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**The destabilizing Foreign Interventions¹ in the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus
during the 1960's decade.**

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Introduction

The Cyprus Problem is undoubtedly a by-product of the Cold War. Had the Cold War not occurred, probably the Cyprus Problem would not exist. The security competition between the USA and former USSR² had a direct impact on the Republic of Cyprus, a former British Colony. Cyprus with its very important geopolitical position should by no means fall in the Soviet orbit

of influence. Therefore, the Great Powers involved, primarily the USA and the UK, wanted to perpetuate their influence over the Island by keeping Cyprus under the strict control of NATO. This reality would not be necessarily detrimental for the interests of Cyprus, if Turkey was not a member of NATO. But Turkey was not only member of the North Atlantic Organization, but also the most important ally of the West in the Middle East. That meant that the Cyprus Problem should be solved according to Turkish wishes. Ironically, any effort to consolidate NATO control over Cyprus was inconsistent with the aim of Cypriot leadership for a truth independence³ devoid from the Zurich weights⁴ and was leading towards partition. There is much evidence in this paper that supports our argument.

More specifically, the constitutional crisis of Cyprus in December 1963⁵ forced the Great Powers that were involved in the conflict (the USA and the UK) to re-determine their role and interests. This time their objectives were not the limitation of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, with Zurich- Style solutions, but the total termination of its sovereignty. More analytically, the inter-communal conflict of 1963 was a major threat for their regional strategy in the area of Eastern Mediterranean. Any escalation of the crisis could provoke a Greco-Turkish war, weaken the south-east flank of NATO and attract soviet influence in the area. The UK, the ex-colonial power was a dwindling power in the postcolonial international system.

That meant that it could not sustain the burden of dealing with the Cyprus crisis alone and therefore the Americans would be involved in the management of the crisis.⁶ The UK and the USA wanted to revise the constitutional status of Cyprus in order to satisfy Turkish demand for

permanent separation of the two communities. In December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot officials had already withdrawn from the central Government and other administrative positions and the Turkish Cypriot population was concentrated into various enclaves scattered all over the island. The Turkish Cypriots were defending by force the limited partition they attained. At the same time, on December 30 1963 the British drew the Green Line separating the two communities until now.

Hegemonic Powers Vs Cyprus Sovereignty

On January 15 1964 a five-member conference⁷ was convoked at Lancaster house in London, with the participation of the Guarantor Powers, Britain, Greece, Turkey and representatives of the two communities. The aim of the conference, which was presided over by the British Secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys, was to find a final solution for the Cyprus Problem. At the Conference, the British and the Americans that were involved later at the end of January in the discussion, demanded, among others that a NATO Peace force be sent in Cyprus in order to support the British forces that were deployed on the island soon after the inter-communal conflict erupted in December.

Duncan Sandys supported Turkish Cypriot's demand for the geographical separation of the two communities, that would be accomplished through the removal of Turkish and Greek Cypriots from various areas of the island in order the mixed villages to be abolished. At the same time – according to the plan- an intergovernmental committee based in London would provide the

commander of the NATO power with political guidance. The crucial point in the Sandys-Ball plan was that it did not mention the Republic of Cyprus at all, which would not participate in the committee mentioned above. This was a fragrant violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus and it made the intentions of the two powers clear. President's Makar demand that the Security Council should decide for the deployment of a Peace Force and that the states that should participate should belong to neutral states than NATO members led the conference to a deadlock on 31 January.

American President Lyndon Johnson sent the undersecretary of State George Ball to the island in order to press Makarios to accept the proposals. Ball threatened Makarios that if he would not cave in his demand the USA would do absolutely nothing to avert a Turkish invasion on the island. This flagrant threat that would be repeated many times in 1960's signified the American intentions. Subsequent American governments used the threat of a Turkish invasion in order to compel Cypriot leadership to accept the Turkish demand for a divisional solution.

More tragically, in the light of their failure to impose their divisional solution on the weak state of Cyprus the Americans in collaboration with the British orchestrated an "artificial crisis",⁸ the "Suez of Cyprus" as I call it. The crisis that has been neglected by the researchers provided that in case clashes erupted in Cyprus, British Forces would be sent on the island in order to dictate the areas of northern Cyprus that Turkish forces would attempt occupy. We must not forget that Turkey was repeatedly threatening that it would invade Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The last such threat was set forth by Ismet Inonu on January 28, 1964. In another level the Anglo-American plan provided that the two NATO countries should ensure the Greece

would not react in case of a Turkish invasion. The Americans would press the Greek government not to send troops to the island by threatening that in either case the American efforts to contain the Turks to make a limited invasion would fail. On February 14, 1964 Turkish warships were heading towards the island.

At midnight, the British announced, just as the American contingency plan envisaged, that an army command organisation was to be flown to the island. At the same time, the British surprised the UN with an urgent plea for a meeting of the Security Council in order to examine a request for a peace keeping force, which Makarios had theretofore rejected. As Ian Craig and Brendan O' Malley inform us in their awarded book "The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion",⁹ the arrival of British troops and the UN initiative proved enough to persuade the Turks to abandon their invasion for the time being. Turkish soldiers who were aboard those ships reported later that their superiors told them that they were heading towards the island in order to make a real invasion¹⁰ and that it was not a military action. So, the Turks never realized that they could succeed in invading Cyprus ten years before the invasion of 1974.

At the micro level of Cyprus, the British were trying to consolidate partition and the geographical separation of the two communities. Martin Packard, who was appointed in January 1964 as co-ordinator of the tripartite mediating initiative in the northern areas of Cyprus, mentions that he came to the island with a genuine desire to promote the reconciliation of the two communities in the local level and, according to his argument, in many cases he succeeded in his goal. But as he explains in his book "Getting it Wrong, Fragments From a Cyprus Diary 1964", the Commonwealth Relation Office was supporting his goals, while the Foreign Office

and the English secret services insistently undermined them. During his meeting with Martin Packard on 12 February 1964, George Ball told him: “Very impressive, but you’ve got it wrong, son. Hasn’t anyone told you that our objective here is partition, not re-integration?”¹¹ In another incident, in May 1964, when Cypriot authorities arrested Keith Marley, a senior RAF aircraftman, they found particular weaponry on him, as well as messages that were destined for the terrorist Turkish Cypriot organisation TMT.¹² After investigations in his house the authorities discovered tapes and material that connected him with conspiratorial activities on the island. His arrest led to the discovery of a conspiratorial network that was undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cypriot government by collaborating with the Turks.

After the failure of the Anglo-Saxons to impose the Sandys-Ball Plan, the Cypriot Government made a recourse at the United Nations and on 15 February the Security Council held its first meeting. The Security Council at its eighth (and final) meeting adopted the resolution No. 186.¹³ international organization the weak state of Cyprus achieved a big victory against the hegemonic powers and their intentions to abolish Cypriot Sovereignty. As President Makarios stressed, “the main purpose of the recourse was to achieve a resolution safeguarding the Sovereignty of Cyprus against armed intervention or the threat of armed intervention from without.”¹⁴ This purpose had been achieved. The Security Council, recognized the sovereignty of Cyprus and called all member states to refrain from any action or threat of action that could make things worse in Cyprus or to endanger international peace.

At the same time, the Treaty of Guarantee was put in question and Ankara could not invoke in the future. Operative paragraph 4 of the Resolution providing for the establishment of a “United Nations peace-keeping force”, was another point of support of the Cyprus Sovereignty,

that met the basic Cypriot demand that the force should emanate from and under the Control of the UN.

In the meantime, armed clashes between the two communities in various areas of the island continued. Clashes occurred in March at Ayios Ilarionas, an area of strategic importance near Nicosia, and in the town of Paphos. The whole tentative situation in comparison with the advent of the Greek Army on the island provoked ongoing tensions between Turkey and Greece. On 13 March 1964 Ankara threatened again with armed intervention. Turkey went further when she started preparations for an invasion on the island. According to information, the Turkish invasion would take place on 5 June 1964. American President Johnson, worrying that such an eventuality would provoke a potential Soviet intervention, sent a letter to the Turkish President Inonu underlining the American objection to the Turkish plans. Thus, Turkey suspended its plans. Our conclusion is that the fear of Soviet interference deterred Turkish invasion. The Turkish threat to invade the island was cancelled by a "systemic constraint"¹⁵, a well known concept derived from theory of International Relations.

The "De-Internationalization" of the Cyprus Problem: Double enosis or Partition.

Despite the Cypriot victory in the UN the hegemonic powers, namely the USA, continued to plot for the removal of the Cyprus Problem from the international fora, especially the UN. This strategy, the strategy of "de-internalization of the Cyprus problem", mainly aimed at the imposition of a NATO-style solution on Cypriots.¹⁶ Therefore, after the USA failed to invalidate Cypriot sovereignty, she invented a new strategy, the strategy of "double enosis".

Johnson's envoy Dean Acheson bypassed Sakari Tuomioja, UN Mediator, who was appointed by the resolution 186 and he tried in Geneva during the summer of 1964 to conciliate two diametrically opposite aims: The Turkish aim for partition and the Greek aim for enosis. However, the Acheson plan would unavoidably lead to the partition of the island. Acheson, among others, proposed the concession of Karpasia peninsula to the Turks under full sovereignty and the creation of Turkish Cypriot cantons.¹⁷ Actually there were two versions of the Acheson plan. The first version was accepted by the Turks as a basis for discussion. The second version provided for the lease of Karpasia peninsula to the Turks for the construction of a military base limited in size. The Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou accepted the second version and rejected the first.

We must underline the fact that Turkey never consent to the Acheson Plan. According to many documents derived from State Department archives the Turks wanted full sovereignty of the 4/10 of the island. It is important to mention that when the Turkish negotiators Nihat Erim and Turgut Sunalp went to Ankara in order to negotiate with the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu they agreed, as the most acceptable scenario for them, the concession of the 21 % of Cypriot land to Turkey, including Kyrenia.¹⁸ Erim pointed out to Acheson that this kind of solution was acceptable for Turkey from the military point of view, because Turkish Cypriots could resort there in case of the eruption of clashes with the Greek Cypriots.

he Acheson proposal collapsed in late August.¹⁹ In any case though, had the Acheson plan been accepted the island would have been divided 10 years prior to the Turkish invasion, while the island's security would have been constantly in danger. As we have noted above, the 4/10 of the

island would have been under Turkish sovereignty, while Turkey would have a military base on the island, with full authority of use. The security dilemma between the two communities would have been worsening day by day and the Greek Cypriots would have been in grave danger by the threat of the Turkish army's presence on the island. Turkey's proximity to the island was complicating things further for the weak state of Cyprus. The Greeks irrevocably rejected the Acheson plan on 25 August 1964. Three days later the Turkish foreign minister Jemal Erkin also rejected the plan,

At this point it is useful to examine the main axes²⁰ of the American diplomacy regarding the Cyprus Problem. The first axis -according to Professor Vangelis Coufoudakis- was (and it still is) the urgent need to solve the Cyprus Problem because of the strategic position of Cyprus and the implications of the problem on the Greco-Turkish relations and to the cohesion of NATO. The second axis -and the most important for our analysis- is Turkey's greater geopolitical value for the USA than Greece's. Therefore, any solution of the problem should satisfy Turkey's interests.

Furthermore, the Cyprus Problem is not only a Greco-Turkish affair, but it must be solved in the context of NATO. Every interference of the UN was regarded as detrimental for the American interests because it could attract soviet influence. Finally, the continuous interventions of the hegemonic power in order to to deter a Greco-Turkish war. We have already mentioned Jonson's letter to Inonu. As we have mentioned above American action was not due to disagreement with Turkish aims, but because of the fear of imminent USSR involvement and exploitation of the conflict. The absence of this danger in the summer of 1974 gave Henry Kissinger the opportunity to change drastically the balance of power on the island.

In the meantime, the UN Mediator Touomioyia suddenly died in August 1964 and Gazo Plaza from Equator replaced him. The newly appointed mediator, who was vehemently against the Turkish demand for population exchanges was in favour of a unitary, independent and sovereign state. He said that the Turkish demands could be satisfied only by use of force. The Turkish side rejected Gazo Plaza's report²¹ arguing that he was acting beyond his mission. Furthermore, American refusal for a solution within the UN parameters led the whole procedure to failure. In December 1965 Galo Plaza informed Secretary U Thant that he would resign.

Political Turmoil in Greece and its implications on the Cyprus Problem

In July 1965 Greece faced a major political crisis²² because of a disagreement between the leader of "Enosis Kentrou" and Prime Minister George Papandreou and King Constantinos. Prime Minister Papandreou wanted to replace the Minister of Defence Petros Garoufallias and the Chief of the Army Ioannis Genimatas with persons loyal to him because he believed that Garoufallias and Genimatas were displaying exceptionable submissiveness to the King. When King Constantinos refused to sign the relative decrees Papandreou resigned.

The governments that came to power after Papandreou's reassignment were ideologically biased and projected their willingness to subject the Cyprus Problem to NATO context and to remove it from the UN auspices.²³ So, they engaged in a series of meetings with the Turks in order to find a solution for the Cyprus problem. In December 1966 at Paris the Greek Foreign minister Ioannis Toumbas and his Turkish counterpart Ihsan Tsaklayiagil signed a memorandum²⁴ indicative of

the contrasting objectives of the two sides. The Turks demanded that the Zurich agreements should be preserved, otherwise a form of con-sovereignty between Turkey and Greece should be established. On the other side, the Greeks insisted in enosis after particular Greek concessions. The talks continued without any success until the Greek Colonels overthrew the Greek government, in April 1967.

The Greek Junta continued to flirt with the “Acheson Solution” and approached the Turks in order to “solve” the Cyprus Problem by giving the Turks promises for concessions. The Greek Prime Minister Kollias met with his Turk counterpart Suleiman Demirel on 9 September 1967 in the Turkish town Kesan and the next day in the Greek Town Alexandroupolis near Evros river.²⁵

The Greeks proposed to give Turkey a base under lease, and the establishment of a NATO base on the island in order for the Turks to consent with the solution of enosis. After hearing the Greek proposals Demirel was infuriated and underlined to the Greeks that the meeting should not have occurred since the talks were based on enosis. He also said that Greek insistence could provoke a Greco-Turkish war. The meeting was a landmark for the Cyprus Problem, because the Turks diagnosed Greek submissiveness. As Nikos Kranidiotis notes “The Evros Talks proved the distance between the two sides and showed that the Greek insistence for a solution through dialogue between Greece and Turkey was a big mistake.”²⁶

Regional and Local Developments intermix and The Abandonment of Enosis

At the regional level, the developments had profound impact on the regional balance of power. The “Six Days” War of 1967²⁷ and the defeat of Arab states by Israel polarized Middle East

relations further. After the war the two major powers, the USA and the USSR consolidated their presence in the area by supporting their respective protectorates. Cyprus as a geopolitical extension of the Middle East could not remain unaffected by the sub-systemic changes that were taking place in the region.

At the micro-level of the island a development which was very detrimental for the security of Cyprus occurred: The withdrawal of the Greek division that staged on the island in 1964. On 15 January 1967 clashes²⁸ erupted at Kofinou and Agios Theodoros villages, when the Turkish Cypriots opened fire against the Greek Cypriot police. After the incident the Cypriot National Guard led by General Georgios Grivas entered into Kofinou village, overpowered the Turks and occupied the villages. However, it was a Greek victory confined at the local level with wider implications. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Tsaklayiagil conveyed a diplomatic note to the American Ambassador in Ankara demanding the USA to allow Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. Turkey demanded also the withdrawal of the Greek army and General Grivas from Cyprus and the abrogation of the National Guard as well. At the same time, the Turkish Parliament authorized the Turkish Army depart for Cyprus.

The American President Lyndon Johnson, alarmed by the developments, sent Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to Athens and Ankara with the clear task to deter a Greco-Turkish war.²⁹ Vance threatened directly the Turks that in case they invaded Cyprus the USA would make a Greco-Turkish war destructive for both countries. Johnson made clear to Vance that he should make everything to stop the war.³⁰ The same thing did not happen in July 1974 when Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco, Undersecretary of State for political affairs, to Greece and Turkey in

order to stop Greece from resorting to war with Turkey, but not Turkey from intervening in Cyprus.

The Greek Junta consent to the Turkish demand and removed the Greek division. Makarios on the other hand did not consent to the abrogation of the National Guard. But which were the motives of Junta's action? According to one explanation, Junta regarded the division as an obstacle because it could draw Greece to war with Turkey and put the military's rule in danger. As Papadoulos had confessed "the Greek division could have become our grave".³¹ Furthermore, the Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis believed since 1964 that the Greek division should be withdrawn from the island because Greece could not provide air cover and that Bulgaria could exploit a Greco-Turkish war.³²

The Greek division was withdrawn on December of 1967. This development altered the power equilibrium in Cyprus: Turkish invasion could no longer be deterred and this situation helped Turkey to proceed with partition scheme. On 22 December 1967 the Turks created the "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Command". The developments compelled Makarios to inaugurate the "policy of feasible against the policy of desirable". That meant that the two sides should negotiate in order to reach a settlement based on independence and not enosis.

The Inter-Communal Talks and the Thorny Issue of Local Self-Administration

It's beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in detail the inter-communal talks³³ that took place between June 1968 and September 1971. However, we will deal with the contrasting goals of the

two communities and the regional environment within the talks evolved. The United States of America supported the inter-communal dialogue as they did with the Resolution 186 because of the lack of alternative solutions. The danger of a new crisis was imminent. The inter-communal talks constitute a crucial turning point for the Cyprus Problem because the Turkish side tried to capitalize the “benefits” that ensued from the limited de-facto partition that existed with the enclaves which were created in 1963. Therefore, during the talks it tried to institutionalize partition by vigorously demanding that the Greek side should accept the local autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot community. So, since the beginning of the talks Rauf Denktas surprised the Greek negotiator Glafkos Clerides by accepting all the thirteen points that Makarios proposed for revisal in 1963, but he demanded broad autonomy for his community as an exchange.³⁴ This proved to be the thorny issue that paralyzed the talks. While the Greek side accepted the idea of separated local authorities, their responsibilities being regulated by the parliament, the Turkish side demanded broad local autonomy provided by the Cypriot Constitution. Furthermore, it insisted on the establishment of a Central Command that would regulate the local authorities. According to the Greek side the Turkish demand was undermining the unity of the state and in corresponded to an effort of legalizing partition. As Archbishop Makarios put it “The Turkish Cypriots demand property title for their illegal edifice>>.”³⁵

The Inter-Communal Talks started again in June 1972 with the participation of two experts on constitutional matters from Greece and Turkey respectively, Michalis Dekleris and Orchan Alticansti. The issue of local autonomy continued to provoke major problems on the whole procedure. At the same time, Denktas, who was illegally elected president of the Turkish-Cypriot community, hardened his positions even more while he backed out from other agreed issues. More specifically he demanded the institutionalization of communal autonomy based on three

levels: The level of villages, the level of towns and the level of the community. Moreover, he demanded the establishment of separate police on communal base and a separate television and radio as well.

We must underline that the talks were evolving in a very difficult international and regional environment. The October War of 1973 between Israel and the Arabs and the subsequent strategies of Henry Kissinger gave the USA the total control of Middle East.³⁶ A result of this was the increase of US influence on the international affairs. Moreover, two other factors had particularly negative impact on the talks: Dictator Papadopoulos was ousted by the head of military police, Demitrios Ioannides, a regime hard-liner, while in Turkey Bulent Ecevit came to power. Ecevit gave the final blow to the talks when he stated that a federal solution should be applied. The destabilising foreign intervention, namely the Greek coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion, fatally undermined the territorial integrity of the island, which is divided thenceforth.

¹ As a foreign intervention I define every effort of a gGreat Power (hegemonic power) to intervene in the internal affairs of a minor state, in breach of the UN Charter article 2, in order to attain direct or indirect political benefit.

² For the origins of the security competition between the great powers and its consequences see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 2001).

³ Apart from the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance that were signed in Zurich in February of 1959, the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and his Turk Counterpart Adnan Menderes also signed a secret memorandum. It was a Gentlemen's Agreement that was not published along with the other agreements. It provided for the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO. However, according to the official Greek Cypriot view, this would be against Greek Cypriots' objective for the improvement of the Cyprus Constitution and for the attainment of Union (Enosis) with Greece in the long term. As Makarios's advisor, Nikos Kranidiotis, notes, the Cyprus Government did not concede to join NATO because Turkey's position in the Alliance was stronger than Greece's. So its aforementioned objectives could not be met. See, Nikos Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Polity: Cyprus 1960-1974* (Athens: Estia, 1985), 21-22.

⁴ According to other sources, the Republic of Cyprus tried to find out which the official American views were regarding Cyprus's accession to the Non-Aligned Movement. Therefore, Miltiadis Christodoulou, former Government's Spokesman, asked the first American Ambassador in Nicosia Frazer Wilkins about the American position. The ambassador pointed out that the USA did not want Cyprus to join NATO. As he added, Cyprus was a small country which had nothing to offer to the military aspect of the Coalition. Moreover, when Makarios visited Washington in June 1962 he asked President Kennedy's views on the issue. The American President praised Cyprus's accession to the Non-Aligned Movement, stressing that he shares Makarios's views regarding Cypriot foreign policy. See Miltiadis Christodoulou, *NATO in the Cold- War and the Post Cold War Era and Cyprus* (Nicosia: Proodos, 2000), 27-30.

⁵ For the Constitutional Crisis of 1963 and the views of the great powers involved (the USA and the UK) as regards the need for the amelioration of the Cyprus Constitution, see Sotiris Rizas, *Enosis, Partition, Independence: United Nations and Britain in Search for a Solution for the Cyprus Problem, 1963-1967* (Athens: Vivliorama, 2000), 21-40 – in Greek.

⁶ Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and the Undersecretary of State Ball, Washington, 25 January 1964, U.S Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968*.

⁷ For a very comprehensive analysis about the events and the positions of the actors during the conference see Stella Soulioti, *Fettered Independence: Cyprus 1878-1964* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006).

⁸ Regarding this issue and its correlation with the great powers' strategies in the field of international relations see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (Athens: Poiotita Publications, 2001), 266-269 –in Greek.

⁹ Brendan O' Malley, Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 94-101.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Martin Packard, *Getting it Wrong: Fragments From a Cyprus Diary 1964*, (Indiana: Milton Keynes-Author house 2008), 1.

¹² Costas Hajiargiris, "Daily Telegraph in favour of the partition of the Island with the pretext of a supposed disarmament of the irregulars", *Phileleftheros*, May 1964 –in Greek.

¹³ United Nations, Resolution 186 (1964), adopted by the Security Council at its 1102th meeting on 4 March 1964, available from, [www.un.int.Cyprus/resolut.htm](http://www.un.int/Cyprus/resolut.htm).

¹⁴ Soulioti, *Fettered Independence*, 463

¹⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Berkeley : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 93-101.

¹⁶ This term as regards the Cyprus Problem was first used by the late Greek Undersecretary of Greece for of Foreign Affairs, Giannos Kranidiotis. See Giannos Kranidiotis, *The Cyprus Problem 1960-1974* (Athens: Themelio, 1984) , 129-149 –in Greek.

¹⁷ Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, July 11, 1964, Document 83, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.

¹⁸ Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, July 20, 1964, Document 88, (FRUS).

¹⁹ Acheson admits in 22 August 1964 that despite his heroic efforts to find a solution based upon his plan, both sides rejected the Acheson proposals. Therefore he proposed to abandon the effort and try a new policy that

would prevent Cyprus from falling into the Soviet Orbit. Specifically, Acheson recommended a policy of supporting Greece in an effort to neutralize Soviet influence over Makarios. See Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, August 22, 1964, Document 138, (FRUS)

²⁰ Van Koufoudakis, "American Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Problem 1960-1991", in C. Yiallourides- P. Tsakonas, *Greece and Turkey: After the end of the Cold War*, (Athens: Sideris Publications, 1999), 448-452 –in Greek.

²¹ Report of the United Nations Mediator to The Secretary General, March 1965, available from, http://www.Cyprus-Conflict.net/galo_plaza_repot.html.

²² For the political turmoil in Greece which led to the fall of George Papandreou's Government, see Nicos Delipetros, *I Decided to Talk* (Athens: Estia, 1989), 117-122 -in Greek.

²³ Ploutis Servas, *The Cyprus Problem: Blames*, Volume C (Nicosia: Voyiatzis Publications, 1985), 15-27 –in Greek.

²⁴ Ibid 80-85.

²⁵ Kranidiotis, *Unfortified Polity: Cyprus 1960-197*, 443-450.

²⁶ Ibid, 449.

²⁷ For a very comprehensive analysis for the development of the crisis of 1967 see Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist- Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 302-347.

²⁸ For the Crisis and its development see Cyprus State Archives (CSA), FA2/184.

²⁹ Editorial Note(301), *Foreign Relations of the United States*, November 1967.

³⁰ Michalis Ignatiou, Costas Venizelos, *Kissinger's Secret Archives: The Decision for the Partition* (Athens: Livanis, 2002), 420-422 –in Greek.

³¹ Miltiadis Christodoulou, *Partition a Course without Stop* (Nicosia: Proodos, 1996), 101 in Greek.

³² Rizas, *Enosis, Partition, Independence: United Nations and Britain in search for a solution for the Cyprus Problem 1963-1967*, 229.

³³ For a comprehensive analysis of the Inter-communal talks see Michalis Dekleris, *The Cyprus Problem, The Last Chance 1972-1974* (Athens: Sideris Publications, 2003) –in Greek.

³⁴ Giannis Lambrou, *History of the Cyprus Problem: The Years after Independence* (Nicosia: Parga Publications, 2004), 209 –in Greek.

³⁵ Cyprus State Archive (CSA), FA2/90.

³⁶ For the October War and the American strategy see Nicos Panayiotides, *In Search of a State: The Palestinian Problem ant the Role of Great Powers for not being resolved* (Nicosia: Power Publishing, 2012), 141-161 –in Greek.