieratic form, a sublime identity, a sacred destiny, making it exist with his gestures, movements, utterances, his own flesh and blood—but leading it to perfection, to completion and death, with the sentiment of exalted force... This theatrical intoxication, this most superficial pleasure, that of the most superficial man, who is himself nobody, who represents everybody and anybody, in fact communicates with the ontological pleasure of the universe, whose force continually
creates forms, forms of being, and is contented, exhausted in that
creation, but does not will any of them to survive…(“The Return”
165)

In identifying the problem of language, Lingis’s own language hovers
between the axiological and the apophatic, seeking words whose forces chant and
do not discourse. Alluding to Nietzsche’s affirmation that the primal force of
language is axiological, he affirms that “words are uttered not for their
representational form but for their condensing, intensifying force--mantras” (The
Community 64), and “the strong and active forces of healthy sensuality speak,
speak words of consecration and imprecation” (65). In Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche
portrays poetry as the great healer of the existential worries of human life: the
Apollonian (philosophical) and Dionysian (poetic) characters must be held
together if either is to attain its fullest potential.

Lacking the language of the place where he travels Lingis is attentive to
rhythm, sound, voice, the integrative part of our bodies: “Our voice does not
produce sound out of silence. It resounds with the tone and density of the wind
coursing through the body’s tubes and bellows, shaping melodies and words in
the ambient air that is traversed with so many whispers and calls. It joins the
drone and crackle and outburst of things and the murmur of the environment”
(The First Person 24).

The subject of the body in translation is not free of the questions of
eroticism and intimacy. In the opening chapter of After Babel, Steiner makes clear
that translation, as an act of interpretation, is a special case of communication, and
that communication is an erotic (intimate) act: “Eros and language mesh at every
point. Intercourse and discourse, copula and copulation, are sub-classes of the
dominant fact of communication. They rise from the life need of the ego to reach
out and comprehend, in the two vital senses of “understanding” and
“containment,” another human being” (25).

As Gayatri Spivak suggests, we have to turn the other into something like
the self in order to be ethical (“Translation as Culture” 21). Translation, in this
sense, is more erotic than ethical. The translator is such a “medium,” therefore –
he or she is a carrier of intimacy, an “intimate body,” as Spivak puts it (21). Such
intimacy becomes life when a translator translates another culture to the language
of his or her own, into his/her own system of inscription. Then a translation becomes an act of primal importance intertwined with the sense of responsibility toward the translator’s own language, the sense of the undefinable and intimate feeling of debt to the place-holder of that language.

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Lingis’s style, as I have said before, is distinguished by the variety of the usage of academic terminology, notes and references. This provides his language with a certain strangeness. Even quotations are incorporated into the texts as a kind of direct speech or dialogue with no clear verification. It was James Clifford who noted that after Malinowski’s generation was gone, writing about other cultures changed: the informant, or the writer/anthropologist, or the writer/inscriber emerged as a complex historical subject, neither a cultural type nor a unique individual. Clifford acknowledges that his own attempt “to multiply the hands and discourses involved in “writing culture” aims not to assert a naïve democracy of plural authorship, but to loosen at least somewhat the monological control of the executive writer/anthropologist and to open… negotiation of discourses in power-charged, unequal situations…” (Routes 23).

James Clifford and Alphonso Lingis are linked in seeing the interaction between culture and travel as a never-ending translation, as a juxtaposition of itineraries where practices of displacement might emerge as constitutive of cultural meanings, rather than as their simple means of transfer or extension. “And if there is no cure for the troubles of cultural politics in some old or new vision of consensus of universal values,” posits Clifford, “then there is only more translation” (Routes 13). This is what Lingis describes in the essay, “Dreadful Mystic Banquet,” as the “beginningless and the endlessness of anonymity,” which overwhelms us when we leave “the space of work and reason to go to these separated places marked out by taboos and prohibitions… to make contact with, and to contract with, extrahuman forces” (“Banquet”), and expose ourselves to transformation and continuous translation. Lingis’s translations of rites materialized through the language of gestures and movements of the body. Such understanding of translation points to the possibility of the exteriority of
translation, something that Bakhtin described as “unfolding externally, for the
eye, the ear, the hand… not within us, but between us” (The Formal Method 8).

This explains why Lingis’s stories are never alone: they are intertwined
with the stories of others, from other historical times and cultural spaces. It
explains also why Lingis’s travel writing is at the same time historiographic. He
travels not only in space but in time, back and forth, among stories of others that
he considers more important than his own:

The historian’s text inscribes not only the meaning the individual
initiatives and collective enterprises had for those who launched
them, but also the meaning they had for the generations that came
later and built and destroyed in the world which those initiatives
and enterprises had shaped. And the historian formulates the
meaning of the past for his own generation and their descendants.
History presumes that we must learn from the deeds, triumphs,
and defeats of the past. (Dangerous Emotions 14)

At this point I must refer to the Polysystems theory, which worked around
the idea of literature as an independent system with its own hierarchy and
transformations within it, ones that can influence the hierarchies of other systems.
Polysystemists grounded their argument on the obvious diffusion of borders
between translated and original literature, and on the appearance of a number of
semi- and quasi-translations within the system. Later, this idea of Polysystem was
expanded by Toury’s theory of norms, which assigned primary importance to
socio-cultural constraints affecting writing: all texts are written in a certain
language for a certain literary and cultural system. In Lingis’s essays the
polysystemic norm works through the usage of a plural “we.” By “we”, Lingis
refers to a specific audience, he doesn’t create a target audience, locating himself
at a “source” that the “target” is ignorant of. By uttering “we”, Lingis also erases
himself as an author and makes a translational shift by letting his writing be
guided by the effects and emotions the other culture engages him in. He
introduces, to use Toury’s terminology, a differential measurement into his
writing by allowing the meanings and possibilities of the “source” to take him
over (as when he describes rituals). Lingis produces a sort of quasi-translation of
other cultures. To follow Toury, such quasi-translation is not based on norms but on shifts—on the possibility and freedom of locating the self between the extremes of the source and the target. This is the open possibility of in-betweenness, so to speak. Such strategy is always already used by Lingis in his travelogues. Lingis’s travel writing could be named a quasi-translation of culture, and in terms of philosophy, a quasi-philosophy of travel.

The philosophical travelogues of Alphonso Lingis evoke what can be called a metaphor of translation; metaphor that embraces philosophical speech and also makes his texts read like meditations on travel and continental philosophy, reports from the field, or “letters to friends,” as the author himself puts it. Those “letters” with no names and addresses, from the Americas, from Africa and Asia, those extraordinary journeys, as well as the bodies of knowledge that are found in his travelogues, separate Lingis from academic philosophy, making him truly interdisciplinary. His inter/continental approach spans the globe and reaches beyond the academy. Woven into his philosophical language are the faces, desires, lusts, fetishes, drives, and emotions of the uncountable others in which he has immersed himself while travelling. His original work flows from his affective immersions; he is a “radical empiricist,” as Tom Sparrow called him in the essay “Bodies in Transit” pointing to the fact that Lingis’s philosophy takes “senses and sensuous relations embedded in the world of experience seriously” (101). If Lingis breaks with philosophy through a re-assertion of the impact of sensation on one’s identity, and on life in general, it is at the same time true that he is inspired by encounters with other cultures—unknown bodies and intelligences, and the claims they have made on his body’s own intelligibility. As Simone Fullagar puts it in her essay, “Encountering Otherness”: “For Lingis, travel figures as a movement of self into a liminal space… Liminality marks the passage of self from one identity to another and involves the suspension of everyday life that is at once located within the specificity of place and also always metaphoric with respect to the mediations of a Western imagination” (171 and 181).

Lingis’s journeys refuse the conventional categories of travel narrative or philosophical treatise, for he creates a relationship with the reader that affects and unsettles the certainties and truths held onto in the face of difference. Lingis does not simply seek out an exotic other as the object of western desire. Rather, he
explores the complexity of his relation to otherness in order to subject himself to the risks, possible friendships with, and the alterity of, the other. Lingis’s philosophy is invested with translation of culture, and these two modes of thought circulate through one another, creating a mutual exchange and the translation of the theoretical into the sensuous and vice versa. In other words, Lingis’s travel testifies to the irreducibility of the sensuous, and its role in constituting and reconstituting oneself. A system of sensation, sensuality, and sensibility abounds in his texts and attempts to contest the dominance of rationality of American culture, the fluency of one’s affects, and one’s mastery over the carnal world.

Lingis’s travelogues inform my belief that contemporary travel writing offers an important measure of current spatial practices, both geographic and textual, at a time when such practices are subject to close scrutiny throughout the academic disciplines. More important than its fruitfulness for academic study, however, is that Lingis’s thought, in general, makes one reexamine one’s conceptions and negotiations of the directives the world, both human and natural, places on the body. His travel experiences return him to the depths of a philosophy that puts the body in the picture. Some of Lingis’s works discussed in this chapter are written in a manner of sharp contrast between cultures, an eclectic manner evoked by the variety of his bodily experiences in other cultures. His travel writing is not only a translation of other cultures, distant and unknown to us; it loudly speaks of testing one’s body in the surroundings of other cultures and of the elemental. The combination of elements of autobiography, anthropology, psychoanalysis, science and art in his texts, together with his philosophical insights, produce powerful and provocative investigations of the physicality of writing and the relativity of authorship.

To understand Lingis’s work one definitely has to go beyond academic criteria and venture even into the world of the popular. He starts with the particular rather than the abstract, which is the opposite of the traditional philosophical approach. If existentialism led to a break with gods and myths, to a dismissal of biological drives, Lingis has worked to draw attention back to the mysticism suggesting that it has more influence on our actions than we are possibly aware. Lingis tells in one of his interviews: “In taking our ambitions, our values, and our achievements seriously we turn ourselves into idols, which we cannot help fearing will soon be covered with graffiti and pigeon shit… what else
can we do, do we do, but laugh…?”(Janis, Interview). As a devoted travel writer Lingis seeks stories, not answers; he seeks concrete examples and texts.

The representation of the other for Lingis is a movement that could be rightly associated with Benjamin’s notion of an afterlife. The difference between “you” and “I” is immanent, but something of you always exceeds my representation of you. The representation of the other as translation exceeds “the original,” but always as a mode of temporality, or as a temporal kernel located in the original that ensures the original’s endurance and survival. While translation unfolds, perpetually renews and transforms the original, it at once springs forth from it, finding its conditions of possibility in the original’s afterlife. This reciprocal, mutual interdependence is part of natural life. The term ‘life’ in Benjaminian as well as Lingisian thinking is not restricted to the life of the living organism. Instead, both thinkers ground natural life in historical finality to identify life itself as history.

To live for Lingis means something more: it is to feel oneself surrounded in the plenitude of the flesh of the world. As Lingis writes in *Phenomenological Explanations*, “to sense is to sense the substantial” (67). The remainder is a reminder that the travel writer is elsewhere. The tension between naturalizing and exoticizing strategies generates what Lawrence Venuti (after Le cercle) has called the remainder in translation, those elements in the target text which resist assimilation (Cronin, *Translation and Globalization* 160).

Being in culture, for Lingis, means submitting oneself to the processes of living and dying in the community. It may be in the tensions of submission and responsiveness to the words of community members that ethics emerges. Lingis notes that there are two avenues into communication – one that “depersonalizes… visions and insights, formulates them in the terms of rational discourse, and speaks as a representative, a spokesperson, equivalent and interchangeable with others, of what has to be said,” a stance that is prevalent in much social science research; and another, “in which you find it is you, you saying something, that is essential” (Lingis, *The Community* 116). Advocating the latter over the former, Lingis argues that to enter into conversation with another is to lay down one’s arms and one’s defenses; to throw open the gates of one’s positions; to expose oneself to the other, the outsider; and to lay oneself open to surprises, contestation, and inculpation. It is to risk what one found or produced in
common… One enters into conversation in order to become an other for the other (The Community 87-8). There is, actually, something in the other that calls forth what Lingis terms “a recoil of respect” (31). Becoming an other for the other implies making oneself available as an attentive, respectful and engaged witness and re-describer, precisely as some of Lingis’s works imply.

But for Lingis our actions and encounters are responses to imperatives and directives. Intentionality and the conscious ego are not central to many domains of knowledge, for Lingis. Wolfgang Fuchs, in his autobiographical book Encounters with Alphoso Lingis, sees Lingis’s renewed historiography as a conceptual tool that enables us to name, describe and experience encounters, promising a dynamics for developing fresh forms of knowledge. Immersing himself in a study of phenomena like the face, embodiment, alien force, mortality, joy, expenditure, Lingis challenges not only theoretical philosophy but also the Western understanding of eroticism, intimacy, morality, human nature, the self and its relation to the other’s world, home, cosmos and history. With these conceptual tools at hand, we might gain more insight to other truths and values—including the beauty, health, generosity, courage or history of peoples and places that directed philosophy’s response to other lives and realities. The whole world becomes a fieldwork.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation, as it was defined in chapters one and two, was to look at the phenomenon of the translation of culture and the problematic of a displaced language in the context of worldliness as it is perceived in contemporary American travel writing. Travel writing—a genre that involves mobile boundaries between target and source--provides an especially rich ground for new explorations in this direction, and my four case studies of contemporary USA-based authors prove that translation as a window to the world and as a human activity are in many ways inseparable from the concept of culture. As I have indicated in chapter one, ever since the Cultural Turn in translation theory, translation is no longer defined as an activity that takes place between two languages, but rather as something taking place between two cultures, as a dialogue. The translator is allowed to emphasize the creative aspect of translating--to intervene in the original, subvert it, divert it, even aim to entertain the reader--in his or her dialogical engagement with the source culture (Bassnett and Lefevere, *Constructing Cultures*, Robinson, *The Translator’s Turn*, Snell-Hornby, *Translation Studies*). As translation theory moves toward an understanding of translation that sees it more as a cultural (rather than a linguistic) transfer, the act of translation becomes not simply a “transcoding from one context into another,” but an “act of communication, a dialogue” (Snell-Hornby, *Translation Studies* 39). Culture, therefore, is not just the “arts,” but it has a broader anthropological sense, as referring to all socially conditioned aspects of human life (39). I also have stressed in chapter one that Umberto Eco decisively identifies translation with culture, which is conceived less as a static phenomenon and instead as the endless translation of signs into signs (*Experiences of Translation* 71).

My case studies go a step further to show that the translational capacity of culture is an important criterion of culture’s specificity. In general terms, it has been stated in my work that culture operates largely through translational activity, since only by the inclusion of new texts into culture can the culture undergo innovation as well as perceive its own specificity. Viewing America as a mixed source and as a point of departure I demonstrated how American, and more
generally Western and rational perceptions of culture are being challenged by travel writers, and how the translation of culture not only can defamiliarize the receiving culture but also can consolidate or criticize an established cultural order. Since the hegemony of English has a power to exclude or suppress the influence of other languages and cultures on the target culture, it is useful to look not so much into the relationship between source and target but into the possible effects of translation on the target (in this case, American) culture. My aim, in other words, was to show how translation challenges the target culture, the thinking and the understanding of the world within it. Although the reception culture as such is not clearly defined in any of the authors, my case studies still prove that certain translations oblige even hegemonic language to express thoughts and facts that challenge its hegemony as such. That does not mean that translation becomes a purely internal affair of the target language, or that the linguistic and cultural problems posed by the original become irrelevant. On the contrary, translation perceived as cosmological—as the process of continuous interaction and exchange between cultures where language is only one aspect of it—reveals the interdependency of cultural systems on each other. This means that a specific culture and language, no matter how hegemonic or dominating it is, is not a closed system but one that is constantly nourished and challenged by the energies of an open system—that is the world at large—which becomes the main source and guarantee of the closed system’s survival.

How translation opens up the economy of closed systems, could be well explained using the concept of dialogue, introduced into literary studies by Mikhail Bakhtin. Introducing the concept of dialogue Bakhtin went further than the Russian Formalists and Victor Shklovskij with his concept of defamiliarization—the dialogic relation between various forms of art and literature was newer, it held and offered more possibilities than formalist “form against form” interaction. Bringing the theory of Mikhail Bakhtin into Translation Studies is new. Applying his concepts for translation is something that can be called the “added value” of my work. Bakhtinian theory helped me show how the working mechanism of culture is connected to translation. This connectedness can be observed from two points of view. The first derives from the fact that, thanks to Roman Jacobson’s works, a semiotic turn took place on the borderline between translation studies and cultural semiotics. The scope of translation as a term was
widened and the methodology of Translation Studies started to change due to the differentiation between three kinds of translation activities: intra-lingual translation, inter-lingual translation and intersemiotic translation or transmutation. Another aspect that can be linked to translation as the working mechanism of culture is that of the semiotics of culture. And it is particularly for this purpose that I have introduced Bakhtin. He attributes to the language of literature (and, at the same time, to the text as well) the capacity to operate as a meta-language, one that translates from one sign system into another. For Bakhtin, the text is a series of translations where a dialogue takes place between texts and practice—between empirical practice and theoretical practice, between science and ideology (Robel 1995; De Michiel 1999). It is, in other words, a dia-logic place, for at least two different logics meet: those of different cultures and those of different languages. Understanding, for Bakhtin, is a process that, on the one hand, creates differences (word and counterword), and, on the other, similarities (word and its translation). And if the dialogism of understanding is borne in mind, it is possible to talk about two types of dialogue. Bakhtin called this co-existence of different voices, ideas and several equal subjects in the text ‘polyphony.’ Polyphony, in fact, is a way of representing the other, according to which a human being is “an alien consciousness of full and equal rights and of full meaning that has not been set in the finishing frame of reality” and whose interpretation, accordingly, is a dialogic process (5:340). The representation of any idea by a human being cannot be separated from her/his personality, and dialogism is a particular form of the mutual influences that shape consciousnesses with equal rights and meanings. According to this, polyphony as a whole is an artistic “will to unite several single wills, a will to reach an event” (2:29). Any culture therefore is analysable in a polylogic manner or as a polylogue thanks to its heterogeneity. In Bakhtin’s thinking an important principle is revealed—the polylogue of a culture cannot be analysed as a sum of monologues, for culture as a whole operates through dialogic relationships between monologues and a polylogue is thus an intertwined phenomenon. What is necessary to understand this intertwining is studying and understanding the space in which it takes place, cultural space. Within this space, it is necessary to understand the situation that creates dialogue or is accompanied by dialogue—to understand the event or the text. Culture has its own sign systems or languages on the basis of which the members of the culture communicate.
Thus, one possibility of understanding a culture is to learn the language of the culture, the sign systems that operate within the culture. The languages of culture are apt to change and their signs are ambiguous. Thus another possibility remains—to approach culture via events that bind different sign systems. It is the combination of both that I have searched for in the work of travel writers. The polylogic approach to culture gives priority to the coexistence of different autonomies and observes the differences of differences. A dialogic polylogism though gives priority to links and to the mixing of autonomies, to the differences between sameness and to the sameness of differences as I have tried to reveal in my case studies.

One of the first people to introduce Bakhtin to the world at large, Julia Kristeva, has stressed the ambivalence of Bakhtin’s system; considering the same poles, she juxtaposed the polyphonic novel with Menippean satire as a heterologic phenomenon. Thus, if we proceed from this logic, polyphony creates a dimension of diverse voices differing from one another. Travel-writing is an exemplary case of a polylogic text, for the different languages are already fixed in the text. As a semiotic translation, on the other hand, travel writing fills an important gap—it engages the complexities, the intertwining of the languages of culture. As a result, the general notion of culture can be described as a process of total translation.

One way or another my case studies also offer a critique of translation in the context of the exchange of meanings between cultures—translation as mistranslation (Raban); translation as anomaly (Iyer); translation as a code (Gibson); and translation as rationalization of language (Lingis). To study the status of meaning is to study the substance and limits of translation. As the cases of travel writing demonstrate, translation seems to be a constant of cultural and individual survival, and survival involves movement. It depends on accurate reading and interpretation of a web of vital information. There is a vocabulary, a

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8 To explain heterology as a concept one should return to the time when Bakhtin was most active. Some dozen years before Bakhtin introduced the concept of polyphony, a dictionary of musical terms A Guide to Concerts by Boris Asafyev (1919) was published in Russia (reprinted in 1978). This booklet, which has had considerable influence on the metalinguistic thought of its period, defines several concepts of the theory of music as general and theoretical ones. When it is read through the prism of Bakhtin’s works that were to follow, the notion of heterophony also opens up this way. Heterophony “is not yet polyphony in its developed (articulated) form, in which each voice has an independent meaning, but one of the stages in the transition to polyphony (in which all voices form an intricate horizontal complex that is moving and continuously changing)” (Asafyev, A Guide to Concerts 31).
grammar, and possibly a semantics of colours, sounds, odours, textures, and gestures as multiple as that of language, and there may be dilemmas of decipherment and translation as resistant as those I have met in my case studies. Travellers’ experiences show that although language is polysemous, it cannot identify, let alone paraphrase, even a fraction of the sensory data which a traveller is able to register when facing another culture. This is the problem of what Jacobson labeled ‘transmutation’ (as I have mentioned above): the interpretation of non-verbal signs by means of a verbal sign system and vice versa. But as travel writing shows, one need not go immediately or entirely outside language. There is, between translation proper and translation perceived metaphorically, a vast terrain of partial transformation. The verbal signs in the original culture are modified by one of a multitude of means or by a combination of means such as (in my case study) paraphrase, description, thematic variation, citation, collage, and many others. Those means are intertwined in the matrix of culture.

In my work I have also tried to apply translation to the larger question of culture and of inherited meanings. To what extent is culture the translation and rewording of previous meanings? And how are these meanings being challenged by translation? The case studies demonstrate how non-verbal sign systems (performance) enter into various combinations with verbal sign systems (the travel story). The absence of knowledge of the local language in the place where one travels is one of the reasons why such combinations occur. The travel writer who sets another culture to text is engaged in the same sequence of intuitive and technical motions that prevail in translation proper. His or her initial trust in the signification of the verbal sign system is followed by interpretative appropriation, a transfer into the textual matrix and, finally, the establishment of a new whole which neither devalues nor eclipses the source. The travel writer need not cite her/his source text. She or he can imagine, reflect, or enact it with greater or lesser fidelity. She or he can treat it in a limitless variety of perspectives ranging from photographic mimesis to deliberate distortion of the allusions and associations. It is up to the target audience to recognize and reconstruct the particular perspective. I have distinguished between four forces of translation—centripetal, centrifugal, petrifying and elemental. These manifold transformations and reorderings of the relationship between an initial verbal event and the subsequent reappearances of this event in other verbal or non-verbal forms might best be seen as topological.
As George Steiner explains it in *After Babel*, topology is a branch of mathematics which deals with those relations between points and those “fundamental properties of a figure which remain invariant when that figure is bent out of shape” (234). The study of these invariants, as Steiner suggests, and of the “geometric and algebraic relations which survive transformation has proved decisive in modern mathematics. It has shown underlying unities and assemblages in a vast plurality of apparently diverse functions and spatial configurations. Similarly, there are invariants and constants underlying the manifold shapes of expression in our culture” (*After Babel* 234). It is these constants that make it possible and useful to consider the fabric of culture as topological. One of my questions was how much of what the travel writer sees is a previous text. Convention and traditional codes of identification have a strong grip on reflexes one might have thought spontaneous. This has to be recognized as a topological process. Defined topologically, a culture is a sequence of translations and transformations of constants. Translation always tends towards transformation. When one sees this to be the case, the clearer understanding of the linguistic-semantic energy of a culture and of that which keeps different languages and their topological fields distinct from each other becomes possible. According to Steiner, the distinction between prevailing verbal, formal, thematic, or modal constants is bound to be “artificial,” but it can serve to point up different strategies and ideals of “rewriting” (235).

Travel writing illustrates a crucial mechanism of recreation and shows that transference need not be absolute. The translator of culture can keep a balance between two cultures by substitution which is a constitutive part of metamorphosis. In any case, the dependence is there, and its structure is that of translation. As for the topologies of culture, my case studies demonstrate that rational communities are the product of already set patterns of perception and feeling. Western culture, as Alphonso Lingis indicated in his philosophical travelogues, has so thoroughly stylized perceptions of its community members that they experience their traditionality as natural. Lingis raises the question of cultural and linguistic difference in the light of a carnality that unites us all.

The authors that I have chosen for my case studies question the dynamics of such traditionality and challenge it. In each of my cases, the travel writer is meant to recognize the source, to grasp the intent of a transformation which leaves
salient aspects of the original intact. What I have found out is that, long-persuaded of the dynamics of Western ways, of the futuristic tendencies operative in Western science and technology, the “rational community” (to use Lingis’s expression) of the US is meeting through cultural translation a subtle counter-current, a new understanding of its confinement within world bounds. “America” too is a creature of fables and human dreams. It may be that cultural traditions are more firmly anchored in the syntax of culture than one can possibly realize, and that cultures shall continue to translate each other for their individual survival.

My findings focus on the idea that even the global empire such as the US at the turn of the millennium cannot survive without so-called peripheral cultures, languages and translations, which continue to challenge and transform by confronting homogenizing forms of a larger whole. The work of the writers of my choice also shows that despite their command of global English, the issue of language remains the central issue when they move outside the borders of “America” as “Americans.” On the other hand, the four authors taken together represent a critique of translation demonstrating that translation establishes not only understanding but also order. Travel and the freedom of movement in the exchange of meanings may break the symbolic order and disclose the volatility and spontaneity prevalent in interaction between cultures.

The present study attempts to contribute to a wider enquiry of cultures and languages. Though many issues of travel and translation are revealed through this work, it does not approach some important issues such as the experiences of travel as involuntary departure, issues of gender in language and translation, the language of mixed marriages, loss or transformation of the mother-tongue. These questions demand analysis since for human beings in late modernity, the inescapable fact of language diversity and heteroglossic pressures, even within single languages, make travel a verbal event.

And finally, my findings refer to the place of English among other languages in an era of globalization. As it spreads across the earth, international English becomes like a fluid without an adequate base. As Pico Iyer’s texts show, one need only converse with colleagues from abroad to realize how profound the effects of linguistic dislocation are. Only the native cultural environment can provide a language with the interdependence of formal and semantic components.
which translate culture into active life. The internationalization of English has
begun to provoke a twofold enervation. As my case studies indicate, in many
cultures imported English is eroding the autonomy of the native language and
culture. Intentionally or not, American-English and English, because of global
diffusion, are one of the principal agents in the destruction of natural linguistic
diversity. In other words, the modulation of English into an Esperanto of world-
commerce, technology, and tourism, constantly has new effects on English
proper. It is too soon to judge the dialectical balance, the reciprocities between
profit and loss, which will accrue to English after it has become the lingua franca
of the earth. If dissemination weakens the native genius of the language, the price
would be tragic, but one of the positive sides of the condition of contemporary
globalization is the inflow of other cultures that augments the vitality of English
and enriches its vocabulary.

To a greater or lesser degree, every culture offers its own reading of life.
To move between them, to travel and translate, even within the restrictions of
totality, not only brings the language closer to the body, but also creates
alternative worlds of human individual expression and experience that enrich Babel.
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